Quote:
Originally Posted by John Dudek
I should have said that there would have been 400 aircraft in the PI by March, 42, but as was further quoted: "Within a few months, this number would have been RAISED CONSIDERABLY." Hap Arnold said that "We must get every B-17 availiable to the Philippines as soon as possible."
"His statement was not an exaggeration. On the outbreak of war there were 913 U. S. Army aircraft scattered among the numerous overseas bases. This number of aircraft included 61 heavy, 157 medium, and 59 light bombers and 636 fighters. More than half of the total of heavy bombers and one sixth of the fighters were already in the Philippines.43 Within a few months this number would have been raised considerably." Added to this number were B-24 Liberators that were now coming off the assembly lines. These too were slated for duty in the far east.
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"Raised considerably" and "We must get every B-17 available to the Philippines as soon as possible." mean nothing in terms of real numbers. The Philippines were by no means the only deserving areas in line for reinforcement, and as far as aircraft were concerned much was dependent on production rates. After all, the "Europe First" policy was still in effect and both Britain and the US commands were giving much higher priorities to shipments to the Soviet Union. the other problem, of course, was that the aircraft themselves could fly to the Philippines, but ground echelons and maintenance equipment, vital to the continued
operation of those aircraft, required shipping which remained in critically short supply for more than two years after Pearl Harbor. It's extremely doubtful that, even had the supply routes remained open, there would have been a 1,000 modern combat aircraft in the Philippines by the end of 1942.
Your blanket condemnation of the fighting abilities of the Filippino troops is highly incorrect and defies logic. The largely untrained Filippino's fought very well at Abucay Hacienda, Layac Junction and a number of other places during the long double retrograde manuever onto the Bataan peninsula. Later they proved their worth during the Battle of the Points and throughout much of the campaign on Bataan, as they held most of the line there. As far as numbers go, IIRC, the final number was 137,000 men overall at MacArthur's command, because many of the divisions were never fully mobilized given the historical time frame.[/QUOTE]
I did not condemn the fighting abilities of the Filipino troops, please do not put words in my mouth. I said most were untrained and ill-equipped which is manifestly true. I specifically said very many of them performed heroically and courageously, which was also true, but they were no match for the Japanese troops they faced. If they had been, even with Mac's bumbling, the defense of the Philippines would have had a much different outcome. I do not believe MacArthur ever had 137,000 Filipino troops under his command in the Philippines. It's true that the mobilization of Filipino troops was never completed, but it's also true that many troops never showed up for mobilization, and many who did, couldn't be even partially equipped and many of these simply went back home.
Do you have any documentation concerning the four US divisions you claimed were slated for the Philippines? I remember something about Marshall offering MacArthur a National Guard division just before the war started, but Mac turned it down claiming he had enough troops; so I'm skeptical about the four additional divisions you mentioned.
Also the total of 44-45 submarines you claimed seems questionable. I'm aware that the Navy had no plans to send additional reinforcements to the Asiatic Fleet because it had been ordered to stand on the defensive in the Pacific and needed every ship and plane just to safe guard the Strategic Triangle and the supply routes to Australia.