Japans biggest mistakes?

It all depends on where the info came from. It is mostly excepted that most Japanese survivors of the war who wrote books on it fudged quite a bit of information as a way of saving face, and subsequently made it's way into other books. I have personally only ever found one piece of primary information that regards the attack on the Aleutians as a feint. That was a post war interview with Capt. Amagi, the Air Officer on Kaga during the battle. No offense to Mr. Amagi himself, but I wonder how much he had to do with the planning of both Operation MI and AL and how much he really knew about the mission. As has been mentioned, I have not found any meeting minutes of the planners that explicitly states the object of Operation Al was a diversion for the real objective of Midway. Indeed the lack of information regarding AL as a feint leave one to believe it was it's own Operation carried out concurrently with MI. Regardless I highly recommend reading Shattered Sword. It is a well written account of the battle. Obviously it will not sway everyone, but 60 year old preconceptions are generally hard to break anyways (Dresden casualty figures more recently).

 

Honestly it is not a topic where I am extremely passionate in my view point. If you say most primary sources you have read indicate the operation was not a diversion I believe you as I am pretty much only going off of secondary sources.

 

I think most of the sources (and there are many) that claim the Aleutians operation was intended as a diversion are simply examples of poor scholarship. Some author reached that conclusion, said so in his book, and subsequently other authors simply repeated what sounded logical without really examining the issue.

But if the Aleutians really were intended to be a diversion, the timing doesn't make any sense. For a diversion to work properly, it would have to have been scheduled at least four or five days prior to June 4th. That is because it would take that long for the US carriers at Pearl Harbor to sortie and reach a point in the North Pacific far enough away from Midway to be useful to the Japanese attack plan. And this would have meant the Japanese would have expected the US carriers to approach from the Northeast. In fact, all of their searches were to the Southeast, which only makes sense if they thought the US carriers would be coming from the direction of Pearl Harbor.

That wasn't the case. The Aleutians operation commenced on June 3rd., the day before the Midway attack was scheduled on June 4th. That simply isn't enough time to for the American carriers to do anything except to prepare to sail. If the Aleutians really were a diversion, the only effect would have been (if everything had gone as the Japanese expected) to give the Americans one additional day to prepare to meet the Japanese attack on Midway. That makes absolutely no sense from the Japanese perspective.

In the event, the Midway Invasion Force was sighted within an hour of the Japanese attack on Dutch Harbor on June 3rd. The Japanese didn't expect this, but if they had seriously planned for the Aleutians to be a diversion, they certainly would have allowed more time for the diversion to actually work.

The other fact which argues against the Aleutians as a diversion is the deployment of the Japanese submarine ambush that was established on June 2nd. between Pearl Harbor and Midway. This picket line of submarines was intended to report on, and attack, the American carriers as they came out of Pearl Harbor in response to the Japanese attack. But it was placed to the northwest of Pearl Harbor in an area which the US carriers would transit if headed for Midway, but NOT if they were steaming toward the Aleutians from the northeast of Midway. Thus, the Japanese deployed their forces as if they expected the American carriers to steam toward Midway on June 4th. or June 5th., NOT toward the Aleutians on June 3rd. or 4th.

In fact, the Midway operation may have been seen by the Japanese as a diversion which would allow them to carry off the Aleutian operation with minimal forces because the American fleet was expected to have it's hands full just countering the massive attack on Midway. If this was the case, it makes sense to execute the Aleutians operation in conjunction with Midway rather than by itself, or simultaneously with some other operation.

 

This is true from a tactical point of view. In fact, there are some who believe that the Doolittle raid was actually a tactical defeat for the United States.

However, from a strategic point of view, the Doolittle raid was a war winning brilliance of strategy. It resulted in a morale booster for the Americans and a morale reducer for the Japanese. Resources that were being used in other parts of the world were diverted back to Japan in order to protect the home front. And it settled a debate between the Army and the Navy regarding Japan's next objective: Yamamoto carried the day and did not just decide on Midway but significantly pushed the date up.

It's interesting that just the opposite argument can be made regarding Pearl Harbor. This was a tremendous tactical victory for Japan but strategically, it was a disaster that sealed their fate.

Bob Guercio

 

Ok,i know this is getting away from the way the discussion is going but i found this yesterday and think its a snippet worth passing on about U-GO.

"in operation imphal 12000 horses including mules, 30000 oxen and 1030 elephants were used by the 15th army"

All the horses died but some mules survived,the average life expectancy for horses was 55days against 73days for mules.
they author went on to say he thought it remarable that all the elephants survived in spite of all the hard work.

Elsewhere he notes that horses were much better at swimming than oxen

Captain Seiryo Yamashita,Veterinary Department,15 Division Pinlebu,Indainggyi

 

That wasn't random or anything...:eh:

 

The Doolittle Raid, as I have pointed out before, occurred after the Midway operation had been tentatively approved on April 12, by the Japanese Naval General Staff, so it did not result in the adoption of Yamamoto's plan to attack Midway. But there had been much internal opposition to Yamamoto's scheme, and the participants were still debating the sequence and timing of the various competing proposals for further offensive action by the IJN. Thus, as you indicate, the Doolittle (or as the Japanese insisted, "Do Nothing") Raid certainly added urgency to the deliberations. Unfortunately for the Japanese, this allowed Yamamoto to insist on a time table that was hopelessly ambitious and forced a planning process that was hasty and not properly thought out.

 

Hello Jagdtiger,

never thought about that - but makes a lot of sense. Maybe a good chance for a "What if"??

Regards
Kruska

 

Devilsadvocate,

I'm sure that you are correct; however, since I am new to this forum, I feel that it is necessary for me to defend my credibility and cite the source, although erroneous, of my information.

As noted on page 229 of "The First Heroes" by Craid Nelson.

When Doolittle and his men attacked, the American military had no idea that the Japanese navy was in the middle of a bitter strategic conflict in the wake of Operation Number One. The general staff logically wanted to consolidate and expand their Pacific conquests, solidifying their outlying bases in New Guinea and the Solomons, and then pushing on to New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa, cutting off Australia’s sea lanes to the United States.

Yamamoto and his Combined Fleet officers, however, wanted to finish the job they’d started at Pearl Harbor by destroying what remained of America’s Pacific Fleet, most crucially its aircraft carriers. They recognized that the Doolittle assault could only have been delivered by a carrier sailing near Midway, an American controlled mid-Pacific atoll eleven hundred miles northwest of Oahu. By occupying Midway, the Japanese could ensure that no future American strike force could ever approach the home islands again. Additionally, attacking Midway could draw the U.S. Navy into a battle that, dwarfed by Japan’s vastly superior power, it was guaranteed to lose.

Faced with the possibility of further bombings of the homeland and direct assaults on their emperor, the general staff could no longer justify its position, and Yamamoto’s strategy was approved. Midway would be taken, and the American navy’s Pacific Fleet completely annihilated.

As I am finding out, history books are chock full of erroneous information and I wonder how much reading must be done on any particular subject before one can be confident of the facts.

Thanks for the info,

Bob Guercio

 

I do know how you feel. We're in the same boat. That's why I like this forum. The guys and gals here have taught me to check and recheck my facts and continue reading and updating what I know.

Now for my two cents worth:
Japan's biggest mistake was underestimating America's dormant industrial capacity, the patriotism of the average American, and the resolve of the US leadership (Roosevelt etal)

 

Did they underestimate U.S. Industrial capabilities or just ignore it?

 

Yamamoto certainly knew and realized that, for this reason, Japan could not win a long war against the United States. He actually was against the attack on Pearl Harbor but once ordered to do it, he put his all into it.

He figured that the United States would lose it its will to fight before developing the potential for military production that it had and would sue for peace. He figured that if he agreed to leave the United States alone in their part of the world, the United States would agree to leave him alone in his part of the world.

He believed that he could run rampant in the Pacific for about six months. Interestingly, that turned out to be quite true.

As I see it, I don't think that they underestimated the potential industrial capability that the United States had. They underestimated our response to being attacked at Pearl Harbor. After all, we were a nation of isolationists at that time but that changed overnight.

By the way, Yamamoto studied in the United States and, I believe he went to Harvard.

Bob Guercio

 

I think the case may be made that the Japanese did both.

They definitely knew that the US was capable of out producing Japan by a very large ratio. But they really underestimated how quickly the industrial capacity of the US could be converted to war production. And, in the final analysis, the Japanese were completely stunned by exactly how much more the US could produce than Japan.

Japanese ship building experts, for example, absolutely refused to credit the fact that US yards could build a fleet carrier in 14 months, or an escort carrier in 90 days, despite hard evidence that it was being done. The number of aircraft the US was turning out in 1944 was about triple what the Japanese planners had estimated was the maximum possible US output.

But the fact remains; despite being generally aware of the vastly superior American industrial strength, although the exact figures were underestimated, the Japanese simply ignored it in planning their war.

 

No, the Pearl Harbor attack was not originally part of the Japanese plan for the "Strike South" strategy.

The Pearl Harbor attack was Yamamoto's idea, and it was bitterly opposed by the Japanese Naval General Staff and Yamamoto's nominal superior Admiral Nagano, Chief of Staff of the NGS. So acrimonious did the debate over whether to attack Pearl Harbor become, that Yamamoto threatened to resign if the attack was not approved. Thus Yamamoto conceived, planned, and put his career on the line in order to push through the Pearl Harbor attack plan.

What Yamamoto opposed was the idea of going to war with Britain and the United States, in the first place. Ironically, Yamamoto's insistence on the Pearl Harbor attack was what largely negated Japanese strategy; Yamamoto managed to not only start the war, but also lose it in a single morning.

 

It was too good not to pass on,how often do you hear about elephants in wwii?

 

to fully neutralize the facilities in hawaii, and splitting its forces too far and wide at midway.

 

Despite some rather generalized statements made later in the war by Allied commanders, it's not clear that the Japanese even had the ability to "fully neutralize" the facilities in Hawaii, and they certainly couldn't have done it in one day. Some historians have suggested, without analyzing what it would have taken, that the ship repair facilities, slipways, drydocks, machine shops, etc. and the fuel storage tanks should have been the targets of a third and perhaps subsequent waves of air attacks from Nagumo's carriers. But was this practical given the Japanese limitations?

First of all, was it possible for Nagumo's carriers to launch follow-up attacks on December 7th?

The Japanese lost a total of only 29 planes shot down out of the 274 launched in the two historical strikes on Pearl Harbor. That represented less than an 11 % loss rate. However, an additional 111 planes were seriously damaged, although able to return to the carriers; 20 of these planes were subsequently "written off" as unrepairable. That means that, as of the early afternoon of December 7th. Nagumo's effective forces had been reduced by 140 aircraft. This represented about one third of the total number of planes originally available to the six Japanese carriers. Of course, a number of these could be repaired and returned to service, but not immediately. So any additional air strikes against Pearl Harbor on December 7th. would be considerably weaker than the first two. Since about 57 American fighters remained operational on Oahu (although the exact number was unknown to Nagumo), and the AA batteries were now completely manned and ready, any additional Japanese attacks could only be made at a much higher cost in aircraft lost. Furthermore, it would have taken about two hours to organize, fuel, rearm, and launch an additional raid which meant that the planes would return to land on the carriers after dark. That would raise the chances of losing a considerable number of aircraft.

These were not the only factors Nagumo had to consider. The exact number and current locations of the American carriers were unknown to the Japanese, but Nagumo knew that at least two and possibly as many as five American carriers were in the vicinity of Hawaii, and these could, at any moment be launching attacks against his carriers. If this happened while his planes were away conducting air raids against Pearl Harbor, he would, to put it mildly, be in a desperate situation. And the longer he lingered near Hawaii, the better the chances that exactly something of this nature would happen.

Furthermore, the weakened Japanese strike forces even at full strength were not able to deliver the tonnage of bombs or torpedoes likely to be able to completely destroy the fuel and repair facilities at Pearl Harbor. The repair facilities themselves were well dispersed around the naval base and were not likely to be seriously damaged by the tonnage of bombs the Japanese were able to drop. A week later, the much more compact Cavite Naval Base repair facilities were damaged (but not destroyed) by bombing attacks, but these were delivered by massed, twin engine, G3M's and
G4M's carrying much heavier bombs. It might have been possible to torpedo the gates on the dry dock at Pearl Harbor, but this target was less than 130 feet wide and partially obscured by the bulk of 1010 Dock and the vessels which were always moored along side of that dock; it would have been very difficult to hit and there is no guarantee that it could have been hit by torpedoes.

The fuel tanks would have represented a much easier, but by no means, assured target. It's informative to note that a scant four months later, the same pilots, flying the same aircraft, and delivering the same ordnance, were ordered by Nagumo to attack and destroy the fuel tanks at the British Naval base of Trincomlee on the island of Ceylon. Despite a concentrated effort to carry out these orders, the Japanese were able to destroy only one tank out of the 51 at the base, and that required one of the planes to crash dive into the tank. In addition, the USN was then constructing bomb-proof underground tanks with the same storage capacity as the above ground storage tanks at Pearl Harbor. These tanks were then nearing completion. The destruction of the existing tanks at Pearl Harbor would have made it more difficult for a time, for the USN to use the base, but would not have prevented that usage.

Thus it's questionable that Nagumo's forces, on the balance, could have done much more to neutralize Pearl Harbor as a useful naval base. They might have made it's use a bit more difficult, but balancing that with the additional risk and potential cost to the Japanese, it doesn't seem like a good bargain.

As for Midway, the dispersion of forces was just one of many flaws in the Japanese operational plan, and probably not the most serious. The lack of introspection, the hasty and ill-judged planning, and most especially the badly compromised communications which led to the Americans being able to concentrate their forces exactly where the Japanese were most vulnerable, were all equally destructive of Japanese chances for victory. Moreover, Midway was just the culmination of a strategy that left Japan so over-extended and hopelessly unable to defend any territory, that it's difficult to see how a single defeat at Midway, changed into a victory, could have any significant effect on the final outcome of the war.

 

Well Japan biggest mistake was the attack on pearl harbor

PS: i never so a brave country attacking the united states

 

Hi Everyone,

If one presumes that all countries seek to expand their standard of living and this was Japan's intent, although I don't know that this was the case, perhaps her biggest mistake was allowing the militarists to take control of the government and choosing a military method for achieving this.

I suppose one of the biggest "what ifs" in history is "What if Japan had taken a nonmilitary and peaceful route to better herself and her people?

I'd love to hear the answers to this "what if" from some of the heavy weight historians in this forum.

Thank you,
Bob Guercio

 

it wasnt. japan was just trying to beat U.S.A down enough that they would sue for peace before they could harness the gigantic power of their production. midway was the last chance to do this. when they lost they realized peace was going to come the hard way and from then on they were just fighting to keep what they had.