Thread: Trains in WWII

Thanks. I don't think some realize what a large part railroads played in the war. I will have to look around for that info for you .

In the article above it states,

Where trains are to be protected by means of antiaircraft machine guns, the troops transported will furnish 3 antiaircraft sections. Three antiaircraft railroad cars are provided, one at the center of the train, and one at the center of the front and rear halves of the train. There are two types of railroad cars: an open high-sided car with a superstructure or scaffolding, and an open low-sided car. The type of car used depends upon the make-up of the train. Thus in the case of non-motorized units which will use roofed cars for the most part, the guns must be placed at a considerable height in order to get a clear field of fire. Therefore, two high-sided cars with a superstructure are used, and only one low-sided car. This allotment of cars is reversed for motorized units. The high-sided antiaircraft cars are spotted in the train with the roofed cars, the low-sided antiaircraft cars with the open cars. Where possible, the guns are mounted on vehicles when the low-sided car is used. In conjunction with the antiaircraft machine guns, 20-mm. antiaircraft guns may be used. When the 20-mm. guns are to be used, 2 antiaircraft sections are formed, and 3 low-sided cars, specially designed for antiaircraft use, are provided. One car is placed at the tail-end of the train and another at the center. The third car is placed immediately behind the locomotive so that when the direction of the train is changed, as in switching for example, the tail car need not be shifted; if possible, this car should also be provided with a gun. At least 2 open cars with low loads should be coupled to either side of these special antiaircraft cars in order to give a good field of fire. Additional 20-mm. guns may be used when required.

Ill looks to see if I can find any photos.

"The defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945 was perhaps the most significant event in modern history. From the defeat of Germany, evolved the world we know today. Significantly the freedom we have to express our opinions and to debate topics such as this are the direct result of the actions of millions of brave men and women who fought to defeat Hitler’s regime. We owe a great debt to the many who paid the ultimate sacrifice for what we take for granted today.

As much as the defeat of Germany was achieved by force of arms from the Allied nations, defeat also came from within. Germany was not adequately prepared for war in 1939, and the early victories were achieved through the relatively new tactics of Blitzkrieg, modern equipment, superb training and leadership, ineptitude of the enemy and plain good luck.

Significantly Germany’s ill preparedness for war manifested itself in the first months of war and by December 1940 was readily apparent in the German transport system which was buckling under the demands of the German armed forces. This was no more apparent than with the Reichbahn, the German railways, an amalgamation of the former state railway systems.
The Reichbahn was forced to absorb a vast network of railways in varying condition, and locomotives and rolling stock that were often incompatible. As there were few common designs the new railway system was burdened by operational problems, increased and often duplicated costs and a maintenance headache of mammoth proportions.

Much of the plant and equipment was built in the late nineteenth century and the early 1900’s and had not been modernized because of the Great War, the chaos of the Weimar republic and the Depression. As much as a massive modernization programme was begun, with a view of upgrading track and other facilities, the construction of standardized locomotives and rolling stock, it was not complete by the beginning of war. This problem grew as the war progressed as they advanced deeper into the Soviet Union. Because of the restricted loading gauge and the increased demands of the German forces, the Reichbahn was forced into a never ending cycle of building more locomotives and rolling stock to achieve the task.

With the invasion of the Soviet Union the demands on the railways reached crippling proportions, culminating in the coal shortage of winter 1941/1942. There was no shortage of coal, but a lack of coal wagons which had been appropriated by the Wehrmacht and due to the chaotic conditions at the railheads behind the front these wagons were simply tipped off the tracks to allow space for the following trains.

Equally problematic for the Germans were the loss of over 100,000 trucks and 200,000 horses between the opening of Barbarossa and March 1942. These losses were to have an impact against the chances of success some six months later at Stalingrad.

It was clear such a situation could not continue otherwise the rail system would soon collapse. Albert Speer (Minister for Armaments and Munitions Production) and ErhardMilch (Director of Air Armament & state secretary in the Air Ministry) were charged with setting the railways right, and with brutal efficiency they cleared out the railway administration, sacking the incompetent heads of the railways and throwing out the rule book. To alleviate some of the operational problems, longer and heavier trains were run at faster speeds. An accelerated programme of converting the Russian broad gauge system to the German standard gauge system, the construction of longer passing loops and new railway yards was set in motion.

Short term measures alleviated the crisis, but only a massive construction programme would provide a permanent solution. The effects of the enforced intervention was highly visible in 1943 with the construction of over 4,500 locomotives and nearly 52,000 freight wagons. As formidable as these figures may seem they were never enough to resolve the crisis that engulfed the Deutsche Reichsbahn from 1939 to 1945.

Rheinmetal Borsig were charged with building a family of Austerity class locomotives, all based on standardized designs. One of these locomotives was so successful over ten thousand were built and many remained in service until the end of steam operations in Europe.

All these measures were only partially or such successful as the demands from the various fronts, in particular the Eastern Front, continued to place undue strain on a system that was not designed for such traffic. To transport a fully equipped panzer division could require up to three hundred trains. Multiply that out over the entire Eastern front, coupled with the normal supply demands and it is easy to see why the German railways could not keep up with the demands of war.

In addition the railways had to compete for labour, cope with the burden of transporting Jews, which coincidentally often had priority over trains heading for the front. Until the bombing campaign against the railways intensified in 1943 the system held together. Most aiming points for these raids were on the town centres, where the central railway stations and yards were situated, so as the bombing tempo increased, so did the damage and disruption.

As much as the emergency measures freed up the traffic to and from the Eastern front it was obvious the chain of patched up railway lines leading to the railhead on the river Chir over 100 kilometers west of Stalingrad were incapable of supporting German forces. The track was not well ballasted or in good condition, slowing trains considerably. The Luftwaffe used four trains per day, but this was not enough and many supplies, especially fuel were flown into German held airbases. Further compounding the problems were a rail yard too small to cope with the traffic and the resulting congestion placed great strain on the largely horse drawn vehicles supplying German troops in Stalingrad.

This situation was compounded in late October 1942 when it was obvious the Soviets were preparing an offensive against the flanks of the German forces. To reinforce the 3rd Romanian army, Hitler ordered the 6th Panzer division with two infantry divisions to transfer from France on the 4th November. Nearly one thousand train loads were required for this move east and it was nearly one month later these forces arrived, long after the Soviet offensive had surrounded Paulus’ 6th army.

The situation was hardly better in the buildup for Operation Citadel, with lengthy delays of moving the troops and equipment forward. On a smaller scale the sheer difficulties in transporting the new Tiger tanks to the front caused delays, that were only resolved with a combination of ingenuity, skill and a lot of sweat.

By mid 1943 the Allied bomber offensive was causing very real disruption for the railways. Although damage could be repaired relatively quickly by experienced crews, damage was becoming cumulative in some areas where bombing was frequent. Of added concern were the rising casualties amongst train crews, mechanical and maintenance staff along with the various administrative branches that kept the trains running. While the personal strength reached over one and a half million by the end of 1943, the replacement of skilled personal was not easy, as a consequence the standard of maintenance gradually declined and the accident rate which had been on the rise since the beginning of the war, worsened.

This was compounded in early 1944 when after the defeat of the Jagdwaffe in February-March, American fighters after completing escort duties were allowed to attack targets of opportunity. They were so successful in shooting up anything that moved, the Deutsche Reichsbahn reported in June the daily average number of trains wrecked in May by marauding Allied fighters was over forty trains per day! This loss rate was outstripping German production of locomotives and rolling stock, already in decline to the increasing demands of the German armed forces. Now repair crews had to range far and wide over the German countryside, clearing train wrecks and repairing track. The destruction of railway bridges became a further dislocation as these were harder to repair. Another grave concern was the massive loss of experienced train crews, placing further strain on the overburdened system. A worse situation existed in the occupied countries, especially France where the railway system had been damaged beyond repair by Allied airpower in preparation for the D-Day landings. Without the railways the German army was forced to endure lengthy and dangerous road marches attempting to reach the battlefronts.

Fortunately for the Deutsche Reichsbahn Allied air support for the invading forces diverted much airpower away from German targets, however day and night bombing of German cities continued to pummel the railway system. Though the railways operated right till the collapse of the Third Reich, the ability to adequately supply German armed forces in the chaos of the collapse was no fault of the railway crews and staff who performed Herculean efforts to keep the trains running.

The German railways, like German industry was not prepared for war in 1939, and incompetence and poor planning led to the crisis of early 1942. The efforts to alleviate the situation, while tackled with vigour and considerable expense would never make up the shortfalls of the early war years, ensuring the German armed forces could never be adequately supplied to fight a protracted war.

A common factor soon appeared, especially on the Western front, where German armoured columns were forced to drive to the battlefronts because the railways were no longer operational.

By war’s end the German railways were a barely functioning shambles, though some services were still operating remarkably efficiently. With the flow of spare parts, replacement troops, fuel, munitions and rations slowed to a trickle by the collapse of the railways the effectiveness of German forces decreased dramatically.

Six years earlier the German railways were hard pressed to supply Germany’s war needs and they never were able to. Without an adequate supply chain, no nation can win a war.

The American railroad system
The American railroad system was blessed with a generous loading gauge and consequently with fewer train movements could move greater tonnage. Thus America won the tonnage per mile war, which was to be a critical factor in 1944.
Another factor was the wear and tear on track and equipment. All combatants during the war experienced a decline in the efficiency of their railway systems under the increased traffic demands, America included. By the end of the war, many US railroads were in a bad way from these demands. Consequently in the immediate post war period many railroads were forced to spend heavily on track and plant repairs, replacement of locomotives and rolling stock without any assistance from the US government which was spending its tax dollars on airports and highways.
Consequently some railroads went into insolvency or were forced to amalgamate with their competitors. The replacement of worn out engines was another problem and proved to be prohibitive. Companies were faced with replacing large numbers of steam locomotives, not a cheap option by any stretch of the imagination. Diesel locomotives were a cheap option and the railroads embarked on a massive dieselization programme. Unfortunately for the railroads a lot of the first generation diesels weren’t much good and they were forced to replace them within ten years. This was an expense many companies could not afford, indirectly leading to more bankruptcies and forced amalgamation of some railroads.
In consequence the demands of America’s war effort had large scale and long terms effects on the US railroads and that was without the dropping of one bomb on the US mainland."

German Transport System WWII « War and Game

in all probability it was mid 1944 not early that some 40 trains a day were popped, the US AF was really stuck with non freelance and aiding the US heavies on the journey into the Reich with P-7's the 9th Af 354th fg had been equipped with the P-51B in December of 44 and not until the 8th AF was issued with the P-51 was the long distance shoot at anything targets observed in full fold. your posting after my initial response is just what the P-51 pilots claimed as to AA 'Sections' noted on the train cars, with folding down sides

Shot of a 88 Flak gun with multiple tanks kills. Eastern Front

because of the weight problems the 12.8cm was not often used on railcars and was then afixed in standard ground positions. what was used was the reliable 8.8cm and 10.5cm, the guns constantly moved throughout the Ruhrgebeit which gave our bombers a real headache

Well they certainly look like there would be a weight problem for the cars themselves for sure.. Not to mention the added weight the Locomotives would have to pull. I would think that the smaller caliber guns would be more numerous just because of that and the fact you could put more of them on the railcars

JC many times in this case 4-6 heavy Flak were transported by two locos end to end, brought out on rails and left for several days, then at night the Flak-cars would be moved to another area not to make prime targets by the US or Bomber Command. this was the case in the Ruhr as well as places like Hamburg and Kiel. heavy Flak cars were not long term due to the in-balance at firing so the guns were then removed and placed in fortified bunker positions.

(this is a captured Chinese armoured train)











from
http://blinda.ld.infoseek.co.jp/vkg_214b.html
http://www.hx.sakura.ne.jp/~troll/tetudou/index.html

"Railroads such as the Pennsylvania and the New Haven committed even more of their equipment because of their strategic locations. Filling an ocean liner in New York or Boston harbor with 13,000 troops involved as many as 21 trains. These might require over 200 coaches, 40+ baggage cars and over 30 kitchen cars.

Troop movements of over 12 hours were assigned Pullman space, if available. Pullmans sometimes slept 30,000 members of the armed services a night. This effort was helped by the fact that Pullman had about 2,000 surplus cars, mostly tourist sleepers, which had been stored instead of scrapped. When extra equipment was required for larger-than-normal troop movements, the government would request removal of sleeping cars from all passenger runs less than 450 miles. This resulted in extra standard sleepers for those times when, for instance, many troops from Europe were being transferred to the Pacific.

In 1943 and again in 1945, the government ordered 1200 troop sleepers from Pullman-Standard and 440 troop kitchen cars from ACF. These designs were based on a 50-foot box car equipped with "full-cushion" trucks capable of 100 mph. The center-door sleepers slept 30 in three-tiered, crosswise bunks. While not up to the same standards as the rest of its equipment, Pullman treated these cars service-wise as if they were the same - linen and bedding changed daily, etc. The Korean War again saw troop trains, but by Vietnam the numbers were down. This was due to availability of more large airplanes and also to the reduced capacity of the railroads. After the Korean War, some use of rail was made for reservists going to summer camp. I remember Lackawanna trains in the summer going to Camp Drum near Watertown from New Jersey. "

http://www.ubuyvacations.com/Railroa...tml#TroopTrain

Finland

Here's a bit higher tech thread:
Axis History Forum • View topic - North African railroads
It's 13 pages of discussion about trains in North Africa. Down to details on the locomotives.

Who fired the flak guns. DId they have units on the train or did infantry fire them?

Originally Posted by B-17engineer

Who fired the flak guns. DId they have units on the train or did infantry fire them?

From the article above,

"g. Organization Railway Flak units are organized into regiments, battalions, and batteries; the precise composition of the units is not known. It is believed that the regimental organization forms a pool from which units may be drawn as the necessity arises, either for mobile defense or for train protection. The unit most frequently met with is the battery, which in mobile defense probably moves and operates as a unit; in the case of train protection, the battery headquarters presumably administers detachments allocated to different trains. Although railway Flak units are part of the German Air Force and are administered through the usual GAF channels, it is probable that train protection detachments are operationally subordinate to the transport authorities; there is some evidence that guns provided for the protection of military trains may in certain circumstances be manned by army personnel."

A drawing of an artillery wagon of "Bartosz Glowacki", built in Warsaw. As it was described above, the train was equipped with three such wagons, probably after Polish-Soviet war. In 1939 the train should have only two artillery wagons, as other Polish trains. This drawing is a copy of some photograph (note, that the proportions are deformed), showing the wagon's look in the early thirties (AAMG turret added, early "sharp" camouflage). [source 5]

http://derela.republika.pl/glowacki.htm





The captured armoured locomotive Ti3-13 (from former train nr.52 "Pilsudczyk") in German train Panzerzug 21. On the left the assault wagon from former nr.54 ('Grozny') train, on the right the assault wagon from nr.11 ('Danuta') train (without aerials).
The photo is taken probably in 1940-41, because the mountings for Polish HMGs in assault wagons are not removed yet. Looking at the boiler top, this locomotive apparently has a dome closer to the chimney and further to the sandbox, than most of other locomotives series Ti3 (which is evident on drawings). The locomotive is wearing German camouflage.

http://derela.republika.pl/ti3.htm

Throughout WWII, the Axis transportation system remained a focus of Allied air attacks. Shown below are two photographs of destroyed railroads in Germany from our collection. The left photograph is labelled as Duren, March 1945; and the right photograph is labelled as Weisbaden, April 1945.


http://www.lonesentry.com/features/f...ed-trains.html

German train commemorating Holocaust children arrives at Auschwitz - International Herald Tribune

Originally Posted by Za Rodinu

German train commemorating Holocaust children arrives at Auschwitz - International Herald Tribune

Who could forget the transport of the poor innocent human cargo that the German railways carried to death,misery and slavery?

The TKS on a rail runner as an armoured draisine.

(German armored rail car with tank cannon turret - a French officer who has written on armored trains in the past described this vehicle as a 'turreted self propelled rail car (Schienenpanzerspahwagen) built by the Steyr Company for use in the Balkans. '
In his response to album owner, Kim Fields, this officer further stated "Part of a set of only 4 that were built, none have survived. Apparently this photo is one of only a few photographs that exist of this machine.

In 1943 Germany introduced light armored scout cars to the Balkans to secure the railroad lines against partisan attacks. As a result of their deployment, cars with greater firepower were requested, these were fielded in the fall of 1944.

The concept was to permit an armored train consisting of 12 cars with varying armament (four cars with Panzer III N turret mounting a 75mm L/24 cannon, two cars carrying a quadruple 20mm anti-aircraft gun, and six cars armed with machine guns carrying infantry, command, communication, and medical sections. Since each car by powered by a 76h.p. Steyr motor, disabled units could be assisted by other operating cars, an improvement over other armored trains generally powered by a single steam engine.

Due to material shortages, only eight trains were operational, these contained only eight scout cars (two cars with Pz III turrets, two command cars with fixed antenna, and four infantry cars). Six other cars were also included: two flak cars carrying the quad 20mm guns on a flat car, two panzertragerwagens (tank carriers) with a Panzer 38t tank, and two flat cars carrying track maintenance equipment, which was used to detonate mines on the rail bed. Each train could be operated as two sections of four scout cars each, depending upon the mission."

http://www.508pir.org/album_barger/combat_4.htm