Hitlers biggest War Mistakes

All of this input on the German economy comes round to the same thing; a centralized economy doesn't work. In Germany's case, it was a centralized economy on steroids because of the pace of the war. The economy of the USSR creaked along for seventy years only because it had much greater raw material sources to exploit, but even so it ran badly and eventually stagnated into collapse competing against western capitalist economies.
In Germany's case, they were able to run at a high pace only by looting the nations they occupied in the first surge of expansion, as well as their own dwindling stocks of materiel. One must view this in the light of post-war West Germany where (without the crippling debt of pre-war Germany) they were able to produce goods based on market demand and are prosperous until the present day.
During the war, the centralized economy produced war materiel to one customer - itself. This is not sustainable. How could it be? They were producing a product that destroys itself, using their own labor as cannon fodder, and paying for it with treasure from occupied nations that was not renewable due to their own pillage and theft of those economies.
National Socialism didn't work any better than any other type of socialism. And just to avoid the inevitable nit-picking, I define socialism as a government that actually directs production. I'm not talking about a capitalist social-welfare state where production is based on consumer demands.

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Following the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941 and with the onset of World War II, the federal government set out to impose new or expanded controls over the country`s economy. On January 6, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced some ambitious production goals to support the war. As a result, all of the country’s economic sectors were then under increased government control. While economists usually oppose price controls, it was a state of emergency.

The government then sought the cooperation of those who controlled the resources needed to conduct the war successfully. It took many agencies to resolve disputes between workers and management, set price controls, and impose rationing on scarce commodities as part of the war effort. Such agencies as the War Production Board (WPB) and the Office of Price Administration (OPA) were created in 1942 to increase total production and to control wages and prices.

Wage and price control measures, as well as regulating the hiring and firing of workers, was also initiated by the government. The National War Labor Board was established by an executive order of President Roosevelt on January 12, 1942. The board was responsible for determining the correct procedures for settling disputes that could possibly affect any war production. It was also authorized to approve wage increases and quickly adopted the Little Steel formula for wartime changes based on the rising cost of living.

The Emergency Stabilization Act was passed in October 1942, which placed wages and agricultural prices under control. There were immediate wage restrictions, and in order to attract labor, the employers offered a range of such fringe benefits as pensions, medical insurance, paid holidays, and vacations. Because the foregoing were not paid out in cash, they did not violate the wage ceiling. Controlling output proved easier than controlling wages.

The Office of War Mobilization then emerged in 1943 to reallocate the production of military matériel. In order to convert to military production, resources for the production of consumer goods had to be diverted. The great surge in munitions production reached its peak in 1943, after such motives as patriotism and financial incentives drew the necessary resources to war production centers.

In June 1943, the OPA established more than 200 Industry Advisory Committees whose sole purpose was to aid the price control effort. The manufacture of such consumer items as refrigerators, automobiles and even housing materials was forbidden at that time. During World War II, many inflationary pressures were created by shortages of both goods and labor. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased by more than 35 percent. Strict limits were set on the manufacture of numerous consumer goods.

The public supported price controls, and businesses supported them even before they were implemented. Most labor leaders cooperated with President Roosevelt by pledging not to strike. With their cooperation came an increase in union membership, which resulted in a general decrease in labor militancy.

Despite the efforts of the National War Labor Board, the shortage of labor during World War II precipitated a sharp increase in wages. Congress passed the War Labor Disputes (Smith-Connally) Act on June 25, 1943, which authorized the president to take over plants needed for the war effort, thereby preventing further war production disruption because of labor disputes. Although strikes were prohibited, they still occurred.

Social Security also was affected by the price controls. During the wartime crisis, Congress refused to raise the benefit levels (with the exception of veterans); however, it did increase the number of beneficiaries and contributors (taxpayers). With the war there was a revolution within government finances: Revenue demands led directly to a large increase in income tax rates and withholding on individuals.

During the war, a positive measure began for some when the federal government stimulated and controlled the course of private industry by offering low-interest loans, generous tax credits and guaranteed purchase contracts for business ventures. In some cases the government went to great lengths to construct factories, then hand them over to private interests to operate.

Rent control was another factor. In order to have an effect, the rent level must be below that which would otherwise prevail, because controls prevent rents that attain market clearing levels and shortages result. Many economists agree that rent controls are destructive.

With war came the rationing of food and more price controls. For example, in 1945 the food situation had improved slightly and the statutory price of rice was reduced. In 1946, however, harvest difficulties and inflationary conditions created a widespread demand for an increase in prices. When there was no longer a shortage of food grains, there was no further need for price controls.
http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1689.html

 

Military 22/6/41.
From the point of view of running a country which would, in turn, have an impact on a war effort when war came, so many.
Often the agenda of the party was seen to be the priority.

 

Declaring war to the USA in december 1941. Otherwise Fdr would not have a reason to start war for 2-3 years. Hitler did him a favour.

 

Invasion of the Soviet Union and declaring war on the United States six months later... two biggest blunders...the rest like letting the British escape from Dunkirk, delaying Operation Barbarossa, micro-managing his armies and end up fighting on too many fronts, was secondary...1941 was really his downfall.

 

Don't invade Russia.

 

The biggest mistake Hitler during World War II was the two front War. If Hitler had thrown all of his forces into a full scale attack by ground, sea, and air against Britain and conquered the British before Operation Barbarossa he would have had the necessary resources to have made it to Moscow before General Winter stopped his forces. Also by taking Britain and the British Islands he would have left no point for enemy forces to land that was near Europe, thus cutting off the main entry point used by America when they joined the war in 1942. With the British Empire out of the way, Germany would only have to major forces to over come, the United States and Russia. In addition it is very possible if the British were defeated before 1942, that the US may have made no attempt to fight the Germans, and focused all there energy on Japan, giving Germany even more time to tackle Russia.

 

"If Hitler had thrown all of his forces into a full-scale attack by ground, sea, and air against Britain and conquered the British before Operation Barbarossa he would have had the necessary resources to have made it to Moscow before General Winter stopped his forces."
Between August 1940 and April 1941 he was doing this - Raeder knew ( as did his U Boat Commander Donitz) that the navy did not have sufficient forces to Blockade GB and the airforce which was developed to support the army on land lacked everything it would require to defeat GB by directly bombing or attacking shipping. ( In 1940 Germany could neither replace lost aircraft nor could she replace lost aircrew).
Defeating GB was going to be the long haul and one which could not accommodate Barbarossa at any time in the near future and against a fast rearming and expanding Red Army probably not at all. ( Whatever window of opportunity she had against Russia that window was closing and the chance of defeating Russia was never ever certain).
Generals Autumn and Winter did not stop the German Army - the Germany Army had by August been eroded by the demands made upon it by its commanders and by the casualties inflicted by the Red Army. the German Army was overextended, had little by way of reserves - certainly nothing which would cover their increasing losses in men and material and yet they were in a Russian Winter still expected to take Moscow. the changing seasons in Russia were well known - that they changed and that the Germans were caught by them shows how unprepared they were.
1942 would have been no different the outcome would have been the same if anything the Red Army would have been more prepared and we might be debating " had they invaded in 1941".
Germany's mistake - it goes back to Dunkirk and the escape of the BEF, to defeat GB the BEF would need to have been taken only then would Germany have had a free hand in the east, in the east she would still have been short-handed and totally under-resourced to defeat Russia.

 

Even if the BEF had gone into the bag in 1940 , if Britain did not surrender she would have had to be invaded. In 1940 Germany did not have the means to defeat the Royal Navy. At the time the Luftwaffe had little or no torpedo capacity and the dive bomber force had not been trained for major anti shipping operations and accuracy was lacking. Germany faced the same problem that the French had faced at the beginning of the nineteenth century - even through some stroke of luck/British ineptitude sufficient improvised shipping had been assembled and managed to fling an army ashore it could not have been supported and supplied. Hitler's mistake was to indulge in a war against a naval power with an inadequate navy.

 

ARWR - completely agree with you.Had the BEF been captured it might have been a chip on the table to apply pressure to make GB end hostilities but again "what if", surrender would, in any case, probably have been unlikely.

 

Just wonder who else than Winston could have given the Moral spine to continue the war against Hitler?

 

Kai , Atlee the leader of the opposition was also of a similar mind to Churchill, not for seeking terms.

 

Thanks for your comments, I see your point and thanks for giving it.

 

Indeed War Cabinet minutes indicate that only Halifax considered this - even Chamberlain was opposed (and without him Churchill would not have retained his premiership).