What if there were no Louisiana Manuevers in 1940 and 41?

Ok, this thread is an off-shoot from another semi-popular and very interesting thread concerning the Louisiana Manuevers.

Here's the particulars concerning the parameters;

1. There were no large scale manuevers conducted by the US Army in 1940 and 41. Same old garrison duty as it was between the wars.

2. The US Army was involved in expansion as a result of the draft instituted by congress and call-ups of Guard/Reserve units (in late 1940) along historical lines.

3. The US Army continued the progress of trianglation of it's divisions along historical lines.

4. The war would have continued on along the historical timeline, with the US entering as it did on 7 Dec 41.

So here's the deal, put in simple terms. The scope of this discussion is what would have happened to the US and it's war effort on the army's part as if the Louisiana Manuevers would never have taken place.

For beginners, the US Army would have entered the conflict without the benefit of the hard learned lessons of those early and formative experiences. No implementation of armored/mobile doctrine, organization and command, service and support, and most of all, no lessons learned on how to fight in a modern conflict, against a modern enemy.

Now for your input....

Hopefully we will have a lot of fun with this discussion, and learn something at the same time. Don't be shy. Jump in and let's get this one rolling.

 

Are you also proposing that all the various corps and divsion manuvers did not take place either? Those provided most of the same lessons as the larger army size tests. Perhaps the results would be interpreted differently? The reduction of the proposed armored divsions from nine to six tank battalions is one of the changes acredited to the Louisiana Manuvers of 1940. Perhaps the divsion and corps training of the same period had the same result? I dont know. Perhaps the number of smaller scale training exercises would increase?

 

In order not to hijack my own thread, let's just stay with the original suggestion of no Louisiana Manuevers in 1940 and 41. I am not familiar with the other manuevers that you have mentioned. In other readings, I know that units conduct their own manuevers and drills and work their way up (company, batallion, regiment, etc.). Is that what you are talking about?

 

In part. The divsion and corps commanders were responsible for completing prescribed training programs. Above that there were the four 'Armys' or Departments the lower 48 States were divided into. The commanders of those (Kruger, DeWitt, Lear, & Drum) were the senior leaders responsible for training until the activation of HQ Army Ground Forces. These commanders of 1st thru 4th Armys had their own ideas for large scale training. If I recall correctly the Lousiana and Carolina Manuvers were a larger version of this, which Marshall caused to happen.

As far as the changes.... A wider variety of opinions and judgements might emerge without a single 'ultimate' judging agency. The results of the Lousiana and Carolina Manuvers were evaluated by a group of more or less unified boards and their judgements published throughout the Army. If the seperate commands exercises are not uniformly evaluated and the results not made know to all then seperate doctrinal schools and training standards will emerge. Conversely if a larger number of smaller exercises are evaluated by a overarching national group then there might be a benefit from a wider variety of ideas being tested.

One clear benefit of the large scale 'army' size manuvers is that it forced a Reality Check on the logisitcians. From experince I know it is usually the practice to fairy dust away potiential problems you dont have to actually deal with in training. Putting a dozen plus divsions into the same exercise area at the same time forced the logistics officers to face up to their limits in 1940-41.

 

Members:

My participation in the Lousiana Manuvers in 1941 were very small. But I heard a numer of my superiors comments that the manuevers were not to train small units but to train commanders and staffs in how to deal with large groups of combatants.

They would not have food nor POL if it not been for civil rail and motor transport companies. You may recall that the Normandy Supply scheme was Called the Red Ball Express. This is the name of one of the motor carriers that supplied the Louisian Manuvers.

After the Field Exercises the US Army went of an all out drive to create a robust Sevice of Supply. The supply chief of the ETO was absolute ruler of the Supply System and he had more troops at his diposale that the Combat Armies. The US Army ended up with 5 million in Europe. 60% of these were under the Sevice of Supply Commander.

As Ever,

Walter L. Marlowe
( Airborne all the Way)

 

Mr. Marlowe, what unit did you serve with during the manuevers? Did you and your fellow officers see the manuevers as a success at the time, or something that could be called a "rather large fubar?" Of course history, and what you pointed out proved that the manuevers and lessons learned from them were a success, but sometimes at the time, you can't tell what went on until "the dust settles."

 

That's a pretty good what-if! Just to chuck in my totally uneducated and rather abstract couple of cents...

Obviously the army as a whole wouldn't have had the modifications in doctrine made as a result of the manoeuvres but I think that doctrine was becoming a changing, developing entity and therefore when you look at the early US involvement in the war it would have been in an early phase of it's evolution, however by the time it got around to Italy, Normandy and so on the lessons learned on the battlefield would have been the same as they were in real life. I agree however that the major change is likely to be to the logistical process. If the US Army was inexperienced dealing with large numbers of combatants and these manoeuvres helped teach them lessons about keeping soldiers in the field supplied, arguably this knowledge would have been invaluable in North Africa and so on. Once again though, I can't help but think that what knowledge was lacking would have been picked up in the early years of the war.

 

I love what-if's threads Yay.
Obviously, if this did occurred that America enterd ww2 without any skill at all,and fighting against an emeny that was fully trained and powerful to the core,that America would have simply lost alot % of there battles.
Not only that,the US generals that lead there units in to the war,would have no idea how to lead there units against a much knowledgable emeny general.

Look at America when first join ww2,they only had a bit of knowleage on how to fight and it took to1944 for America soldier to be just as good as emeny soldiers at fighting.
Just imagine what would happend ,if America had none at all. Alot more deaths and would not advatage the allies at all.
probelary be more of a noosence for the Allies in trying to train the americans into fighting and using equitment.(takes time and energy,which the allies did not have)

 

Heidi, I think you are getting a little confused, these manoeuvres seem to be more about training generals and high level commanders, individual soldiers would still receive the same level of combat training etc that they had in the real world. It also isn't necessarily a question of training the generals to lead their men so much as manage them, move them and supply them which is an entirely different kettle of fish entirely.

 

The most probable consequence for the US Army is the same thing that happened to the US Navy early in the war.

The US Navy was faced with the same kind of problem at the beginning of the war; at the unit, squadron, and fleet level, it knew how to fight and proved this in the first two major naval battles, the second of which gutted the Japanese Navy's offensive capabilities for the rest of the war. But the Navy was facing a more complex problem than just winning fleet engagements; it had to conduct a series of offensive operations aimed at securing a string of bases across the Pacific so that the power of the US Air Force and Navy could be brought to bear against the home Islands of Japan. Although this was realized at a very early date (prior to WW I), and war-gamed regularly throughout the 1920's and 1930's, no large scale "field exercises" were ever conducted by the Navy. Some small scale exercises were effected in the Caribbean, largely to test various aspects of amphibious doctrine and equipment, but no strategic-level exercises involving all levels of command and staff functions were ever conducted.

The result was, that when the US Navy launched it's first offensive in the Pacific, against the Japanese at Guadalcanal, the planning was deficient in several areas, notably logistics. The men on the ground and at sea managed to outfight the Japanese on several occasions, but the struggle was prolonged because the planners had failed to anticipate numerous logistical and other problems. The US prevailed over the Japanese, who it turned out, had severe logistical problems of their own, but it took some very bloody fighting and the replacement of the over-all theater commander (Ghormley) before victory became a reality. The US Navy learned fast; pre-fab bases, advanced logistical doctrine, specialized equipment, a dedicated fleet train, rapid building and repair of air fields, and many other innovations were born out of the Navy's Guadalcanal experience. All of that took time and the US Navy's long-awaited central Pacific offensive wasn't launched until 15 months later in November, 1943.

I doubt very seriously that the Army's Louisiana exercises solved all of the staff and command problems, or even uncovered all of them, but it was a step in the right direction. The same thing would have probably resulted if the US Navy had conducted large scale exercises designed to ferret out command and staff-functuion defieiencies, But I don't think it would have had a major impact on the war because, as noted, the Navy learned quickly, and quickly moved to correct the deficiencies it found. I expect the Army would have acted in a similar vein.

 

It is my understanding that the Louisiana Manuvers made the Career of General Eisenhower. He was the Operations Officer for the US Third Army in this manuever. His supply and tactical plan was very good and General Kruger the commande allow him to execute it. They both became better know military persons as the war progressed.

I do know the Army devoted more time and assets on the Supply Service after Manuever.

As Ever,

Walter L. Marlowe

(Airborne all the Way)

 

I believe this is completely correct, also it should be remembered that his close friend and fellow proponent of armored warfare was his opposite number in the opposing force of 2nd Army; G.S.Patton. When his forces neutralized Patton's he was asked afterwards how this came about. His reply was that; "I know how Georgie thinks." (paraphrasing)

Here is a section from an 'Ike" site; "

General George Catlett Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, had ordered the largest war game exercise in American history to take place in Louisiana during September. The 3rd Army would face the 2nd Army in mock battle. Marshall had characterized the event as "a combat college for troop leading." Over 470,000 soldiers would be involved and the huge war games became one of the top media stories in 1941. Ike’s job was to work with his boss, Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, in devising the strategy and troop movements that could lead the 3rd Army to "victory" over the opposing forces. They designed a fast moving envelopment maneuver to defeat their adversary. During the exercise the attack plan worked well and, to General Krueger’s chagrin, the press praised Eisenhower rather than Krueger as the strategist that led to the 3rd Army’s success.

At the end of the maneuvers General Marshall asked Brigadier General Mark Clark to give him a list of ten officers that Clark would recommend for consideration to be promoted to service in the War Plans section of the General Staff in Washington. Clark responded that he could supply such a list, but all ten names would be Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Ike was immediately promoted to Brigadier General and ordered to report to Washington as Marshall’s Deputy Chief of War Plans for the Pacific and Far East.

See:

Ike Stories - Ike Sets Wartime Pacific Strategy - Eisenhower Memorial Commission - Ike Sets Wartime Pacific Strategy

I really enjoy reading that place, and going to other sites it recommends.

 

Very interesting postings. Here is my take on this topic. I have compiled my family and friends' personal observations and experiences during the 1940-1941 Louisiana manuevers. My family's French, German and Italian ancestry played a significant part during these manuevers. Some of the information that I have collected, documents some of the significant contributions of the Louisiana people, culture and remote locations played in the overall training manuevers; e.g. French language and culture, my grandfather was recruited to serve as a communication commander between the local people and the manuever communication officers, etc. He was awarded a WWII letter of Appreciation by the Army for his contributions to the overall success of the "Communication" part of the manuevers. If anyone has any interest or documentation on the Louisiana Manuevers and would like to share information, just let me know.

Melo1925

 

Do you have your information on a website yet?