The Italian Army In WWII by W.W. Turnbow
BACKGROUND AND PREPARATIONS:
a. The Italian armed forces were faced with a conflict between theories of employment. They had historically been structured for deployment in the mountainous terrain found in Italy and her immediate neighbors. These forces were forced to adapt themselves to a colonial role, and, even more conflicting, to the “War of Rapid Decision.” These theories mixed about as well as oil and water, and Italy lacked the industrial power and the raw materials to field forces able to meet all these needs. She even lacked the means to be a major power in a modern industrial war.
b. All Italy’s plans and preparations had been made for war against Germany/Austria, France, and Yugoslavia. Industry and trade had traditional ties with Britain, France, and the U.S. This was so prevalent that the geography section of the officer’s qualifying exam (tests prior to consideration for promotion) included the border areas with France, Switzerland, Austria, and Yugoslavia. The characteristics of the armies of these nations were also covered. Africa was ignored.
c. One faction of the army wanted an alpine oriented army. In a 1937 conference on the future of armor, a ranking general said, “The tank is a powerful tool, but let us not idolize it; let us reserve our reverence for the infantryman and the mule.” This group saw “Men, our indisputable resource,” not machines. They came close to the philosophy of French Col. de Grandmaison and believed in “mind over matter.” This meant that the solution for any tactical problem was a mass of infantry.
d. Architect of the mechanized concept was Gen Federico Baistrocchi (CoS during Ethiopia. Gen Alberto Periana succeeded him. This faction developed an innovative theory of manuever warfare in restrictive terrain. The “La Guerra di Rapido Corso” was adopted as doctrine in 1938. These men then found themselves in charge of an army that was not organized, equipped, or trained for the type of warfare envisioned. They found themselves in charge of an army wherein a large percentage of senior officers opposed the accepted doctrine. They also found themselves in charge of an army with its reserve officers lacking any training and experience in the new doctrine.
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Italians in WWII
For the first time I have seen "History" at close quarters,and I know that its actual process is very different from what is presented to Posterity. - WWI General Max Hoffman
