No, not necessarily, but I'd like to know why there is such a large discrepancy, especially since the other sources I have tend to confirm the Wiki figures rather than yours.

At any rate, now your contention is that the 14th Army made a major contribution to "victory in the Far East". Well, maybe, but it still had no effect on the outcome of the War in the Pacific nor the defeat of Japan. The 14th. army undoubtedly kept the Japanese from over running India, but that didn't spell the defeat of Japan or even affect Japan's strategy. It kept India in the British Commonwealth for a few more years and that was about it.

As the two of you have become mired down in the my country vs your country thing (something I know well when it comes to Canadian forces and WWII , please let me bring you some websites which may or may not have been on this Theatre area, but which you can both view at the same time, and I will try to concentrate on the British aspect as that is what you are "discussing." By the way, I find myself automatically not using sites for this thread that start out referring to the start of World War as Dec 8 1941 as I assume that the writer or historian has a limited world viewpoint.

For starters, this thread has a post from wtid45 that has a link to information on the British contribution. forgotten army

Today, I found this information on the 42 Commandos for a new member:
Lost Marine

WORLD WAR II : China-Burma-India(CBI) Theater

IMPHAL AND WW-II


On 7 June 1944, I remember taking shelter in a roadside ditch while the air pummeled a bunkered hilltop. We were listening to All-India radio and heard the long-awaited news that our armies had landed in Normandy. Now everybody thought, we can see the eventual end of the war in Europe and better back-up the forgotten 14th Army. Going off-net was against order but at such times the temptation was too great.Captain P.A. Toole entered in his Diary. The only thing that kept him in the ditch was 'the end of the war would be his not for the world'.

Mankind's unrest, greed and selfishness in the late 1930's staged the onset of World War II. Adolf Hitler in Germany and his supporter B. Musoolini of Italy seized Europe. On the other side of the world the Japanese were at war with its neighbors. Then the British and French were drawn in the war. America was still an onlooker supplying war materials to its allies. By September 1941 the Japanese had compiled secret plans to invade Malaya and Phillipines. On 7 December 1941, Japanese planes attacked Pearl Harbor. Next day, President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared war against Japan. December 11, 1941, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States. Then the world was on War.

Singapore crumpled at the hands of the Japanese Imperial Army on 15 February 1942. The defeat of this critical island in Southeast Asia quickly led to the fall of the Netherlands East Indies. A large number of European soldiers and civilians were trapped in Singapore. Many were used as forced laborers to build the infamous Thailand-Burma railway and the much romanticized 'The Bridge over the River Kwai'. More than 45,000 Indian and Malay soldiers were asked to transfer their loyalties to the Japanese. Many refused and paid the price. Nearly twenty thousand Indians joined the Indian National Army (INA) led by Netaji Subash Chandra Bose in the belief that the Japanese would drive the British out and India would gain Freedom.

The Japanese quickly advanced to Burma, and their progress was unstoppable. General 'Vinegar Joe' Stilwell with his troupes including Surgeon G. Seagrave and the missionary hospital Burmese nurses walked 29 days through jungles, crossed strong streams, climbed mountains and finally escaped to Imphal, Manipur, from the closely pursuing Japanese Army. At the same time, the British General William Slim and his group arrived at Imphal from the Arakan section of lower Burma. Another British Brig. Orde Wingate and his force known as the 'Chindit column' escaped into Imphal from upper Burma. Thus, the withdrawal from Burma was over.
By early April 1942, the Japanese had completely occupied Burma.

At Myitkyina, the largest town in upper Burma, the Japanese had assembled a strong force with air-strips. Their goal was to capture the Imphal plain and move up to upper Assam to cut off air supplies to China over the 'HIMALAYAN HUMP'. This would give them an advantage and a complete supremacy over China and Asia, a disaster for the Allies. The INA led by Subash Bose and his ally the Japanese also marched to take over Imphal and then to proceed toward India with 'Delhi Chalo' slogans. The only way to enter India from Burma was through Imphal. Therefore, the control of Imphal became the 'DO or DIE' for all sides. The British army and its Indian forces had strongly fortified the Imphal plain and Manipur valley. Airstrips were constructed at Tulihal, Imphal; at Koirengei, north of Imphal and at Palel/Kakching, 45 km south of Imphal at the Moreh-Tamu road. The Japanese army attacked Imphal continuously, and the British and its Allies resisted fiercely.

The first bombing of Imphal by the Japanese Tojo took place on Sunday, 10 May 1942 at various localities, namely, Khoyathong, Menjorkhul, Thangmeiband, Chingmeirong, Mantripukhri at Koirengei airstrip, etc. In the south, the Palel/Kakching airstrips were also bombarded. However, the British and their Indian engineers did a marvelous job of reparing the damages quickly every time. The bombing of Imphal and Manipur valley continued for almost 2 years. Imphal inhabitants had run away to different villages, which is locally known as 'Japan lanchenba' or running away from the Japan war. The Japanese army took only two months to proceed from Singapore to Burma, and then the war had become deadlock at Imphal either side not being able to advance. Both the British and Japanese forces had fortified each side with a large number of soldiers and the best in their ranks. The Imphal situation was critical.
Lord Louis Mountbatten and members of his Southeast Asia Command authorized Wingate, then a major general, to lead an assault into north-central Burma and capture Myitkyina and Mogaung strongholds of the Japanese army. Mountbatten suggested that Americans help Wingate's expected three-months of campaign by the same unit that operated China over the Hump. The answer from the American Air Transport people was a big NO since they already were involving in China campaign and they did not have extra aircraft and men. Mountbatten requested Gen. H.H. Arnold and President Franklin Roosevelt for help. The matter was given priority in the Quebec conference scheduled for August 1943. In the conference, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill brought Mr.Wingate as a guest.

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff were so impressed with General Wingate that they not only agreed to supply the air transport but also authorized the first American commando force to serve with it. In November 1943, Admiral Lord Mountbatten was named as the Supreme Allied Comander. By then both the British and Japanese forces were formulating new strategies to attack the other side.

Fierce fighting continued at the seige of Imphal. The American Project 90752, code named 'Bond Project', was drafted. Personnels were ordered to duty on May 8, 1944 and directed the reciepents to proceed to Morrison field, West Palm Beach, Florida - Destination unknown, Task temporary air transport command. One hundred experienced pilots, 100 co-pilots, 100 new C-47A airplanes were delivered to Morrision field. Thus, the 3rd Combat Cargo Group, the first one to see WW II combat, was created.

Back in Imphal, the Japanese attacked Kohima, 125 km to the north of Imphal with a small garrison of 3500 and without an airstrip, with their 15,000 strong soldiers via 'Hell's Gate' in order to cut off the Dimapur-Imphal road. This would obstruct the supply of ammunition, medicine, food, water, etc. from the upper Assam plains to Imphal. At the begining of the battle, 5 April 1944, the garrision held all the hillocks which were in a commanding position above Kohima. But they were pushed back and the Japanese soldiers dug in the higher grounds. The fighting was so close that the district commissioner's garden was divided in the middle claiming alternately by the Japanese and the British, which later came to be known as 'no man's land'. They were not shooting at each other anymore but hand to hand bayonet charges were exchanged. Over 600 casualties were handled by Colonel Young D.S.O., a British doctor and his Indian staff.

While Kohima was being attacked, Imphal valley was completely surrounded in all directions by the Japanese army at the hill tops with heavy artilleries. However, at that time, the Japanese had directed their aircrafts towards south in the Arakan region where British forces are attacking. The propaganda from the British Government to the local people was that the Japanese were invading Manipur and India.

Therefore, Subash Chadra Bose and his INA along with the Japanese army did not receive much help they had expected from the natives. Area war veterans narrated that two Japanese soldiers disguised themselves as local workers (the British employed a large number of local inhabitants as laborers and housekeepers) and stole an aircraft from the Palel airstrip. Subash Chandra Bose used the airplane to drop leaflets narrating that the Japanese and the INA were in fact friends of India and that they were trying to free India from Britain. They had to show the picture of Netaji with Mahatama Gandhi. By that time Manipur already had a large number of followers of Gandhiji's Indian National Congress and they knew about Subash Bose's earlier role in the Congress Party. Finally, several locals joined INA, and underground movements started. The British army immediately collected all leaflets by offering large sums of money to those who were loyal and would bring it to them. Several members of the Manipur Mahasava and leaders from the hills and plains were rounded up at the Langthabal military camp. Thus, INA led by Netaji Subash Chandra Bose for the first time on 14 April 1944 hoisted the Indian tricolor flag at Moirang, 45 km south of Imphal at Tiddim road.

In the north, the 14th British Army was advancing to relieve Kohima from Imphal. Captain P.A. Toole of 305 Field Park Company, I.E. and also of 20 field Company, I.E. wrote down the war accounts in his diary. 'I landed from a Dakota on an Imphal airstrip in early April 1944. There had been an air-raid warning whilst we were in flight from Comilla and we had to turn back to Silchar and wait. When we arrived there was a blazing plane at the end of the runway and gunfire at the distance. I had been through the blitz but this was real war and not like the movies. The Japanese 15th division had surrounded the town and here in the north had dig-in on a number of dominating peaks, including those sitting astride the only road north. This road led to Kohima (itself besieged by the Japanese 30th Division). The country was steap, partly jungle with deeply cut ravines running down from the heights above. We had just got across one of these with difficulty to the other side when the distinctive rattle of an enemy light machine gun opened up and everybody laid flat.' That was when Captain Toole heard the Allies had landed in Normandy.

On June 11, 1944, 1st Lt. Walter Duch, Commanding Officer of the 10th Cargo Combat Squadron, jumped the gun and sent his aircraft to Imphal from Sylhet (~235 km to the west of Imphal) on their first mission into combat. Those would be the first combat sorties flown by a Combat Cargo Unit. By that time it was clear that the locals were sympathetic towards the Japanese; so any strategic discussions were to be held in the absence of the local people. The fighting in the valley resulted in several loses. The 10th Squadron had one plane and crew listed as missing. Tokyo Rose - the female voice of Japan's radio propaganda campaign - broadcasted the news the next day and even listed the names of the dead crew members as well as the number of the air plane. The landing at Imphat airstrip was tricky. Although Japanese aircrafts were not a problem since they were fighting in the Arakans, ground firing was continuous from the hill tops. By then the strategies were no longer secret, the Royal Air Force (RAF) fighter aircrafts will circle the valley several times in order to confuse the Japanese artilleries, and the Cargo planes will land quickly on the airstrip below. The air campaign was successful. At last around noon of 22 June 1944 the 14th Army joined the troupe advancing down from Kohima at milestone 109 north of Imphal. By mid-July Ukhrul at the east, a Japanese stronghold between Imphal and Chindwin, was cleared adding to heavy casualties to the Japanese.

Below Imphal at Bishenpur, the Japanese 33rd Division held against the 17th Division (Black Cat) and the fighting was bitter with no side gaining any advantage. To root the Japanese, heaviest artillery was got together and bombarded the Japanese at Ningthoukhong Kha Khunou where the Japanese were at their strongest. It is said that not a single leaf was left on a tree after this action. Imphal seize was as costly for the Japanese as Flanders was for the Germans in World War I for here on the 'Bloody Plains' 50,000 of the Japanese best soldiers lost their lives.

By early August 1944, Myitkyina was captured, and the Japanese were loosing at Imphal too. Monsoon was at its peak; heat, mosquito, shortage of food supply and ammunition caused a lack of enthusiasm and will power among the Japanese soldiers to proceed further. They were hungry, sick from malaria, and homesick fell upon them. Netaji Subash Chandra Bose was heart-broken: his dream of capturing India had failed. He flew back to Singapore and was never found. The sick and retreating Japanese soldiers were provided help, food and shelter by local inhabitants of the hills and plains of Manipur. Despite the monsoon British and Allied forces decided to start an advance which could be largely supplied by air since the necessay technique had become highly developed and the RAF had command of the air. One line of progress would be Palel-Moreh/Tamu-Kalemyo and the other would be at Bishenpur-Moirang-Churachandpur-Tiddim.

After six weeks of Japanese seize, the Imphal plain was rescued. On 16 November 1944 the British moved to Moreh near Tamu but the advance was slow towards the Tiddim road because of mine fields led by the retreating Japanese. Victory in Imphal was in fact the turning point of this war. The Japanese army for the first time was fighting a retreating war but not until many more lives were lost in both sides. After the conquest of the Imphal battle, Lord Mountbatten went to Sylhet and thanked the American Combat Cargo Groups personally. In December at Imphal in front of the Scottish, Gurkha and Punjab regiments General Slim was knighted by the viceroy along with three Corps Commanders, Christison, Scones and Stopford.
World War II ended after the atomic bomb 'Little Boy' was dropped from Enola Gay, the American B-29 Bomber, at Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and another at Nagasaki three days later. In a true sense the rescue of Imphal-Kohima could be described as the 'NORMANDY OF THE EAST'. Later after the war, World War II Memorial Cemetries were established both at Imphal and Kohima. The Imphal cemetry has 1300 British Burials, 10 Canadians, 5 Australians, 220 Indian, 40 East Africans, 10 West Africans and 10 Burmese. A more or less equal number of burials were also laid at Kohima. However, the most ignored were those innocent local people who died in this war. When two gaint elephants fight, the uprooted are the inculpable grass. The forgotten Imphal-Kohima War will come to life every time you visit these War Cemetries. The burial sites are marked with bronze plaques recording their anguish and sacrifice: 'WHEN YOU GO HOME TELL THEM OF US AND SAY FOR YOUR TOMORROW WE GAVE OUR TODAY' depicts the war in an inscription at Kohima. At Bishenpur, south of Imphal, a Japanese War Memorial was also erected and another for the Indian National Army and Netaji Subash Chandra Bose at Moirang, 45 km to the south of Imphal at Tiddim Road.

__________________
Regards, Michelle

Oliver Goldsmith, "I love everything that's old: old friends, old times, old manners, old books, old wines."

*CHINA-BURMA-INDIA - Remembering the Forgotten Theater of World War II
Many links to stories, many American, but it does include some British references including a great Life Magazine pictorial *British Raid Burma - LIFE - June 28, 1943

http://www.amazon.com/British-Army-1.../1841767905The British Army in the Far East 1941-45 (Battle Orders) (Paperback)
by Alan Jeffreys (Author) "During the 1920s and 1930s British strategy in the Far East centred upon the naval base at Singapore..." (more)

__________________
Regards, Michelle

Oliver Goldsmith, "I love everything that's old: old friends, old times, old manners, old books, old wines."

Burma Campaign: Seizing Imphal and Kohima In World War II » HistoryNet

The Allied effort in Burma during World War II was dominated by strong personalities and hampered by divergent strategic goals. Guided by a coalition of British and Americans, the participants themselves were multiracial, including Indians, Burmese and Chinese. For the Americans, the campaign was closely linked to keeping China in the war through supplies shipped over the Burma Road. The British and the Soviets did not feel that the Chinese could make a significant contribution to the overall effort against Japan, and instead wanted the Burmese campaign to serve as a barrier for India and as a fountainhead for a future Allied drive to force the Japanese from Southeast Asia. Another problem was the American suspicion that the British were striving to preserve their colonial empire at the expense of local nationalism.

Burma was invaded in December 1941 by a relatively small Japanese contingent of 35,000 men. The initial landing was at Tenasserim, on the Isthmus of Kra, aimed at neutralizing British airfields threatening the Japanese move south into Malaya. However, the goal of the extensive campaign that followed was to cut the vital Burma Road to China. Air attacks on Rangoon—the principal port of entry for Allied supplies—commenced toward the end of December. Japan’s ensuing advance northward into the interior proceeded almost unimpeded to the Sittang River. Rangoon was finally abandoned on March 6, 1942, and after a period of reinforcement, the Japanese succeeded in routing the British. Abandoning Mandalay, British Sir General Harold Alexander was compelled to order a general withdrawal to Assam in India.


The Japanese drive into Burma was foreshadowed by their rapid advance at the beginning of the war. As the British hero of Burma, Lt. Gen. (later Field Marshal) Viscount William Slim, recalled: “The British Empire, with its Indian and Australian comrades, lost Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore. This was the greatest defeat in the history of [the] Empire.”


Burma is a large country. Compared to Europe, it covers more area than France, the Low Countries and much of Germany. To the north and west, it is bordered by the Indian provinces of Assam, East Bengal and Manipur. Farther to the north lies China. Several major rivers run through Burma, including the Irrawaddy, Chindwin and Sittang.


Internal transportation at the time consisted of a limited road and rail network and steamers plying the major rivers. However, in 1941, the most significant route was the Burma Road, which ran from the port of Rangoon through Mandalay, on to Lashio, then across the Chinese border to Kunming. Japanese plans in 1941 had not included any operations beyond the frontier of Burma, which was to become the western bastion of their Greater East-Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. The speed and ease of their victories had, however, produced symptoms of the “victory disease” (underestimation of the enemy), and in August 1942, General Count Hisaichi Terauchi’s Southern Army headquarters in Hanoi ordered the Fifteenth Amy in Burma to plan a limited offensive into Assam. Although this was temporarily abandoned because of American successes in the western Pacific, it was revived when the Japanese reorganized their command structure in Burma in June 1943, which brought an aggressive commanding general, Renya Mutaguchi, to power. Thereafter, two plans of action came into being. The first was to continue westward to the Arakan in southwestern Burma, where the new Japanese Twenty-eighth Army would mount an offensive against the British XV Corps, pinning down Slim’s reserves. The second called for Mutaguchi to proceed with three divisions and destroy the British IV Corps on the plain around Imphal, seizing the great Allied supply depots and depriving the British of their springboard for an offensive to retake Burma.

The British Fourteenth Army, based in eastern India, was to be the military instrument that would oppose this Japanese offensive. Lieutenant General William Slim assumed command in October 1943. He was not a member of the British privileged classes; rather, he was a product of Birmingham University’s Officer Training Corps. Shortly after the outbreak of World War I, Slim had been commissioned into the Regular Army as a second lieutenant in the Royal Warwickshire Regiment. During World War I he was wounded at Gallipoli, and while recuperating he discovered that there were periodic openings in the Indian army that allowed officers of limited means to live quite well. He applied and was granted a commission in the West Indian Regiment. Subsequently, he was reassigned to his old regiment, the Warwickshires, and fought with them in Iraq and the Middle East. Finally, in 1922 he joined the Indian army as a captain in the 6th Gurkha Rifles. He later attended the British Army Staff College and served in the Sudan. In 1942, with the Allies’ plight worsening, he returned to India as a major general. In October 1943, he took over the British Fourteenth Army. ...... see the link for the rest

__________________
Regards, Michelle

Oliver Goldsmith, "I love everything that's old: old friends, old times, old manners, old books, old wines."

Burma Campaigns (World War II) – Dictionary Definition of Burma Campaigns (World War II) | Encyclopedia.com: FREE Online Dictionary

Burma Campaigns (World War II) (Jan. 1942–May 1945) The longest campaign involving troops from the Commonwealth and the British Empire during World War II. On 19 January 1942 two Japanese divisions advanced into Burma, accompanied by Aung San's Burma National Army. They captured Rangoon (8 March) and quickly reached Lashio at the southern end of the Burma Road, thus cutting off the supply link from India to China. In May they took Mandalay, forcing the British forces under General Alexander to withdraw to the Indian frontier. Attempts to regain the Arakan (October 1942 to May 1943) failed. Meanwhile, in February 1943 Wingate led 3,000 Chindit troops behind Japanese lines. They suffered heavy casualties, but provided an important boost to British morale. In 1944 the Allies repelled a Japanese attempt to advance into northern India, inflicting upon the Japanese Army the biggest defeat in its history. In October an offensive was launched by British and Commonwealth troops, and US-supported Chinese Nation-alists under General Stilwell. The Burma Road was reopened in January 1945. By now a discontented Aung San had contacted Mountbatten and in March his troops switched sides to join the Allies. As General Slim's 14th Army advanced down the Irrawaddy, a force of Indian, Gurkha, and West African forces moved through the jungle of the Arakan, supported by air-drop and amphibious operations. The Japanese headquarters at Akyab fell in January, while inland Mandalay fell to Indian and British troops, after fierce fighting, on 20 March. Rangoon was attacked by land and sea and fell on 2 May, and by 17 May Burma had been recaptured. Myanmar

also has links to other resources

__________________
Regards, Michelle

Oliver Goldsmith, "I love everything that's old: old friends, old times, old manners, old books, old wines."

Burma Campaigns (World War II) – Dictionary Definition of Burma Campaigns (World War II) | Encyclopedia.com: FREE Online Dictionary

Burma Campaigns (World War II) (Jan. 1942–May 1945) The longest campaign involving troops from the Commonwealth and the British Empire during World War II. On 19 January 1942 two Japanese divisions advanced into Burma, accompanied by Aung San's Burma National Army. They captured Rangoon (8 March) and quickly reached Lashio at the southern end of the Burma Road, thus cutting off the supply link from India to China. In May they took Mandalay, forcing the British forces under General Alexander to withdraw to the Indian frontier. Attempts to regain the Arakan (October 1942 to May 1943) failed. Meanwhile, in February 1943 Wingate led 3,000 Chindit troops behind Japanese lines. They suffered heavy casualties, but provided an important boost to British morale. In 1944 the Allies repelled a Japanese attempt to advance into northern India, inflicting upon the Japanese Army the biggest defeat in its history. In October an offensive was launched by British and Commonwealth troops, and US-supported Chinese Nation-alists under General Stilwell. The Burma Road was reopened in January 1945. By now a discontented Aung San had contacted Mountbatten and in March his troops switched sides to join the Allies. As General Slim's 14th Army advanced down the Irrawaddy, a force of Indian, Gurkha, and West African forces moved through the jungle of the Arakan, supported by air-drop and amphibious operations. The Japanese headquarters at Akyab fell in January, while inland Mandalay fell to Indian and British troops, after fierce fighting, on 20 March. Rangoon was attacked by land and sea and fell on 2 May, and by 17 May Burma had been recaptured. Myanmar

also has links to other resources

__________________
Regards, Michelle

Oliver Goldsmith, "I love everything that's old: old friends, old times, old manners, old books, old wines."

Capt. Drew-Smythe Burma World War II
Many photos from Capt. Drew-Smythe

World War, 1939-1945 › Campaigns › Burma | LibraryThing
Books under this subject

• Quartered Safe Out Here by George MacDonald Fraser (133 copies)
• The Burma Road by Donovan Webster (69 copies)
• Defeat Into Victory by William Slim (59 copies)
• Burma, the longest war, 1941-45 by Louis Allen (41 copies)
• China, Burma, India by Don Moser (41 copies)
• The Stilwell Papers by Joseph W. Stillwell (30 copies)
• The Marauders by Charlton Ogburn (24 copies)
• Tales by Japanese soldiers : of the Burma campaign… by Kazuo Tamayama (18 copies)
• Codebreaker in the Far East by Alan Stripp (18 copies)
• Chindits--long range penetration by (James) Michael Calvert (13 copies)
• The Chindit war : Stilwell, Wingate, and the campaign in… by Shelford Bidwell (12 copies)
• Shots fired in anger: A rifleman's view of the war in the… by John B George (9 copies)
• Prisoners of hope by (James) Michael Calvert (7 copies)
• Galahad by Charles Newton Hunter (4 copies)
• Burma 1942-1945 by Raymond Callahan (3 copies)
• Battle For Sangshak by Harry Seaman (2 copies)
• A Detail on the Burma Front by Winifred Hilda. Beaumont (2 copies)
• Merrill's Marauders, February - May 1944 (1 copies)
• With Wingate in Burma being the story of the adventures of… by David Halley (1 copies)
• Wings of the Phoenix; the official story of the air war in… (1 copies)

BURMA AND INDIA IN WW II
...Except for five Chinese divisions and a mixed American and Chinese brigade known as the Mars Task Force (replacing "Merrill's Marauders"), Allied forces in Burma consisted of British and British Commonwealth forces. Operations in Burma during the last year of the war were left to the British, who were more interested in recovering Singapore than in taking Burma or helping China. The British preferred to reconquor Burma from the south, beginning with a seaborne assault on Rangoon, but demands on shipping for European and Pacific operations precluded such a plan. Consequently, the British attacked from India across the Irrawaddy River to Mandalay and then south to Rangoon. They experienced tremendous difficulties because of the terrain and the resistance of seasoned Japanese troops. Supply by air was essential to the success of operations. Mandalay was captured after a prolonged fight in mid-March 1945.

Progress to the south was relatively fast after March 1945, and the reconquest of Burma was essentially completed with the capture of Rangoon on 3 May 1945....

__________________
Regards, Michelle

Oliver Goldsmith, "I love everything that's old: old friends, old times, old manners, old books, old wines."

Capt. Drew-Smythe Burma World War II
Many photos from Capt. Drew-Smythe

World War, 1939-1945 › Campaigns › Burma | LibraryThing
Books under this subject

• Quartered Safe Out Here by George MacDonald Fraser (133 copies)
• The Burma Road by Donovan Webster (69 copies)
• Defeat Into Victory by William Slim (59 copies)
• Burma, the longest war, 1941-45 by Louis Allen (41 copies)
• China, Burma, India by Don Moser (41 copies)
• The Stilwell Papers by Joseph W. Stillwell (30 copies)
• The Marauders by Charlton Ogburn (24 copies)
• Tales by Japanese soldiers : of the Burma campaign… by Kazuo Tamayama (18 copies)
• Codebreaker in the Far East by Alan Stripp (18 copies)
• Chindits--long range penetration by (James) Michael Calvert (13 copies)
• The Chindit war : Stilwell, Wingate, and the campaign in… by Shelford Bidwell (12 copies)
• Shots fired in anger: A rifleman's view of the war in the… by John B George (9 copies)
• Prisoners of hope by (James) Michael Calvert (7 copies)
• Galahad by Charles Newton Hunter (4 copies)
• Burma 1942-1945 by Raymond Callahan (3 copies)
• Battle For Sangshak by Harry Seaman (2 copies)
• A Detail on the Burma Front by Winifred Hilda. Beaumont (2 copies)
• Merrill's Marauders, February - May 1944 (1 copies)
• With Wingate in Burma being the story of the adventures of… by David Halley (1 copies)
• Wings of the Phoenix; the official story of the air war in… (1 copies)

BURMA AND INDIA IN WW II
...Except for five Chinese divisions and a mixed American and Chinese brigade known as the Mars Task Force (replacing "Merrill's Marauders"), Allied forces in Burma consisted of British and British Commonwealth forces. Operations in Burma during the last year of the war were left to the British, who were more interested in recovering Singapore than in taking Burma or helping China. The British preferred to reconquor Burma from the south, beginning with a seaborne assault on Rangoon, but demands on shipping for European and Pacific operations precluded such a plan. Consequently, the British attacked from India across the Irrawaddy River to Mandalay and then south to Rangoon. They experienced tremendous difficulties because of the terrain and the resistance of seasoned Japanese troops. Supply by air was essential to the success of operations. Mandalay was captured after a prolonged fight in mid-March 1945.

Progress to the south was relatively fast after March 1945, and the reconquest of Burma was essentially completed with the capture of Rangoon on 3 May 1945....

__________________
Regards, Michelle

Oliver Goldsmith, "I love everything that's old: old friends, old times, old manners, old books, old wines."

British Fourteenth Army: Facts, Discussion Forum, and Encyclopedia Article

The British Fourteenth Army was a multinational force comprising units from Commonwealth countries during World War II. Many of its units were from the Indian Army as well as British units and there were also significant contributions from West and East African division within the British Army.


It was often referred to as the "Forgotten Army" because its operations in the Burma Campaign were overlooked by the contemporary press, and remained more obscure than those of the corresponding formations in Europe for long after the war.
Creation

The army was formed in 1943 in eastern India.. With the creation of South East-Asia in late 1943, the Eastern Army of India which formerly controlled operations against the Japanese Army in Burma and also had large rear-area responsibilities, was split into two. Eastern Command (reporting to GHQ India) took over the rear areas of Bihar, Oriss, and most of Bengal.

Fourteenth Army, part of the British 11th Army Group became responsible for operations against the Japanese. The Army's commander was Lieutenant General William Slim. Its principal subordinate formations were Indian IV Corps.in Assam and Indian XV Corps in Arakan.. During the early part of 1944, the Army also had loose operational control over the American and Chinese.Northern Combat Area Command and the Chindits operating behind enemy lines under Major General Orde Wingate.
Defending India

In early 1944, the Allies began tentative advances into Burma. The Japanese responded with all-out offensives, intending to destroy the Allies in their base areas.

The first Japanese move was a subsidiary attack in Arakan where XV Corps was advancing slowly south. After initial Allied setbacks, in which an Indian divisional HQ was overrun, the surrounded units defeated the Japanese at the Battle fo the Admin Box. A vital factor was the resupply of cut-off units by aircraft. The main Japanese offensive was launched on the central front in Assam. While a division advanced to Kohima to isolate IV Corps, the main body attempted to surround and destroy IV Corps at Imphal. Since the Japanese attack in Arakan had already failed, battle hardened units were flown from Arakan to aid the besieged forces in Assam. Also, Indian XXXIII Corps was moved from southern India, where they had been training for amphibious operations, to relieve the garrison at Kohima and then push on to relieve Imphal. The result of the battles was a crushing Japanese defeat. The Japanese suffered 85,000 casualties, mainly from sickness and disease after their supplies ran out. The Allies had been continually supplied from the air, in the largest operation of its type to that date.
Retaking Burma

In 1945, amphibious operations to recapture Burma had to be cancelled once again because of shortage of resources. Instead, Fourteenth Army, consisting of IV Corps and XXXIII Corps, was to mount the main offensive. Since the Army's supply lines by land were long and precarious, air supply was once again to be vital.

The Japanese attempted to forestall the Allied attacks by withdrawing behind the IrrawaddyRiver. Fourteenth Army was nevertheless able to change its axis of advance. IV Corps, spearheaded by armoured and motorized units, crossed the river downstream of the main Japanese forces and seized the vital logistic and communications centre of Meiktila. As the Japanese attempted to recapture Meiktila, XXXIII Corps captured Mandalay, the former capital which was of major significance to the Burman population. The result of the Battle of Central Burma was the destruction of most of the Japanese units in Burma, which allowed the subsequent pursuit.

Led by IV Corps, Fourteenth Army advanced south, covering 200 miles (320 km) in a month. It was vital to capture Rangoon, the capital and principal port of Burma, to allow the Army to be supplied during the monsoon. In the event, IV Corps was held up 40 miles (64 km) north of Rangoon by sacrificial Japanese rearguards, but their advance caused the Japanese to abandon Rangoon, which was occupied after an unopposed amphibious landing (codenamed Operation Dracula on 2 May.

The Fourteenth Army was supported by the Women’s Auxiliary Service (Burma who provided a canteen service for the troops of Burma Command and moved down through the country with the Army.

End of the War

The Army headquarters was then relieved of responsibility for operations in Burma. A new Twelfth Army headquarters was formed from XXXIII Corps HQ and took over IV Corps. Fourteen Army HQ now moved to Ceylon to plan operations to recapture Malaya and Singapore. It controlled XV Corps and the newly-raised Indian XXXIV Corps.

General Slinm was promoted to command Allied Land Forces South East Asia. Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey was appointed to command Fourteenth Army.

A seaborne landing on the west coast of Malaya, codenamed Operation Zipper, was being prepared but was forestalled by the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Japanese surrender. Zipper was nevertheless mounted unopposed as the quickest method of introducing troops to Malaya to enforce the surrender of the Japanese there and repatriate Allied prisoners of war.


Fourteenth Army was renamed Malaya Command. on 1 November 1945.


Commonwealth Army


The Fourteenth Army, like the Eighth Army, was made up from units that came from all corners of the Commonwealth. In 1945 not only was the Fourteenth Army the largest army in the Commonwealth, it was the largest single army in the world with about half a million men under the command of General Slim. Men of the 81st and 82nd West African and 11th East African Divisions served with great distinction. There were many units and formations from the British Army but the majority of the army was built around the British Indian Army, which was stated to be the largest all-volunteer army in history.
Order of Battle



The 14th Army was the Second World War’s largest Commonwealth Army, with nearly a million men by late 1944. See the link for more on the Order of Battle and other links.

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Regards, Michelle

Oliver Goldsmith, "I love everything that's old: old friends, old times, old manners, old books, old wines."

Thank you for your effort to present so much data on the CBI; I have read or reviewed many of he websites you referenced and read perhaps two dozen books on the CBI theater, so I am pretty familiar with the information available about the theater.

I disagree that this is a "my country vs. your country" argument. I have not mentioned the American resources which, from a logistical and support standpoint, were considerable. I do not dispute that the bulk of the fighting forces in the CBI were either Chinese or British Commonwealth manpower, nor that these suffered the overwhelming share of casualties.

What you and wtid45 seem to be unable to comprehend is my contention that the reason the CBI became the "Forgotten Theater" is that nothing happened there that materially affected the outcome of either the European war or the Pacific war. This was largely because the bulk of the Allied combat forces there fought a defensive war until well after the Axis was essentially defeated in both Europe and the Pacific.

There is nothing shameful in that, as wtid45 seems to think; it was simply the strategy adopted by the British Supreme Command. It was contrary to the wishes of the United States, which would have liked a more active offensive against the Japanese, but the US was not willing, or able, to commit more combat troops and more support units and therefore could not expect to dictate the course of operations in the theater. I am well aware of the size of the 14th Army, but size alone does not mean it will exert a commensurate influence on events.

I FIND NOTHING SHAMEFUL IN WHAT THE 14TH ARMY ACHIEVED IN DEFEATING THE JAPANESE HOW LONG DID IT TAKE THE AMERICANS WHAT I DO FIND SHAMEFUL IS YOU AND YOUR COMPLETE DISRESPECT OF THIER BRAVE AND PROUD RECORD IN BURMA/INDIA, EMOTIONAL PROUD OF MY COUNTRY, AND A FATHER, AND AN UNCLE WHO FOUGHT THERE YOU BET YOUR LIFE I AM AND I MAKE NO APOLIGIES FOR IT TO YOU OR ANYBODY ELSE.

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WHEN YOU GO HOME, TELL THEM OF US AND SAY, FOR YOUR TOMORROW,WE GAVE OUR TODAY. Epitaph on the Kohima memorial .

Stating historical facts demonstrates "shameful disrespect"? I think you are are so emotionally involved in the subject matter that you are incapable of accepting the fact that, despite considerable bravery, and at the cost of many casualties, the most important thing the 14th. Army accomplished before Japan was defeated, was the defense of the Indian border. Notable as it was, that did not contribute significantly to the defeat of Japan, nor did it have a significant affect on the course of the war in the European theater.

Now, if you want to argue otherwise, it would be appropriate to advance some contentions that the defense of the Indian border DID somehow negatively affect Japan's conduct of the war before it was defeated in the Pacific. You seem to be incapable of doing that, so I can only conclude you cannot dredge up facts which support such a case.

Incidentally, it's considered improper to use all capitals when posting in a discussion thread on this forum. The moderators, in the past, have warned others against such discourteous behavior; just a friendly reminder.

DA,I have stated facts and supported them with websites that if you take the time to explore in depth you will see that the campaign in Burma/India was significant in effecting the Japanese, forces dispositon of troops and eventually stopped an invasion, that if we listened to you would of stopped at the borders India, I dont think so. I wrote my reply in caps because you only seem to read what suits you I base this on the FACT that you have ignored a number of points in my posts.

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WHEN YOU GO HOME, TELL THEM OF US AND SAY, FOR YOUR TOMORROW,WE GAVE OUR TODAY. Epitaph on the Kohima memorial .

Some comments from the eminent British military historian Max Hastings, in his Book "Nemesis; The Battle For Japan, 1944-45" page 65;

"For months following the the expulsion of British Forces from Burma in May, 1942, they were merely deployed in north-east India to meet the threat of Japanese invasion. As this peril receded, however, it was replaced by a dilemma about future strategy. Winston Churchill admitted to the British cabinet in April, 1943: 'It could not be said that the [re]conquest of Burma [is] an essential step in the defeat of Japan.' Yet if this was acknowledged, what were the British and Indian forces to do for the rest of the war? After the humiliations inflicted on them in 1941-42, the London government was stubbornly determined to restore by force of arms the prestige of white men in general, and of themselves in particular. If the Asian empire was not to be restored to it's former glory, why should British soldiers sacrifice their lives to regain it?. Herein lay uncertainties which afflicted strategy throughout the second half of the war, once the initial Japanese tide began to recede. What was Britain's Far East campaign for? And what would follow victory? No more convincingly than the French or Dutch -- the other major colonial powers in Asia, though they contributed nothing significant to the war effort -- did the British answer those questions."

"In the latter part of 1942, and throughout 1943, Britain's operations against the Japanese were desultory, even pathetic. Led by feeble commanders against an unflaggingly effective enemy, and with scant support from the government at home, troops failed in a thrust into the Burman coastal region of Arakan, and were obliged merely to hold their ground in northeast India. Embarrassingly, in the winter of 1943 the operations of six and a half British and Indian divisions were frustrated by just one Japanese formation. Americans like Lt-Gen. Joe Stilwell, senior US officer in China, became persuaded that the British were no more willing to grapple with the Japanese than were the Chinese armies of Chiang Kai-shek."

Hastings goes on to state that neither Washingto nor Canberra approved of British strategy in Burma and both capitals rrejected requests for American and Australian reinforcements. On Page 67, Hastings says;

"If the British wanted to recapture Burma, they must do it with their own resources. 'If our operations formed merely a part of the great American advance,' cabinet minister Oliver Lyttelton warned the British chiefs of staff in March 1944, 'we should be swamped. It [is] essential that we should be able to say to our own possessions in the Far East that we had liberated them by our own efforts.' Thus the British government knew that a campaign to retake Burma would be difficult, and would not bring the defeat of Japan a day closer."

There it is. The British efforts in Burma were not about the defeat of Japan, but solely for the purpose of restoring their national pride and facilitating the return of their colonial possessions appropriuated by Japan.

Your assertion that British and Indian troops tied up Japanese forces in the CBI is absurd in light of the fact that there were nearly 400,000 British, 100,000 Chinese, and nearly 2,000,000 Indian troops in the CBI, not to mention Americans, Australians and other Commonwealth troops, and never more than 350,000 Japanese. It was the Japanese who successfully tied up Allied troops in Southeast Asia.

DA, you seem to have a problem with us Brits and this is apparent in this thread and also in your keeping mostly to the what if cartoon thread i disagree with what you say and dont have the time or patience to reply in length to your anti brit comments just think this over if the 14th army had sat on thier collective arse in the CBI what would the outcome of been

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WHEN YOU GO HOME, TELL THEM OF US AND SAY, FOR YOUR TOMORROW,WE GAVE OUR TODAY. Epitaph on the Kohima memorial .

So stating facts and quoting a British military historian's conclusions is "anti-British"? Is that because you just don't like the facts? They don't make the Brits look glorious enough? I suggest you get Hastings' book and read it.

No I guess you don't have the time or patience to respond with any reasoned arguments, that's pretty obvious from your poorly reasoned and emotional tirades.

BTW, I have thought over the outcome if(?) 14th Army had sat on it's a$$ for the entire war instead of just the first 36 months. The outcome of the Pacific war would have been exactly the same. And Max Hastings, judging from his comments, believes the same.

Of all the military historians who have written of the Burma campaign you choose some limited quotes from Max Hastings, to support your argument you really must try better than that DA. And to say that if the 14th Army had beeen completly inactive that would not have affected the outcome of the war in any way complete and utter bullshit. And the turnaround in Burma/India started in 1943 when Slim was appointed GOC 14TH Army with the first victory in january of 1944 with victory complete in june of 45, then you yanks drop 2 atomic bombs in aug 45 because you had so defeated the Japanese

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WHEN YOU GO HOME, TELL THEM OF US AND SAY, FOR YOUR TOMORROW,WE GAVE OUR TODAY. Epitaph on the Kohima memorial .

Limted perhaps, but to the point, and definitely saying the same thing I am. So no, I don't have to try harder, my reference is right on target. Your post implies you have some problem with Hastings as a historian; what is it? if you really think he is wrong, why don't you supply some sources with quotations supporting your assertions? And not just some links to generalized websites that really don't address the issue I've raised. In case you've forgotten, the issue is that 14th. Army in Burma defended the Indian border, and in 1945, recaptured Burma, but really didn't have any strategic effect on the outcome of the war.

And the second issue that you seem to be raising is that the Americans, Australians, and New Zealanders didn't defeat Japan. Or is it that Japan wasn't really defeated until the atomic bombs were dropped? You aren't very clear on this implication; just what is it that you are saying?

Well, I'm not asking anyone for a history lesson. But my own thoughts.

DA is correct in the fact that the Pacific war was an American, war, I'm not saying he said that, but I cant be bothered to read the whole lot again...The Americans didn't need or want our help. Plenty of written docs and biographies exist to prove that.

DA is also correct in the strategic thinking of the Brits and how it differed from the Yanks in the Burma theatre...Our aim as he points out is to protect India, reconquer Burma and on to Malaya and Singapore and get our previous losses back as a first priority, and if possible force a naval group on the yanks whether they want it or not...got to be there at the finish after all...Thats Churchill...

Yans knew this, saw it as Brits and Empire once more and were not in the least bit interested in Burmas relief for any other reason than the supply of China.
FDR, unlike Churchill had a bee in his bonnet over China, thinking at first they were the key to the war in that area. Churchill on the other hand thought the opposite right to the end, even over inclusion in big 3,4 or big what ever figure was thought of around the peace table..

Therefor Americas only interest in the area was not in how many divisions were tied down in Burma, what the threat to India was...but only in how it fitted in to supplying China and therefore meeting their own objectives...no not Objective Burma...Errol go back to bed.

The loss of the Burma road supply route even before the war to politcs was a major problem in USA's planning and thinking of the time...the actual physical loss when the British began their longest ever retreat in arms was a major obstacle to American planning and thinking.

Here we have yes, the bravery and individual battles that shine for the British in Burma, even if in retreat...there was more to it than just a rout, but a rout it most certainly was. There could be no other way....Starved too long for other theatres...And rightly so in my own view...Sittang bridge fighting...heroic and at times idiotic decisions, but the individual soldier as DA says was a different matter. They did their best...

Best for them under Slim was yet to come at Kohima etc and the reconquest of Burma. DA I think has no quibble with that. But did it help with the Pacific war...?

I can only ask a few questions...

What was the importance of the Burma Road to America in the early days of their ww2?

The hump and the new road of supply a major engineering feat, bettered by little in my view throughout the war, and a petrol pipeline etc that was nothing short of a testament of great American engineering...
That new supply line figured heavilly in Americas planning and decision making processes...

So how important was this supply line to keeping China fighting the way America wanted it to...(not withstanding the fact they seemed to be quite intermittent on that score)??

Was The Chinese effort or the percieived effort at the time, not in hindsight but at the time...was that important in any way to the Pacific war in the minds of FDR and his Generals, Admirals and advisors?

If the answer is no, then what was its purpose?

If the anser is yes, then I would state that the 14th army's battle even if not for the reasons of affecting assistance to the Pacific theatre in many Americans minds, stopped the new supply lines from being over run and thus gone. How would this affect the American mindset or physically effect it and the war in China and also the Pacific if gone?

The defence of India mattered too...Calcutta being bombed gave a good insight to the northern Indian airfields and the use that could be made against China if they too had been overun...

So maybe we are looking at this from 2 different angles.

The British indeed wanted to defend India, relieve Burma and reconquer lost territories.

The Americans thought only of China.

So did the 14 th army whether by intent or not, defend and allow the American plan for China at the time go ahead and did this or was this supposed to help in the pacific theatre.

The 14th army fought their battles heroically, and held many Japanes troops in Burma, that is not I think what DA is saying anyway....

But how many Japanes where the Chinese holding down in China?

And how did that effect the Pacific theatre and troops needed on islands etc?

I dont know...I'm willing to listen...

As for Hastings, I have my own much personal view on the man...His Overlord book was good for figures and records, but nothing new brought up in it..

As an Historian....I remember well him storming the Falklands beaches in his reports back home...My god the man virtually won that war on his own...I have not since read any of his works without remembering the accuracy of his Falklands reports and books.
And then I read someone elses version.

I think this is a fair assessment. But I also think that early in the war, Roosevelt and some within the JCS had an unrealistic hope that Britain might use India as a base for the recapture of Burma, Malaya, and Singapore, thereby putting pressure on Japan to reinforce it's flank in the Southern Resources Area (SRA). This didn't happen, of course, and probably never could have, due to Britain's situation in Europe and the Med.

Very true, and Churchill undoubtedly had the more realistic view. Roosevelt and the JCS persisted in believing, right up until mid-1944, that China had to be kept in the war with lavish American aid. What no one in Washington seemed to realize is that China had pretty much opted out of the war shortly after it became obvious that the US was going to defeat Japan. Neither Chiang nor Mao saw any point in exerting themselves to challenge Japan, when the US was going to win anyway.

Agreed. The average British and Indian soldier fought as best they could, though without much success, due to inept leadership, lack of material resources and a general lack of concern among the military leaders in England.

I think Roosevelt and the JCS felt maintaining supplies to China was important to keeping China "in the war". By "in the war", Roosevelt meant actively fighting the Japanese and keeping the pressure on the Japanese Army in China. The hope was, that this would keep the Japanese from being able to pull any units out of the Asian mainland to reinforce their forces in the Pacific. Of course, this never happened, and by mid- to late 1944 this was becoming obvious to the military and political leadership in Washington.

But the 14th Army didn't stop the supply lines to China from being cut by the Japanese. The supplies were cut off because the 14th Army waas not able to hold northern Burma. And since there was no apparent interest on the part of the British in recapturing even northern Burma, it became necessary for Stilwell to launch an offensive to that end utilizing American-trained Chinese troops. That was the major reason most Americans in the CBI felt the British troops there were doing nothing.

The Japanese could not have effectively attacked China from airfields in northern India. There is a little matter of the Himalaya mountain range being in the way, not to mention the impossible logistics for the Japanese. The Japanese had already cut the American supply lines to china through northern Burma; closing the port of Calcutta, or any other Indian port, wouldn't change that. The defense of India mattered, but only to Churchill and his generals.

The intentions of the British and Americans in the CBI were divergent, no doubt of that. Britain wanted to protect India as a colony; the US wanted to keep China supplied because it felt that China was keeping the Japanese occupied (to the tune of possibly a million men) while the US slogged it's way across the Pacific.

In reality, both were mistaken.

Japan did not intend to occupy India as part of it's Phase One campaign; if it had it would not have stopped after routing the British Army in Burma. Yes, I know they attacked Kolima and Imphal in 1944, but this was a desperation spoiling attack to ruin Britain's planned campaign to retake Burma.

The US was wrong about China and the occupying Japanese. Japan did keep about a million men on garrison duty in China, but the supplies the US sent to China weren't really a factor in this because, after 1942, the Chinese did nothing with them. In fact, thousands of the better trained and better equipped Japanese troops were pulled out of China and sent to the Pacific. By the beginning of 1945, the Japanese army in Asia was a mere shell of it's former self.

So neither the US nor Britain realized it's expectation/hopes in the CBI and regardless of what either nation perceived as being the case, nothing that took place in the CBI had the slightest effect on the outcome of the Pacific war.

It's true that the British soldiers who fought in Burma for the most part did so heroically, but there were almost 400,000 British and close to 2,000,000 Indian and other Commonwealth troops in India/Burma, not to mention thousands of Americans (mostly engineers and logistical support), serving in the theater. While Japan had no more than 350,000 troops assigned to the theater. So if anything, the Japanese were tying down far more Allied troops than vice versa.

I'd go along with most of that, I do have concerns about one or two things but will come back later on them.

Thanks for the salute on him Wtid, Ive been reading up on the strategic demands and requirements for China in Fdr's area and the importance of in his mind keeping China in the war at whatever costs. Interesting stuff...I have a bit I would like someone like DA with his home knowledge to clarify on this.

As for Hastings....You know his nickname in Falklands by military....Wendy....Or on a good day paras called him....her upstairs.....

They had to be forcibly stopped on passage down on one occasion from forcing a cork somewhere where a cork is not supposed to go....He was held in such high regard by all....

What is it you would like clarified?

I don't particularly care what the British military thought of Max Hastings. All I'm interested in is does he have any failings as an historian?

Yes.. He tells fibs.