For an insight into what Pat Dyas's comrades thought of his lone duel with Wittmann read pages 14,15,16 and 17 here:
http://www.sharpshooters.org.uk/Downloads/2002.pdf
Here for those who want it now!
Subject: Re: Books on Wittmann
By far the best and most accurate book about the events is
Villers-Bocage through the lens by Daniel Taylor published in
1999. This book contains plans and also timings of each stage.
Carpiquet Bound by W.D.Allen & R. F. H. Cawston published
in 1997 does have limited information about Villers-Bocage
but also covers the period 1939-1944.
Villers-Bocage Tigres au Combat by Henri Marie, Georges,
Jean-Pierre Benamou and Laurent Mari includes photographs
of the town in its original state.
Sharpshooters Newsletters various accounts.
My reason for writing this
I have always had misgivings about the events that occurred
during those fateful days in June and since then, so much has
been written about the battle, often in my view inaccurate, so
I decided to remain silent.
I had however written a description about Normandy in
late 1944 when I was in hospital and this, after editing, was
produced in printed form in 1995. I had excluded any details
that could, to my way of thinking, be very critical of anyone at
Villers-Bocage.
The Regiment moved off at 0500 hrs 13 June on a dry clear
morning with A Sqn leading followed by A Company (Coy) 1
Rifle Brigade (RB), half the Recce, RHQ (four Cromwells), the
other half of the Recce, B Sqn, C Sqn and 1/7 Battalion (Bn)
Queens Regiment (Lorried Infantry), also a Battery of 25pdr.
field guns of 5RHA (moving independently).
Due to the terrain,the column was in line ahead along lanes
and roads, but any recce to the flanks was difficult. The
bocage consisted of narrow lanes, often sunken, hedgerows,
ditches, small fields and very wooded in parts.
The Breakthrough was completely unopposed and the
Advance continued along a narrow road to Amaye-sur-Seulles,
over three miles from Livry. The Brigade Commander
(Brigadier “Loony” Hinde) was continually urging the CO to
move the column at a faster rate which the CO did try to do
but he was a very experienced and vigilent commander,
particularly in a situation like this.
The Advance then continued on to Villers-Bocage and A Sqn
went up a narrow lane into the town where they were met by
some French townsfolk who said that Germans were in the
town. Major Peter Scott, OC A Sqn, who was a very
experienced officer, said that he was very uneasy about
entering the town but he was told to push on through Villers-
Bocage and towards the Objective. The front of the column
had now come over five miles.
RHQ at this stage was halted on a forward slope short of
the town and I was sitting in the scout car scouring the
surrounding countryside with my field glasses, as I had been
doing most of the time. Then I located an enemy eightwheeled
armoured car half hidden in an orchard on a slope
facing us, about 600 yards away, and watching the column.
I had been following the Cromwell tank of the Regimental
Second-in-Command (2 I/C) and I shouted to Major Arthur
Carr in the tank to knock it out and pointed.The turret inside
of the tank was jammed with kit and the turret could not be
traversed so nothing happened.
The Regiment was on one net and we were all on Wireless
Silence, except A Sqn and the CO, with this silence only to be
broken in dire necessity or enemy spotted. I knew that this was
serious so I then came up on the air to the RHQ troop leader
who was behind me, also in a Cromwell, giving the location.
Nothing happened so I climbed onto Major Carr’s tank in front
and stood on the engine, but the turret was still jammed.
I watched the armoured car again through my field glasses
and I had a strange feeling that the commander was also
watching me.Then the armoured car slowly turned round and
went up the hill out of sight amongst the trees in the orchard.
I was absolutely amazed that the armoured car had not
been spotted before, but even worse, no one fired at it at any
time, as it was an easy target.The lack of any response set me
thinking about the position we were in and the fact that
nobody seemed to be aware of risks of attack.Armoured cars
have excellent crews and I was sure that the commander had
been reporting all our movements.
Villers-Bocage
RHQ went on up the hill into the west end of the town and
continued along the Rue Pasteur, passing the Mairie on our
right, and after a slight bend to the left, halted just short of the
east end of the town.We had come about half a mile and we
were on the main road to Caen.A Sqn were a mile ahead on
Point 213 (see Sketch Map).
The Brigade Commander (Bde Cmdr) came up in his scout
car and he and our CO talked for a while in the road.The Bde
Cmdr then went back and the CO got into his scout car, going
forward to A Sqn.
I was in my scout car looking all round for enemy infantry,
as I felt sure we would be attacked,but others in RHQ seemed
very relaxed, even dismounting and walking around. At one
stage even Major Arthur Carr got out of his tank which I
thought a risky action as he was now in a position of
command,should anything happen to the CO, but he got back
in his tank shortly afterwards.
Looking ahead past Major Carr’s Cromwell, I could see the
light tank at the back of the front half of the Recce (Lt Rex
Ingram) about 200 yards away and I did hear some spasmodic
firing ahead.
Firing went on ahead and the next thing I knew was that
the light tank of Lt. Rex Ingram exploded in a huge sheet of
flame followed by billowing black smoke.
Attack on RHQ about 0900 hrs
Almost immediately a Tiger tank appeared in the road in front,
maybe some 50 yards away, coming slowly towards RHQ. I
looked round rapidly as I thought there would be enemy
infantry as well but in fact none appeared.
Almost at the same time, A Sqn was coming under attack
and suddenly the net was completely crowded with traffic.
Major Carr in front of me ordered his Cromwell driver to
pull over to the right against a stone wall and when I looked
behind, there seemed to be confusion with no commands
from the RHQ Troop Leader in his Cromwell behind me, nor
from anyone else.
The tanks in RHQ troop then moved to the right following
Major Carr’s actions. Some tried to reverse but I knew that the
Cromwell in reverse was very slow.There was a lot of firing
ahead and smoke everywhere as the smoke bombs fired by
the RHQ Troop Leader fell behind the Tiger.
I was now left with the scout car facing the Tiger, trying to
work out the best thing to do, as I certainly was not going up
against a wall to be picked off at leisure, also I wanted to avoid
capture if possible.
The Tiger tank, of course, could not be penetrated through
the front by a Cromwell and was doubtful in the sides or
back, but it would be worth having a try and there was always
a chance of hitting the tracks. However, I did not think that
anyone in RHQ would be capable enough although there was
time to have a go, as the Tiger could not knock all the tanks
out immediately.
The Tiger halted and traversed the gun to my right to fire at
Major Carr’s Cromwell, so with no orders coming out of RHQ,
I felt that I was free to act as I considered best. Suddenly I
made up my mind to go back to B Sqn and try to find a Firefly.
I told my driver that once the Tiger fired we would turn
round and go back as the Tiger would have to reload before
firing again, thus giving us some space.
The Tiger fired and knocked out Major Carr’s tank which
caught fire.The flash from the 88 mm gun was terrific with a
very loud bang then the Tiger started forward again coming
closer.
My driver very calmly turned the scout car round and
started back down the road to B Sqn I must say that the Tiger
was uncomfortably close when we turned round.
Driving back to B Sqn
There was still no time to relax and we went round the slight
corner where I saw Captain John Philip-Smith, a most
experienced and capable officer, with the other half of the
Recce and, as may be expected with John, the Recce vehicles
were deployed in good positions.
I told him briefly about RHQ and the Tiger coming his
way. He said that he had feared being attacked and said that
he would move the Recce vehicles, as they would have no
hope against a Tiger. The Tiger then came round the bend
and I shot off down the road to B Sqn which I had thought
that I should have found with or just behind the Recce.
However I was wrong, so I concluded that they must be a
little further back.
The long road stretched ahead and I went on and on past
the Mairie,now on my left but I could not see B Sqn.The road
was absolutely empty and silent, no people, no vehicles and I
had a curious feeling of utter loneliness, thinking that I had
made an appalling mistake. I had kept trying to get on the air
to B Sqn HQ to alert the Squadron Leader about RHQ and the
Tiger but the air was still jammed as A Sqn was continually
under heavy attack.
15
Arrival at B Sqn
At last I saw a B Sqn tank at the very bottom of the town on
its own and much further back than I ever expected. It was a
Firefly commanded by Sergeant Lockwood who I knew. He
was a very capable senior NCO.
His tank was well sighted and I told him about RHQ and the
Tiger coming towards him. He told me where B Sqn HQ was
and I set off, finding it easily from his directions.This was the
first piece of luck that I had and answered my problem of
finding a Firefly.
After I had left, Sergeant Lockwood moved his tank forward
some 100 yards and engaged the Tiger. He was the first to
tackle the Tiger with a chance of damaging it, and in fact the
Tiger eventually turned round and retreated back towards
what was left of RHQ.
I realised now as I approached B Sqn HQ that, in my view,
there was no adequate Regimental control nor any rear link to
Brigade, also I was completely puzzled that B Sqn did not
appear to be fully deployed. It seemed to me that the Tiger,
apart from Sergeant Lockwood, would have had no
opposition all the way to the bottom of the town.
B. Sqn. HQ
When I arrived at B Sqn HQ I saw Major I.B. (Ibby) Aird (OC
B Sqn) sitting in the turret of his Cromwell looking quite
complacent so I climbed on his tank and saluted him. I told
him about RHQ, the Tiger tank and that I had seen Sergeant
Lockwood. He did not acknowledge me nor did he say
anything.
I stood there, then I told him about the attack on A Sqn but
he must already have known about that. I then said that he
must alert his Sqn, as there was nothing between him and A
Sqn, some 11/2 miles away. I also offered to alert his Sqn for
him on my wireless, but he said absolutely nothing, giving me
no response in any way. I was absolutely at my wits’ end.
Then, out of the blue, Major Peter McColl, (OC C Sqn),
appeared and wanted to know what the hold up was as the
back of B Sqn and also C Sqn, were blocking the road into
Villers-Bocage so the Queens Battalion could not get through
into the town.
I jumped down from Major Aird’s tank and told Peter
McColl what I had said to Ibby Aird and explained that I could
get no response from Ibby. Peter, in no uncertain terms, told
Ibby Aird to alert and deploy B Sqn and move them off the
road.
To my surprise, Ibby Aird did take action and then Peter and
I had a long talk about the situation, discussing such matters
as Regimental control, and setting up a new wireless rear link
to Brigade as the existing rear link in RHQ had been destroyed
by the Tiger tank in the attack on RHQ.
With the Temporary RHQ
A temporary RHQ was immediately set up for B and C Sqns,
together with the remaining half of the Recce, under Major
Ibby Aird as acting CO (he was senior to Peter) and Major
Peter McColl as acting 2 1/C. I remained with this RHQ
carrying out various duties, as we were so thin on the
ground. I also spent a lot of time listening on the wireless. It
was of course Peter McColl who set up the new RHQ and he
made many of the decisions. He was always a most inspiring
officer and it was his ability and enthusiasm that reestablished
Regimental Control, not that he was given any
credit for it.
It was now becoming apparent that A Sqn was in serious
trouble and then Tactical Bde HQ informed Temporary RHQ
that B Sqn should try to break through to A Sqn. I could not
see how this was possible due to the distance as they were
well over a mile apart with the enemy in between and now in
the town in strength.
However, it was certainly correct to have a try and the four
troops in B Sqn put up a wonderful show, as did the Queens,
knocking out a number of German tanks in the town,
including Tigers, but eventually, the task proved too difficult.
Sometime in the late afternoon Capt Pat Dyas, who was in
a Cromwell in RHQ, appeared on his own on foot having
worked his way back from RHQ via John Philip-Smith and the
Recce. Pat gave a complete run down to Ibby Aird about the
attack on RHQ and all he had done. Ibby installed Pat as
Adjutant at the Temporary RHQ.
The Queens Bn was now in the town but gradually the
Germans obtained control of the east end of the town. B Sqn
and C Sqn, with the Queens, continued to hold the west side,
but eventually orders were given about 1700 hrs on 13 June
to withdraw, and this was completed by 2030hrs.
Resulting from this, the CO, the remaining elements of A
Sqn,A Coy 1RB and the forward part of the Recce were left to
their fate. It was all very sad.
B Sqn, C Sqn and the Queens withdrew back some three
miles to Amaye-sur-Seulles, a village we had passed through
that morning. At Amaye, the Brigade had formed a box
comprising TAC (Tactical) Brigade, 8 and 11 Hussars, 1 and
5RTR, 1RB less ACoy, 1/5 and 1/7Queens, 5RHA and the
remnants of 4CLY.
The troops in this box were attacked for most of 14 June,
often being surrounded,but at 23.15hrs,all troops were ordered
to withdraw during the night to the original line at Livry. I went
back about 20.00 hrs to the harbour area at Ste. Honorine-de-
Ducy that had been allotted to 4CLY and marked out the areas
for B Sqn, C Sqn, the Recce and RHQ. The regiment arrived in
the harbour area about 03.00 hrs on 15 June.
Some further thoughts
1. The German armoured car incident did worry me and this
may have cost us dearly.
2. When the attack on RHQ took place, we did not know
that the firing ahead, prior to the Tiger appearing, was A
Coy 1RB being virtually demolished, whilst strung out
along the road waiting for the officers to return from an O
(Orders) Group.It does seem strange to me that they were
not deployed in any way but from reports, they were
stood down with many riflemen not in their vehicles.
3. The attack on RHQ appeared to throw everyone into
confusion when the Tiger tank appeared, but although I
expected to see infantry, this is the sort of thing that can
happen when deep in enemy territory. It was of course
most unfortunate that the Cromwell armament was
inadequate but at least I think some orders should have
been forthcoming. As it was, everyone seemed to do as
they wished which to my mind is unacceptable,
particularly in the field. After all, there was quite a lot of
time and the Tiger could not fire at every tank at once.
4. My meeting at B Sqn HQ with Major Ibby Aird was
disastrous, partly because I knew the Tiger situation was
critical and partly because of the way that Ibby never even
acknowledged me in any way and would not speak to me.
Afterwards, I came to the conclusion that he resented
being informed by a junior officer and then being told
what to do, but even more important, I was convinced
that he was incapable of acting without orders and he also
lacked the mental ability to grasp the complex and fluid
situation confronting him.Although I had known him for
some time (he had been in 4CLY since 1940 and had been
in many battles), this was the first time I had come across
him in the field.
5. Later, I thought over Major Peter McColl’s statement to
Ibby that the road was blocked on the entry into Villers-
Bocage by B Sqn and then I worked out that Ibby must
have been sitting where I found him for at least 30-40
minutes, probably more, because the Recce with
JohnPhilip-Smith was closed up to RHQ, hence the long
distance I had to go back on the way to B Sqn. B Sqn must
have been stationary there of course when the Bde Cmdr
came up to the CO.This to my way of thinking appeared
very alarming and hence the reason that when the Queens
arrived in the town the Germans were already on the east
end. I am sure that this contributed to the fact that B Sqn
could not get beyond the town to reach A Sqn on Pt. 213.
16
6. I was puzzled over Pat Dyas and his exploits because it
came out later that,by chance that, in his efforts to get out
of the way of the Tiger, he had reversed his Cromwell into
an excellent position to fire at the side of the Tiger, but did
not do so, although the Tiger did not attempt to fire at his
tank at any time. Apparently the gunner was not in the
tank so the gun was not fired.
7. When the CO went forward about a mile to A Sqn , Major
Arthur Carr, as 2 I/C, should have made sure that B Sqn
were deployed forward on the east side of the town with
C Sqn also deployed covering the rear. These two Sqns
were essential for any immediate support of A Sqn who
was absolutely out on a limb. Also, it was equally
important, that the Queens Battalion should be able to be
fully deployed rapidly in Villers-Bocage as a firm base
whilst the town was comparatively free of enemy. As it
was, their vehicles were strung out stationary in a
vulnerable position along the road into the town.
Eventually the four Companies dismounted from their
vehicles and entered the town on foot.
8. I am certain that the CO was let down by two senior
officers. Firstly by Major Arthur Carr, who, I felt, never
grasped the serious and critical nature of an advance into
enemy territory, coupled with no apparent understanding
of support for A Sqn. I did wonder if he realised that 4CLY
had now changed over from an attacking role to a defence
role (Major Arthur Carr was posted to us from the Staff in
Cairo when we were in Homs, Libya in the summer of
1943. He was OC A Sqn in Italy and became Regimental 2
I/C when we returned to England in early 1944. I have no
idea if he had had any actual experience of armoured
warfare in action before coming to us).
9. Secondly, I feel that the CO was also let down by Major
Ibby Aird who seemed totally unaware that by not moving
B Sqn fully into the town, he completely blocked the
narrow road bringing the long column behind to a
shuddering halt.Again, I do not think Ibby really thought
about A Sqn and its need for support nor did he
understand the overall situation. When I found him at B
Sqn HQ, he must or should have known from the wireless
that A Sqn were under attack about 11/2 miles ahead.
10. The actual Breakthrough, Advance and arriving on the
Objective was a great success with credit to the CO but to
throw it all away due to failure of adequate backup is sad
in the extreme, and resulted in abandonment of the CO,A
Sqn and the remnants of A Coy 1RB. Casualties in RHQ,A
Sqn and A Coy were high but fortunately many became
prisoners of war, not that this is much consolation for the
captured.
11. Although much has been written and talked about over
the years regarding the attack on RHQ, in fact the loss of
RHQ had virtually no effect on the overall battle, other
than failing to impede the Tiger tank in any way, as the
Temporary RHQ was set up very shortly after I arrived at B
Sqn HQ.The loss of A Coy 1RB,however,was serious as this
left 4ClY with no infantry support and made it vital that
the Queens Bn move into the town as quickly as possible.
12. Lastly, a comment about the CO who I think had a rough
time. He was a very experienced and capable officer who
was fully aware of the risks and problems in a task like
this. The CO was continually harried and chased by the
Brigade Commander, obviously against the CO’s better
judgement. It was sad that he was captured.
Aftermath with a comment on Sharpshooters at War
In the Regimental History Sharpshooters at War (pages 177-
182), there is a copy of a report on the battle that appeared in
the Royal Armoured Journal written by Major I. B.Aird, and
it will be found that this write up of mine differs very
considerably from Ibby Aird’s report. I have always been
aware of this.
At no time did Ibby Aird ever raise the subject of Villers-
Bocage with me. That, I thought strange as he must have
known that I knew a lot about that battle.
Visit to Villers- Bocage in 1995
I did go to Villers-Bocage with my daughter Joan in 1995 as
she had always wanted to see the various places where we
were in Normandy in 1944. We visited many of the sites
including Vire, Caen, Bayeux, Falaise and of course Villers-
Bocage.
We went to the Mairie in Villers-Bocage where the Union
Flag and the French Tricolour were flying, then saw the model
of the old town. Everyone was most charming at all times,
considering that we, helped by the enemy and the RAF,
destroyed their town for them.
I did look very carefully around the town, the roads
entering the town and Point 213, but this
