This from Field Marshall Kesselring about the Italian military.
" We have already noted the weak officer-enlisted relationship
which existed during World War I. That tradition continued into
World War II and was observed with concern by Kesselring. He
said,The ordinary soldier received--even in the
field--entirely different rations from those issued to
non-commissioned officers and officers. The size of
the ration was multiplied according to rank, and larger
amounts obviously also meant a better choice of good
food. The officers ate according to their ranks,
increasingly well and copiously. The ordinary soldier
was issued the most frugal ration; had it been
plentiful and good, the officer would obviously not
have needed the double, or still higher, ration
quantity. The officers, etc. ate separately by
themselves, without contact with their men, often not
knowing what and how much they received. Thus, the
war-time comradeship, the main feature of which is the
community of life and death, was being undermined...I
have often pointed out to Cavallero, what a dangerous
effect the above-mentioned conditions had on the morale
of the men...I have personally experienced that our
German field kitchens were being practically besieged
by Italian soldiers, while I was eating excellently on
the customary officers ration in the Italian officers
mess".
But Kesselring continued his unbiased appraisal with:
I do not intend to expose deficiencies by making
the above statements, but only want to clarify the
reasons for the failure of the Italian soldier in order
to give interested persons the possibility for taking
corrective actions. I also do not want to deny in any
way that the relationship ketween officers and men was
nevertheless a good one".12
Kesselring did not hesitate to applaude the "fundamental
decency of the simple Italian man and of the possibility of
progressively developing him into a good tough fighter and
soldier". His appraisals of the Italian soldier's abilities must
be considered very valid because he saw them first hand. He
said,
I have seen much too many heroic performances of
Italian units and individuals--such as the Folgore
Division near El Alamein, the artillery in the Tunisian
battles, the crews of the Kleinstkampfmittel (smallest
means of combat such as one man torpedoes) of the Navy,
the crews of torpedo boats, the units of torpedo
bombers, etc.--not to express this opinion with
conviction. But the decision [outcome] in a war is not
brought about by top performances of individuals but by
the training condition and morale of the entire
army. It is therefore wrong to represent the Italian
soldiers and the Italian people all together as
militarily inferior and unsuitable for a tough war.. In
this context, Mussoloni and his former state
secretaries are either guilty of gross neglect, or
Mussolini is definitely guilty of not having desisted
from war if he was aware of these precarious gaps.
13"
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1988/HEG.htm
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GERMAN-ITALIAN RELATIONS
For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman
Re: GERMAN RELATIONS
