The Italians had there moments were they fought hard but for the most part they didn,t amount to much they weren,t respected by the allies they were seen as a weak link.

I am getting conflicting impressions from this thread and from other sources I have read. On the one hand, Mussolini was popular with the average Italian before the war started going badly (and even Italian-Americans at least before the US got into the war). He promised them a new Roman Empire and I imagine most people didn't mind that. Also, it is stated clearly that the Italian troops under German command in North Africa fought well. I saw a part of an modern fictionalized Italian film about El Alamein and the hero was a student volunteer from a university back home and he was all gung-ho for the war.

On the other hand, we hear about how the most Italians were ashamed of the "stab-in-the-back" of France, that most Italians liked France and hated the Germans, about how they were not dedicated warriors like the Germans were, about their poor leadership and equipment.

The question is...if these latter qualities were true, how is it that the Italians fight well under the Germans?
Perhaps the situation was more of a mixed bag and that some Italians were enthusiastic for the war, and others weren't?

I think that'd be the case everywhere though, from the die-hard fanatic soldiers, to the career soldiers, to the 'draftee' who didn't want to be there.

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poor tactics because italian forces were led by Rodolfo Graziani, an expert of colonial warfare but little suitable for a modern mechanized war... also a Matilda tank was more usefull than an italian infantry battalion equipped only with 47mm AT gun completely ineffective against those kind of tank

AFAIK the "stab in the back" theory is not true, I found no mention of it in any conversation I had with people who lived through the war in Italy, after the trade sanctions and the Ethiopian campaign France and England were "the Enemy" for most Italians and opposition to Mussolini in Italy was practically non existent.

The reluctance to go to war and the unpreparedness was mostly in the armed forces and especially the officer corps, not the common soldier, the Army's still lived by a "caste system" and the decision making process was even slower and less suited to modern warfare than the French one. This somewhat worked as long as the troops were on the offensive like in Somalia or the 1941 USSR (if you are attacking it's your plan that matters) but went to pieces as soon as there was any need to react efficiently to enemy action. This was not strictly speaking a "morale" failure but did cause very similar effect (no organized resistance).

Many biografies of navy officers report an "inferiority complex" towards the RN that grew with the unexplainable failures due to the ULTRA intercepts, this, combined with Mussolini's reluctance to risk major units and fuel shortages produced a nearly complete paralisys as far as the major units were concerned, the light units that kept the supply lines to North Africa open until the very end were certainly not lacking in morale.

The air force was ineffective compared to it's raw number of planes, but here again morale was not the problem. The industry's failed to provide planes comparable to the enemies and in sufficient quantities, some planes were good, none outstanding so the Regia Areonautica never had a "happy period" of technical superiority. Training, especially in tactics, left a lot to be desired as well, I remember reading of an RSI ace that was surprised, in 1944, to learn about the "finger four" formation for high speed fighters that had been in use by the Germans since the Spannish Civil War.

IMO Italians fighting well under German leadership is a myth, I don't know how it orignated.
There are very few recorded instances of smal unit level integration before 9/1943, the two countries mostly fought parallel wars rather than as allies. Units like Ariete and Folgore or the Alpini fought better than the average Italian unit for reason that had nothing to do with the Germans, AFAIK there were no Germans in any of those units though Folgore may have had some German equipment.
Of course Rommel sometimes said that Italians would fight better under his command but I suspect the motivation was not exactly objective, he definetly had a personal agenda there.

After September 1943 the situation changes dramatically, while the weapons don't improve much, both the forces that fought with the Allies and those that fought with the Germans mostly used Italian stocks of equipment, the troops were closer to volunteers than concripts and the officers were a lot closer to the troops than in the pre-armistice armed forces. Those troops fought pretty effectively and the same can be said of a number of Italians that ended up serving in various German units (so 100% German equipped).

As i said in an earlier post the Italians had there monents on occasions they fought hard but there overall combat record is not good and they were not held in high regard by there opposition in the desert they were seen as a weak link and it wasn,t just in the desert war when they attacked Greece things didn,t go well for them either.

The Italians in WW2 had there elite units who could fight but for the most part they were a low quality fighting force for what ever reason leadership,equipment take your pick.

It should be noted that 8th army also suffered from poor leadership and doctrine in the early years of the desert war,on numerous occasions we had our troops over run after they had taken there objectives because we had no tank support the tanks were not linked with the infantry they were seen as a seperate force.

The British also had what they called Boxes which were static defensive positions with infantry and artillary and anti tank guns mines etc which could be isolated and cut off.

They also believed in breaking there divisions up into brigade sized groups to fight seperate battles they were contantly trying to break up the New Zealand division to be used piece meal sending brigades where ever they wanted the Australians had the same problem and our commander wouldn,t have it Auckinleck told Freyberg this is a brigade sized war and Freyberg replied since when.

Our commanders use to call it the cow pat theory because when you looked at a map the troop positions looked like a whole lot of cow pats spread al over the place.

I have a book at home with a german stating that the brigade sized group could offer nothing more than a bee sting it could hurt you but couldn,t knock you out.

And when you talk about bad leadership how about asking our tankmen to drive straight at 88mm guns over and over again.

When you look at it the leadership of 8th army wasn,t much better.

At the time New Zealanders regarded themselves as British.

No we considered ourselves part of the empire we didn,t consider ourselves British we saw ourselves as a New Zealand force with our own identity that is why the division was called the 2nd New Zealand division.

According to my grandfather (who is by no means an authority on the subject ) blamed the Allies ( mainly England and France) for the reason Italy entered the war. When the allies placed an embargo on Italy for their invasion of Abyssinia ( I think that this is the right spelling), Hitler and Germany were the only ones to help Italy out. This in turn forced Mussolini to Germany's side. But as I said this is only my grandfather's opinion. I know that my grandfather said that alot of Italians were forced to work either in other countries that could be a contributing factor to why the Italian forces were so weak. My grandfather and his friend were drafted in 1939 but fled to Germany to work instead, I wonder how many others did this as well?

Your Grandfather has a very selective memory it would seem, and there was a great deal of time between their invasion of Abyssinia and their joining the Axis "Pact of Steel", about five years actually. The Italians survived quite nicely for those five years, and only declared war on France when it was beaten. In Mussolini's own words (paraphrasing) he needed "Italian deaths so he could sit at the peace table and claim French territory", which he did. Here is what really happened in the "non-effective" sanctions against the Italians for their aggression.

The League of Nations responded by exonerating both parties in September 1935. On Oct. 7; 5 days after the invasion happened, the League declared Italy the aggressor. Although the Italians were declared the aggressor, all they got was a bad reputation. There were no immediate repercussions from this. The league sanctions took even longer. That was in part because of the League had to use a procedural device too avoid the Italy's veto power.

League sanctions began in November 18th with arms embargo, financial embargo, non-importation of Italian goods. However, this embargo was only limited to arms and capital. Many of the war materials and reinforcements, such as steel, oil, food, rubber were allowed. Those items were discussed but were still put on hold. This meant that the Italy could still get the war materials. It must be also noted that (the) United States did not join this embargo.

The Suez Cannel, which was the main supply route the Italians used, owned by British, was also not blocked. (all emphasis mine)

See:

WHKMLA : The Economic Boycott against Italy Declared by the League of Nations : Why it Failed

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Happy Trails,
Clint.

The Italian troops did tend to be innefectual. There are several reasons for this, and in a nutshell after studying WW2 for decades, here are the main reasons i think:

1. There are no bad troops, only bad officers. That old saying has been and will continue to be proved over and over. The Italians had fought well and bravely in World war 1, for the allies that time. The Italian troops believed in what they were fighting for in that war - Italy's borders - and there were many instances of outstanding Italian army units and battles.
Italian morale in the second world war, however, tended to be low. For whatever reason, the training of Italian officers was nowhere near the caliber of German, British, or even American officers. Leadership at all levels tended to be misguided, ill-trained, badly motivated or incompetent. For example when the Italians went into North Africa the first thing they did was build fortifications and proceed to occupy them. That was all. No attempts at expanding their lines or even any attempt to built a serious defensive line. Although outnumbered by the Italians sometimes 2 to 1, the British made rapid and deep advances very quickly when they undertook to attack the Italians in North Africa. This was a major failure of high level leadership, NOT the fault of the common italian soldier - who often fought to the death.
Rommel said of the Italians "Certainly they are no good at war."

2. Italian small arms were very poor. For instance, Italian machine guns jammed regularly (they required oiled ammunition, not a good thing in a Desert battlefield.) However, many italian weapons, especially some of their aircraft, were quite good. The problem was the Italians were stuck in their old world craftsman ways - what they made, was often of high quality and sometimes even practically hand built. However traditional Italian methods of manufacture were far too slow, and expensive, for a fast moving war of attrition like World War 2. Large numbers of every weapon, munition and supply imaginable were required, not hand-made artwork. Unfortunately Italian industry never fully geared up for this before the Italian armistice in 1943.

3. Finally, the Italians lacked fire-brand leaders like Hitler, Goebbels and Goerring. They lacked the sense of resentment from the Versaille treaty that had been imposed on Germany. And possibly most important, they lacked real hostility and antagonism towards the enemies (Greece, Ethiopia, etc.) Mussolini had chosen for them.

Clint I absolutely agree with you,not sure if its because he's 94 and the memory is not as good as it used to be or his view is coloured because he lived through it ( kinda of like he sees it from the inside looking out while the rest of us see the bigger picture, hope thats understandable). Its funny, to this day he still doesn't like England or France

Your grandfather is certainly not alone in his opinions. AFAIK the sanctions, while in fact not very effective, were played by Mussolini's propaganda machine to create resentment against England and France that was shared by most of Italy's population. If you look at Italian magazines from the 1936-40 period or talk to people that lived through it they mostly tell the same story: Italy was betrayed at Versailles by her former allies that didn't deliver what was agreeed on in 1915 (the Fiume incident is just the tip of that iceberg) and her former allies were now conspiring to deny Italy her "right" to a colonial empire.

IMO trade sanctions have proved a remarkably ineffective means to contain expansionist policies, I can't recall one example of them being effective while they were ineffective or even counterproductive in the case of Italy (1936) and Japan (1941). More recent instances like Cuba and Iraq didn't work either. Giving a dictator a very visible, but not immediately threating, enemy to gather internal consensus against is a very bad idea.

I couldn't agree more TOS, economic "sanctions" almost never work as designed, but a blockade is an act of war and had to be avoided in this case. And to Kris that is also possible that your Grandfather's memory is sharp even at his age but is colored by the information he received at that time. That is certainly understandable.

Mussolini did make a big deal out of the "failure" of the Versailles Treaty, and used every chance he got to show that Orlando had been a dupe and Italy had been shortchanged. It was the ploy that swept him and the Fascists to power after all. Italy was an importing nation for much of its fuel needs, and Britain wasn't really in the position to interrupt that by much really. They (British) could cut back on food and fiber to the Italians, but not much else. I suppose France could also put a dent in some food stuffs, but I cannot think of a single item which Italy couldn't produce that the French could.

Italy got about 2/3 of its petroleum from the Romanian and USSR fields, with America contributing about 10% and the rest from the Dutch East Indies (as I recall). America had suffered a terrible crop failure set in the "dirty thirties" and had little food or fibers to export (if any). Also Italy had signed a treaty in 1933 with Stalin for commercial goods, including grain. That was the time when Stalin dumped grain on the market while his own people starved. Sad commentary on Stalin.

And Kris, I didn't mean to demean your Grandfather in the least. If I did, I apologize.

That whole time period is a very disturbing set of circumstances, a world-wide depression, droughts, state controlled news/information, and totalitarian leaders coming to the fore.

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Happy Trails,
Clint.

Clint, no need to apologize! As much as I love talking to my grandfather about his experiences growing up in Fascist Italy, I know that his memories and his opinions are just that his. I was just happy to contribute to a thread!