Forget Putin and the 2016 election, look at the 1940 Presidential election

This is a condensed version of a comment that I thought I had posted but it didn't make it.
During the early to mid to late 30's,Hitler, Italy, and Japan were militarily aggressive and the Pact of Steel was signed, in May of 1939. For various reasons Japan was invited to join but declined. FDR was alarmed at what he saw, knew, that at some point, the US would have to get in but he also knew that the US wasn't ready either mentally or materially. He had to win re-election, in 1940, in order to prepare the country for war and he did one hell of a job. He was consistently leading, in the polls, running up to the 1940 Presidential election , while at the same time, was also actively, publically, and successfully getting his war preparedness plans authorized; some of which were massive increased appropriations, the first peacetime draft, revisions to the Neutrality Acts so that France and Britain could buy war material, the Destroyer for Bases Agreement, the Neutrality Patrol, and the authorization to call up the National Guard and Reserves.He also prodded Japan, by terminating the 1911 commercial treaty with Japan, signing the Export Control Act which cut off aviation fuels and scrap iron to Japan, and moving the Pacific Fleet to Hawaii and away from the West Coast.
What was Wilke doing during this time? Nothing, but trying to sway votes by calling FDR a war monger. Hitler, Italy, and Japan saw the consequences, if FDR should win , so they came back, repeated their wedding vows of the Pact of Steel, and went one better. They signed the Tripartite Pact, in September of 1940, barely two months before the general election. This time Japan eagerly signed on the dotted line. The one better is Article 3, of the Tripartite Agreement.
ARTICLE 3
Japan, Germany and Italy agree to cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict.
In September, of 1940, who was the only major country not formally involved in Europe or the Sino- Japanese Conflict? Yep, the US,and, if FDR was elected, they knew that they were about to get smoked. That's why they came back, just a few months later and signed the Tripartite Pact, with Japan jumping onboard. The difference, in the two agreements is that having Japan onboard insured a two ocean war, and the Article 3 language was a not so subtle threat, to elcet Wilke and not the war monger.

 

Potato or Potattoo. He received Congressional authority, to call up the National Guard and the reserves, in August of 1940. By September of 1941, National Guard units had been deployed to the Philippines. It's one thing to call up reserve units before getting attacked but why call up and deploy National Guard units before December 7th? The only answer is that FDR expected the Japanese to attack, somewhere, and he was putting assets into potential combat zones, before the attacks occured.

 

Where's your proof, something, anything, that backs up your lunatic theory that FDR didn't intentionally back Japan into a corner?

 

Proving that something didn't happen has an odd ring to it. Shakes head.

 

In this case, it's easy to prove something didn't happen. Find one thing that FDR promoted, approved of , or signed that helped Hitler, Italy, or Japan, from the early 30's until Dec.7th, 1941. The closest thing is FDR signed the Neutrality Acts of the mid to late 30's. Even then he had to be led , while kicking and screaming, to do it.

 

One would be hard pressed to find any President eager to circumscribe executive power on the diplomatic stage, especially during a period where the world seemed to be going mad.

 

Sigh...is there something in the water? The same lunatic notions are going the rounds at TankNet. I'm really uninterested in debating this hoary old canard, but at least it might help if you had the actual timeline of events and who initiated them and what the reactions were...

1931
18 September: Liu-Tiao-Kou Incident (outbreak of Manchurian Incident) Japanese forces occupied Mukden, Changchun and Kirin.
26 October: US Government called on Japan and China to abide by the Non-Aggression Pact.

1932
7 January: US Government notified Japan and China of her non-recognition of the status quo in Manchuria.
15 March: US Government announced non-recognition of Manchukuo.

1933
24 February: General Assembly of League of Nations approved Lytton Report.
25 February: US supported resolution of League of Nations.
27 March: Japan issued notice of withdrawal from League of Nations.
31 May: Truce agreement reached between Japan and China.
5 July: Agreement reached between Japan and China whereby Japan withdrew from North China.
7 August: Kwantung Army withdrew to Great Wall line.

1934
23 October: Preliminary conference for Naval Disarmament Conference held in London.
29 December: Japan denounced London Treaty.

1935
9 December: Five-power naval disarmament conference held in London.

1936
15 January: Japan withdrew from Naval Disarmament Conference in London.

1937
27 March: Japan notified British Government of non-participation in conference for limiting guns aboard capital ships.
7 July: Marco Polo Bridge (Lukouchiao) Incident begun – origin of Sino-Japanese Incident.
6 October: US Government issued a statement accusing Japan of violating the Kellogg Peace Pact.
12 December: Japanese aircraft attack and sink USS Panay in the Yangtze River.

1938
1 July: Department of State notified aircraft manufacturers and exporters that the United States Government was strongly opposed to the sale of airplanes and aeronautical equipment to countries whose armed forces were using airplanes for attack on civilian populations.

1939
26 July: US notified Japan of the abrogation of the US-Japan Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in consequence of Japan’s continued attack on American citizens and encroach on American interests in China.
4 November: US repealed Arms Embargo Act.

1940
4 June: US embargo on export of machine tools to Japan.
2 July: US Export Control Act passed authorizing the President, in the interest of national defense, to prohibit or curtail the export of basic war materials.
22 July: "The Outline for Handling Current Affairs with a Shift in the World Situation" was approved at the Imperial General Headquarters and Government Liaison Conference.
25 July: Partial US ban certain grades of steel and scrap iron, and some lubricants.
26 July: US issues ambiguous regulation restricting export licenses for aviation gasoline, which could be interpreted to include virtually all POL products.
27 July: "Principles to Cope with the Changing World Situation" approved by Japanese Cabinet; national policy changed to a stance of presupposing war with the United States.
6 August: US clarifies regulation on aviation gasoline export licenses.
22 September: Japan pressures Vichy government into agreeing to Japanese operations in northern Indochina.
27 September: United States placed an embargo on export of scrap iron to all nations outside the Western Hemisphere, including Japan. Japan-Germany-Italy Tripartite Alliance Pact signed.
16 October: Embargo on export of iron and steel scrap goes into effect.
12 November: Royal Dutch Shell and Standard Vacuum sign contracts with Japanese government for POL deliveries in the first six months of 1941 that were one-third the Japanese demand. Critically, the contracts require deliveries by Shell and Stanvac tankers (a minor part of the total) be paid in yen, while deliveries by Japanese tankers (the major part of the total) be paid in dollars.
10 December: Copper, brass, zinc, bronze, nickel, and potash added to embargo.

 

1941
13 January: Initiation of part of naval war preparations plans (emergency war preparations).
6 March: US Secretary of State Hull initiated a request to the Maritime Commission that pressure be put on American companies operating foreign-flag tankers to withdraw them from the Japanese trade. Due to the language of the 12 November contract, the withdrawal of American tankers means virtually all of the Japanese oil deliveries for the first six months of 1941 were dependent on payment in dollars.
6 March: Without a public announcement, the US State Department Division of Export Controls suspends action on approving gasoline export licenses.
11 March: Extension of US Lend-Lease Act to include China.
27 March: Passage of the Pacific Bases Reinforcement Bill (1.5 billion dollars) through the U.S. House of Representatives.
25 June: Imperial General Headquarters and Government Liaison Conference, the government enacts policy directly in line with the views of the Army and Navy General Headquarters that southern French Indochina needed to be secured in order to acquire rubber and tin.
2 July: Outline of the Empire's “National Policy to meet the Changing Situation” authorizing occupation of southern French Indochina ratified at Imperial Conference. The US knows of the decision almost immediately via MAGIC decrypts of Japanese embassy cables.
23 July: Notification by the United States to the effect that grounds for negotiation would be destroyed by the Japanese forces' occupation of southern French Indo-China.
25 July: Japanese assets frozen by United States.
26 July: Japanese assets frozen by Britain.
27 July: Japanese assets in Dutch East Indies frozen and Japanese imports and exports limited by Dutch government.
29 July: Announcement by Japan's Imperial General Headquarters to the effect that Army and Navy forces will be dispatched to southern French Indo-China in conformity with the French-Japanese Joint Defense Agreement.
1 August: US revokes export licenses on all POL exports. Cryptically, the Division of Export Control stated applications could be resubmitted, but would not be approved if they exceeded "prewar quantities" or involved "fuels and oils suitable for use in aircraft and . . . certain raw stocks from which such products are derived."
6 September: Outline for the execution of the Empire's State Policy decided at Imperial Conference.
10-13 September: Combined Fleet regular table maneuver and special table maneuver (including study of Hawaii Area Operations) at the Naval War College.
24 September: “In connection with the turning point of political and military strategy, the following was proposed to the Government by Imperial General Headquarters in regard to the diplomatic negotiation then under way: 1. A deadline date of 15 October be set for diplomatic negotiations. 2. The latest possible date for the commencement of Southern Operations be mid-November. 3. Preparations be made to begin operations in early November.”
28 September: Japanese occupation of southern (Cochin) Indochina.
8 October: Embargo on gasoline shipments to Japan by the US, Britain, and Holland.
20 October: Unofficial adoption of a basic naval operations plan (including attack of Pearl Harbor) to prepare for the possible outbreak of war.
21-30 October: Daily Liaison Council between the Imperial General Headquarters and the Government. "Outline for the Execution of the Empire's State Policy" reached on 6 September at the Imperial Conference rescinded. A new study on war with US, Britain, and Holland was commenced.
1 November: Formulation of draft plan "Outline for the Execution of the Empire's National Policy" at Liaison Council meeting between the Imperial General Headquarters and the Government.
3 November: Yamamoto, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, called in by the Chief of Naval General Staff and informed of operations plan.
4 November: Adoption of "Outline for the execution of the Empire's National Policy" at a Cabinet Conference.
5 November: Adoption of the "Outline for the Execution of the Empire's National Policy" at Imperial Conference. Issuance of Imperial General Headquarters "Navy Order No 1. Order to complete preparations for operations by early December and instruction on operations plane and policies."
6 November: Meeting of the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet and his staff and all Naval and Guard District Commanders to receive instructions on operations plan formulated by the Imperial General Headquarters.
8-10 November: Agreement on operational plan by Commanders in Chief Combined Fleet, Second, Fleet, and Commander in Chief of Southern Army Terauchi (at the Army War College in Tokyo).
13 November: Operational conferences at Iwakuni between the individual fleets of the Combined Fleet.
14 November: Operational agreements at Iwakuni between the various Armies and Fleets.
15 November: Explanation of the operations plan (in the form of war games) by Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff in the presence of the Emperor at the Imperial General Headquarters in the Palace.
16 November: Completion of operational agreements between Army and Navy (Iwakuni).
17 November: The Carrier Striking Task Force left Saeki Bay at 1700 hours for Hitokappu Bay.
21 November: Issuance of Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order. Advance of necessary forces to operational waters. Permission to use force in self-defense when challenged.
26 November: The Carrier Striking Task Force sortied from Hitokappu Bay toward the point of deployment northwest of Hawaii.
29 November: Liaison Council between the Imperial General Headquarters and the Government. (Regarding declaration of war against the United States, Britain, and Holland. Basic plan established.)
30 November: Report of completion of naval war preparations made to the Emperor by Navy Minister and the Chief of Naval General Staff.
1 December: Decision on "Declaration of war against the United States, Britain, and Holland" at the Imperial Conference.

 

Public Resolution No. 96, 76th Congress, approved August 27, 1940, gave FDR the authority to call up the Guard, which began with four divisions (30th, 41st, 44th, and 45th), seven Coast Artillery (AA), three Coast Artillery (155mm Gun), and eight Coast Artillery (Harbor Defense) regiments, and four observation squadrons, under EO 8530 of 31 August. However, the induction of NG personnel did not actually begin until 16 November 1940 and the last inductions were in February 1941. Most critically though, the authorization was to expire on 27 August 1941...and was extended indefinitely on 7 August after General Marshall's testimony...by a single vote. FDR's request and the Congressional authorization was an extension of the Limited State of Emergency declared by Presidential Proclamation 2352 on 8 September 1939, in reaction to the German invasion of Poland and the French and British declarations of war.

The 192d (activated 20 December 1940) and 194th Tank (activated 12 March 1941, less B Company, 194th, which remained at Fort Lewis, Washington) Battalions were sent to the Philippines for a simple reason. They were available when MacArthur requested reinforcements after the tensions escalated following the Japanese occupation of French Indochina (to "protect" it from Thailand). MacArthur wanted an armored division, but none were available. Only a single GHQ Tank Battalion, the 70th, was organized and active, but was required for the expansion of the Regular Army and AUS GHQ Tank Battalions. Of the other two NG battalions, the 193d also went to the Pacific after Pearl Harbor, the 191st to North Africa, Italy, and France.

The other NG unit sent to the Philippines was the 200th Coast Artillery (AA) was from New Mexico and a large number of its personnel were bi-lingual in English and Mexican Spanish, which is similar to the Spanish spoken in the Philippines by a small percentage of the population. It was sent instead of the 206th CA (AA) from Arkansas, apparently based on that slender difference.

 

I didn't know about Nye until your post. I partially agree with you. Without digging around and mostly just scratching the surface, maybe, he just tried to gave them what they wanted, maybe he was a die hard isolationist, or maybe he was a conspiratorial lunatic. What I do know is that it is 3:00am CST and too damn early for this. Good night.

 

Well done for being an uninterested bystander.

 

It's simply my boilerplate response to this particular unsupported notion. I remain an uninterested bystander when it comes to conspiracy theories and other fantasies, such as historical "what ifism", since I grew out of them about fifty years ago.

 

This all could have been settled with a simple foot race between Wilkie and FDR.

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