Quote:
Originally Posted by Devilsadvocate
That's a good one!
I can't imagine anything more useless to Weaver than a book on tank doctrine by some German theoretician. He wasn't conducting a blitzkrieg on the plains of Europe where there were plenty of roads; he was confined to a small defensive position in the Philippines where roads were practically nonexistent. He didn't have air cover, artillery, well-trained infantry, resupply, engineers, unlimited fuel, or much of any other kind of support. More importantly, he didn't have the initiative, nor any real chance of seizing it. He was tied to the defensive position that MacArthur had been forced to defend, not because it was a good one, but because it was the only one available, and, on top of all that, he had to conserve his forces to cover MacArthur's tardy retreat into the Bataan peninsula.
Why is it that some think that what worked for the Germans for a short period in Europe would always work for everyone everywhere?
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Weaver also didn't innovate, change or adapt to a fluid battle situation either. He turned down requests for badly needed tank support on one occasion that I'm currently aware of and marked time during a second, key battle. Tank support in both battles could have played a pivotal role and made a serious difference in the battle's outcome and how long the Fil-American Forces could have delayed the Japanese advance towards Bataan. On the Layac Line, Weaver's tanks remained far removed from the action, marking time. Serious tank support that could have busted the Japanese line wide open had a few dozen tanks and some supporting 75mm armed half tracks been committed to battle. The same holds true at Abucay Hacienda when Weaver turned down General Parker's request for armored support, remarking that "It would have been like using elephants to kill ants." With five 30 caliber machineguns on each Stuart tank, Weaver could have killed alot of "ants." On both occasions, Weaver's greatest failing was that he failed to "ride towards the sound of the guns."
It is worthy of note that USMC Stuart tanks and infantry teams later performed very well against well-entrenched, Japanese troops on Munda and Bougainville and in much more hostile and thickly canopied jungle conditions than were to be found in this part of Luzon.