only post for me today as I am heading out the door for a nice 50 mile plus bike ride......

chatted with Ian at JJF pubs on Friday and he told me that the plan is to have the Georg Maier's book Drama between Budapest and Vienna translated by years end......

all for now. Stevin post anything and everything !

E

Some HQ info by Gen Walter Warlimont " Inside Hitler´s headquarters 1939-1945 "

...on 16th January signs of panic snap decisions soon to be proved impractical;" The Fuhrer demands crash action to move two armoured and two Infantry divisions rapidly from Libau ( Courland )."

The same day Hitler ordered that sixth SS Panzer Army , the first formation he had allowed to be withdrawn from the Ardennes for rest, should be thrown into Hungary to protect the vital oil area. A few weeks before Hitler given a direct order behind Guderian´s back for the immediate move of an SS Panzer Corps from the Centre of the Eastern Front to Hungary. Guderian now lost temper.

In his evidence after the war Keitel lifted the veil from these events, admitting that Hitler considered the protection of Vienna and Austria as of vital importance and that he would rather see Berlin fall than lose the Hungarian oil area and Austria.

On 17 january Warsaw was evacuated by the last four weak battalions defending it. This was done without Hitler´s knowledge and without an express order from him. When he heard of it he went into a paroxysm of rage, proving, according to Guderian´s account, that he at least realized that he himself was responsible for the rapid collapse of the eastern front.

The next few days Hitler devoted to studying the loss of Warsaw and to punishing the general Staff for what he regarded as its failure.

In spite of all Guderian´s protests Colonel von Bonin, the Chief of the Army Operations Section and two lieutenant-colonels on his staff were arrested and , with Guderian himself, subjected to days of interrogation by the notorius Chiefs of the SD, Kaltenbrunner and Muller. Bonin finally landed in a concentration camp in which he remained to the end of war.

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First installment. I have tried to translate these writings as true as possible how Jan Vincx wrote them. I have changed some sentences to make reading easier. With all due respect, his writing style is not the easiest to follow.

Translated from: NEDERLANDSE VRIJWILLIGERS IN EUROPESE KRIJGSDIENST 1940 – 1945, Part IV by Jan Vincx and Victor Schotanius

First attempt to break the encirclement of Budapest

On December 24 1944, about 25.000 German and 45.000 Hungarian soldiers got encircled in the Budapest area. On January 1, 1945 –the day the Germans launched their first attempt to break the encirclement- Festung Budapest had a length of 21 Km North to South and about 18 Km East to West.

In the evening hours of December 24, units of the Panzer Rgt.5 “Wiking” that had recently been in combat north of Warschau, Poland, received notice to prepare and move.

On December 26, the troops are boarded on trains. Different convoys leave from the MODLIN-NASIELSK area. Route and destination are kept secret from the troops. The whole operation takes place in complete secrecy. After a 700 Km train ride through freezing weather, the unheated trains reach KOMORN (KOMAROM) on the Danube (70 Km Northwest of Budapest), in the last days of December.

The troops have a good time on New Years Eve 1945 in KOMORN. The troops start marching to TATA at 09.00 on January 1, 1945, after attending a concert on the market square.

The units of Panzer Division “Wiking” that were rushed to the area East of TATA preparing for the attack. To their right are units of 6 Panzer Division, KampfGruppe Pape and an Hungarian Kavallerie Division. On the left side is SS Panzer Division “Totenkopf”. The attack will start at 18.00, January 1, 1945.

The Commander of Regiment “Germania”, Ostubaf Dorr, acts as temporary Division Commander as the C-i-C has not arrived yet. Pz Rgt 5 “Wiking” gets ready to attack with 22 Panther tanks and 10 Mk IV tanks. The regiment consists of hardly two companies, barely 20% of full strength. Ustuf Jan Vincx is attached to II/SS Rgt. 5 as a forward artillery controller. Preparations for the attack are made in haste. The order for the armored units is: Attack via the road from TATA to the east, break through enemy positions and reach AGOSTYAN, 4 Km east of TATA. Then move in Southeasterly direction to BIESCKE and take the hills near that town.

To increase the element of surprise the attack will begin after dark and without the usual artillery barrage. Soon after the troops move out they are confronted by an heavily mined enemy position on the road. It takes till 23.00 before the infantry gets through this position and by 24.00 the mines are cleared. Only then Rgt. 5 can advance towards AGOSTYAN.

Heading his platoon at the spearhead of the Regiment is Ustuf Hinz. He is standing upright in his tank. Just before his tank reaches AGOSTYAN he is hit in the head from behind and is killed instantly. The attack is such a surprise for the Russians that they can’t prevent that many German soldiers who were captured here a week ago are liberated.

The attack, which continues at dawn over the heights south of AGOSTYAN, is held up due to intense enemy fire. Russian artillery even manages to directly destroy a tank from a well camouflaged position. Only when darkness sets in again, 5 Company of Rgt. 5, which is leading the attack now, manages to capture the road that runs in southeasterly direction from AGOSTYAN. Engineers, transported on the most forward tanks, clear the mines. Anti tank positions also have to be cleared. In the meantime, ever increasing numbers of enemy infantry attack from the woods on the steep slopes that are on both sides of the road. The tanks are confined to the road. They are useless in those woods.

In the early morning hours of January 3, the armored spearhead reached VERTESTOLNA, 6 Km southeast of AGOSTYAN. This position is reached at the same time by II Battalion “Germania” under Hstuf Pleiner. A reconnaissance unit discovers a strongly manned and well fortified enemy anti tank position. It is placed where the main road from TATA to VERTESOLNA enters a wood. The guns cover that main road where the German tanks are supposed to come from.

It appears that this position cannot be dealt with by frontal attack. The necessary air support is lacking. Especially now when the enemy is deploying their own air support. Artillery is also of no use due to the condition of the ground.

Tanks drive through a ravine, then approach the position along the edge of the wood and attack the position from the flank. The enemy position, unable to turn its guns far enough, is destroyed. There are no losses on our side. The Russians lose 7 anti tank guns and several tanks.

Due to this action the armored spearhead and the following unit have to fight their way over a winding road through the woods. They have to engage and destroy several Russian tanks that are positioned away from each other at certain intervals. This terrain is completely unsuitable for offensive action with tanks. But there is no alternative. On the right side the woods are on a slope that runs up to 400 meters high and which allows no room for a pincer-movement. At the left side the slope is less steep but other factors prevent the tanks from using the terrain. At the same time neighboring units on both the right and left flank have difficulty keeping up. Because of this the flanks are unprotected. The divisional reserves are used to protect the flanks but this undermines the capacity for offensive action.

In the meantime the enemy forces are getting organized and they utilize the advantages of the terrain: While the Panzers are confined to the road, they hold the woods on the higher lying slopes beside the road. This gives the Russians a great opportunity. Both the division commander and the general are with the most forward armored columns and urge to push on.

The advance progresses slowly until the tank column reaches the end of the wood, a few hundred meter before the town of TARJAN. Shortly before the 1st platoon of the 5th Coy, lead by Ustuf Kerckhoff, reaches this more open terrain, the commander of the 2nd platoon, 5th Coy, Oscha Maenner, is killed. He drives his tank just behind that of Ostuf. Lichte, commander of 5th Coy and is shot to pieces by a Russian tank which has managed to get behind him unseen. This Russian tank is destroyed shortly after.

At 15.00 TARJAN is in German hands. On the south side of the town fighting lasts till darkness. At 17.00 the divisional combat HQ is already established in TARJAN, in an effort to push on the offensive with speed. The terrain, enemy fire and air support take a heavy toll. No sign of the Luftwaffe. Also the effectiveness of our own artillery is becoming less.

Due to the terrain and the fact that other units still haven’t made as much progress as “Wiking”, it is foreseeable that a second MALGOBEK-situation will arise. In order to prevent this, the commander of Rgt. 5, Otsubaf Darges, decides to change the march-route and move to the south in order to reach TATABANY, which lies just over the hills. This route also allows the tanks to operate on more suitable terrain, until they reach the main road north of BIECSKE again.

Kerckhoff’s platoon takes the point position. Tank after tank climb the steep slopes in the dark. Jokingly the tank crews claim the ‘Edelweissabscheiden der Gebirgstruppe”. Because of this movement, the tanks link up with Battalion “Norge” under command of Hstuf. Vogt, that managed to reach this position before.

Strong Russian formations in the back, dug in with anti tank guns and armored cars, are destroyed. Then TATABANYA is reached.

So far, the Hungarian population greets the Germans everywhere with joy. The liberated Hungarians tell the Germans terrible stories about Russian occupation.

In the night of 4 to 5 January, Rgt. 5 attacks from TATABANYA towards the southeast over rather easy terrain. At dawn the troops reach the road running from CSABDI to BIECSKE, 3 Km north of BIECSKE. They completely surprise a Russian supply column and destroy it. Shortly before the troops get on the road to BIECSKE, the commander of II/Pz Rgt 5, Htsuf. Fluegel get hit in his foot, close to the combat post of II/”Germania”. Hstuf. Pleiner leads his battalion to the same position.

Kerckhoff’s panzer platoon leads 5th Coy of Pz Rgt. 5 through the estate HEGYIK, to the south of GSABDI. From there they turn towards BIECSKE. A few hundred meters down the road they receive heavy anti tank fire which knocks out the first two tanks. Kerckhoff and the commander of 5th Coy, Ostuf Lichte, escape the same fate by driving through the smoke and hiding behind a small elevation in the terrain. The remaining combat ready units of SS Panzer Regiment 5 “Wiking”, together with battalion “ Norge” dig in around the HEGYIK estate in porcupine-formation. In the next few days they are involved in heavy defensive action.

Enemy strength increases constantly. Wintry weather and snow restrict troop movement. Forward units of the “Totenkopf” division manage to reach the line MANY-ZSEMBEK en in doing so relieve the pressure on Wiking’s left flank. The flank on the right is completely exposed. The troops that should be there are nowhere to been seen.

Around BIECSKE enemy troops are forming strong defense lines. Still, on January 8, tank units, part of an attack carried out by both divisions manage to capture the cemetery of BIECSKE. Then, however, it becomes apparent that all offensive strength, needed to push through to Budapest, has been used. From now on the occupation and defense of the HEGYIK estate is first priority. The sovjets attack the estate constantly with artillery and tanks. The problem of reinforcements and logistics becomes more and more acute. Only during the night the wounded can be evacuated (carried out under command of Dr. Kalbskopf) and ammunitions can be brought in by truck.

Artillery forces the ‘guests’ to leave the second floor of the estate to the first and finally to the cellar. There is no opportunity to sleep. At night, Russian infantry attack in waves. They capture some houses nearby which are recaptured after heavy fighting. During one of these attacks the commander of I/Pz Rgt. 5, Hstuf Hein gets wounded in his calf by grenade splinters. He stands with Ostuf Lichte in a doorway at the back of the mansion, discussing the situation, when he gets hit. Ostuf Bauer takes over command.

With courage never seen before the grenadiers of Battalion “Norge” under Hstuf. Vogt defend their sector. Every infiltration attempt by the Russian is being repelled. With their war-cry ‘Norge!’, feared by the Russians, on their lips they counter-attack and push them back in intense man to man fighting. Till January 12 the men manage to keep these forward positions at the HEGYIK estate.

The first attempt to break through to BUDAPEST via BIECSKE has been given up. On January 12 they retreat from the HEGYIK estate. The majority of division “Wiking” is being pulled back on January 9th. They are moved to the vicinity of ESTERGOM (GRAN) to regroup, reorganize and get ready for another attempt. This time over the PILLIS mountain range towards BUDAPEST in the southeast.

The remaining panzer units who are moved back on the 12th from the vicinity of BIECSKE don’t understand why the attempt has been aborted. They were a mere 27 Km from BUDAPEST. They won’t participate in the second attempt. They pull back to RAAB (GYOR). From there they move by train to the area of VESPREM.

Generaloberst Guderian, since juli 1944 head of the general staff of the army, visits the HQ’s of generals Balck and Gille in those critical January-days. His impressions of the first attempt to break through to BUDAPEST are included in his book: ”Memories of an soldier”: “The probable cause of failure to succeed is probably due to the fact that the initial successes of January 1st weren’t followed up upon the next night, and we neglected to achieve a complete break through. We didn’t have the soldiers and officers we had in 1940. If we had, this operation would have been a success”.

This severe criticism of the men and officers isn’t correct and doesn’t seem fair. With only a quick look at the staff-maps at the HQ’s, Generaloberst Guderian could have seen that General Balck had chosen the wrong route over wrong terrain for this attack. Sending tanks over small roads, winding through woods in middle-high mountains in the middle of winter and against well organized enemy was against all prevailing rules with regards to tactical insight. With the attacking units of Division “Wiking” there were men and officers who knew the circumstances in 1940 from their own experience. They also knew that in 1940 tank formations weren’t sent into combat at 20% of their strength. Back then they also could count on efficient artillery support and adequate air support by the Luftwaffe, who were masters of the air then.

Therefor; this attempt to break through to BUDAPEST was carried out by brave, experienced men of steel, but they were not prepared properly.


Second attempt to break the siege of Budapest

On January 12, the tanks of Pz Rgt. 5 are being driven from TATABANYA and TATA to RAAB (GYOR) to the north. That same day also sees the end of the attempt to reach BUDAPEST from ESTERGOM (GRAN) that started on January 10.

Regiments “Germania” and “Westland”, which were part in this attack, completely surprise the enemy. The German field kitchens are already preparing food for the beleaguered troops in BUDAPEST. From the already liberated PILISCZENTKERESZT the men can see the towers of BUDAPEST, a mere 17 Km away. Then at 20.00 they receive the order to halt the advance, to the unbelief of the troops and despite the arguments of several field commanders who feel BUDAPEST is within reach. With Budapest in sight and determined to break the siege of their needy comrades, they are told to move back North the next day and give up a great opportunity. They don’t leave before enjoying the spa of DOBOGEKO and stare at the church towers of BUDAPEST one last time. Does it surprise anyone that some of the troops talk about treason out loud and that tens of thousands comrades will have to pay for this with their lives?


PS:I have also found a "rendering of events" of the Totenkopf division in these battles in WIE EIN FELS IN MEER. When I am done with Wiking (which will take me a while) I will start on the Totenkopf material on these battles.

[ 06. March 2003, 04:43 AM: Message edited by: Stevin Oudshoorn ]

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Stevin :

Thanks much for your diligent work in translating from the Dutch for us into English......very much appreciated. Great materials ! I'll translate or I should say type in Steve Kanes article from back in the early 1980's next week when I return from business. Gone for 4 days.....

E

Ok, hopefully no one will find this tedious. As promised from moons ago, Steve Kane's article in 1975. Ops in Hungary and Austira. Last gasp of the Waffen SS

when one thinks of German military offensive ops during the last 6 months of the war, the famous Ardenne attack, inevitably comes to mind. Without question this was Nazi Germany's last major offensive effort, but it was by no means her only attack during the first 3 months of 1945, and while most of them were total failures, Hungary was the scene of two attacks that showed the Russians that the Third Reich was still capable of limited offensive action.
It is true that most of these offensives were doomed from the start. to Hitler, they represented actual chances for a much needed victory, but only the most fanatical of Nazi's shared his delusions. Other military men sometimes saw chances for local victories, but they all realized that such victories could have no effect on the war except the postponing of the inevitable: the defeat of nazi Germany.
The key, or so Hitler believed in achieving victory at this late stage of the war, was the use of his elite panzer divisions of the Waffen SS. Hitler had lost faith in the German Wehrmacht long ago, but he still clung to the belief that his picked SS troops would bring victoiry. this belief was to be shattered in the months to come.
Nevertheless, the story of German offensive ops in Hungary is mainly one of Ss effort. After Hitler finally conceded defeat in his Ardennes counter offensive he quickly shifted the four crack W-SS Panzer divisions that had participated in the attack to Hungary, despite the violent protests of Heinz Guderian, the German tank expert and head of OKH, the Army High Command, which was in charge of the Eastern Front. Earlier in 1945 two other Ss Panzer Divisions had been involved in a futile attempt on Budapest. Most importantly of all, however, was the effect of these SS Panzer Divisions had on the Western Allies, especially eisenhower. In April 45, as the American armies began racing into Germany, great fear existed in their minds over the possibility of a national Redoubt. German propaganda had blown this myth all out of proportion. The basic theory was that thousands of ide-hard Nazis would hold up in the mountainous regions of southern Germany and Austria. This national Redoubt area was supposedly a huge underground factory where weapons and supplies had been stored away previously to sustain prolonged German resistance. tied to all of this was the fact that in April of 45 no less that ten Waffen SS dvisions were in and around Austria and the national Redoubt area. eisenhower knew how fanatical a foe the Ss could be and he took no chances; troops were diverted from Berlin to enable others to seize the Redoubt area as rapidly as possible. The political repercussions of this action are still with us today......

typo errors all mine, more to come

Finally, I've gotten some free time for posting again, and completed more computer upgrades. Although it was hard to resist some of the wonderfully intellectual WW2 debates in the FFZ... think I'd rather keep this thread going. And hopefully this weekend I'll have time to put all this together into one doc.

Nice stuff on the recent posts. Thanks for the translation, Stevin!

More from Ripley... not Spring Awakening yet- Operation SouthWind. German attack against the Gran Bridgehead to make way for Spring Awakening.

One interesting note that I don't think has been mentioned... "For the first time, six SS Panzer divisions would be committed to an operation on the Eastern Front under the command of SS panzer corps, and two of those corps would be under the command of the Sixth SS Panzer Army."
Sepp Dietrich commanded Sixth SS Pz Army, and according to Ripley, "... he did not relish such a high-level command. He left most of the day-to-day running of the army to his staff... Not suprisingly, therefore, many army generals -and some Waffen-SS ones as well- thought Dietrich had been promoted way beyond his ability."

I SS Panzer Corps Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, led by SS Gruppenfuhrer Hermann Priess
Leibstandarte - 27 Panzer IV tanks, 41 Panthers, and eight "antiaircraft tanks". Also, a "full battalion of 36 of the new Tiger II tanks."
Hitlerjugend - 40 Panzer IVs, 44 Panthers, 20 Jagdpanzer IVs, "plus more than 150 armored halftracks." Also attached was the 560th Heavy AntiTank Battalion, which fielded 31 Jagdpanzer IVs and 16 Jagdpanthers.

II SS Panzer Corps, led by SS Gruppenfuhrer Willi Bittrich. Das Reich and Hohenstaufen divisions.
"Like I SS Panzer Corps, Bittirch's command had a heavy artillery regiment equipped with towed 210mm howitzers, and a rocket launcher regiment with Nebelwerfers..." (So this would apply to both SS Panzer corps.)
"Bittrich's panzer regiments were short of tanks, but the shortfall was made up with Sturmgeshutz (StuG) assault guns. They were distributed to the panzer regiments second battalions to augment their Panzer IVs."
(Hmmm... now there's a problem, especially in bad ground. Having to turn your vehicle to engage the enemy in mud could present problems)
Das Reich 34 Panthers, 19 Panzer IVs, and 28 StuG IIIs
Hohenstaufen 31 Panthers, 26 Panzer IVs, and 25 StuG IIIs.

(as mentioned above, these strengths I think are for Southwind, NOT S.A.)

"The German offensive would be conducted in two phases. It was to kick off with a preliminary operation, code-named South Wind, by I SS Panzer corps to destroy the Soviet bridgehead on the western bank of the river Gran, which threatened the German left flank along the banks of the Danube. The Soviet bridgehead held by seven infantry divisions and a number of armored units, was to be bludgeoned out of existence by a head-on attack by the Leibstandarte and Hitlerjugend divisions."
Battle was commenced evening of 16/17 February. German troops achieved suprise, and were able to penetrate 8km before they raninto the first enemy Pak-front. King Tigers were brought up to deal with the enemy. 76mm Antitank shells were unable to knock out any of the King Tigers, and the attack progressed. Hitlerjugend engineers were able to sieze a bridge over the Parizs Canal capable of carrying "Panzer IV and Panther tanks", and penetrated a further 16km. "Armored kampfgruppen from both divisions advanced on 19 February, employing panzerkeil tactics. With the heavy King Tigers and Panthers in the lead... By early afternoon the Waffen-SS tank crews were at the Danube, in the eastern bottom corner of the bridgehead."
(This brings up an interesting issue... Ripley earlier noted only a bridge capable of carrying Panthers- not King Tigers. I'm curious as to how the Germans managed to get the King Tigers across the canals...)

Damn... out of time for tonight already. More to come tomorrow and this weekend...

[ 01. April 2003, 02:18 PM: Message edited by: CrazyD ]

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Seriously, all today is missing is free cotton candy and the annual Bay State Hooker Parade to make it any better.

delays, damn delays...



not done though...

__________________
Seriously, all today is missing is free cotton candy and the annual Bay State Hooker Parade to make it any better.

Crazy :

Keep adding to this please and I will try my best to continue Steve's article from earlier. If the CT will hold off I'll spend some quality time here instead of even looking at FFZ crock.....

E

Heh heh... luckily, my work has calmed for at least a couple weeks, and I'm finally looking at some free time. So no rush! I'm going to finish Ripley this week, and then branch out a bit further and see what else I can find. Late war period is proving to be very interesting...

Course, paying off library fines would be the first order of business...

And hey, without the FFZ, we might not realise how VERY interesting and impressive the WW2 knowledge ammassed here is.


(btw- any book recommendations on this area that would maybe be found in an OK library?)

__________________
Seriously, all today is missing is free cotton candy and the annual Bay State Hooker Parade to make it any better.

ah books.......hmmmmm, I do know of two books, one from Russia and the other from Hungary on the Gran bridgehead. As to the title names..... still waiting for the promised translated book from JJF on Budapest to Vienna which I think will gather all our info collected into one tremendous volume but appears to be out next year...maybe ?

E

Next year "maybe"? "Hopefully"!!! The last year of the war seems ot be an area of little research. At least as compared to other subjects. More books would certainly be nice...
(Of course, you know we'll go through this whole thread, post a bunch of stuff... and as soon as the thread is done, the book will come out. )

More from Ripley...

20th February. "Armored spearhead" (LAH) ordered to turn North to deal with Russian IV Guards Mechanized Corps entrenched on west bankof Gran. Pieper decides on a nighttime attack to minimize German armor losses. The attack proceeds forward, and "several German tanks were lost, but the route north was opened".
Leibstandarte stops to re-fuel and re-arm Feb. 21st.
Evening of 22/23 Feb., HitlerJugend 25th Panzergrenadier Regiment ordered into action against northern flank of IV Guards. "Attacking southwards during the evening of 22/23 Feb., the combined panzer-infantry operation degenerated into confusion when German units failed to recognize each other in the darkness and strated trading fire." (Aside... this sounds odd. Would be nice to get more info on this "freindly fire" incident. Haven't heard of this happening too often in German forces.) This fire attracted Russian artillery, which began shelling the German troops, and stalled the planned attack for at least an hour. Following this, the "assault tanks" (Tanks or s.p.g.?) quickly ran into a minefield, "losing several". Only a daring flank attack by the Regiment's armored personell carrier battalion saved the german troops. The APCs managed to infiltrate a village beyond the minefields. The panzergrenadiers were hence able to engage the russian tanks in armor-unfriendly urban conditions. The russian tanks were forced to flee. Another aside- Ripley's tone makes it sound as if the german APC troops took little or no casualties. Accurate?
This left only a contracted Russian position on the west bank of the Gran.

Feb. 23- preparations for the final assault on the Gran bridgehead.
Germans commence final phase of Southwind, the complete elimination of Russian bridgehead, evening of Feb. 23. In only six hours of fighting, the final pocket of Russian troops at 8:30 hours Feb 24th are forced to withdraw their bridgehead across to east bank of the Gran.

Operation Southwind-
Russian losses- 2000 killed, 6000 wounded, 500 taken prisoner, 71 tanks lost and 180 artillery pieces lost.
Waffen-SS losses- 3000 "casualties" (no distinction between killed, wounded, and captured), "dozen" tanks destroyed, "scores more" german tanks seriously damaged and sent back for repairs.
(I would tend not to trust Riplye's number too much. Dosen't seem to exact, and he also does not at all clarify numbers for Waffen SS.)

In relation to the losses during Southwind, Ripley doea make note of the lower quality of the replacements for the Germans. Personell replacements in the Waffen-SS divisions came at this point in part from Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine- and hence had far less training or morale than regular Waffen-SS troops.
One also has to wonder about the panzers by this point. If AFVs had to be "sent back for repairs"... how thorough and well-done were the repairs?

On to Spring Awakening...

Waffen SS units involved...

IV SS Panzer Corps, led by Gille, Totenkopf and Wiking divisions.

Sixth SS Panzer Army, led by Dietrich.
I SS Panzer Corps, led by Preiss, Leibstandarte and HitlerJugend
II SS Panzer Corps, led by Bittrich, Das Reich and Hohenstaufen

Total- 400,000 troops, 7,000 artillery pieces, 965 aircraft, and 400 "tanks and self-propelled guns".
(another vague reference from Ripley. I'd like to know an approximate ratio of tanks to SPGs.)

Hmmmm... a better-researched OoB would be nice here...

[back to work... more to come tonight...]

__________________
Seriously, all today is missing is free cotton candy and the annual Bay State Hooker Parade to make it any better.

good point, once we gather what we can on these last ops they should be edited and formulated from front to finish and sources used and it should be archived in some way.

you ahve brought up also an interesting point and that bing the numbers of Stug's in the Panzer kompanies. Besides forming a strong Sturmgeschütze Abteilung, many of the W-SS panzer divisions now have one to two Kompanies of stugs to replace the dewindling amount of Pz. IV H and J variants.

E

And by early 45, armor in general was in short supply- making a larger number of StuGs even more noticeable.
Also, further problems in difficult terrain- especially wetlands. Since the StuG (or any TD for that matter...) has to swing the entire vehicle to sight the gun, becoming immobilized is even worse. At least a tank can still make use of the turret weapons!

I put together some numbers really quick (so they could be added wrong )(and keep in mind these numbers are from Ripley, and we don't know how relaible he is...). For Southwind, the I and II SS Panzer Corps had 262 tanks and 53 StuGs. This number does not include the independent battalions- the Tiger company (s.SS.Pz.Abt 101 (501)) and the 560th s.JgdPz.Abt. So- that makes about a 5:1 ratio of tanks to StuGs. BUT- this does not account for the fact that the LAH and HJ had a disproportionate number of tanks for the start of Southwind. The II SS Panzer Corps is likely more representative of the W-SS's "tank strength- 110 tanks and 53 StuGs, or about 2:1. Now Ripley lists for Southwind "scores" of tanks needing to be sent back for repairs. Then, he lists 400 "tanks and self-propelled guns" for Spring Awakening. SO if many of the tanks had to be repaired after Southwind, what were they replaced with? It could be, that for Spring Awakening, the numbers of tanks had dwindled drastically. We know the 101(501) still had a few Tigers... and there was still some number of Panthers still battle-ready. But I wonder what some of the numbers were- maybe S.A. had far fewer tanks than it seems, and the SS troops had to rely almost entirely on SPGs.
Where to get this info? (If it's somewhere earlier in this thread, I WILL kick myself in the ass!)

btw, in regards to my earlier post, Southwind operation was to eliminate Russian bridgehead on Gran river

Also- I had to note this down to get things clear... this has kind of strayed onto the entire Budapest relief attemt, as opposed to just Spring Awakening (in NO way a problem- just pointing it out!! ). So far, Ripley's stuff has touched on three operations-
Konrad - IV SS Panzer Corps (Totenkopf and Wiking commanded by Gille attempt to relieve Budapest- unsuccessful. 1 Jan 45 -> 27 Jan 45
Southwind - I SS Panzer Corps (Leibstandarte and Hitlerjugend commanded by Priess) eliminates Russian bridgehead over River Gran. 16 Feb 45 -> 24 Feb 45
Spring Awakening - Sixth SS Panzer Army (I and II SS Panzer Corps commanded by Dietrich) and IV SS Panzer Corps attempt to relieve Budapest (and according to Hitler win the war or some such nonsense )- unsuccessful.

OK OK, back to Ripley on Spring Awakening

The main effort of the German attack was to be directed between Lakes Balaton and Valencei. This would be the attack area of the Sixth SS Pz. Army. I SS Pz. Corps would advance north on Budapest while II SS Pz Corps would move east to protect the right flank. Gille's men (IV SS Pz Corps) were to suppport the operation on the left flank of Dietrich's army.
Ripley has some thoughts/analysis about the op...
"They [Germans] were expected to advance over waterlogged terrain, which was dissected by numerous canals and rivers. Of greater concern, was the fact that the Russians knew they were coming." Interesting... according to Ripley, despite the paranoia security and secrecy surrounding S.A., the Russians found out anyway.

In the ~month since Operation Konrad, the russians had re-fortified the approaches to Budapest with new Anti tank guns and dug-in infantry positions (in Pak-front arrangement). The russians also based their defences south of Budapest (the direction the germans would be attacking from) on the river and canal system, making advances bridge and road dependent. "Some 16 Russian rifle divisions were in the path of Dietrich's panzers, with two tank corps and two mechanized corps, with some 150 tanks, in direct suppport just behind the frontline southwest of Lake Balaton itself." Whats more, the Russians were also building up armor (1000+ tanks) north of Budapest for their own offensive along the Danube valley. The Germans were essentially wlaking into a giant armored trap, even if they could have succeeded in relieving Budapest.

Enough for tonight. I'll post actual operation tomorrow, and then start examining further sources.

[And I do plan on putting all this together for my (and anyone else's!) files. This late war stuff is really fascinating. Tragic, in a way- the germans really couldn't accomplish anything by this point, and yet Hitler still had them going on a suicide mission...]

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Seriously, all today is missing is free cotton candy and the annual Bay State Hooker Parade to make it any better.

http://preview.thehistorynet.com/mhq...ter99_text.htm

The siege of Budapest

By Peter B. Zwack


On December 24, 1944, Hitler, over the heated objections of much of his staff, ordered SS Obergruppenführer (Lt. Gen.) Herbert Gille to immediately prepare his formidable Fourth SS Panzer Corps, then refitting in the Warsaw area, for deployment to Hungary to relieve the encircled German corps in Budapest. Thus began the disproportionate buildup of German panzer forces in Hungary during a period of extreme peril on both the Eastern and Western fronts. By March 1945 six elite Waffen SS panzer divisions and a quarter of all available Wehrmacht panzer divisions would be committed to Hungary, ostensibly to retain the Reich's last remaining strategic oil reserves.

On New Year's Day the lead elements of the newly arrived Third SS Totenkopf (Death's Head) and Fifth SS Wiking (Viking) Panzer Divisions, advancing in column and without initial artillery preparation, crashed into the overextended Soviet Fourth Guards Army near Táta. Although Soviet Intelligence was aware that Gille's corps had recently redeployed into Hungary from Poland, it had lost track of the two elite SS divisions, mainly because they used different radio security procedures than the more numerous Wehrmacht units. The Soviet failure to track these dangerous units enabled the Germans to achieve full tactical surprise and a quick breakthrough.

This attack from the northwest heralded an extraordinary month of maneuver warfare, coupled with strikes and counterstrikes in western Hungary, with Székesfehérvár and Bicske as the hubs and Budapest always the prize. Although strategically the war was clearly lost, January 1945 would be the last month of the war during which the Germans fought the Soviets with some possibility of securing any sort of tactical victory.

With the loss of Budapest's main airport on December 27, the supply situation became critical. Eighty tons of provisions per day were needed to supply the garrison alone. The Germans threw everything they could into the support of Budapest. A racetrack in Pest was hurriedly converted into a makeshift airport where venerable Junkers Ju-52s flew in rations, ammunition, and gasoline and evacuated the seriously wounded, including the son of German Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel. When Soviet tanks overran the racetrack on January 9, the Germans converted the Vérmezö, an eight-hundred-yard-long park directly below Castle Hill, into a last-ditch landing zone. This narrow park, appropriately called the Blutwiese (bloody meadow), drew constant fire as light aircraft, frequently gliders piloted by daredevil teenage Hitler Youth members drawn from junior flying clubs across Germany, continued to recklessly land by night.

Both sides recognized that the Battle of Budapest was developing into the bloodiest and most sustained siege since Stalingrad. Consequently, psychological warfare increased as the battle intensified. Through loudspeakers and airdropped leaflets, the Soviet chipped away at the morale of the garrison. While Gille told the beleaguered garrison, "Hang on, we're coming!" the Soviets broadcasted, "Gille kommt aber kille [sic] Gille" (Gille's coming but we're going to kill him). Another leaflet read, "Die Schwarzen Raben fliegen aus Stalingrad" (The black ravens are flying from Stalingrad). The Germans generally were unfazed by these psychological operations, whereas Hungarian units, especially those formed from recently mustered recruits, suffered heavily from desertion.

Despite the protestations of General Ivan Hindy, the senior Hungarian commander, German sappers blew up the magnificent Chain and Elizabeth bridges into the Danube in the early dawn hours of the 18th.

While the defense of Pest collapsed, the Germans were surreptitiously disengaging Gille's bloodied but still dangerous corps from the northern sector and stealthily redeploying it south by rail. Although weakened from the failure of their northern option they now planned a belated execution of the southern option.

Once again, Soviet signal intercepts failed to track the SS corps. Four panzer divisions, including those comprising the veteran Third Panzer Corps, flattened the unprepared Soviet 135th Rifle Corps, rending a fifteen mile hole in the Soviet line. German armor rampaged through the enemy positions, gaining a dozen miles the first day. By January 20, in the last great German panzer raid of the war, lead elements of the Third Panzer Division pushed almost seventy miles into the Soviet rear, reaching the Danube near Dunapentele, where they shot up enemy river traffic. The storied First Panzer Division, with its infantry augmented by the Hungarian SS Regiment Ney, retook the key city of Székesfehérvár on the 23rd, unhinging the entire Soviet sector.

This was the last serious Soviet military crisis of the war. Within five days the German attack had split Tolbukhin's front, pinning it against the Danube. Advancing German spearheads were just miles from the Soviets' main supply routes crossing the river and were just one bound from Budapest. Marshal Tolbukhin perceived the threat to be grave enough that he requested to withdraw his forces back across the Danube, which would have meant success for the German southern option and temporary relief of the garrison. For a moment Stalin almost relented, but then ordered the Soviet marshal to hold his ground.

Soviet countermeasures were swift once the magnitude of the crisis revealed itself. Two rifle corps slated for the final reduction of Buda were hurriedly redirected south. The Fifth Guard Cavalry Corps rode sixty-five miles in twenty-four hours, arriving with the other redeployed corps in the nick of time to blunt the increasingly attenuated German advance. On the 24th, the Germans conducted a last-gasp attack that approached to within thirteen or fourteen miles of Buda's southern suburbs. The garrison managed to make radio contact with the fading German spearhead, greeting it with the words, "Warm wishes towards your success and our liberation, ten thousand of our wounded await you."

Once again Pfeffer-Wildenbruch requested to break out, and once again Hitler ordered the wavering garrison to remain in place. Faced with fresh Soviet forces to their front and the erosion of their dangerously extended southern flank, the German relief force was forced to postpone the offensive on January 28, thereby sealing Budapest's fate.

On February 6, the Soviets, attacking from three sides, finally took Eagle Hill after six weeks of continuous fighting. The defense of Budapest was fatally compromised with the Soviet seizure of this key tactical height. From Eagle Hill's summit, Soviet artillery spotters were able to call in accurate fire on the garrison's positions below them on Castle and Gellert Hills. The improvised landing strip on the Vérmezö became untenable. German counterbattery fire was negligible and was unable to answer the torrent of Soviet shellfire. The doomed garrison was relentlessly pressed against the Danube into an area of approximately one and a half miles by seven hundred yards. Critical shortages in artillery, ammunition, and gasoline limited the garrison's ability to respond to any crisis.

Pfeffer-Wildenbruch, against Hitler's orders, directed a breakout to commence at dark on February 11. At eight o'clock that night, while President Franklin D. Roosevelt was dining with Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Stalin at Yalta, the garrison began its breakout attempt.

Three German division commanders lay among the fallen. Hauptsturmführer (Captain) Joachim Boosfeld was in the initial Eighth SS attack. Hit in the leg by mortar shrapnel in mid-January, he credited his survival to his servant, Ricard, who had never left his side and had found him a special pair of Hungarian boots for his damaged leg. Boosfeld related: "All around us people were falling--bodies lay everywhere. Ricard was hit in the head. I pulled him in and treated his face as best I could, my hands shook so much I had difficulty binding the wound." They then joined the attack that overran the Soviet positions opposite Szell Kalman Square, rushed through a factory, and hobbled their way into the Buda hills. Boosfeld evaded the subsequent Soviet manhunt, reaching German lines on February 14; Ricard was captured.

Within a day the Soviets managed to seal off most escape routes and set up an extensive manhunt. Trucks patrolled the edge of the Buda hills, offering safe conduct to those who surrendered.

Many did, and hundreds of them, mostly Germans, were summarily executed and dumped later into mass graves. Arpad Goncz, the current president of Hungary and a Cold War-era dissident and poet, composed "The Mass Grave," capturing his memories of this frightful slaughter's aftermath: "They dug two graves: In one they threw the Hungarians, in the other the Germans and the dead horses. The Germans and Hungarians were usually barefooted: in those days they paid due rever