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Old January 13th, 2009, 11:18 PM
John Dudek John Dudek is offline
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Default Re: What if MacArthur goes on the offensive in the PI?

Quote:
Originally Posted by Devilsadvocate View Post
I understand that Clint, my remarks were directed at the author's of the site.

I base those remarks on the War Department document relative to Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare; HyperWar: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942 [US ARMY IN WORLD WAR II] The basic war plan which the Allies more or less adhered to throughout WW II was basically agreed to almost a year prior to Pearl Harbor. It was a comprehensive scheme for the prosecution of a global conflict, and as such, included the framework of the Pacific theater strategy. For that reason, Eisenhower's role in the establishment of Pacific strategy necessarily would have been limited to the details of implementing the aforementioned strategic plans.

MacArthur probably didn't have much "input" to the Rainbow 5 plan, at all. My understanding was that it was largely Admiral Stark, and I would assume, the staff of the Army-Navy planning Board who revamped War Plan Orange into the Rainbow series of war plans. MacArthur, as you correctly point out, was retired at that time and resident in the Philippines.

It would be very difficult to imagine, however, that MacArthur, upon being called back to Army service in July, 1941, would not have been familiarized with the overall current war plan for the Pacific theater, and the role the Philippines were to play. If nothing else, it would be incumbent upon any theater commander in that situation to inquire about such plans to make sure that he was current relative to what was expected of him.

You may very well be correct about Mac's unwillingness to accept the finality of the plans (WP 46). To be honest, it seems to me that the behavior of Marshall and Roosevelt in sending massive reinforcements and material to the Philippines just prior to the war had the unfortunate effect of introducing a strong element of confusion over exactly what the Administration's plans actually were with regard to the defense of the Philippines. So, I believe Mac did have some case for refusing to accept the verdict of Rainbow 5, that the Philippines were hopelessly indefensible.
Exactly! Given the degree of the massive amounts of money, modern military supplies, equipment and manpower that the Philippines received in the preceding year, how could MacArthur ever think otherwise? In the space of a single year, the Philippines received more US military aid and material than in all of the years since the First World War.

According to "American Caesar", MacArthur was utterly shocked beyond belief upon landing in Australia, after leaving the Philippines, only to be told that not a single US Army Combat Division or Regiment was currently in country. That's when he fully knew that the Philippines were truly doomed.