Unfortunately, I don't watch tv, I have to rely on the opinions of others... more on, what would Hitler do? From: "At Hitler's Side: The Memoirs of Hitler's Luftwaffe Adjutant" Hitler had interpreted this event (Pearl Harbor) as the signal for Germany to declare war on the United States. I was appalled at his unworldliness and innocence as to an industrial potential which just over twenty years previously had been decisive in the Great War. It exposed the amateurism of his foreign policy and his deficient knowledge of the world beyond Europe. He was relying for the foreseeable future on the hope that the conflict between the USA and Japan would keep the Americans out of the European theatre. He was convinced that his `Weltblitzkrieg', as the historian Andreas Hillgruber calls it, in which all enemies are vanquished swiftly one after the other, would be successful. Presumably this also meant that he would hasten to the aid of Japan, since he spoke repeatedly of the need for closer German-Japanese military cooperation. If so, I thought this would not be a good move. ... ultimately Hitler's extra-European political ideas were based more on his wishes than on reality.
more, from David Irving's Goebbels. Mastermind of the Third Reich. Irving is the only person with access to Goebbels' diaries from the period. We have no choice here. Goebbels did not share Hitler’s hopes for a timely Japanese intervention. He expected Tokyo to sit this war out. But Ribbentrop secretly encouraged the Japanese to believe that if they declared war on the United States, Hitler would follow suit. ... At first Washington admitted only to having lost two battleships and a carrier at Pearl Harbor, with four more battleships and four cruisers damaged. ‘That,’ wrote Goebbels with satisfaction, ‘is a loss of blood . . . that they’ll never make good.’ He was thrilled by Japan’s infamous act: She had had no real alternative. Acceptance of Washington’s ‘provocative and insolent’ demands would have meant her abdication as a great power. ... There could be no doubt whatsoever about Hitler’s next move. ‘We shall have no choice,’ wrote Goebbels, ‘but . . . to declare war on the United States.’ Now, he gloated, Roosevelt had got his war. ‘Of course,’ he added, ‘what he’s got is very different from what he anticipated. He certainly imagined that he could deal with Germany first.’ War with the United States had long seemed likely, particularly since the speech by Hitler in Munich a month before. With Japan taking the first step, what Goebbels described in his hitherto unpublished diary as a ‘gasp of relief’ escaped the German public: The psychological terror, the uncertainty, was over. A mood of invincibility swept over the Nazi leaders. Hitler remarked that they now had an ally, undefeated in three thousand years. ... He is filled with joy at this fortunate turn of events [recorded Goebbels] . . . He rightly points out that he always expected this. That’s true. . . He always expressed the view that, when the hour struck the appeasers in Tokyo would have nothing left to say. . . . Hitler told Goebbels that he had known nothing beforehand. ‘He was taken completely by surprise and, like myself, at first didn’t dare to believe it.’ In his estimate the Japanese now controlled the Pacific Ocean. ‘The Japanese adopted precisely the right tactics by attacking right away and not getting drawn into lengthy preliminaries.’ ‘The Führer,’ Goebbels recorded, ‘is rightly of the opinion that in modern warfare it is wholly out of date, even medieval, to issue an ultimatum. Once you make up your mind to defeat an enemy you should wade right in and not hang around until he’s braced himself to take your blows.’ Hitler confirmed to Goebbels that he would declare war on the United States in his forthcoming Reichstag speech, though delaying it by two or three days, hoping to score a Pearl Harbor of his own against the U.S. navy in the Atlantic. ... At his ministerial conference the next morning Goebbels again warned against encouraging excessive optimism. Over lunch Hitler however expressed confidence that Japan would soon take the Philippines, Hongkong, and Singapore. ... Addressing the gauleiters while still in Berlin Hitler opted for greater candor. He confessed that he had spent sleepless nights worrying whether he was doing the right thing in declaring war on Roosevelt. ‘The Führer,’ Goebbels reported to his diary, ‘is convinced that he would have had to declare war on the Americans sooner or later. . . Now the conflict in the Far East drops into our laps as an added bonus.’ He viewed the battle of the Atlantic with greater confidence. Whoever won there would win the war. Hitler predicted to the gauleiters that the western ‘plutocracies’ would not abandon their Far East possessions, but would fritter away their forces around the world. The present impasse on the Moscow front was, he said, no more than ‘an unavoidable hitch.’
Then find a different source to support your argument. I live by many hard and fast rules in my personal and professional life, and this one always works for me. If you have to preface an argument or comment by citing a work, regardless of the content, by a known and proven Holocaust denier and Hitler apologist, don't continue. You can make due without it.
I wrote: Irving is the only person with access to Goebbels' diaries from the period (the end of 1941) What's wrong with that? Not Irving is speaking there but Goebbels himself. It's mostly copy/paste from his secret diaries. And the diaries reflect what Hitler thought and said. There no other source like this. Not even close. Because Goebbels was there all the time. And because Hitler and Goebbels were friends.
BS. The Goobbels Diaries are published in German in a 29 volume set. The English translations are in 3 volumes each by a different translator. Irving has never published the diaries only sourced them for his book.
The quotes are all well and good, but do nothing to prove your "History Channel" contention that was... Can you provide any sources supporting this contention?
Why not just read the pact: The Avalon Project : Summary of the Three-Power Pact Between Germany, Italy, and Japan, Signed at Berlin, September 27, 1940. Notably Article Three: Germany, Italy and Japan agree to co-operate in their efforts on aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting powers is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict. [my underlining] As others have mentioned, Japan did not enter the war when Germany (and Italy) expanded it to the Soviet Union. Japan entered into a neutrality pact with the USSR on April 13, 1941, so apparently they did not consider that to conflict with their existing obligations under the Tripartite Pact. Japan observed neutrality with the USSR, to the extent of allowing almost half of United States Lend-Lease to the Soviets to pass through Japanese-controlled waters. The Soviets also complied with the neutrality pact. Even their denunciation of the pact, one year before its expiration, was in accordance with its terms: The Avalon Project : Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact
Irving published parts of "his" diaries. The book above was published before the diaries were published in German. I don't think many people here want to read long passages in German. The relevant parts available in English were badly translated and are considered unreliable. And all of that has nothing to do with the subject at hand. The rule is: attack the argument, not the person.
"The present Pact comes into force from the day of its ratification by both Contracting Parties and remains valid for five years" 1941 + 5 = 1946 "one year before its expiration" means otherwise the pact will be "automatically prolonged." It didn't give the right to denounce it at will, it would be a mockery of "valid for five years."
because: "when one of the three contracting powers is attacked." Germany wasn't attacked, Italy wasn't attacked.
Fair enough. But in actuality, I attacked the source material itself. I was giving advice to not use a Holocaust deniers interpretation of history due to proven accusations. Irving took primary source material and spun it to "prove" his antisemitic agenda. Sorry, but if his name is on it, its garbage and factually skewed. Using the diaries is fine, have at it, just don't trust his usage.
I think I've learned a few things from this bot-inspired thread, so thanks to all parties involved. However, it feels as though we've slipped a little sideways into some fine points (not uninteresting). For the sake of clarity, and to be sure I understand the relevant positions here, @wm, could you kindly recap your thesis here (which may have evolved over the course of the thread)? Thanks!
I have done nothing but attack the argument - The reason he declared the war was the Tripartite Pact required it. He couldn't weasel out without losing face and without losing his Japanese ally. The quotes you have provided do not support the argument...As a matter of fact they support the opposite - that the Tripartite Pact was not the reason for Hitler declaring war on the US.
Really? From the pact: ARTICLE II. Italy, Germany and Japan undertake each for himself that none of the parties to the present accord will conclude either armistice or peace, be it with the United States or with England without complete and reciprocal agreement. A formal declaration of war was necessary to ensure as far as possible ... that Japan would remain in the war. "Hitler: 1936-1945 Nemesis" by Ian Kershaw
Let's try once more: Japan was subjected to wanton, months-long economic and political aggression - that threatened her very existence. Japan had to resort to war in self-defense.