Could France have survived?

Any artillery piece with or without specialized armor piercing ammunition be it shot, HEAT, or something else still poses a real and substancial threat to armored vehicles. Heavy wall HE (sometimes refered to as Common, Semi-Armor piercing or, anti-concrete) rounds are more than capable of stoving in the armor of many tanks depending on the caliber of the gun.
For a 75mm using common rounds it could easily smash in 30mm of armor to about 1000 yards. Also, at any range a near miss or direct hit would also produce significant fragment damage to the suspension and other exposed parts of a tank.
The US 105mm later in the war using heavy wall "anti-concrete" shells could smash in a Panther's glacis at up to about 500 yards. That gives you some idea of how dangerous even HE rounds could be to tanks.

As for use of the 88. This gun is relatively rare in combat in France in 1940. The Luftwaffe controlled the bulk of these weapons and used them primarily for air defense. When called on they could be deployed for use as ground weapons. At Arras for example none of the British tanks were knocked out by 88's. Rommel's 7th panzer had none with it. There the major tank killer was the panzer division's towed artillery. 105mm guns firing common rounds did the bulk of the destruction and were largely responsible for blunting the British attack.
Outside the 8th S. Pzjr Abt with their handful of 8.8 cm on Sdkfz 8 halftracks there were no mobile 88's either; all were towed.

The Luftwaffe too is not the fearsome machine it is made out to be. Ground support was limited to Richthofen's VIII Flieger Korps. Additionally, there was no system in place for forward observers to simply call on ready air support. Instead, requests for support went up the Heer chain of command then to the Luftwaffe who would assign aircraft if they thought it necessary. At the Meuse crossings air support was planned days in advance and expected. Elsewhere it was usually non-existant.

 

AFAIK Koenig's FF brigade had 54 75mm, 7 47mm and 18 25mm, in addition to some 120.000 mines and 44 81 or 60mm mortars at Bir Hakeim. AA defence was assured by two quad 13.2 MG mounts and 18 40mm Bofors guns, it was a very strong defensive position. Interestigly nearly all the the guns, save the Bofors, appear to be of French orgin. Most pictures I've seen show French origin small arms but British helmets.

Neither Rommel nor the Italians used the M1897 so where these guns were comming from I don't know, most likely they were from Siria.

 

My mistake I must be confused with koufra. Allow me some time and I will check where I read this.

 

Abot the German air support, it lacked of a ground-air comunication like the allies had from ... Torch? unfortunately it was the best in 1940. In fact I´ve read (if it's true or not I don´t know) the blo... Stukas stopped the French counterattack. As you post up there: More Dewoitines were needed.



There is one Photo with a Somua and a Stuka but I'm not able to found it (blame google). The Heinkels bombed the french railway stations ...

About 75 mm... what if we put a wheel under the barrel as the british 25 PDR ?

But there weren´t neither the Dewoitines, the improved tactics and comunications, the strategic reserve ... and you would have to change the whole French army doctrine before 1939 to achieve them. May be the question is if one of these changes would have been enough to save France ( and millions of innocent pepople) in 1940. I have made myself this question since I started to learn about WWII.

Well ... Or foward "ULTRA" to march-april of 1940. But it didn't happened.

 

I'm not at all sure that is indeed the case. The USMC had devoted a significant amount of effort into it during the 20's and 30's and has at least a claim to that title in 1940.

 

It is correct there were no Forward Air Control teams or target Spot teams in 1940 as existed later. However the German air liasion communication was fairly rapid. Also the liasion officers were leaving the CP and moving forward to the battle zone in a effort to speed communications further and increase the accuracy and timelyness of target information. This aggresive activity by the air liasion increased in 1941, there were more liasion teams, and techniques were further refined. In preperation for Op. Blue in 1942 the Heer/Luftwaffe created a actual Forward air control presence for the armored corps. The teams got their own armored cars and radios to communicate directly with the aircraft. Techniques for marking refrence points and targets were developed & refined.

Actually techiniques were suprisingly well refined in 1918. If you can find a copy of 'The First Air War' by Lee Kennet there are some descriptions of the Close Air Support techiques of WWI. In one example the French organized a airstrike of over 100 aircraft on a German front line reserve within two hours of discovery. Most of the knowledge was forgotten in the 1920 as the air power doctrine debates focused on longer range stratigic and interdiction missions. On the NW Frontier of India & in the Rif War the British and French still practiced the techniques for CAS, but the experience was not permanetly developed into a proper doctrine. The US Army Air Corps intially had a 'Strike Wing' which included CAS techniques in its mission. But, that was disolved in the late 1920s. Udet saw CAS techniques demonstrated by the USAAC when he visited the US in the 1920s. He departed with purchase orders for two of the single engine strike aircraft the USACC used from the manufactor.

The USMC took a close interest in the Army practice of the 1920s. When the USMC stood up its two expeditionary Brigades in the mid 1920s they both included a small composite air group that included single engine tactical bombers. The USMC Expeditionary Brigade deployed to Shanghai China in 1928 included its air group. The proof for the USMC came in the Nicaruaguan intervention from 1928 to 1933. The 11th Marine Regiment deployed there included a composite air group. Over the 4-5 years the aircraft performed reconissance, supply, medivac, liasion, interdiction, and close air support missions. Radios were seldom available for the aircraft. Target location was transmitted to the aircraft mainly with colored cloth pannels laid out in specifc patterns. Message cans carried dropped messages, or were snatched from grab lines. In some cases the pilots were able to land and confer directly with the ground commander about target location and attack timing.

In 1941 the British 8th Army and Desert Air Force were feeling their way towards proper CAS techniques. By late 42 or early 43 they were able to provide liasion teams with a forward control or target spotting capability to the leading brigades in each corps. The US AAF lagged paying too little attention to CAS and forward air control. As the battle in Normandy developed Gen Quesada ended this stagnation on that front and did things like increase the number of radios available and speed up communication techniques.

In the Pacific and Asia things went ahead faster. On Guadacannal the US Army commanders got a close look at the techniques the USMC had preserved and became ethusiastic. On Leyte & Luzon in 1944 the US Army was suppported by a USMC air liasion and air support organization. Supposedly the USAAF refused to support creation of a similar army organization. In the Okinawan campaign 10th Army AF had a complete & integrated air liasion and CAS organization. In Burma the Commonwealth took things to a similar or higher level. Air Liasion/Spotting teams were as important as the artillery FO in defeating the Japanese in the battles of 1944-45

Other reading from my shelf: 'History of the Marine Corps Aviation in WWII' by Sherrod, 'Across the Dark Islands' by F Radike (has description of spotting a airstrike on Guadcannal), 'US Marine Corps Aviation' by Merske, 'After D Day' by J Carfano, 'The Battle for Italy' by Jackson. Biography of Gen Dolittle 'I Could never Again be so Lucky', 'Pattons Air Force' by D Spires.

 

Can someone tell me what "AFIAK" means?

 

new one on me.

 

I suspect it is AFAIK

...or As Far As I Know, indicating the person posting recalls some information, but lacks or cant recall a reference & is labeling the information 'unconfirmed'.

 

Thanks Carl, that has been bugging me for awhile!

 

A humble contribution to this thread:

I my opinion (largely based on my grandfathers testomonies and to Marc Bloch's "Strange Defeat", the once glorious French Army was doomed to loose in 1940. Nobody had foreseen that the 'Front', this WWI icon view, would move as fast as 20 to 30 miles a day. German motorized units moved faster than any French general could imagine. The sacred theory of 'front alignment' forced French divisions into an endless flight beginning May 14th, until mid-June, I think, on the Loire River, where remnants tried a last honour stand.
By the way, all the best French mobile divisions were affected to the 1st Army who rushed in Belgium. They fought to absolutely no use againts the German diversion in the low countries, ending pityfully in Dunkirk after racing against encirclement.
To top all of that, le French political class was not ready to issue extreme orders as to execute deserters or any retreating general, like Soviets did in winter 41 or in 42. The moral crisis, combined to the doctrinal defeat was complete.
The best proof of this is that the gallant Free French had to wait until 1943 to become really popular in France.
In spite all of that, most French soldiers fought bravely when ordered, and the casualty rate for the whole campaign has been greater than during the famous 1916 Verdun battle.
This is why in the French Army we still respect those who gave their lives during these terrible weeks.

 

One among so many others is Lt Beau who was an airman at Chateaudun. Wereas his squadron was on operation, his base was attacked and he chose t face the enemy with one of the only flyworthy aircrafts left and met the Luftwaffe which has launched a massive attack on his base. The brave man paid the ultimate price . Today he is remembered by his name that was adopted by the base and by a memorial stele at his crashsite





The reason why I took this very example is because of the early date (may 12th) and day of the attack: The base was attacked only two days after the beginning of the offensive and hundreds of miles behind the front line. it was a total surprise.

 

I think it was all about strategy and not fighting ability. The French could have easily defeated the blitz had they allowed the spearheads to penetrate and then launch large attacks to cut them off

 

I agree with you. The problem is that only a few officers believed in this modern strategy, most Generals, including Gamelin was the old school type and not prepared for bliztkrieg warfare. But let us get back to the topic , considering this thread is about a strategy game .

 

French defeat = Wrong doctrine + wrong command + wrong political choices

Wrong doctrine + wrong command: Old CO, totally incoherent plans, first world war mentality
(with a few exceptions) and more than anything, no understanding of the possibilities of concentrated armoured formations with tactical aviation support, when the high command initiated some measures to remedy to this problem, it was too late and the changes were not complete enough to make a difference.

Wrong political choices: The high command was the result of inadequate political choices and a lack of will to reform the military

France situation prior to Fall gelb:

Active units: at least equivalent to their German counterparts
Reserve units: Not too bad compared to their German second line equivalents
Tanks: More tanks, and for many types, better than their German equivalents (B1-D2 tanks, Somua S35 and so on)
Artillery: Excellent and continue to remain good throughout the battle of France
Aviation: Professional and efficient, despite some flaws especially in the bomber doctrine, good to excellent quality fighters, even 'outclassed' models gave a good show against the Bf 109.
Marine: Totally outclassed the Kriegsmarine and Regia Marina, especially after the disastrous Norway campaign (disastrous for the Kriegsmarine)

France even in 1939, had the material means to easily counter a massive German mechanized attack, it even took some half measures to give itself these tools.
The 2 DLC and the DCR's creation is a witness to that.

Sadly for France, they didn't implement this in full and more than this, they didn't use these mechanized/armoured formations as counter attack reserves....instead sending the DLC to Belgium (Dyle plan) and using the DCR for only local counter attacks.

The Maginot line wasn't a bad idea, and didn't even suck up funds which would have been better used elsewhere.
Just a lack of correct doctrine and the right command......lead to France's defeat.

 

A fairly consice thumbnail of the situation. I have to quibble over France alone being able to hold off Germany in 1939 ( I think they really needed Great Britain ), but otherwise I agree.

As you wrote France was moving (very slowly) to modernize equipment and doctrine, but alas, Hitler would not give them the time to do so. To be fair England's armour doctrine was not a whole lot better than France's was.

The Maginot line was not totally bad idea, but to work it had to extend all the way to the coast. The Dyle plan was a compromise to overcome the limitations of the Maginot line. Sadly for it to work the Allies needed to have Belgian co-operation. The Allies needed to set up a defensive line in 1939 while Germany was occupied with Poland.

The weak spot in the Ardenne would remain, but hopefully with troops deployed there over the winter Gamelin might have tumbled to the threat. Then again we are talking Gamelin.

 

Belasar:
You are of course right, even if France had had the right high command and doctrine the UK was needed.
UK's armor doctrine showed its limitation against the Afrikakorps (I am not talking about the small armoured counter attacks at Arras and other places in France).

I agree the Dyle plan was a compromise but I will never understand why use the best French troops (and among them the only truely mobile reserve the DLC) and send them North in a move that even most of the French CO found at best hazardous and useless at that time.

I am pretty sure that: If even Gamelin had kept the DLC as mobile reserve with the adjunction of some of the DCR, the Sedan's disaster would probably have been contained.

Gamelin: Yes the big problem, but IMO -> France as a democracy carries this responsability, after all the politicians kept such a man in place.

Something I always wondered, while Germany was busy in Poland, was the Western front really that weak if it had to stop a serious general offensive....
Saw numerous figures, but some still say the German western front was weak while others say the opposite.
And even looking at effective strength based on the figures found in the German archives I don't think they were that strong.

 

They weren't but yes, Gamelin wasn't the right man. The 1939 Saar offensive was a lost opportunity. There was almost no German resistance
but Gamelin chose to stay behind his fortifications and cross the borded for propaganda puposes only. It is often said the French weren't ready , but the Germans ( and the British )weren't ready either, their best troops were in Poland and many of those on the west front had bicycles or horses, not Panzers and Stukas.
If French tanks would have been used together istead of seperately (even in 1940) , the strategy could have been a success. I shouldn't blame Gamelin, the man was from the old school he simply had no idea of what Blitzkrieg meant. Poland and France had to pay the price so that other countries would learn from this.

 

I believe that the French were compelled to use their best mobile troops to complete the movement ahead of a already in motion German offensive. IF the Belgian Government had co-operated with the allies in fall/winter of 1939, conventional infantry units could have made the move, or could replace the mechinized/motorized units after the Dyle line was reached. Then the best French units would be available as a reserve.

That is the way it should have happened.

Belgian thinking in this matter leaps from the arena of wishfull thinking to the realm of fantasy. The Maginot line almost makes a German thrust thru Belgium the only viable axis of attack. If Imperial Germany would attack thru a neutral Belgium, then why would Hitler's Germany not do so as well?

Full Belgian co-operation in 1939 was best chance the Allies had to stop Hitler after September 1,1939. Perhaps one the most compelling 'what ifs' out there.

 

Agreed. Once the Germans crossed the Meuse it was all over, but how did they do it against one of the finest armies in the world? Answer: sowing confusion. The French were entrenched in ideas stemming from the first World War. A very sophisticated command system that relied almost purely on communications. Without orders, French captains in the field would stove up. Period. The Germans panzer divisions worked freehand giving alot of latitude to decisions made at the point of contact. And, very importantly, the German tanks had radios...French tanks didn't. Thus, when the Germans were rolling wild behind French lines cutting off communications, the French were paralyzed and gave up not knowing. It's not just that simple, but this is a big reason France fell so quickly in confusion.