Second request first:
See War Department Manual TM 30-430
Handbook on U.S.S.R. Military Forces November 1945 for details on Soviet tactics of the period.
As for Marshall Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky (also spelled Tuchachevski)(1893 - 1937): Began his career in the Czar's army as a Lieutenant. Fought in Poland in WW I. Noted as variously ambitious, vain, clever, intelligent and courageous. Was said to be a passionate Russian patriot and ardently believed in the Revolution.
Within Stalin's inner circle, Tukhachevsky was not often well received by those closest to Stalin. Budenny, Stalin's drinking buddy and crony dispised Tukhachevsky because his military ideas downplayed the role of cavalry (Budenny was an ex-Czarist cavalry sargent). Tukhachevsky was often at odds with Frunze and Voroshilov over military orgainzation and doctrinal matters. He also had the bad fortune to befriend Trotsky.
Tukhachevsky did have some advanced and very "Western" ideas about modern warfare and the tactics by which such a war should be fought. He was a strident advocate of mechnaization in the same vein as Fuller was in Britain.
Tukhachevsky argued for a more professional military and a committee in the Communist International to act as a general staff against Frunze who wanted a more general militia type army. Both Frunze and Voroshilov argued that such an army could win through superior "fighting spirit" of the worker (we all know how well
that works
).
Tukhachevsky was a foremost advocate of military education and study of theory giving the Red Army much of its early military literature including the 1936 Field Service Regulations.
Tukhachevsky introduced paratroops into the Red Army in 1931 and was a mover in orgainizing its first large mechanized units. Although many of his ideas on mechanized warfare paralleled those of Germany and Britain, he, like British theorists of the day, put too much faith in armor at the expense of other arms. He openly denegrated the role and continued use of cavalry advocating mechanization instead. Tukhachevsky thought both Fuller and DeGaulle "brilliant."
His basic premise for battle was that it would occur in four stages:
First, that the enemy's fixed front lines would be assaulted by a combination of infantry, tanks and artillery at its weakest point(s) found by scouting. Next, wherever success was made the attack would be reinforced. This would become the main effort.
The next stage was a breakthrough at the decisive point. In this stage mobile forces of tanks, motorized infantry and, cavalry would encircle the enemy and defeat them in detail.
Last, the use of airmoblie and paratroop forces along with fast tank units would make deep penetrations into the enemy rear where they would attack lines of communication and enemy headquarters.
Although the Red Army never was able to develop these ideas into a truly professional and capable force prior to WW 2, the ideas were there. Generals Martel and Waverll both attended maneuvers where they were as impressed with their size as with their clumsiness in maneuver.
Martel wrote in his
An Outspoken Soldier "The Russian Army was still a bludgeon, quite incapable of rapier work; it had the armoured spikes put on the head of a bludgeon and would strike a deadly blow when it binded; but an active and well-equipped enemy should often be able to avoid or counter the blow and would at least inflict heavy damage on a clumsy opponet."
Had Tukhachevsky survived the purge (he was accused of being a tratior...how original
)he might be more widely remembered as a Soviet Guderian.
