Was it possible for the Graf Spee to break out of Montevideo?

You never know for sure what's going to happen to a ship untill she goes down, so it was usual practice to torpedo the hulks, sometimes, like for USS Hornet, even this was not enough to ensure a swift sinking but it doesn't mean the ship was salvageable. WW2 has many episodes of abbandoned ship remaining afloat after being abandoned by the crew and later salvaged, often by the same crew that had left her. In the case of RN Pola at the time of the fight (so before 12:00) her captain De Pisa had told the crew to leave the ship, though he remained on board together with the rest of the officers to supervise the flooding, and most of the crew had left her. When the firing ended and she proved to be still afloat he closed the sea vents and part of the crew returned on board as the water temperature was pretty low. Then she was found again by Hancock and the scuttling operation resumed, according to De Pisa's account she had already taken around 4000t of water (possibly computed by the size of the flooded compartnents) when he had the flooding stopped.

 

Yes, this is one of the ironies of the topic, as the historical scuttling of the ship actually enabled the British to "capture" what was left of her. They gained significant intelligence from components removed from her radar.

 

Sorry, Tiornu. Don't mean to suggest it was terribly practical. I would guess that you are quite correct, even without scuttlings there would no doubt have been few ships captured, as captains didn't tend to order their ships abandoned until they were pretty well complete losses anyway.

Further, many of the ships in question were scuttled in heavily contested waters where both sides would have been loathe to expose the resources necessary to tow a captured vessel clear. (Which I suspect is the real reason the Japanese finished off Hornet. The usual story that she was too far gone doesn't quite wash. If they'd been able to wait around and tow her I'm sure they'd have loved the intel. They almost surely sank her for the same reason we tried: "Well, if I can't tow her clear then I'm darn sure not going to let the other guy do it!")

However, none of that discounts the often quite significant efforts taken to scuttle ships to prevent their capture. Even if it wasn't going to happen much, I would guess at least a few more ships would have been captured otherwise.

Though probably not GS. But taking her out of the harbor is mighty risky to the crew. You'd be asking an awful lot of men to die just to keep the Brits from capturing her. (As I'm pretty confident she'd not have made it home, even if she succeeded in breaking out.) So maybe scuttling was the next best thing, even if the water was too shallow and somebody was bound to get something that way. At least it wasn't the whole nine yards, and nobody else has to die in the process. Tough call.

 

I still don't have a clear idea of GS's status at the time of her sortie. Was she mechanically sound enough to make the journey home, assuming she fought her way past the British cruisers? If not, is a bloodless scuttling the best option? That would be a matter of opinion, I suppose.

 

There's significant discussion of just this over on navalwarfare.net. It seems that the action had severed a crucial steam line, a fact the Germans hushed up for a great many years.

The thread is here: Graf Spee - 16 hours fuel?It points in turn to an article on noac-national.ca that I can't seem to access, but the crucial piece of the article is quoted:

Now why they can't rig up some kind of tank heater I'm not quite sure, and I'd really like to see the source of the quote, but it does provide enough detail to make me curious. German warships of that vintage were . . . quirky. Prone to odd vulnerabilities due to their rather experimental designs.

I'm suddenly quite curious and I'll keep looking, but I begin to think she really wasn't seaworthy enough to make a dash home even if the Brits weren't out hunting. (Which by then, of course, they were.)

 

Guys, just a quick clarification on the thread. It was pretty obvious that in her current state there was no way GS could make it back to Germany. The key to the question as posted was, was there somewhere else she could have made it.

 

I don't recall that this equipment was on the list of irreparable items prepared by the crew in Montevideo. I believe that the main diesels were capable of pre-heating their own fuel, at least some of it. So despite the revelatory nature regarding the auxiliary boiler's damage, I can't say that it was as decisive a matter as recent articles indicate.

 

Well Buenos Aires wasn't that "far away", and Argentina and Chile were the only two south American countries to NOT break off relations with the Axis powers after the Pearl Harbor attack. Whether or not the "in flux" Argentine government would allow them to stay longer, or aid them in repair is a question. I think that Ortiz had fallen ill, and was being replaced de facto by another man (Castillo, Rameriz ?) who might have been a bit less aid than the man who showed up post-war (Peron). Remember that even though they refused to break off diplomatic ties with Germany, the USA was their largest trading partner after Britain sort of lost the ability to pay for the beef shipments.

That could be a bit of a problem for a warship in the "taking refuge" in their ports or waters. Just a thought, every nation's actions are generally based on economics in the long run, and Argentina knew full well which side of the bread their butter was on.

 

I was looking around for just where Roberto Ortiz stood politically, and it appears that while he was elected as a representative of the right wing politically, he soon surprised everybody and became a bit more of an internationalist. He didn’t step down due to illness until late 1940, so it would have been he in charge in Dec. of 1939. Here is the whole "blurb":


The world economic crisis that began in 1929 had serious repercussions in Argentina. Unemployment and other hardships caused profound social and political unrest. Economic conditions improved substantially during the administration of General Augustin Justo, but political turbulence intensified, culminating in an unsuccessful Radical uprising in 1933 and 1934. In the period preceding the presidential elections of 1937, Fascist organizations became increasingly active. In May 1936, following the organization of a left-wing Popular Front, the Argentine right-wing parties united in a so-called National Front. This organization, which openly advocated establishment of a dictatorship, successfully supported the finance minister, Roberto M. Ortiz, for the presidency. Contrary to the expectations and demands of his supporters, however, Ortiz took vigorous steps to strengthen democracy in Argentina. Countermeasures were adopted against the subversive activities of German agents, who had become extremely active after the victory of National Socialism in Germany. The corrupt electoral machinery of the country was overhauled. Ortiz proclaimed neutrality after the outbreak of World War II in 1939, but he subsequently cooperated closely with the other American republics on matters of hemispheric defense.


Goto:


Depression and Turmoil - History - Argentina - South America: argentina history, national socialism, south america, m ortiz, administration general

 

Whether or not possible scuttling in shallow water was not an option. If that was his choice he could have gone out with his skeleton crew and done it in deep water.

If fuel heating was the problem then the Graf Spee would not have gotten out of port as the fuel would have been cold. Uboats used diesel engines and had no boilers.

The fuel separators are another story. Large long range ships like Graf Spee need ballast and pump sea water into fuel tanks. They then have to clean that fuel to use it. The cleaned fuel is kept in day tanks. Graf Spee took on fuel while in port, likely clean fuel, so she could run.

When your country is at war you do not do as they did. Look at Bismark! Admiral Lutens refused to open fire at the British Battleships till threatened with mutiny bu its captain, sending out a radio message giving away his position, refusing to finish off Prince of Wales? I suggest that the German Navy was not loyal to Hitler. Look at the failure to give the Nazi salute! That carried the death penalty! Look at the cruise of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Lutens finds a convoy and does not attack because a British battleship Duck of York was spotted shadowing the convoy. His ships were faster and one could have attacked from the other side of the convoy while the other shadowed Duck of York. Imagine the losses incurred if the convoy has to scatter, what happens if Duke of York has to work up to full speed and charge through the convoy, what happens after Duke of York works up to 30 knots in pursuit of one and the other starts to attack the convoy? What does the admiral do, he reports the position of the convoy and leaves. Look at Bismark before the battle. Lutens refuses to top up her fuel tanks in Norway even though a tanker is there and tops up Prince Eugen! A mistake or on purpose? You are heading out to do commerce raiding, do you not fuel up? Bismark had sailed nearly 1,000 miles! A mistake or on purpose to sabotage the mission?

I put it to you that the some of the surface commanders purposely lost battles. That the other pocket battleships were not used as commerce raiders because their commanders could not be trusted. Look at the surface units tied up by Graf Spee! Aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, all chasing around the south Atlantic instead of being available for the battle for control of the Mediterranean Sea! Invaluable! Look at the cruisers that patrolled the Denmark Straight and shadowed Bismark. If the pocket battleships were out they would have been in the South Atlantic.

I think the real question is was the battle thrown? Why did Graf Spee charge the British ships instead of running away? The Captain claimed he thought them destroyers. Why would you charge destroyers and close the range? Why would you choose battle 7,000 miles from home? I put it to you that the Captain purposely threw the battle! So whether or not there was a fuel problem we will never know. I put it to you that Graf Spee should not have chosen battle, that Graf Spee CHOSE to give up its advantage (Range), chose to allow the British to split her fire ( It is almost impossible to range with only 3 guns) and chose to be trapped.

I personally believe that she could have escaped.

 

johny49,

Seriously, a modicum of research on your part would do you a world of good.

The was no engagement between the Scharnhorst & Gneisenau and the HMS Duke of York. The two battlecruisers did encounter the HMS Rodney towards the end of "Operation Berlin", and quite rightly avoided combat, the Rodney's 9 x 16-inch guns were not to be taken lightly.

Your tactic of trying to draw off the HMS Rodney is a failure also. The British battleship simply has to stay with the convoy and let the German warships come to her. Since her primary role is convoy escort and her relatively "slow" speed, she is unlikely to go chasing after anything. If Lutgens really wanted to risk the loss of one of the battlecruisers, he could have split his ships and attacked from opposing points of the compass, in hope of dividing the Rodney's gunfire.

Stil, IIRC, were not the German admirals under orders not to risk severe damage/loss of their charges, thus, turning tail upon sighting a more powerful surface unit is just following orders.

Finally, the German "twins" had already sunk over 110,000 tons of British shipping without accruing any appreciable damage. So, are you really suggesting that a few thousand more tons was worth the high risk of losing one of the "twins" to the HMS Rodney?

WTF?

The Admiral Scheer went commerce raiding from October, 1940 - April, 1941, after which she returned to Kiel for overhaul. This cruise resulted in a total tonnage bag roughly equal to the combined total of the "twins" Operation Berlin". A commerce raiding mission scheduled for July, 1941, was canceled after the sinking of the Bismarck and the Failed breakout of sister ship Lutzow. This will be the last attempt to give the Speer a commerce raiding mission until she is assigned to participate in the destruction of convoy PQ-17, a mission which will also be called off. It was hoped that the Sheer would be able to act in concert with the "twins" and Prinz Eugen following the conclusion of "Operation Cerberus". However, both "twins will suffer mine damage necessitating yard repair, and the Prinz Eugen will have her stern blown off three days after joining the Speer.

The Deutschland/Lutzow was ordered to resume commerce raiding on September 27, 1939, after having been ordered to cease such operations on September 5th. Her bag would be small, 1 ship captured & 2 ships sunk, before her voyage was cut short in early November, 1939, after she suffered severe structural damage during a powerful storm. Plans for another commerce raid were set up, but would be cancelled so that the ship would be available to participate in the April, 1940, invasion of Norway. During her participation in the invasion, she would suffer severe damage from a British torpedo and be placed out of commission for almost a year while repairs are completed. Shortly after being placed back into service, she participates in "Operation Sommerreise", a day later she would take an aircraft torpedo in the stern. Again, almost a year would be spent under repair, before she is again declared battle ready on May 10, 1942. A few months later, she is assigned to the attack on Convoy PQ-17, but runs aground leaving the harbor. This will require yet another dockyard visit and it will be the end of October before she is again ready for action. Finally, came the failed Operation "Regenbogen", which one could call a "Perfect Storm" of poorly worded orders, weak commanders, and a faulty tactical disposition of ships.

So, we have the Admiral Scheer participating in one successful commerce raiding mission, and wartime events and damage conspiring to keep her from more, while the "unlucky" Deutschland/Lutzow participates in one commerce raiding mission that is cut short due to damage, and then spends much of the commerce raiding "heyday" in the dockyard under repair, before participating in one failed convoy interception.

I'm sorry, Johny49, but the facts don't support your conclusion that the other "pocket battleships" were not used as convoy raiders because they could not be trusted.

You would close the range because:
1.) Destroyers have very short ranged weapons and likely very weak ones at that.
2.) Gunfire at long range for the 11-inch guns is notoriously inaccurate under combat conditions, so closing the range will, or at least should, increase accuracy.
3.) Long range for the 11-inch guns does not permit the secondary battery of the 5.9-inch guns to engage.

Because the enemy ships will continue to flood the airwaves with updated position reports. While destroyers present a negligible threat to Graf Spee(and an easy victory), their radio calls are very likely to attract the attention of the larger ships that are capable of sinking the Graf Spee.

Escaped from ships that were faster than she was...

Fat chance!

 

I apologize for making the mistake of confusing Kink George 5 with Duke of York both the same class.

But the other convoy was escorted by Ramillies, a very slow old battleship (11 knots slower) with shorter range guns than Scharnhorst. It had 41 ships in it.
To argue that they could not attack without engaging Ramillies is foolish. Ramillies could not cover both sides and front and rear of the convoy.
It was miles wide and long! They could easily have attacked the tankers while out of range of Ramillies and thus not engaged her. Attacking the convoy would have caused it to disburse and leave the ships easy prey for uboats. If they only sank 1/2 the ships @ an average tonnage of 14,000 tons that would have amounted to 280,000 tons. Lutens made no attempt to engage the merchant ships despite the lack of danger from Ramillies. Sharnhorst's Captain tried to get Lutjens to allow him
to draw off Ramillies but Lutjens refused. To suggest Ramillies would decline to try to engage Scharnhorst was to go against the very aggressive nature
of the British navy in the war. The fact that they later easily escaped from Rodney and King George 5 proves the British ships posed little danger.

Running aground leaving harbor? I always found this a convenient way to avoid battle against merchant ships. I also found it curious as the channel is wide!

Escape from destroyers, Yes!!! British destroyers had very short range and would have quickly exhausted their fuel. Without radar at range beyond
Graf Spee's 11 inch guns it was practically impossible to shadow Graf Spee. Both cruisers shadowing Bismark were much faster and one had radar yet
Bismark escaped. Since bridge crew were trained to identify silhouettes at long range the Captain's suggestion he thought them destroyers was crazy.
They could easily see their silhouettes at more than 20 miles through the excellent optics in the fire control masts. They were also to the west and he
could have VERY EASILY waited till they were lit up in the after glow and charged them. His guns had a range of over 33,000 yards, nearly 20 miles.
To suggest that they were not accurate at that range is crazy as Scharnhorst scored hits at that 26,000 yards on Glorious on the third salvo! Lastly
he could have made smoke! If he wanted to engage them with his secondary battery (nuts since they would have been able to hit him and he had
little Armour) he could have made smoke before charging them and then reversed course and engaged them, bursting out of the smoke!

There is nothing certain in battle. John Paul Jones proved that! In the dark people get confused. In the second battle of Savo Island U.S. ships were
firing at U.S. Ships and Japanese ships were firing at Japanese ships. He sails out in the dark, makes smoke, just after they open fire he reverses course
back into the smoke, they follow, he reverses again, very quickly it gets very confused. Anyone who has sailed at sea knows that distance is VERY
deceptive, that conditions can change VERY Quickly! At night you combine haze, fog, and smoke and you cannot see. Remember not only would
Graf Spee be making smoke but the British ships would have made tremendous smoke every time they fired. Also the British ships would have been
using their search lights and he would not so he could see where they were and where they were headed. Then when he disappears into the smoke
perhaps one of the British ships might turn off his search lights and then be confused by another British ship for Graf Spee. Remember he knows everyone
else is the enemy, but the British have 4 other ships out there and only one is the enemy!

You can argue that the German surface Navy had incredibly poor seamanship and tactics, definitely not the case in WWI, or you can argue they did not
want to help Hitler or perhaps were not keen on sinking unarmed merchant ships, but you cannot argue that they made rational decisions and used
their surface navy well.

NOTE Lutjens protested the anti Jewish program in 1938 IN WRITING ALONG WITH 3 OTHER FLAG OFFICERS! His grandmother was Jewish!

 

20/20 hindsight second guessing is fun, but should be taken as such, if you spot a battleship it's possible a carrier is in the area as well, there is no "safe zone" for a raider as any kind of engineering hit could be fatal, the sort of convoy attack is more "age of sail" than something a modern squadron might attempt, AFAIK the tactic that worked best was "stay concentrated and punch through", most "sofisticated" attack plans I know of were failures.
Mistaken identification during a surface battle was not that uncommon.
Destroyers are geneally poor shadowers due their limited bunkerage, if Ajax and Achilles were identified as such the decision to "charge them" is questionable, but then British propaganda would have had a field day if a "pocket battleship" had run from a couple of destroyers (at that date propaganda still was a very big consideration).
Without radar reliably shadowing an 11" armed warship means stayting well within her gun range in any visibility condition below optimal.

 

No sir, you did not confuse the two ships. What you said

is total fantasy, not confusion. The "twins" never encountered either the KGV or DOY during this cruise. Indeed, the only time a German battlecruiser encountered or engaged a KGV class was between the Duke of York & Scharnhorst at the Battle of the North Cape", which resulted in the Scharnhorst's sinking.

The maximum range of the 11-inch guns is 44,760 yards according to navweaps.com However, this is quite meaningless to the argument, since main gun engagements rarely took place at ranges exceeding 28,000 yards. Further along this line, the longest hit ever achieved by either "twin" was at slightly over 26,000 yards against the British carrier HMS Glorious. Therefore, engaging at or about maximum range will do little, but waste main gun ammunition. Thus, the Ramilies is quite capable of keeping the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau "at arms length" and preventing them from doing much damage.

Most unlikely given the battleship escort, by scattering, the lose any protection provided by the battleship and convoy escorts. I don't think the convoy commander will be that dumb.

Where are you getting your average tonnage from?

The TOTAL GRT of Convoy HX-106 was only 279,497 tons, for an average GRT of 6,817 tons. Indeed, there were only FOUR SHIPS WITH A GRT OVER 10,000 TONS!

Probably because Lutjens recognized that the Scharhorst's only advantage was speed, an advantage that could just as easily be negated by any 15-inch shell hit to her engineering plant.

Then again, his orders not to engage British heavy units was possibly another factor in his judgement.

To be sure, the Ramilies would engage the "twins", however, it is most unlikely that she would be "suckered" into a "wild goose chase" after an obviously faster warship, one which she could not hope to catch. Further, the battleship's over-riding order to protect the convoy, would keep the battleship captain's ego in check, so that he would not go tearing off for personal glory. If that would not be enough, almost certain failure in such a chase would result in a most certain court-martial.

It also greatly helped that the Germans never engaged any of the battleships, but prudently retreated before combat could begin.

I can't believe that you seriously ahear to such foolishness.

However, contrary to you belief, Tjeldsund is not wide, and the heavy fog prevented any position fixes.

Of course, this ignores the many peacetime groundings. Some examples; the Battleship France in 1922, the Battleship Espana in 1923, the "Honda Point Disaster" of 1923, USS Missouri "going a 1/2 mile inland" in 1950, the HMS Nottingham in 2002, or the USS PORT Royal off Pearl Harbor in 2009

You forget the first rule of the sea: Ship happens!

But, all the time they are there they are still flooding the air waves with position reports. Further, all commerce raiders tried there utmost to prevent there victms from getting of contact reports. Yet, here your are allowing three "British destroyers" to broadcast constantly and unimpeeded for as long as there fuel hold out, without taking any available actions to prevent them from doing so.

Nor, do they have to remain outside the range of the 11-inch guns of the Graf Spee. Since she is unlikely to waste ammunition, other than a few desultory salvoes, by firing at extreme range.

The weather during the Battle of the River Plate was much different than that during the Bismarck chase.

What is your point, did not the HMS Ramilies sight one of the "twins" and identify her as the heavy cruiser "Admiral Hipper", even though the two ships look very different from each other.

Yes, a FEW hits were made at such long range, but the main guns never engaged the destroyers, they were left to the secondary armament. It is also worth notin that this "luck" was never again repeated.

Which is entirely depending on the wind - it's direction and speed - for it's effectiveness.

Johny49,
What are your even talking about? What does a night action have to do with a daylight action such as the Battle of the River Plate(where the battle took place in excellent visibility)? As such, the entire rambling paragraph has no bearing on the matter at hand.

Could you please put this is some kind of context relivent to the discussion at hand.

Using battleships & battlecruisers as "commerce raiders" is a "rational decision"? How do you figure? Do you consider, using expensive capital ships for a job that cheap converted merchantmen could do with equal or better ability, "rational"?

The only use of there surface navy that the Germans did "well", was to "camp" the Tirpitz in Norway and use the threat of her operation as a "fleet in being", thus forcing the Allies to maintain a strong naval presence in the Atlantic, long after it was really needed.

What does this have to do with the price of tea in China? It didn't stop Lutjens from racking up an impressive score during "Operation Berlin."

 

The British 15" guns were more than capable of engaging the Germans at any range that they chose.
If you are relying on Wiki's description ("and her newer 11" guns outranged the 1915 era 15" guns of the British ship") I would take it with a grain of salt, as I note that it cites no refernces.
The BL 15" gun has a range of over 33,000 yards.
Imperial War Museum Collections > Collecting Departments > Frequently Asked Questions : The 15-inch Guns

No, you are in error with your calculations, as 33,000 yards is 16.3 nautical miles, about the same range as the British 15" guns.

That's exactly what we are suggesting.
The 26,000 yard hit on the Glorious is tied for the longest hit EVER by a naval gun, matching the 26,000 yard hit by the Warspite. (using those same model BL 15" guns)

Longest Gunfire Hit on an Enemy Warship

The conditions were also very good in that instance, calm seas and good visibility. It was February in the North Atlantic, near Greenland, and the seas were heavier than either the other examples where warspite & Scharnhorst achieved hits at 26,000 yards.
No other hit beyond those ranges was ever recorded, despite several attempts.

Umm, no.
The convoy was a couple of miles wide, and an engagement at 26,000 yards is about 13 miles distant.
With the sighting of the German ship(s) the Ramillies would have positioned herself between the convoy and the Germans.
To circle around the convoy would entail a loop of some 20 miles or more, while the Ramilles can much more easily reposition.

 

Sure, but to think that the Ramillies making about 20 - 21 knots was going to leave the convoy to chase after the 32 knot Scharnhorst is just wishful thinking.

Which engagement are you referring to?
The fact that battlecruisers can use their superior speed to escape a slower battleship does not mean that heavily armed "battleships pose little danger" should they choose to close for engagement.

Lutjens decided to break off before the battlecruisers were identified. In this respect he was correct, the convoy saw only 1 KM ship, and assumed that it was Hipper.

In Feb of 1941 there were 10 RN battleships/battlecruisers and 3 aircraft carriers in the UK, Gibraltar & Halifax, with the Germans roughly in the middle of that triangle. Had they engaged the convoy, the RN would have dispatched substantial forces to intercept them, which may well have ended up in a similar manner to the Bismarck's first sortie.

Scharnhorst - The History - Operation "Berlin"

Does any reputable historian claim that there was a "lack of danger from Ramillies" or is that your (rather fanciful) hypothesis?

This is a quite similar engagement between the 2 battlecruisers and a British warship with the battle at Lofoten, when they engaged the Renown, except that the Renown had only 6 x 15" guns (Ramillies had 8) and was not as well armoured as the Ramillies.
After Gneisnau had 1 turret knocked out and some other damage the Germans withdrew.

You also need to take into account that at the range that the battle would be fought (20,000 - 22,000 yards) the Ramillies's deck armour has a good chance to stop the 11" shell, while the plunging fire from the 15" shell would be much more lethal.

Aha! Now I understand!
It was all a Jewish conspiracy!

 

Looking at what Admiral Sommerville says about them, he had the four surviving "R" in his squadron when facing Nagumo's Indian ocean raid, I very much doubt HMS Ramilles would be able to do even 21 knots, the "R" had not undergone a major refit between the wars and their machinery was not in good condition. Also their turrets had not been modified to allow greater elevation so the 15" range was less than for the other British 15" ships. Another peculiarity of the "R" was that their boilers used up more water than their distillers could produce with a resulting reduced range (they were designed for North Sea fighting).
Despite the above once the big guns start firing anything can happen, German gunnery was usually very good at the beginning of an engagement, as far as I know their FC equipment was extremely demanding and as fatigue set in the accuracy lessened, but a lucky 15" hit may well cripple one of the BC. I think Lutjens was correct in avoiding the engagement, his mission was commerce disruption not engaging enemy battleships, risking one ship in a one on one duel with a 15" battleship just to allow the other to get at the convoy is bad tactics, I also don't think HMS Ramilles was alone, had the ASW escorts of HX-106 used the usual "smokescreen + torpedo threat" tactic to cover the convoy the unengaged battlecruiser would probably achieve very little while putting it's consort at considerable risk.

 

The escort for HX-106 was the battleship and ten ASW escorts, the usual mix of destroyers, corvettes, and trawlers.

However, the Ramillies was the only escort across the Atlantic, leaving the convoy on February 10th. The convoy picked up 6 ASW escorts on February 12th and another 3 on the 15th. The remaining escort had only stayed with the convoy for the first day at sea, and departed on January 31st, 1941.

So, had the engagement taken place, it would strictly be the "big boys" slugging it out.

 

I've seen both 20 and 21 knots quoted, so it's likely in that range.
This also represented full steam, the usual cruising limit was around 16 or 17 knots

Do you have a figure for the max range of the R turrets then?
The QE's may well have been able to shoot out to 33,000 yards, but if the R's could get 26,000 or 28,000 yards the KM are unlikely to be able to do much beyond that range.

The full escort were actually not present on the 8th, as some joined on the 12th & 15th, however the point is that Lutjens didn't know what the full escort was, only that Ramillies was identified. There could well have been a couple of heavy cruisers shadowing the other side of the convoy, and he also had no way of knowing if any other RN capital ships were in the area.

Not worth the risk in his opinion, a disabled RN warhip could be assisited, but a disabled KM ship was likely going to end up sunk.

 

freebird makes some good points.

already edited my post, I was probably going back over the Arnold Hague convoy database when you responded.

For the "R"'s top speed, she ran trials at a little over 21 knots. For 15-inch range, 4 charge shell, and 20 degree angle, most respectable sources come in at 23,500 yards or there abouts.


Still, had the "twins" decided to bang away at the "R" from such considerable range, they would have wasted a lot of time and shells doing so. Thus, even if they had been lucky enough to have done appreciable damage to the Ramillies, there magazines would probably have been nearly depleted, or at least, have expended a great deal of their main armament shells. Thereby, leaving them with that much less with which to combat any British reinforcements, or deal with any other major impediments to their expedition and eventual return to Germany.

So, I say Lutjens made the correct call, and saved his main gun ammunition for a situation that might have been a little more "dire", with respects to the fate of the "twins". A few thousand extra tons on the scoreboard is not worth the risk of damage and the empty main battery magazines likely to result from an engagement with the Ramillies.