I also have checked numerous sources and documents on the Battle off Samar and can find no evidence, other than some unsupported claims, that the Yamato managed to hit any other ship at Samar. Just about every account of the battle indicates that the Kongo and the Japanese heavy cruisers caused all of the damage to the US ships that were damaged or sunk at Samar. Statements by Japanese officers aboard the Yamato that day, seem to indicate that the visibility was too poor, and the Yamato too far from the American carriers, to even identify them, or determine how close the Japanese heavy cruisers were to the carriers during the latter stages of the battle. If that is indeed the case, it seems unlikely that the Yamato could, or would have, fired her main battery for fear of hitting other Japanese ships.

There is some evidence that Yamato was not considered a good gunnery ship primarily because she seldom got an opportunity to exercise her gunnery crew. The Yamato's 18" gun barrels could not be relined like most other battleship rifles, but had to replaced with newly manufactured barrels. The Japanese had never made any spare 18" barrels, and had only the extra tubes intended for the Shinano; two of these were expended in tests leaving only seven spare barrels for both the Musashi and Yamato. Since the barrel life of the 18" gun was only estimated at between 200-250 rounds, this didn't leave much margin for practice shoots even if full power rounds were not used, and this may have been why neither the Musashi nor the Yamato gunnery crews got much practice.

As for the Shinano, she was converted while still under construction, to an aircraft depot ship. She was not the equivalent of an Essex class carrier being designed to operate an ar group of only 45-50 planes (although she had hangar space for many more), and was not intended for the same role. She was commissioned on 19 November, 1944, and lost ten days later on 29 November, 1944, to four torpedo hits from the USS Archerfish. Some attribute Her loss to not being completely finished, especially as far as damage control equipment was concerned, and having an inexperienced crew. But in fact, the four torpedo hits, spread as they were along her hull on the port side, and hitting where they did, probably would have doomed the ship even if she had had an experienced crew and "as designed" damage control equipment. The torpedoes, set to run at 10 feet depth, had struck the ship above the torpedo bulges and exactly at the point where the side armor formed a joint with the lower armor. This allowed them to penetrate deep into the ship's vitals and flood many more compartments than they would have if they had been set to run deeper. There is also some indication in Japanese sources that the construction work on the Shinano was shoddy since there seems to have been progressive flooding through rivet holes and bulkhead seams.

Clearly, the Yamato, Musashi, and Shinano, all turned out to be rather useless ships for a variety of reasons, not all of them directly related to their designs.

I remember reading that the Yamato was jokingly referred to as the "Hotel Yamato" by other sailors of the Imperial Japanese Navy due to it's not being used for assorted reasons (lack of aircover, not enough fuel oil reserves, etc).

__________________
On the Plains of Hesitation
lies the blackend bones of countless millions
who, at the dawn of victory sat down to rest,
and resting died....
(author unknown-I wish it was me)

I'm sure a lot of effort and resources was spent worrying about their presence.

Sadly by WW2 the age of the Battleship was over. Its only real use was in shore bombardment. In fact for the majority of Battleships in WW2 you could have the same argument. They were built to fight battles that seldom if ever occurred. Even in Napoleonic times Battleships rarely engaged eachother in combat. It was just necessary to have them to control the seas and defend your country. By the time there was aircraft, aircraft carriers and submarines they were basically redundant.

Not that I've seen. By the time of the Battle of Leyte Gulf very few Americans had set eyes on her. Most of the information accumulated about her construction was acquired after the war had ended and we were permitted access to the information. The Japanese called the 18" main armament the "special 16" which helped add to the confusion of the size of the weapons. By mid 1944 US Intelligence had a pretty good Idea, based largely on a photograph taken on a reconnaissance flight over Truk in February. AFAIK this is the first Photograph obtained by any Allied power of a Yamato-class ship. For a good Idea of what we knew and when try reading through this:
What did the USN know about Yamato and when?

__________________
Please give the Combined Fleet the chance to bloom as flowers of death. This is the navy’s earnest request. RADM Tasuku Nakazawa prior to the Battle of Leyte Gulf
It is the function of the Navy to carry the war to the enemy so that it will not be fought on U.S. soil. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz

The Yamato shot at my dad (personally, no doubt) while he was on the Fanshaw Bay during the Battle off Samar.

The CVEs, destroyer escorts, and destroyers of Taffy 3 eventually let the Yamato retreat.....

tom

Any time a weapon system causes an opponent to divert resources to attack or recon that weapons system it has in fact contributed to the war effort. Just as holding the Yamato in reserve due to oil shortages was a strategic issue, US planners had to figure in how much oil their attacking forces would use to go get her. You just can't let a potential threat of that magnitude hang around waiting to be deployed at the enemies whim. Therefore, the Yamato and her sister did contribute to the war effort in terms of resources of material and time off of another engagement that US forces took to destroy them.
Having said that, was their contributions to the time material asset usage worth the cost of building and operating those ships? Probably not. Had they sank a front line CV carrier or two, disrupted the invasion forces at different locations etc., then maybe you could answer differently. As it stands, the US spent a lot of money and manpower chasing and attacking those ships. War is expensive, how many lives could have been saved on an island with the extra aircover, or fire support the ships and aircraft that went after Yamato, or her sister may have been able to provide? We will never know!

I think what you refer to is a "fleet in being." Expenditure of assets to cover the threat of large ships such as the Yamato taxed the US and assisted the IJN as a by-product. Additionally, a similar situation existed in the ETO. Several German capital ships hid out in the fjords of Norway successfully for years and tied down substantial units of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force for years before being discovered and sunk.

__________________
On the Plains of Hesitation
lies the blackend bones of countless millions
who, at the dawn of victory sat down to rest,
and resting died....
(author unknown-I wish it was me)

I don't think the US ever "expended assets" specifically to counter the threat of the Yamato or her sisters. For one thing, so little was known of the Yamato class in the US that it did not particularly concern naval planners or strategists. Nor did the IJN plan initially to utilize the Yamato class simply as a "fleet in being". Perhaps I am mistaken, but I do not recall any mention in Friedman's US Naval Design History series of a USN "answer" to the Yamato class. The US planned a massive naval expansion that would overwhelm any possible Japanese response either in terms of individual ships (or classes), or through a general build-up of all classes of Japanese warships. Perhaps the construction of a large fleet of heavy carriers could be a considered an answer to the Yamato, but if so, it was primarily aimed at nothing more than general numerical and technical supremacy over the IJN.

Perhaps Richard Worth has some information that indicates a more specific USN response to the Yamato design, but I have never seen any such data.

You are right, my military knowledge leans heavily on land operations. It was a poorly worded thought. Earlier posts on this thread reminded me of the RN and RAF and their watchful eye on the KM capital ships in Norweigan waters. The "fleet in being" phrase was attributed to this when I first read about it years ago, and it stuck with me until now. I have also read in the past about the USNs pre-war expansions to counter the IJN, and I tied these two theories together in my limited mind as gospel....

__________________
On the Plains of Hesitation
lies the blackend bones of countless millions
who, at the dawn of victory sat down to rest,
and resting died....
(author unknown-I wish it was me)

There was a "fleet in being" effect in the Pacific but the fleet the US was worried about was the Japanese carriers. It's biggest impact was at Leyte Gulf as far as the USN was concerned. After that it's biggest impact was as domiciles for aquatic life. I think there was a predeliction to overwhelming force in the USN prewar by late war they had it and they used it.

This is true to an extent, but don't forget, when the USN really got into it's expansion in 1940, the thinking then was that Britain might be overwhelmed and the USN would then be required to be able to control both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, not to mention the Indian Ocean. As it eventuated, the RN required no help, except in ASW, to keep the Atlantic free of Axis naval forces. The USN was accordingly free to employ most of it's heavy units in the Pacific.

I will have to check my sources but do you know when they began focusing fighting ships to the Pacific? I specifically remember reading that in late 42 to early 43, something like 2 out of every 3 fighting ships were still being allocated to the Atlantic for the Germany First policy. This at a time when US naval forces were in dire need of addition ships to push up the Solomons.

I think I read that in South Pacific Destroyer by Russell Crenshaw, but It will be a few days before I can confirm where I read it. I recently moved and all my books are in boxes somewhere......

__________________
Please give the Combined Fleet the chance to bloom as flowers of death. This is the navy’s earnest request. RADM Tasuku Nakazawa prior to the Battle of Leyte Gulf
It is the function of the Navy to carry the war to the enemy so that it will not be fought on U.S. soil. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz

I'll save you the trouble Mike, as I am presently reading that book and have it handy.


Pg 19.

As of 18 Oct 1942, when Halsey assumed command, the policy had been that only 1 in 5 US ships were allocated to the Pacific. He immediately requested through Nimitz, who forwarded to Adm Ernest King, a request to change the ratio. Adm King had been working throught Combined Chiefs of Staff to get this changed to 40/60 without success, until 24 Oct, when Roosevelt ignored the Combined Chiefs of Staff and sent a memo to the US Chiefs, instructing them "to make sure that every possible weapon gets in that area to hold Guadalcanal, and that having held it in this crisis, that munitions and planes and crews are on the way to take advantage of our success."

__________________
Best Regards,
JW

Thanks a bunch Jeff!

__________________
Please give the Combined Fleet the chance to bloom as flowers of death. This is the navy’s earnest request. RADM Tasuku Nakazawa prior to the Battle of Leyte Gulf
It is the function of the Navy to carry the war to the enemy so that it will not be fought on U.S. soil. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz

That is good book. I am enjoying it. Well written with good information.

__________________
Best Regards,
JW

Probably true if you simply count naval units, but when the ratio of heavy units (i.e. warships larger than a destroyer) is considered it is probably closer to 1:1 in 1942 and by mid-1943 it began shifting in favor of the Pacific at a tremendous rate. It no doubt varied during the war, but after November, 1943, when Nimitz's long awaited Central Pacific Offensive got under way, the ratio of heavy units deployed to the Pacific to those in the Atlantic was lop-sided in favor of the Pacific. The European war was an Army affair, while the Pacific war was the Navy's show.

hey guys,
Kind of a dumb question about Yamato and Musashi or my nicknames for both ships, Yammer and Sashi.. they both great ships.. were can i fined any good photos of both ships?
Nikki

Nikki,

try here: http://tinyurl.com/ygybs85

__________________

Hey Joe,
Thanks for that! there both great ships! Both ships took a Good deal pf damage before sinking!
Nikki

These ships were a waste of precious natural resources. I don't know what I would have done instead.

I think the answer to the orginal question of the Yamato doing anything to contribute to the Japanese war effort is yes if you consider the resources her and her sister ship Musashi tied up.
There is no secret that these ships were respected and feared by the American Navy. If these ships had been used properly in Leyte Gulf or if they had been used in the Ironbottom Sound actions, I suspect the outcomes would have favored the Japanese.
People can argue that the aircraft carriers and submarines overshadowed the battleship for top spot all day long. Here's something to think about; what looks more menacing, a battleship or an aircraft carrier?
The only reason an aircraft carrier is considered powerful is because of it's ability to project power. It launches planes to conduct combat operations. Their shipboard armament, is almost nonexistant and would never be able to hold it's own in a ship to ship action.
The only reason a submarine is considered powerful is because it can use stealth to attack. What happens when their torpedoes are exhausted? During the war, a lot of subs were lost from depth charge or gun attacks.
The battleship, regardless of country of origin was and still is one of the most powerful types of ships ever built. I like to say that they hold the most concentrated amount of conventional floating firepower compared to anything else in the world. I will concede one thing to the carrier, it was proven how devastating they can be used when launching airstrikes.
You want an example of the battleship's worth? Look in the 1980's when President Ronald Reagan reactivated the Iowa class battleships. They can carry cruise missiles and are even more powerful at sea.
I have to say that if I had been alive during the war and was a ship's captain, I would have wanted a battleship. Wars are won and lost by the decisions made.

[QUOTE=Bulldog1653;455256]While you might be able to make an arguement for Guadalcanal here (I really don't know why they weren't used) by the time they were brought in for Leyte Gulf they were pretty much used as they were intended and one got sunk the other took some damage. It was too late in the war and without any semblence of air cover they were sitting ducks for the TF 38 carriers once located.

Frankly, if a ship looks menacing or not is completely irrelevant. The carrier is not designed to slug it out ship for ship, it's entire offensive strength lies in the aircraft it carries allowing the battle to take place far enough away to keep the carrier from being subjected to a battleships guns.

Quite simply the sub goes home to rearm. What happens when a battleship runs out of projectiles...the same thing.

And hideously expensive in both money and crew to maintain and operate. By the time the war rolled around battleships were for the most part good for only two main tasks, carrying an inordinate amount of anti-aircraft weaponry (see the fast battleships of the North Carolina class around Guadalcanal and later) or for shore bombardment in preperation for an amphibious assault. Surigao Strait was the last hurrah for battleships in a ship to ship action and even most of those in Oldendorf's battleline were older ships resurrected from Pearl Harbor. As for mordern times there isn't much that a battleship can carry that a modern cruiser or destroyer can't carry. There just isn't much need for a 16in gun unless you plan on storming an enemy held beachfront anymore and these may even be outdated soon.

__________________
Bill Murray

"God is great, beer is good, and people are crazy."
Billy Currington

[QUOTE=Bill Murray;455387]9 16" guns and armor to resist the same. Now the utility of that is another matter.

According to this website here it cost 1.7 Billion dollars to modernize and reactive the Iowa's in the 80's. Add in the cost of fuel, paying the sailors, feeding them, etc. In the end, they turned out to be a hassle. 47 sailors killed when the Iowa's number two turret exploded. How many Civilians were killed when the USS New Jersey put up a poor show shelling positions in Lebanon? The quote I heard was something along the lines of "she hit everything except her target". Firing some missiles into the desert, when frankly, another ship a third the size can fire the same missile. In the First Gulf war, the USS Missouri's anti-missile defenses caused a friendly fire incident.

You may have wanted a battleship, but for nothing more than pride. Even when reactivated in the 80's, they were to be in the role of offshore bombardment. We realized that the age of the battleship had ended, we just couldn't admit it.

__________________
Please give the Combined Fleet the chance to bloom as flowers of death. This is the navy’s earnest request. RADM Tasuku Nakazawa prior to the Battle of Leyte Gulf
It is the function of the Navy to carry the war to the enemy so that it will not be fought on U.S. soil. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz