Quote:
Originally Posted by Devilsadvocate
MacArthur was partially to blame for the confusion over what US policy towards the Philippines should be. It's true that Roosevelt and Marshall poured aircraft, equipment, and material into reinforcing him in the Philippines in 1941, but that decision was based on two things. The first was the USAAC over selling the capabilities of the B-17 bomber, and it's ability to deter the Japanese by threatening long range bombardment of their Home Islands. The other reason was MacArthur's BS about how well trained were the Philippine troops for which he was responsible. He had assured Marshall he would have over 200,000 well trained, well equipped Philippine troops ready to contest any Japanese invasion. In fact, he didn't even have a small per centage of that number, and he certainly should have known it.
Furthermore, MacArthur's bungling defense of Luzon and inept handling of his airpower, was what convinced Roosevelt, here was no point in committing additional air, naval, or ground forces to his command. Rather than being "shocked" by there being no US troops in Australia, he should have been shocked that he wasn't ordered to undergo a court martial.
|
MacArthur was basing his military suppositions on the belief that there would be no war in the Pacific until after the monsoon season was finished, sometime after September, 1942. Given the amount of US money, men, supplies and material already in the pipeline, it's safe to say that MacArthur would have had 200,000 well trained, well equipped, Filippino Troops ready to contest any Japanese invasion by that time frame. Marshall assured MacArthur that he would have priority of all the things on his military shopping list, except 90mm anti aircraft guns, as they had not yet cleared their ordinance trials.
It takes time to build and train an army of that enormous size. Unfortunately, that was one commodity that MacArthur never had in his favor.