the reason of German defeat

i think that it is because they used blitzkrieg too many times. it is like football, you can not use the same play over and over again.
Blitzkrieg's strength is suprise, by the time the germans invaded russia, the russians already known their style of attck.
Blitzkrieg is only good for small countries, its goal is to destroy their enemy before they can be organized, that could not have worked on Russia bacause of its size.
i think the germans should have devoloped a new style of attack just for russia, they should understand that Panzers are useless in street warfare. As soon as the russians can organize a line of defense, the war of Blitzkrieg just changed to the war of production, production of tanks, airplanes, which is what the germans could never win, not against russia. Instead of using their speed to maneuver, by pass strong points, cut supply, encircle, destroy; they actually engaged the enemy. The only result of that is like the battle of kursk, one tank for one tank.

another thing is the way the germans treated their subjects. look at the history of man, the empires that treats its subjects well, last.remember, troops win battles, people win wars.

 

While I do agree the Blitzkrieg attack can only work for so long, it seems like it was an effective enough method of attack for the time being. The fact that the Germans let the battles take place in large city's may have been what led to the demise of their attack in Russia, as an army built on tanks can only do so much in city limits.

 

Well it's not like Blitzkrieg was a really specific tactic. It just consisted of pounding the enemy with artillery and bombs, then sending in tanks and infantry, overwhelming the enemy. Now using the Blitzkrieg theory, one can make plenty of variations on it. The enemy really can't anticipate anything specific.

Panzers can be very useful in urban warfare if you know what you are doing. Urban terrain can provide perfect hiding places for tanks to surprise and cut off their opponents, also visa versa though. But the Soviet Union was a vast empty steppe for the most part, unlike the largely industrialized western Europe. Flat empty space also has it's advantages and disadvanteges for tanks as well.

And yes, one of Hitler's fatal mistakes in invading the Soviet Union was entering it as a conqueror instead of a liberator. At the beginning of the invasion the Ukrainian population was largely friendly toward German troops. Of course that all ended when the Einsatzgruppen units were sent in. If Hitler had appeared as liberator of the Soviets from the harsh communist rule it is likely there would have been revolts across the nation against the communist government. And if Hitler really needed to be rid of the "sub-human slav population" he could have dealt with them after he prevailed on the battlefield.

 

Germany was defeated because:

1. Their economy was insufficent to meet the needs of a near global war, particularly in fuel and motor vehicles.

2. Their civil engineering ability was very poor.

3. Their logistical system was a gordian knot of inefficency.

4. Their population base was insufficent to provide for replacements in a long war.

5. They got involved in a land war in Asia

6. They lacked a coherent plan to deal with Britain and resolve that conflict in their favor.

7. They grossly underestimated the importance of technology and research and development in a modern industrial war.

As far as the German treatment of their enemies being high on the list:

I think the Aztecs, Mongols and, Islamic armies of the middle ages (and today I suppose) would disagree vemently with you.

 

If Hitler had been fighting in the Ostfront in WW1 I think he would have never been interested in Barbarossa as he would have realized how huge the distances are. 500 kilometers in the west can make the difference in battle while in the east it´s just 500 kilometers of land.

 

the germans should be Fast and Flexible.
they can not afford to engage the russians, that would be a war of production, they must use the least troop to do the most damage.

 

Ironcross: That was their goal in the series of kesselschlachten. Using their panzers to encircle the Soviets while the infantry poured in and overwhelmed the rest of the forces. Eventually of course their pace and advantage of surprise dissapeared and it turned into a war of attrition.

 

personally, i think that the weakness of the SU was its form of government, and the fact that it is a union.
The germans should take advantage of that, cause it to collapes 50 yeats earlier than it did, take advantage of the west's fear of Communism, take advatage of their propaganda machine, low living standard of the Russians.
push SU into a civil war.






[ 11. May 2006, 10:40 AM: Message edited by: Ironcross ]

 

I agree with you T. A. Gardner.

The more you read on Nazi Germany you start to see a clear picture of all their blunders master race your joking, the self deluded race more like. They built a dream based on an illusion and paid the price for their madness.

Too borrow Hugh Trevor-Roper words.

 

I don't think the west really started to fear Communism until after WWII.

 

Churchill was a known communist hater in WW1 and he was also preparing the western troops in Murmansk area in 1918-1919 which were there to help destrioy communists. Also his speeches were totally anti-communist. However he considered the nazis a bigger threat and hoped that together with the USSR could destroy Hitler.

Churchill´s background was the reason why Stalin did not trust him always that much. Remember the Barbarossa warnings June 1941 by Churchill!

 

To generalize why Germany lost, its simple.

2 FRONTS!!

Not enough supplies, men, materials, etc.

 

even if the U.S. and British did not enter the war. the S.U. will still defeat the Germans, but it will take longer.

 

non of those are fatal mistakes
if they were, then they could not have beaten the french.
but the fatal mistake is their repeat way of attacking; their engaging strategy, and the fact that Adolf Hitler was the real Commander-in-Chief.
one thing the Germans had that no one else had was their outstanding generals and outstanding troops. they should have used them to the fullest, not waste them like in Kursk and Stalingrad.

 

non of those are fatal mistakes
if they were, then they could not have beaten the french.
but the fatal mistake is their repeat way of attacking; their engaging strategy, and the fact that Adolf Hitler was the real Commander-in-Chief.
one thing the Germans had that no one else had was their outstanding generals and outstanding troops. they should have used them to the fullest, not waste them like in Kursk and Stalingrad. </font>[/QUOTE]On the contrary, none of the items I listed have anything to do with the defeat of France.
The war was too short for logistical and engineering problems to arise. The population base made little difference. Britain wasn't a problem until after France was defeated. Beating France did not require a "land war in Asia (as stated by the Sicilian in The Princess Bride).
Their "engagment strategy" was not the reason for their defeat either. In Russia the Germans simply lacked the necessary logistical and engineering means to supply their army at the distances required to win that campaign.
Against Britain the Germans lacked sea power and could not substitute sufficent air power to overcoome the lack of sea power. Thus, Britain stayed in the war. As well over 2000 years of naval history proves a guerre de course by itself, which is exactly what the Germans did with merchant raiders and U-boats, is not a war winning strategy at sea. It is a spoiler against which the sea power involved has to deal with.
Stalingrad which you mention is a perfect example. The Germans could not maintain sufficent rail and road connections to allow 6th Army to perform its task. The Luftwaffe was airlifting in the neighborhood of 25% of this Army's supplies prior to the encirclement. The 6th Army sent nearly a quarter million horses to the rear because fodder was not available. Stripped of what little mobility the 6th Army had to begin with it was literally stuck statically attacking into Stalingrad. The low levels of capability of German civil engineering created this problem in large part.
Where each German army on the Eastern front at that point should have had a dedicated rail line supplying it at a minimum only one or two rail lines per Army Group were avaiable. In some cases, like 6th Army's[/i], the rail heads ended hundreds of kilometers in the rear because bridges across major rivers had not been built (or rebuilt).
All the inspired genius of tactics and strategy will not overcome an army faced with stravation at the end of its tether due to poor logistics. First and foremost, the Germans failed in this field.

 

Hitler sealed the fate of the Germany long before he started the war, Hitler always wanted to attack Russia and wipe out the communists and Jews there. His hate-tread was his own undoing along with his conduct in the war.

 

Another drastic blunder was never gearing up the German economy for all out war like the USSR and US did.

 

Germany did gear up their economy in mid 1941 to a two shift 24 hour-a-day production level. The problem was simply the size of their factories and a lack of assembly line techniques meant that production remained mostly done in small lots.
Henschel's Kassel-Mittelfeld plant where the Tiger I was produced had floor space for a mere 20 vehicles at a time for example. The hulls and turrets were produced by sub contractors at factories scattered across Germany and then shipped there for assembly. The system itself was sloppy and inefficent to a degree that the US and Soviets never were.
Opel's Brandenburg factory, touted as one of the most modern in Germany was producing only 200 trucks a day. That is less than many US truck plants made in an hour.
Junkers, the largest aircraft manufacturer in Germany managed 1 to 3 Ju 290 per month. Ford at their Willow Run plant made a B-24 an hour.
The German manufacturing system was simply grossly inefficent and backward in its production menthods. They could could turn out mere handfuls of good quality stuff but, that was not going to win them the war.

 

Practically the only place where urban fight was of any relevance was at Stalingrad, we can consider this an anomaly.

There is nothing wrong with Blitzkrieg, unless we consider it may imply a shallow mindset searching only for a quick victory only. It's not Blitzkrieg's fault, it worked quite well, we can see very well executed variations under local doctrine in Operations Uranus (the encirclement of Stalingrad), Bagration (destruction od Army Group Centre in June-July'44), and August Storm (defeat of the Japanese in Manchuria, Aug '45).

T.A.Gardner's analysis in his post of 11-May is correct in my view.

I find that grossly oversized PzIII pic from Signal - one of the German propaganda magazines of the time - very interesting in this context, as this photo was taken at the time of Op. Zitadelle, the Blitzkrieg that failed. Also interesting is the fact that the poster speaks in the present, whereas IIRC these events happened 60 years ago and won't repeat themselves except at the wargames table

 

Germany lacked the industrial power of the east and the wetern allies.

Germany did not build enough fighters and bombers to keep full air cover.

Germany never had enough oil or iron ore.

Germany never secured the western front before starting a eastern campaign.

Germany never had enough ships in her surface navy and relied too much on uboats.

Germany never had radar until it was to late.

the list is almost endless I think but these are a few things that I think may have caused problems.