Quote:
Originally Posted by syscom3
The NEI was the main prize. And the Japanese would have bypassed the PI if required. Unless the allies could resupply Mac from the sea, then he's on a tether or will slowly lose effectiveness due to logistics issues.
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The original Japanese Army plan for the "Strike South" scenario omitted the invasion of the Philippines, however, the Japanese Navy, pointed out that the Luzon Straits constituted a "choke point" through which shipments of oil from the NEI must pass to reach Japanese refineries. It would have been possible for the US to use it's possession of the Philippines to again cut off oil shipments to Japan, so the seizure of the Philippines was seen as necessary to exploit to capture of NEI oil resources.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Falcon Jun
....C. This relieves the pressure earlier for the Allies, forcing the higher commanders to reconsider sending reinforcements to the PI. Under the original plan, the US Navy would escort the reinforcements but the hit on Battleship Row "crippled" the Pacific Fleet. But since it's seen that the PI garrison is delivering good results, then it wouldn't be a case anymore of reinforcing defeat.
If that happens, Mac would've the fresh troops and supplies to strike back.
My scenario, admittedly, plays fast and loose with historical facts because it's the only way I can think of for conducting a sustained general offensive. Bottomline, at least for me, without those reinforcements and reconnection to a supply base, the PI garrison couldn't mount a general offensive.
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The only problem with this reasoning is it ignores the fact that, for the US, the Philippines were far down on it's list of strategic priorities in early 1942. The strategic war plans of the US had always assumed that there was a fair chance that the Philippines would be captured by Japan and that a campaign would have to be fought to recapture them at some point. The world situation as it developed in 1940-41, simply reinforced this concept, and it was almost a pre-conceived notion for US planning staffs, by then that the Philippines could not be saved.
The most likely reaction to any perceived success in delaying the Japanese capture of the Philippines would not have been the reinforcement of this temporary success, but to use the time bought for the creation of some defensive line further south which would have had a more realistic chance of stopping the Japanese advance short of the NEI oil resources. If I remember correctly, this possibility was even discussed hypothetically by US war planners, and it was Eisenhower who recommended such a strategy, if it became feasible.