Push the Red Army back against the sea

The question here is not "Could Germany have won the war if......"(I think it is simply out of the question after Stalingrad), but rather "Would if have been possible for Manstein to convert a large-scale withdrawal into an envelopment operation and push the Red Army back and against the sea in 1943 if Hitler had given him the permission to do so?"

 

Hi IC. I think so. Manstein was more than a proven commander, and had shown at Zhitomir the advantages of a 'backhand' move, as opposed to a 'forehand' preffered by Hitler. Most of the top generals were in the opinion that Germany's reserves were dwindling, and to risk them in a battle such as Kursk might throw away their last chance for a stalemate (it did). Had Hitler decided on Mansteins plan, coupled with a thorough elastic defence and mobile reserves (which were still available at that time, mid-43), then the Russkies would have at least been delayed by 6 months, at best maybe even into stalemate. Most don't realize that the USSR was nearing the end of its 'bottomless' manpower barrel by the end of '44. If Germany had managed to inflict another half-million->million casualties, Stalin might well have sought a negiotiated peace....

 

Germany was also towards the bottom of its manpower barrel. The Russians also learned how to perform tactical withdrawals so there were no longer the loss of armies that were surround due to "stand to the last man" orders. It would have ended up as a war of attrition that the Germans could not win. The Soviets had just begun to bring in their armies from Siberia. In my opinion, it would have just added another full year of war.

 

Hi PzJgr. Well, actually, Germany was really just starting to even look in the manpower barrel by mid-43. What other countries had done much earlier, Germany was just starting in 43. And yes, if Stalin didn't make peace even after a huge "reverse" Kursk battle, then it would have still only been a matter of time before Götterdämmerung, like you said, a year at most. However, Germany was still very strong in 43. Actually, it was at its strongest in 43, the problem was that in relative proportion to all the Allies, it was much much weaker than in 40.

But, it is still my opinion that had Manstein had his way, a stalemate peace with Stalin would not be completely out of the question. Whether Stalin would hold that peace is another matter....

 

Welcome to the forum avatar47. I think it would have succeeded had they tried. But I don't know about a stalemate through. Hitler was really not the kind of guy who would just accept a stalemate and call it a day. Besides, the Allies had already demanded unconditional surrender before 1943.

 

I agree with your assessment while the Germans reached their apex the Russians were just beginning. Their production of effective weapons were beginning to come out in large numbers giving the troops a better survivability rate and paired with better tactics, the loss rate would be a lot less than say years 41 - 42.

 

Thanks for the welcome! Well, everything here is all heresay, as we're talking about events 60 years after. But, I think there was at least a small chance of a Russo-German deal if the Red Army had faced massive infantry losses in theoritical offensive campaigns of summer-fall 43. Stalin had no wish as well to see the WAllies spread their capitalist ideas everywhere. He was also fearful that the longer the war dragged on, the greater the chance he might be dragged from power. Had he lost some major battles in 43, as opposed to winning them, he might have been induced to make peace, regardless of UK/US protests.

 

Stalin was a survivor and would cut a deal with the devil if it would benefit him. So, if his position was threatened, I would think that he would ignore any promises made to the West and make a peace with Hitler.

 

If Manstien had started his offensive in the south what would have stopped Russia from launching their offensive from the Kursk pocket and cutting off Manstien in his offensive?

 

Not sure what you mean Tikilal. Started his offensive in the south? What south? And this what-if is about Manstein not starting an offensive, but rather a 'backhanded' reaction to russian moves, as he wisely originally suggested to Hitler, who refused, on political grounds, such a plan.

 

Were commanders such as Zhukov, Konev, Rokossovsky and Vatutin not?

I must be one of those "most"

The Soviet Union was in much better shape then Germany in this aspect and the numbers of divisions raised would contradict your claim. As for a negotiated peace, this was out of the question after the Germans failed at Mosocw and as Manstein said after Stalingrad, Germany had lost the war in the East.

If this was the case, then why was Germany's military shrinking while at the same time the Red Army was growing? Germany even started to transfer its units from the west in preparation for Kursk and after, no more offensive operations existed on Easter Front.

Had Manstein attacked or gave a "Backhand" to the Russians, who is to say that the Russians would not be able to figure out as to where this might occur in the same way that they predicted Kursk?

Also in this scenerio, what would all of the Soviet forces amassed at Kursk be doing?

This we can agree on

This is a double edged sword my friend as the Germans too would suffer huge losses but unlike the Russians, would NOT be able to replace them.

It seems that you may be strongly underestimating the "Man of Steel".

Also it was not Stalin but the Soviet Generals who now had all the flexibility they needed in order to conduct military operations as they saw fit. Believe it or not they were not as incompetent as some may make them out to be

Oh and welcome to the forum!

 

In my humble opinion, no, they were not as good as Manstein. The poor man not only had to 'work' with Hitler, but he also had significantly less resources to work with than those generals. Zhukov had a good share of failed offensives as well (Operation Mars for starters). Manstein's abilities are generally praised by most military historians, though some call him overrated.

It wasn't, it was near its peak sometime in early '44. The number of men in military uniform grew quite alot as the Gov't foraged for manpower in all offices, factories, farms etc. Again, this was all too late anyhow to make a difference, as the number of men under Germany's enemies grew all out of the proportion of the Wehrmacht.

You may be strongly overestimating him He was like a scared dog during the early stages of Barbarossa. When he retreated to his Dacha in the 1st week of the invasion, his inner-circle of politicians came looking for him. When they arrived, Stalin said "What are you here to do?", because he thought they wanted to arrest him for totally mis-judging Hitler's intentions. I think Stalin was considerably more interested staying in power than the war itself, especially earlier in the war, when things were not going that well for the Russkies.

Well, the whole point of the "Backhand", or 'reactive' approach, as Manstein wanted, was that the Wehrmacht would react to any attack by the Red Army with decisive mobile forces. There would be no 'predicting' a counter-attack, because that counter-attack would depend on where the Russians attacked. That is a BIG advantage that Hitler did not consider. A direct attack on the Kursk salient was seen by Hitler as politically necessary. Manstein advocated otherwise, and the military historians from which I've read tend to agree.

No, he said that the war could no longer be won. A stalemate was still possible.

Thanks for the welcome btw, and let's agree to agree on our disagreements

 

I was refering to the Kursk Salient. South of it Manstien wanted to launch an offensive to trap a portion of the Red army against the sea.

I doubt that the Russian forces in the salient would have been moved to attack to the south, leaving the German left(north) flank exposed. If Mansien had started at Kharkov and driven to the Sea he would have had to cross about 1/4 of the russian front. I propose that it would have been better to start further to the South and follow the Donettes river down to the sea.

Dont get me wrong I think that a backhand would have been a better idea for the Germans at this stange than an offensive initiated by the them.

Why dont you both post some numbers on troop strength for the war years?

 

In the outset of Barbarrosa, Manstein had actually much more to work with then any of the Gernerals in the East as the Germans had supperiority in pretty much every field other then tanks in which, while outnumbering the Panzers were absolete in comparison. Not to mention the advantage of surprise.

"a good share of failed offensives"? I am only awair of one, which is Mars and even that is desputed till this day.

Yes I know I went off topic here but this is a sensitive subject for me!

The problem was that while the number of men might have grown, these were not the same men that had invaded in 41'. After Kursk the German army was slowly transforming into the Red Army in 1941, more men but lower morale and experience. Also more and more foreign troops were being used in the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS so replace losses, while suffering from steadily declining numbers in mechanized troops and air supperiority. At the same time the Red Army was going through a transitional phase of its own just in the other direction.

Yes, you are absolutely correct however this was his mood in the opening months of the invassion. Stalin very much changed after tasting victory at Moscow and a peace with Germany was fully out of the question. ( I believe that this was discussed here somewhere I will try to find it. )

Actually Manstein himself was in favor of Operation Zitadelle and was only oppossed to the delaying of it which Hitler had ordered in order to bring in his Panthers and re-arm his Tigers.

According to him? Because difinately not to the Soviet commanders. Though I must say that Operation Zitadelle was a blunder

Though at the time, the Germans simply didnt know as to the kind of force the Red Army was amassing, I believe the largest surprise for them was the scale of the Soviet Airforce.

What your withdrawing already?
( just kidding )

 

What? They Changed the gun in my Tiger? :tankattack:And why isnt there a tiger smiley? :tiger: I found this one but it is lame.

 

Sorry if this sounds like a dumb question, but what sea?
The Black Sea or the Caspian Sea?
Do you really think the Germans could do that in 1943?
What sort of distance are you asking the Germans to push back the Soviets?

 

Owen, I just came into this thread and was hinking more or less the same questions. Who knows, they might be thinking of the Sea of Barents or the Sea of Okhotsk.

It's so funny when you live in the Twilight Zone, isn't it?

Hey! Listen to this!

 

The armor was increased ( hows that for a smiley? )

See you guys got to make everything soooo complicated, im a simpleton and got right down to the juicy stuff!

 

Its a smiley but not a tiger tank smiley.

 

Manstein had proven his superiority as a commander when he showed his ability to stabilize the front with an army that was overwhelmingly outnumbered (1:7). I don't think that's something any soviet commander could have been able to achieve.

Every victory the Russians won was won with a superior force, and much greater casualty.

We are talking about 1943 here. The Russians had become battle hardened through bloody fighting, so could the Germans. By the way, you do know that the German tank production between 1943 and 1944 was 32613, right?

Don't be so sure about that, Stalin was a man who changed his mind quite frequently.

No. I am reading his book, and he clearly stated in it that "strategic defensive” was the only way to carry out the war after Stalingrad.

That was why Manstein wanted a "strategic defensive", for he was not stupid enough to attack an enemy without any knowledge of its strength.(Unlike the fearless Führer)