Look to the work of General Sir Arthur Currie who, as a Canadian, was less beholden to the British High Command and was moreover able to resist being told how to do his job. Currie planned his battles to minute detail, working according to schedules that he would not permit to be rushed by superior officers. He trained his men to know their jobs exactly, using models of enemy bunkers so well built that when the men attacked the bunker for real, it was the umpteenth time they had done it. He planned his advances according to realistic time frames which allowed for bringing in new troops, retraining assault troops for their next job and for bringing up guns and supplies ready for the next assault. He had no delusions of some fanciful breakthrough. Currie has never received the acolades given to Monash (who also planned his battles with meticulous detail) but it was Currie who fought Passchendale to a 'victory' and who engineered the capture of Vimy Ridge and who eventually spearheaded the 'British' advance to Mons. It was an American general who first used parachute re-supply methods to supply the assault troops in their recently gained positions. Whatever the truth of all this, the soldiers who won victory learned their craft. The craft had been learned before, after the Boer War and had been used with success until Ypres in 1914. The tactical skills had naturally been forgotten in 1915 and had to be re-learned. Every army newly committed to battle suffered terrible losses until this craft was mastered. Once the craft was mastered, the German forces were outfought.
During the last 100 days, the Canadian Corps defeated 47 German divisions and captured over 30000 prisoners. But it was not a cakewalk. Canadian casualties numbered more than 30000.
I am not sure of the reason for the French mutiny. My grandfather was attached to the French army until this time and according to him, "they all just went home" The French army had originally signed up the soldiers for 3 years. It may be conjecture but it seems highly likely that many men decided when their 3 years was up, that they had to go home. Others would simply follow. French leave was also very common. At any time a French soldier might decide to go home to his family - often only a short distance behind the lines - for a night or longer. None of this had anything to do with tactical changes. Indeed the French had learned more and sooner than the British new-comers. It should not be forgotten that in the battle of the Somme, the French forces gained most of their objectives, while the British failed to gain most of their objectives. Far from it.
I recall something like the attacking method was getting all the men killed really and after a few days of fighting the French soldiers decided that this has to stop.
Can someone throw some light on this one, after the battle of Mons for some strange reason all sides dug in for a good part of the rest of the war. What bought about that move by all sides?
I love Jutland Richard...lets talk. A "tie" as far as I can decifer, but if you have a different opinion, I'm all ears.
Possible reason they were not sure what to do next but I do find this to be a strange situation, why it is after the battle of Mons on the western front all sides dig in. And yet on the Eastern Front this was a free flowing front, so what lays behind the thinking of digging in?
Jutland is a strange one both sides claim victory. The British chased off the German fleet which never set foot out of port again, as for the German fleet they inflicted a higher casualty rate on the British. You could say they gave us Brits a good left hook and got away with it. I don't see that both sides will ever settle this one due to the fact both claim victory. As you say skunk, I to feel it was a draw with no real outcome for either side. I do feel the British fleet made some mistakes, and may have got some sort of result if these errors did not occur. But you could say that the German fleet or so made some errors as well, it’s one of those strange battles that had no real outcome for either side.
Richard, Probably the sheer distances involved on the Eastern Front precluded any kind of large-scale trench warfare. Different in WW2 because just about every European country was industrialised to some extent.
Valid point Gordon but I still don't really know what were the reasons for digging in? It's like all sides were trying to work out where they go from here onwards. Ok that's a bit lame I know that so what was the real thinking behind it all?
Well, consolidation of territory held; minimisation of casualties, and a chance to tie down the other side until enough reserves could be brought up for the 'Big Push' that was always going to end it all.
Thanks Gordon, that dose make some sort of sense I suppose it was the thinking of the time. There is another factor here is it true that Germany did not ration their food stocks for the duration of the war?
Germany had to ration food during the war and the rationing got worse as the war progressed. Whether it was official or per se does not matter. Indeed Germany was prepared to declare war on Austria in 1918 to guarantee that the Danube would be kept free for German food imports. When Vienna stole a shipment of food destined for Germany (to feed the starving population in Vienna) Germany sent Austria an ultimatum.
The war started in August and had reached a natural end by the time that winter set in. Most nations were unprepared for a protracted war and munitions plants were unprepared for the scale of the war. Not only was ammunition a factor but also the number of guns was a factor. Britain did not have the type of howitzers that Germany used and could not lay down the volume of fire that the German regiment could. The French, while they had more heavy guns (outdated as they were), relied on their 75mm gun which could not deliver the volume or intensity of bombardment that a typical German 105 or 150 howitzer battery could. Add to that the unprecedented casualties and the fact that winter was setting in, there was little incentive for the Allies to counter attack. As for the German side, it was in their favour to dig in and allow the Allies to attack them on their battlefield of choice. Germany had gained a valuable tract of industrialised territory and could sit tight while fighting on the eastern front. Obviously, since digging in was the way to preserve life and defend the position, it made sense to create a line of fortifications that could not be flanked. And so the trenchline war was born.
Didn´t the Maxim by Germans in the early phase change the tactics in the French and British camps?? Well, at least I remember the films where troops marched straight into the machine gun fire and generals were telling that tactics need not be changed even if the number of killed was getting enormous.
that was at the beginning of the war when the generals didnt realize the reality of these things... that changed during the end of the war...
Thanks guys for all of your input, yes it has helped me to get my head around to the thinking of the time.
Regarding testing new/different tactics, that happened frequently. But unforetunatly on a too small scale.(british side) Special units were too small (not larger than a battlion) to make the big difference. Technology was Britains answer. The tank was to be the machine to breach the lines. However it took time and resources to manufacture and train crews. The Germans opted for the Stormtroopers, indirect aproach and new artillery regime. To my knowledge the new ideas was first tried on 1 september by the German eight army under command of Gen von Hutier. He was tasked with attacking across the Dvina in Latvia and capturing Riga. Facing him was the Russian twelfth army under Gen Klembovsky. The Russians had a beachead south of the river where Klembovsky had placed his best units for an offensive on the Germans. Along the rest of the river the russians posted lower class formations to guard the river. Up to this point the thought had been to acheive victory was to bring all materiel and men to bear on the main enemy force and defeat them in battle. von Hutier decided on using manouvre to win the battle. A short (five hour) artillery programme across the russian lines so that the attacking point would not be reveiled, followed by an attack across the river was launched. The Germans managed to infiltrate into the rear and capture the city 9000 russians was captured with minimal losses to the germans. The new tactic was tried with greater success at Caparetto in Italy. 300000 Italians were captured and the Italliian line was moved back some 80 miles. Complementing the tactic was a focus on disruption in the enemy rear. Planes strafing the people, and a mixture of gas cannisters fired with the artillery.
