Quote:
Originally Posted by John Dudek
MacArthur gave the go-ahead to begin the complete mobilization of Filippino Troops on 1 September, 1941. Before that time, there were only plans and little else put forth towards a training program for the Philippine Army, mainly because there was no money forthcoming to finance the construction of military camps, barracks and etc. There was also little to no equipment available before this time to support and equip an expanded Filippino Army of 10 Divisions. At that time too, the only trained, reliable division available to MacArthur was the Philippine Division that consisted of over a third US servicemen.
I wouldn't be so tough on MacArthur. He did the best that he could with what he had at his disposal. I think his greatest failure was not being aggressive enough during the long, double retrograde manuver into Bataan after WPOIII was put into effect. A few major counterattacks utilizing his armor and combined arms could have thrown the Japanese off their game plan and forced them temporarily onto the defensive. That alone could have bought him some valuable time with which to stock Bataan full of munitions and food supplies.
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I will grant you that MacArthur had problems with funding for most of the time that he was supposed to be training the Philippine armed forces. The money was supposed to come from the Philippine Commonwealth, not the US. However, MacArthur surely was aware of the shortcomings of the Philippine Army troops which he had been responsible for training for the last five years. He should have, and almost certainly did, realize that there was no way he could produce 200,000 trained and equipped Philippine troops by April, 1942. To continually assure his superiors in Washington that he would do so, is nothing short of a deliberate deception.
Did MacArthur "do the best he could with what he had at his disposal"? The answer is a resounding, NO! MacArthur knew from at least the end of July, 1941, that his was the responsibility for carrying out the US defensive plan in the Philippines. This plan called for the fortification of the Bataan Peninsula and the stockpiling of supplies, munitions, medicine and food enough to last the defenders for at least six months. Had he started to perform this duty in the fall of 1941, there would have been more than enough time to accomplish everything he had been ordered to do. But MacArthur delayed until it was far too late to do anything other than to retreat into unprepared positions on Bataan with little or no supplies and provisions.
It's not as though the war came as any great surprise to MacArthur, or indeed anyone in the Philippines. He had received numerous war warnings from Washington, and from his own code breakers and intelligence people in the Philippines. MacArthur relied on his aircraft and the Navy's submarines to slow and damage the Japanese offensive, but he let his planes be destroyed on the ground in the first hours of the war, and clearly had no clue as to the limitations and requirements of the Navy's submarine force. In his arrogance, he discounted the fighting prowess of the Japanese. He also overestimated his own ability and military knowledge. MacArthur failed, and failed big time in the Philippines. He was extremely lucky that circumstances conspired to grant him a second chance.
Military History Online - MacArthur's Failures in the Philippines