Her top speed before battle damage was 24 knots. In reacing that speed, she had to pass a critical vibration speed that probably helped knock out her forward turret.

I also believe the British will not just shadow, the memory of Goeben and Admiral Troubridge is too strong, give the Graf Spee some luck like a conveniently placed rain squall and she's gone and catching up with her again is iffy at best. If the Germans disable Cumberland without running out of 11" ammo the nearly out of ammo light cruisers would be very badly outgunned if they chose to follow, not very good odds for Langsdorf but not hopeless either.
IMO the Cumberland is not a significantly more powerful opponent than Exeter, despite the 1935-37 refit that gave her a very thin 4 1/2" thick armoured belt and brought her to 10,800 tonns her overall protection is worse than the smaller ship's that was built with one, her 2" turret armour (identical to Exeter) is practically useless against 11" and probably not enough even against Graf Spee 5.9" secondaries. IMO the best 8" cruisers the RN had were the Exeter, York and the totally reworked London.

The floatplanes far from guarantee the British will be able to regain contact if lost, Ajax had two Fairey Fox at the beginnig of the battle that has around 400 miles range and 3 hours endurance, Cumberland may possibly have the slower Supermarine Walrus thet has better range (600m) and endurance, but it's still not much to mount a search, the time spent launching and recovering planes is going to nearly nullify the 5 to 6 knots speed advantage of the British squadron (I give Graf Spee around 24 knots but Cumberland could not do much above 30 after the refit had increased her displacement by around 10%).

Different situation.

The Goeben was not heavily damaged and Troubridge's ships had much less chance to stop her than Harwood's did of either stopping or shadowing the GRaf Spee. Don't forget how GS had become badly damaged.

It will take a lot more than a rain squall to enable the GS to break contact with three faster cruisers, especially when they can launch aircraft to fly around the squall.

It would take a miracle for the GS to disable all three British cruisers without running out of ammunition for her 11" guns. Just disabling Cumberland alone is going to be next to impossible with her damaged FC and lack of ammo, but that doesn't do her any good, because the Achilles and Ajax still have torpedoes which can take out the GS if she no longer has main battery ammo. Also, in the process of fighting Cumberland, GS is very likely to take additional damage which further degrades her chances

Maybe, but the Cumberland does have more firepower than the Exeter, and most significantly, is completely undamaged and carries a full load out of ammo. She also carries aircraft which can be launched to spot the fall of shot, which gives the British another advantage. In any gunfight with the damaged GS with it's low ammo status, she is likely to inflict significant further damage before being disabled by GS. That lowers the odds for GS close to the vanaishing point, especially with two other British cruisers still in the fight.

The float planes on the British cruisers won't have to use their entire range range to re-establish contact with the GS. That's because she isn't going to be steaming in a random direction; she has only one way to go with any hope of success and that's directly away form the British. That means they can predict her course if they lose sight of her. And she will have only a few hours, at best, to put distance between her and the cruisers, so the search planes will have only to search 100 miles or so in a single direction.

And no, recovering float planes won't take more than a few minutes each, and each cruiser can do it independently, while the other two cruisers maintain contact. One of the British CL's launched and recovered it's float plane during the initial pursuit while the other kept the GS in sight, which proves the concept.

It's obvious the GS is history if she tries to run, and history if she tries to fight. Either way, the odds are overwhelmingly against her getting back to a friendly port, which would be the only justification for either course. Langsdorff made the right decision, the ONLY logical decision, in choosing to preserve the lives of his crew.

It's even worse than that. The gunhouse has only 25mm, which is barely adequate against 28cm splinters.

Eek! Strongly disagree. York and Exeter were what you'd expect from a heavy cruiser squeezed into a dwarfish displacement.

It really depends from whether the British think of Graf Spee as a battleship or a cruiser. Doctrine was to shadow battleships Suffolk/Bismark, Belfast/Sharnhorst but engage cruisers with cruisers.
BTW Goeben, while undamaged, was a couple of knots short of her design speed during the famous chase, coal fired ships definetly could not keep top speed for protracted periods, the vibrations damage and strokers exhaustion practically guaranteed that, oil firing solved the strokers problem but I suspect the vibrations were still there, if ships engage in a stern chase at top speed I suspect they may all run out of anmmo before hitting a thing.

Exeter was one of the hardest fighting cruisers the RN had, she was involved in 3 battles against equivalent or superior forces and performed creditably in all of them.
Practically none of the County class ever fought a drawn out engagement against an equivalent force, Atlantis was no match for a heavy cruiser however poor. I suspect there is a reason none were committed to the Med after Berwick's non stellar performace at Capo Teulada while York was untill her loss, The Italians had a strong 8" squadron that outranged the British six inch ships so why no British 8" ? the County were great steamers, reasonably confortable ships for the time, and ideal for shipping protection but really didn't belong in a battleline.
IMO the treaty cruisers were horrible designs, the best ones that were actually below the 10.000 tonns limit (and there are very few of those if you look hard enough) are the ones with six guns (Exeter and Furutaka).

I do like the Furutakas, and I think they make a useful contrast to Exeter, whose service record leaves me unimpressed. I have no big complaints about her performance against Graf Spee, though a few more 8in hits would have been nice. I'm uncertain how her two engagements with the Japanese can be seen as creditable. She scored no hits in either. In the first one, she received a single hit that knocked out half her machinery; in the second one, she received a single hit that knocked out the other half. Then she sat there playing target. I would agree there's a reason behind the way the Counties were deployed, but we don't know what it is or if it has anything to do with deficiencies. I rate Norfolk's battle record above Exeter's--two engagements against battleships, striking critical blows in both cases.

The comments above, which you responded to with this post were not Richard Worth's but mine, just to set the record straight. I know Richard doesn't like to have someone elses words attributed to him.

British doctrine, like doctrine in other navies, is not some unbreakable rule, but merely a guideline as to how operations should be conducted. If Harwood felt it better to shadow the GS, that's what he would do. If he was in doubt as to the best course Royal Navy tradition was to act aggressively, and most likely, in that case, he would attack. Either way, the odds are clearly with the British cruisers; the GS is very likely to run out of main battery ammunition before disabling any of her pursuers, and then it is all over for her. As for vibration problems, Richard mentioned that GS had a vibration problem somewhere below it's top speed of 24 knots. Presumably, that would present a problem for GS's damaged main battery FC, unless Langsdorff chose to run at top speed.

Your opinions about Treaty cruisers notwithstanding, the Cumberland had 25% more 8" guns than Exeter which gives her a better chance of inflicting damage on GS. Considering that Exeter had damaged GS to a considerable extent in the initial battle, this does not bode well for the GS. Langsdorff will still have to decide whether to split his fire. If he does, he has little hope of seriously damaging any of the British cruisers; if he doesn't, and concentrates on the Cumberland, the Ajax and Achilles will be free to launch torpedo attacks on the GS. The side which better husbands it's munitions will likely win. Achilles and Ajax are low on ammo except for torpedoes, but Cumberland has a full load of both, and GS has too many targets which it must disable.

If they begin with something like "Four score and seven," or perhaps "Maybe I'm the one who's a schizophrenic psycho, yeah," then I will gladly accept credit and all attendent royalties.

Sorry for the quotes mixup,

RN tradition has always been aggressive (No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy. - Admiral Horatio Nelson).

So I think we can agree that Langsdorf's chances if battle was resumed were a lot worse than in the initial fight but not completely hopeless, he probably lost his best chance by putting into Montevideo, just getting back to his position after the first battle would require disabling Cumberland with no additonal damage (not likely).
As to scuttling being the right decisions looking at somewhat similarly hopeless situations in the age of steam the surviving Russians ships at Port Arthur scuttled while the Spannish fleet at Havana came out to be destroyed and both decisions generated a lot less controversy than Langsdorf's.

BTW I would describe Norfolk's opponents more as floating wrecks than warships.

I have occasionaly suggested that Scharnhorst was a hunk of junk.

And that's before she recieved any combat damage, correct?

Yeah. The worst battleship design of her generation. The hit from Norfolk was the first substantial damage she took at that battle.

Something of interest:
F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log
1 - 15 December 1939
PG30253


"Graf Spee" is damaged and has put into Montevideo after her action in the South Atlantic. Naval War Staff has asked B.d.U. what support U-boats could give the pocket battleship off the mouth of the La Plata. I have assured Naval War Staff that I will do all I can and I am determined to try everything possible, in spite of the great difficulties which an operation of this kind with U-boats involves.
2 U-boats (U 44 and U 46) can be got ready in time to reach the La Plata at the beginning of February. The operation depends mainly on the question of supply. It will be necessary to refuel on the way out, on the way back and in the operations area. Naval War Staff promises supplies in the Canaries and off the La Plata from "Altmark". This means that the operation can be attempted. It means going into the Tropics and there is no experience of U-boats in these areas. Preparations must be made accordingly.
Special attention will have to be paid to victualling supplies, clothing and medical matters in view of the changes of climate, high temperatures and strong sun. Torpedo pistols, electric torpedo batteries and ammunition are also likely to be effected. The necessary steps are being taken immediately.
(signed): Dönitz
Rear Admiral and B.d.U.

The U-boat operation in support of "Graf Spee" has been cancelled. Apparently political considerations make it necessary to decide the pocket battleship's fate sooner.


Had KM included U Boats to be positioned with operations...even that far south and in the Indian ocean,
there presence in such scenario's could effect a more favorable outcome for KM operations.
The KM supply ships in the south atlantic support the premise that the U boats could be supplied aswell.
so...its a form of synergy.
something I am seeing a lack of in my KM studies of the war in this early period.

One U Boat could have helped Graf Spee break out,
had it torpedo'd HMS Cumberland,
and....as other posters coment,....RN might only desire to shadow Graf Spee and wait for heavies to arrive,
a U Boat or more in the area could break up the RN's ability to effectively shadow Graf Spee.

shift:
Although several posters here disagree with my views on Graf Spee breaking out,
I am still of the opinion that the imagery left of Graf Spee burning and then a charred hulk emboldened the RN and hurt Germany's national pride.
Graf Spee sinking at sea in the night had the RN acheived that,...
would have deprived them of their image trophy.


Media/propoganda was important to Germany's war effort.

Yeah, but in the end, it was just propaganda.

Was it worth potentially 1,000 dead young men to keep a few negative pictures out of the newspapers?

I don't think so.

The idea of using U-boats in the South Atlantic was nothing more than a fantasy at this point in the war. The two U-boats mentioned (U-44 and U-46), were Type VIIB's with a range of only 6,500 miles at 12 knots. They couldn't even get to the area until the beginning of February and the GS was in trouble in Montevideo in the middle of December. They would have had to refuel on the way out, and again on the way back in an area that was being heavily patrolled by both the RN and USN (neutrality patrols); not a safe thing to do.

Prepositioning them just on the off chance they may have been needed would have been a real waste of resources at a time when Donitz was struggling to keep even a handful of U-boats at sea in the North Atlantic where the convoys were concentrated. They really didn't have much chance of torpedoing British warships which generally moved too fast for subs to get off anything more than an occasional lucky shot. The idea of creating "synergy" by having surface units operate with subs sounds good, but has to be balanced against the German Naval War Staff's tendency of disregarding Donitz's efforts to concentrate his subs where they were likely to encounter convoys, in favor of the perceived (but impractical) advantages of cooperation between submersibles and surface units.

Very interesting document, thanks Tiornu.
I agree that given the subs limited speed getting one to Montevideo in time to do any good is not realistic. The unknown behaviour of the torpedoes may make the whole effort pointless anyway but it's interesting to see the issue of torpedo reliability in "untested waters" was raised long before the failures in the Norwegian campaign!!!
IMO the subs and warships sinergy was a lot more real than you give it credit for, there were historically a number of replenishment operations of U-Boats by the pre-positioned supply ships or the auxilliary cruisers before the Type XIV "milk cow" supply subs were built and for a "special operation" this sort of maximum effort could be justified.
I'm curious about your mention of US neutrality patrols, attacking a warship going about her business on the high sea looks very much an act of war to me.

Another quote from:
http://www.bobhenneman.info/bhbrp.htm
As for sub/surface ship cooperation the only time it really worked that I'm aware of the subs had a lot of time to get in position. I'm thinking in particular of the US use of subs as scouts and rescue ships for pilots. The Japanese attempted to use them at Midway and the failure of that component was one of the nails in the coffin.

There is only one of me.
I am always skeptical of claims for coordination between surface and submarine units. It seems to work only in the most general sense. It's hard to imagine the attempt justifying itself in GS's case. How much patrol time does the submarine lose in getting to its station? And then, exactly what is it supposed to do? Chase down the high-speed targets? If sinking major warships were so easy, it would not have happened so infrequently.

If memory serves me,.....Germany Invaded...Germany aggressed,...
Germany was pre-emptive [Channel attacks/Battle of Britain]

Germany is obviously not concerned about reprocusions...seeing that it is torpedo-ing flagged shipping on world oceans.

Hitler may have changed his geo strategic views later on....hoping to sue for a peace settlement....and possibly have a 1 front war with Russia.

at this early period of the war [Graf Spee].....Germany is making robust
moves as per the U boat attacks....which will occur even in broad daylight
off U.S. east coast...with U Boats deck gunning their victims.

The KM sub report/timeline submited above.......tells me that Donitz is favorable to helping Graf Spee.

again....this is a hypothetical thread,
other posters have comented that Graf Spee could have escaped the RN
via gunnery,....distance seperation due to rain squalls,
My recent add on...that a U boat or U Boats could have assisted,..if not turned the situational tide in Graf Spee's favor.

I believe these forwards are reasonable,
citing Graf Spee's certain doom and the death of 1000 men is biased closure.

If Graf Spee can jury rig ...what is it,....a fuel cleaning system for its engine plant,
ya...if they can bodge that and get to a local where some time permits proper repair,[possible ammo resupply]
that Ship lives another day to fight and make history.

My above introduction of the KM sub/situation readyness report was to support the premise that a U boat or U boats could assist...or actually turn the entrapment situation of Graf Spee [again....this is a hypothetical thread]

I agree that RN ships can move away from sub targeting advantage,
distance themselves so as to negate the subs ability to even match them in shadowing....as they themselves attempt to shadow Graf Spee [should she have successfully broken out].
The introduction to me is reasonable...and like battles in history,
turn of events can occur from surprises.
Imagine what the RN is going to do if HMS Cumberland gets hits with no report of subs in vicinity,...and say....her aft magazines let go,
the RN group...[with allready crippled ships] is not going to reasonably leave HMS Cumberland to burn and sink....as they all race to chase/shadow Graf Spee.
In my seperate thread on Acoustic torpedo,......HMCS Magog has her entire stern blown off [some 60ft].....HMCS Toronto who had drawn near to send a medical officer in a motor boat,.....herself just escaped a torpedo fired at her [ by Kneip U -1223/unless there was another U boat present]
HMCS Toronto had to break off her tow of disabled HMCS Magog to attack the U Boat.


St. Croix was the first escort to be sunk, taking three hits in the stern on the 20th. HMS Polyanthus (K47) was sunk as she came up to screen HMS Itchen's rescue operations. Itchen (K227), forced to retire that evening, returned the next morning and picked up 81 survivors from St. Croix and one from Polyanthus. The following day, 22 September, Itchen herself was torpedoed. Three men were rescued, two from Itchen, one from St. Croix.
[wiki excerpt]

as per above info.....3 warships are sunk by U boats.

I agree that KM are at a disadvantage as per time cycle [in realtime...not hypothetical] as too support of Graf Spee.

this is why introduced the notion of pre staging and operation synergy between service combatants of KM and supply.

Langdorf was clearly an old school officer who cared about seamen as well his duty. Note that he encountered a British ship on the way into port. He ordered them to stop and abandon ship as he would sink them. They stopped but didn't abandon ship and he refrained from sinking them (he really didn't have the time to encourage them). In some ways he was much more suited to being a warship commander in an earlier age.

U-126 did not save Atlantis so it's far from certain that U-44 and U-46 could save Graf Spee assuming they got there in the first place.
Still a squadron engaged in close blockade far from it's bases and close to a neutral shore is horribly vulnerable to subs, the main defence of warships against subs is steaming out of range before the sub can get a good firing solution and ships that have to stay within a few miles of a port can't do that.
IMO Prepositiong subs in case a raider needed support would have been a waste of resources, getting some there after the battle was within the KM's capability but to be any use would have rerquired the political negotiations to go very differently from how they did historically.

Is there a point to any of the above? What does it have to do with Graf Spee's chances in December, 1939? You'll have to be more specific in explaining what you are trying to establish here.

Sure, why wouldn't he be; he was, after all, part of the same navy. But it's obvious, he also clearly realized that there wasn't anything his subs could do to help the GS.

Biased closure??

Possibly, but biased in favor of reality. Of course, weird and improbable things happen in war, but Langsdorff and his superiors had to make their decisions based on the things that were likely to happen, not some wild possibilities that theoretically could happen, but had such a low probability that nobody believed they actually would happen. Prayers for rain squalls, U-boats that can't reach the area for at least a month, miraculous gunnery with the main FC system destroyed...it's all great to speculate on, but Langsdorff had to face reality and decide what to do based on the hard facts; these were not in favor of GS surviving and Langsdorff knew it.

If...maybe...perhaps.... You think Langsdorff and his officers didn't think about the possibilities? That's short changing them quite a bit. It doesn't sound like you have ever had to make a decision where the lives of a lot of men, maybe a 1,000 or more, were in the balance. I know it doesn't sound glorious to you, but that would count for a lot to most men, as it did to Langsdorff.

The only problem with your speculation about the British squadron being vulnerable to subs, is that the subs actually have to be in the same ocean as the British cruisers.

In any case, German subs wouldn't be able to operate in the River Plate estuary where the British cruisers were. The estuary was 139 miles wide, but full of shifting sandbars, and only 30 to 60 feet deep. The British cruisers would be virtually immune to subs until the chase began and then the subs would have only a fleeting chance, if they were exceedingly lucky, to fire at the cruisers. A hit under those circumstances is about as lkely as that fortuitous rain squall.

That's why I said the negotiations would need to go differrently, it would take over a month for the subs to get there, my point was only that the Donitz's memo was based on a real capability.
You have a point here, I didn't have a map of the local sea bed so I was assuming the subs would have the depth to dive if spotted and so could attack the patrolling ships before the Graf Spee attempted to breakout. If they have to wait until the actual breakout we will probably get a repetition (actually anticipation) of the U-126/Atlantis/Devonshire episode tough if comunications between the subs and Graf Spee can be established we may have the GS leading her pursuer into an ambush, still only one shot, and at a 25+ knots target, but a good one.

EDIT: Thinking of Donitz made me remember I had a copy of Reader's memoirs so I looked it up. The story he reports is that the Graf Spee was not fully seawothy, Hitler was pushing for a breakout while Reader decided to let Langsdorf, as the commander on the spot, decide and one deciding factor was the possibility the ship would not sink in the shalloww waters of the estuary and so would be captured. Had I read that before I would have known about the operating conditions for subs. Hitler was unhappy about the decision as he would have preferred a fight to the death (why am I not surprised?).

Actually, whether any notional German subs would have a "good" shot, or indeed, any shot at all, at the British cruisers depends on two things.

The first is the ability of the GS to communicate with the subs as to it's exact time of departure, course, speed, and the likely disposition of the British cruisers. This could probably be worked out through the German naval command, but I remain skeptical that the GS would be able to communicate directly with the subs about any possible last minute changes which might affect the GS's position as she crosses the twenty fathom curve, which was generally held to define minimum safe operating depth for a sub.

The other requirement would be absolutely precise navigation on the part of both the GS and the subs. If either were out of position by as much as 1,000 yards, it could mean the subs would be denied any possibility of hitting the British cruisers. In the Pacific, the US experience with setting up submarine "ambushes" through ULTRA messages was that the navigation issue often ruined what would have otherwise been "perfect" attacks. This, I think, would be the major problem for the German subs attempting to ambush the British cruisers, as the speed issue would mean they would have one chance and one chance only.

Of course, it also has to be considered that there are only two subs and three cruisers; it's unlikely that the subs would be able to sink or cripple all three cruisers, so the survivor(s) would be able to fall back on a plan to simply shadow the GS until additional British forces arrive.

Overall, given the historical experience of all navies in trying to closely coordinate the activities of subs and surface units in WW II, I would say that any German subs on the scene in December, 1939, might have perhaps a 10% chance of inflicting decisive damage on the British cruisers.