DUNKIRK WHAT-IF!!!!!

The Germans were planning the Invasion long before Dunkirk. What happened at Dunkirk just presented the oppurtunity much faster than planned. Almost a stroke of luck for the Germans.

Granted, The R.A.F had control of the skies, but at this time the Luftwaffe was still a match for them. As to the Navy, England had the largest and best Navy in the World. However their strength was in the surface vessels and traditional naval warfare ie; heavy and light cruisers, frigates and battleships but the Kriegsmarine were far from a traditional navy. From 1936-1942' the German "wolfpacks" ruled the Atlantic. It was'nt until mid 41'-42' that the British and U.S Navy, using escort tactics, hunter killer groups and breaking the naval Enigma codes, that we were able to negate the U-Boats.

 

The u-boat overall made little significant effect on Allied shipping, there were simply too much ships avaliable to the allies (the merchant fleets of the occupied nations provided a massive amount of shipping for Britian)and too few u-boats available for a theatre as large as the Atlantic. In addition the British were able to evacuate 200,000 men in Britany including much of their equipment.

Plus the Germans weren't the only ones to have an significant submarine force, the British kept a significant submarine force in the channel and the north sea.

 

Thats not true! The U-Boats had a HUGE affect on allied shipping early in the war. From 1939-1943 German U-Boats sunk almost 5800 ships at 22,000 Gross tons. For every 1 U-boat sunk the Germans sunk 14 allied ships. The amount of supplies needed by England via the Atlantic shipping routes was massive. Almost 2/3 of the British economy was dependent on the allied shipping lanes. Hitler knew to destroy England he had to control the Atlantic.

The British, being able to evacuate Dunkirk was'nt due to a weakened U-Boat force. The evacuation was due to a catastrophic error by the German High Command. The U-Boats, if ordered would of cut the BEF evacuation to pieces. Also, The British Submarine force was secondary in relation to there Surface Fleet. Which was a complete opposite to the German Navy. The German Navy was more geared to the U-Boats and "wolfpack" tactics.

The British and Americans had to drastically rethink there shipping tactics. It was only from 1943 on, that America was able to triple her ship building afforts. When America started building the Liberty' ships. They built 2800 of these ships in 4 years. The reign of the U-boat as a significant threat was'nt really over until mid 42'. It was only then by lots of luck, ie breaking the Enigma codes, hunter killer groups, Radar and solid convoy tactics that we were able to stop them.

If the Allies were unable to stop the U-Boats when they did, England would of been in serious trouble.

 

This from my good friend Clint on another discussion group talking about U-boats in the Channel.

"Before Hitler turned his attention east toward the USSR, which is 1939 through mid-1941 as the time-frame, the Kriegsmarine of Nazi Germany had 57 U-boats which were CAPABLE of going out to sea. I am not absolutely certain, but I do NOT believe this counts the 50 existing Type II boats (A through D models), since they were small coastal and training boats only. That said, 8 boats of those larger types were lost in 1939, 24 in 1940, and 9 more lost before June of 1941. Some were replaced of course in that time line, but by mid-June the U-boat strength was pretty small.

6 of the 10 type VIIA (Atlantic boats) had been sunk well before June,1941. There were 24 type VIIB boats build, and they were an improvement in range, but by mid-1941 twelve of them had also been sunk or "lost at sea". There were a grand total of 538 type VIIC boats eventually commissioned during the war years, but only a few had been built by late 1940 and mid 1941 since the very first was only commissioned by Nov. 1940. 5 of the 8 type IX (A) boats built had been sunk by early 1941, and of the 14 IX(B) improved version boats built, 6 had been sunk or "lost at sea" by early 1941. The IX(C) class only showed up in Jan. of 1941, so they really can’t be counted in my estimation of U-boat strength. There were eventually 54 of them produced but not before the time period we are speaking of.

Most of the other classes of U-boats built, by that time, were NOT terribly threatening types. So no matter their numbers, they could NOT have influenced the Channel usage in any significant fashion in the early stages of the Second World War (pre-Barbarrosa). This is why I stand by the "less than 30 combat ready, sea-worthy" U-boats still existed before Operation Barbarrosa, and at the time of Operation Sealion being considered.

I can recommend Richard Worth's ("Tiornu") Fleets of World War II; and on the net a site called:

http://uboat.net/types/

If you go there (and are patient) you can discover the fates of ALL the "Undersea Boats" built after WW1 until the end of WW2. Pay particular attention to the time-frame of 1939-1941. Does any of this help understand my position on the U-boat weakness of that period? With that limited a supply of ready boats it is no wonder Doenitz was reluctant to allow them to venture into the Channel. With those losses in mind it would appear that the Kriegsmarine DID NOT have even thirty seaworthy "combat" ready U-boats left in early 1940 to the middle of 1941 which is the only period being discussed. Later they did, but when the Operation Seelowe was being discussed, before Barbarrosa, they just flat did NOT have enough of them to risk in the shallow waters of the Channel."

 

And also take into consideration that there is a very big difference between operating in the Atlantic Ocean and in the narrow Channel. In the Atlantic the Germans lost over 700 subs alone during the war.