Please read all my posts on this thread and copy and paste the sentences where I would have missed respect for the people of this forum. Sometimes I have opposed different opinions, but this doesn't mean to miss respect, but to have mutual freedom to speak.
I have already said that I was speaking only about that propagandist article that enlarges a question making it more important than it is.

Explain me better such rules, I am not english native and perhaps I don't understand them.

The hammer meant just to say that sometimes it needs long posts to explain some arguments, and long posts can be heavy and boring to read. Nothing hostile, don't worry.

My culture says that the history and the facts are written on the serious books and filmed in the documentaries.
The populist talks can't be considered important and nobody should have to base his culture on such folklore.

Who has studied the history knows that ITALY WON ALL ITS MAIN WARS EXCEPT THE WW2 SINCE ITS BIRTH LIKE SOVEREIGN STATE, IT HAD AND STILL HAS THE WORLD BEST SPECIAL FORCES HIGHLY RESPECTED ALL OVER THE WORLD IN ALL THE ITALIAN MISSIONS and so such bad folklore can't have any importance.

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I agree with the first line Za but not the others .

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman.

Paolo Caccia-Dominioni, Alamein 1933-1962: An Italian Story, Allen & Unwin....Thanks for mentioning it Skipper!
A excellent book and a great source of information.
Unfortunately I lent my copy out to a friend? and have never gotten it back
I feel its a must read for anyone interested in the North African theatre, it should be reprinted!

Wow, that was pretty in depth, thanks JC!

I see that the folklore continues to circulate instead that the culture of the history.
It's a pity for the credibility of this site.

If you don't like the place (a pity, because the other 6,024 members who made 223,166 posts till now seem to like it) why do you keep coming back then? Haven't you made your point yet?


Don't worry Robert, that was the best I could find, but we'll make a decent thread out of this in the end

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I will do it, don't worry. It's useless to try to discuss freely if it is not possible.

However to follow the spirit of this thread I suggest:

YouTube - Benny Hill in the army

Now let's discuss about what reasons pushed Benny Hill to show the british army in such way..

Because Benny had a sense of humour and other personal qualities that seem to be lacking elsewhere.

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Good to read this answer. So it means that I was right, this thread discusses a comedy written from an american in an article. I hope that everybody are aware of this.

No, it appears the comedian is you but I don't hear anyone laughing.

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Thanks. I thought it was very good also. One of my favorites. I thought it was a good read the first time I read it years ago.

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman.

It was interesting to read Kesselring's views and observations on the Italian military and government. Especially this,

"The ordinary soldier received--even in the
field--entirely different rations from those issued to
non-commissioned officers and officers. The size of
the ration was multiplied according to rank, and larger
amounts obviously also meant a better choice of good
food. The officers ate according to their ranks,
increasingly well and copiously. The ordinary soldier
was issued the most frugal ration; had it been
plentiful and good, the officer would obviously not
have needed the double, or still higher, ration
quantity. The officers, etc. ate separately by
themselves, without contact with their men, often not
knowing what and how much they received. Thus, the
war-time comradeship, the main feature of which is the
community of life and death, was being undermined...I
have often pointed out to Cavallero, what a dangerous
effect the above-mentioned conditions had on the morale
of the men...I have personally experienced that our
German field kitchens were being practically besieged
by Italian soldiers, while I was eating excellently on
the customary officers ration in the Italian officers
mess".
But Kesselring continued his unbiased appraisal with:
I do not intend to expose deficiencies by making
the above statements, but only want to clarify the
reasons for the failure of the Italian soldier in order
to give interested persons the possibility for taking
corrective actions. I also do not want to deny in any
way that the relationship ketween officers and men was
nevertheless a good one".12
Kesselring did not hesitate to applaude the "fundamental
decency of the simple Italian man and of the possibility of
progressively developing him into a good tough fighter and
soldier". His appraisals of the Italian soldier's abilities must
be considered very valid because he saw them first hand. He
said,
I have seen much too many heroic performances of
Italian units and individuals--such as the Folgore
Division near El Alamein, the artillery in the Tunisian
battles, the crews of the Kleinstkampfmittel (smallest
means of combat such as one man torpedoes) of the Navy,
the crews of torpedo boats, the units of torpedo
bombers, etc.--not to express this opinion with
conviction. But the decision [outcome] in a war is not
brought about by top performances of individuals but by
the training condition and morale of the entire
army. It is therefore wrong to represent the Italian
soldiers and the Italian people all together as
militarily inferior and unsuitable for a tough war.. In
this context, Mussoloni and his former state
secretaries are either guilty of gross neglect, or
Mussolini is definitely guilty of not having desisted
from war if he was aware of these precarious gaps.13"

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1988/HEG.htm

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman.

"It is therefore wrong to represent the Italian
soldiers and the Italian people all together as
militarily inferior and unsuitable for a tough war.. In
this context, Mussoloni and his former state
secretaries are either guilty of gross neglect, or
Mussolini is definitely guilty of not having desisted
from war if he was aware of these precarious gaps."

I agree with this totally. Regardless of what others may think.

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman.

I agree with you, the only thing I liked in the link in the original post was the willingness to investigate, the premise that investigating the causes of poor average Italian military performace was worthwile is good, the execution was, to be generous poor and the research behind it frankly unworthy of any serious military historian.
Just to quote some of the most obvious,
Garibaldi at second Custoza ?
The author waves aside the war against Turkey of 1911/12 as irrelevant, why? just because in that war Italian performance was generally good, and against the same Turks that gave ANZAC a b*** nose only a few years later?.
Judging Italian performance in WW1 by only looking at Caporetto is like judging the French performance based on the 1917 mutinies or the Luddendorf offensive. Much closer to the truth would be to state that the Italian soldiers in WW1 generally performed no better or worse than his contemporaries. An this despite a leadership that makes Grandmaison look like an expert of tactical finesse. They were so uninspired as to produce over 10 "Isonzo offensives", without without even the common sense to change the names to give at least the impression of some progress, but then the answer to poor morale, in their way of thinking, was more carabinieri.
The subject of Italian poor performance is worth investigating, but rather lies, in the direction of uninspired (at best) leadership, lack of clear strategic thinking, poor average training and corruption in the procurrement processes. I always wondered how the commander of one of the two corps involved in Caporetto, Italy's greatest WW1 reverse, far from being sacked, ended up as chief of the armed forces. With that sort of leadership there is no wonder the ordinary soldiers were poorly motivated. If this looks familiar to anyone who knows Italian politics well ... why should the military be any different from the politicians that ultimately select them? Sad ....

From the other article,

MANPOWER POOL
Manpower came mostly from peasant stock. The personnel pool was handicapped by many local dialects. The masses were not highly educated. They were not mechanically experienced. Gasoline cost 4 times British prices so Italy had an automotive base of only one motor vehicle to each 130 people. In comparison, France had a ratio of l: 23, Britain 1:32, Germany 1:37, and the US 1:4.4. Italy had, however, a manpower pool with two excellent qualities: the willingness to suffer inadequate clothing, food, and supplies and the willingness, if led with anything approaching competence, to fight and die in conditions that would have caused the armies of the industrial democracies to quail. This manpower was misused as Italy followed the fairly common policy of subordinating infantry to other specialties in quality of personnel.

CONDITIONS OF SERVICE
A policy stemming from the 1870’s based on a fear of mutiny and regional succession resulted in the members of each regiment being recruited from several different regions and stationed in yet another region. This caused friction and lack of trust because of different regional dialects, values, and customs.

Officers enjoyed better food, uniforms and living conditions. They had EM assigned to them as servants. Little consideration was given to the other ranks. Their rations were universally described as the worst of all armies. Little thought was given to medical attention, mail, leave, and other factors of pride and morale. Italian mobile kitchens were wood burning relics of 1907………this in a treeless desert.

Rotation: (from an archive)” British Command, even in quiet periods, did not keep its units in the front line for more than twelve days and, after that, gave them foot days’ complete rest in the rear. On the other hand, our soldiers had for months not had any relief from front-line duty; rest was almost unknown to them, as was also the system of relieving for home leave units that were tired and worn from many months of exhausting life and combat in the desert. There were divisions amount the soldiers that had been fighting for more than twenty-four months in the front line, and that had greatly exceeded the theoretical 200 days which American and British experts have set as the maximum limit of physical and psychological resistance in battle, after which, according to them, the soldier becomes exhausted and militarily inefficient.
If the Italian soldier, deprived of means and exhausted has retreated before the superior numbers, strength and buoyant morale organization of the enemy—if he has retreated it is because the limits of human endurance have been exceeded and he could not do otherwise.”

The Italian army was unspectacular and not overly successful, so the individual courage of the Italian soldier was emphasized to give a sense of national pride."

1.JmA - Weapons & Hardware links page

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman.

Thanks for that last link JC that site is quite good and informative and much more helpful in understanding what went wrong with the Italian army in WW2 than major Hansen's one.
On the items you chose to extract I believe the rotation issue is more pertinent to German Infantry performance on the Eastern front than to Italians in the desert. Graziani's army disaster happened to relatively fresh troops. The Greek campaign also was relatively short and as the war went on the italian troops generally improved not got worse, it was the equipment that got worse compared to the opponents and partly negated the better performance of the soldiers.
IMHO there is still a piece of the puzzle I can't see, but the "break" between conscripts and officers is probably the most significant element.

Nice link. It really helped with my history homework and had a lot of other interesting information.

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Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

Welcome JCARLE. If you enjoy ths forum, why don't you go to the new member section and introduce yourself there? You'd be welcome to stay. JC will be happy to read that this thread has helped you with your homework

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Im glad that some of the "propaganda" ooopppsssss...info I posted helped . Thanks.

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman.

Here is another good example of Allied cooperation involving Italian troops.

HISTORY OF TASK FORCE 45
(29 July 44 to 28 January 45)
HISTORY OF TASK FORCE 45

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman.

And the Italian forces in China

The Italian Armed Forces in China, 1937-1943

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman.

How could I have missed this? Of course JCFalkenberg always loves to help people with their homework!

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LOL. Always first and foremost in my mind LOL. I notice that Truthie no longer wants to educate us with his version of the "truth" LOL.

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For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman.