Alternate N. African/Middle Eastern Front, WWII

It was once stated that the US didn't like the MED campaign because they figured every asset dispatched there would never leave there so what makes anybody think it would be any different for the Germany? There is one benefit for the Allies ,if they just play defence in Egypt, and that is maybe the British/Allies could send more forces to the Far East which may just be enough to frustrate Japan's ambitions. Remember alot of the supplies sent around the Cape of Good Hope then on up to Suez were for the 8th. Army to conduct offensive operations ,now let's just them playing defence and the logistics there are a heck of a alot easier.
all this will take alot of resources & time ,now how does all this affect the later Operation Barbarossa?

 

Sending away so much manpower to far away Africa would deprive Germany of much needed manpower that was needed to power German industry (which historically benefited from partial demobilization after the invasion of France).

 

They aren't losing anything that wasn't mobilized historically for Barbarossa.

 

As a result of the failure to more fully support the North African campaign, the Germans were force to make a much larger commitment in Italy. Specifically, about 20 divisions. The total number of men in the Afrika Korps never exceeded 60,000.

I've tried to maintain a distinction between naval forces and shipping in my posts, but in that post you're replying to I didn't. What I meant to imply was any British ships, whether naval or commercial. For Torch, the invasion of Italy, and Dragoon transport, naval forces, and supply went through Gibraltar.

 

Sending 3 corps in late 1940 instead of one in early 1941 could probably improve the at start Barbarossa position, if they take the canal or at least bring it and Alexandria into easy bombing range so forcing the RN to move to the Red Sea the Yougoslavia pro allied coup is unlikely so the balkan campaign and resulting wear and tear on what became Army Group South forces would not take place. I think two panzer divisions could not be ready for Barbarossa due to Balkan losses, (one had a lot of it's tanks sunk while shipping them back to Germany from Greece, probably they were going by sea because the rail system was already overtaxed) and the couple of infantry div making up the third required korps, the first being the historical Afrika Korps, is probably less than the Balkan and Crete infantry losses.
For a Germany that had a big army and a small navy setting up a southern front protected by roadless deserts may make more sense than one protected by a sea the superior allied navies will eventually gain control of. If the axis manages to take Gibraltar as well (but I don't think the should compromise the neutral status of Vichy or Spain to do that) the German strategic position is vastly improved as they will have interior lines against an enemy with horribly long lines of comunications from the front to it's production base. Against that setup the allies may well give up any idea of a southern strategy and wait for overlord.

Also the loss to British prestige for the loss of Egypt may well snowball through the Empire, while the Commitment to the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zeeland and Canada was unshakeable India was not all that happy with British rule at the time.

 

Even if the Balkan Campaign didn't go through Barbarossa couldn't start any sooner because the Bug River was in such a flood stage .The spring/summer of 1940 was ideal Panzer weather,in 1941 much less so because of the heavy spring rains.

 

My point was that the diversion of effort to North Africa would not significantly reduce troops available for Barbarossa not that it would allow an earlier start date. No balkan campaign could mean a few more stockpiles, the Gemans committed a substantial force in Greece and Yougo, but I think stockpiles were not the main problem in 1941 getting them forward was.

 

Oh Ok sorry for musunderstanding what you said.

 

No problem

 

You are right initially the North African theater did not impact the German effort in Russia significantly. But, that changed with Rommel's success. The Afrika Korps was increased in size. 5th Light became a full panzer division. The need for a massive number of trucks and motor vehicles to support the German effort in North Africa increased tremendously.

By mid 1942 as the German summer offensive by AGS in Russia got underway North Africa was consuming the equivalent of a Grosstransportraum worth of trucks for supply and also represented over three divisions worth of armor and motor vehicles tactically. Had these been available to AGS they might have made a significant difference in the outcome of that campaign.

So, North Africa begins to impact the East Front more and more as time goes on.

 

Not only were a large number of vehicles sent to Africa, the Afrika Korps (or is it Panzer Armee Afrika in 1942?) was possibly the most motorized force of the whole German army, the air bridges to Tunisia and Stalingrad took place nealy at the same time, one big what if is whether the planes commited to the Tunisia air bridge could have made a difference for 6th Army.

But with the British pushed back to Sudan in early 1941 the logistical infrastructure to supply from Sudan a force strong enough to deal with the 10 or so divisions the Axis will have in Egypt by the end of the campaign just doesn't exist and IMO cannot be built by the British before 1942 especially if the closeness of axis forces in Egypt prevents the collapse of the Italian forces in Ethiopia. Keeping those mostly inactive 10 divisions supplied from ships unloading at Alexandria does not use up a huge amount of resources.

Even if the Germans pursue the British the only possible advance route southwards is the Nile itself and Siebel Ferries use up a lot less fuel than trucks and are probably a better line than Kitchener's railway that would be the corresponding British supply path.

Towards the end of 1942 the picture will change as they need to keep a strong force at both ends of the line (Egypt and Tripolitania for possible intervention in Tunisia and French Morocco), the Germans need a couple of full korps supported by either Italian (Egypt) or Vichy (Morocco) infantry to beat back a Torch sized invasion, they can possibly airlift a force of a couple of infantry divisions (the reaction force they scraped up during the race for Tunis was not far from that) but the rest, especially the armour, needs to be already in theater and for this purpose tanks at the wrong end of the north african coast are no use, there is no way of moving them where they are needed by land and if they need to be moved by sea they may as well be in continental Europe as part of a central reserve.

My idea is that a stronger and earlier commitment may save the Germans a significant amount of resources in 1941 and early 1942. As I believe Germany needs to beat the USSR by the end of 1942 an early Med strategy to secue the southern flank may be a good choice.

 

No actually that isn't correct ToS. In 1941 there are 2 pipelines from Kirkuk Iraq to the Med, with one completely in Vichy/Iraqi territory in the spring of '41.

Hold on Slipdigit, the case cited by brndirt is not at all the same circumstance as the idea of capturing Mideast oil.
If I'm understanding correctly, Istnick is postulating what would have happened if Operation Sonnenblume had been a much greater priority from Jan/Feb '41, with Rommel able to drive deep into Egypt in the spring of '41.

The example cited by Brndirt is of Russia, which had advance knowledge of German attacks on Caucasus oil, and well-prepared Russian plans to destroy oil installations beforehand. Thus the axis wern't able to extract any useful amounts of oil

Had Rommel been able to drive the British from Egypt & Palestine in early 1941, they would be able to link up with a pro-Axis Iraqi government that was already in possesion of the Kirkuk oilfields, and the pipelines to the Med. Not only were the British forces unprepared to destroy oil installations, there was only a small British force at RAF Habbaniya, which was surrounded by the Iraqi forces. In fact by May '41 the Germans have a LW base at Mosul, for "Fliegerführer Irak"

In 1941 there are 2 oil pipelines from Kirkuk Iraq, the northern one running to Tripoli, in Vichy held Lebanon, and the southern one to Haifa in British held Palestine. Each of the two pipelines had a capacity of 2 million tons/year, which is not insignificant when compared to the total German oil production, which was never more than 7 million tons. Adding 4 million tons of iraqi oil adds a huge boost to axis supplies.

The history of the British petroleum ... - Google Books

In addition, the British had built refineries at both haifa & tripoli. while the Palestine refinery might be sabotaged, the one in Lebanon was under control of the vichy, not the British in the spring of '41.

 

It is a very useful post. I was looking for this kind of information for while (I'm a pure amateur) , in fact I looked for "Lawrence railways" to get the picture of the comunications in Irak in 1940. So poor.

From "Oil History"

In fact in the first oil fields in Kuwait the petroleum arises spontaneously. No pumps were needed. It looks easy.

Out of threat: All of that without a closed Gibraltar?

 

Probably not. It wasn't really lack of aircraft that caused the Stalingrad air lift to fail but rather a combination of weather and lack of facilities. At the Stalingrad end there were just three airfields and only two of those were really decent ones... at least so long as the weather was reasonable. At the other end of the terminus there were only three all-weather fields in operation as well. There were others but these couldn't be used with regularity and lacked the means to have supplies delivered to them.
German planning for the air lift was, in a word, haphazard. Little attempt was made to put engineers and equipment in place to ensure the airfields on both ends were maintained and open regardles of weather. There was no real attempt to put in good navigation aids either. To top off all that the air traffic control was minimal.
All this conspired to cause alot of aircraft losses in landings and take offs, poor flight pattens that often resulted in aircraft stacking over the airfields waiting for a turn to land, and in general just massive amounts of slop and waste. Then there was the weather. Many days it was so bad few, if any, flights took place. The pilots simply could not take off or land due to conditions.
Having more aircraft present would have changed little.

More like the infrastructure to supply that many German divisions there would never exist.

 

double post

 

IMO the axis would have no problem in keeping 250.000 (and 10 divisions + tail is less than that) men supplied through Alexandria with little or no RN interference as no bases are left in the Eastern Med, they still suffer from the ULTRA handicap but with no bases nearby knowing when and where the ships sail is not terribly useful.
Their main problem at El alamein was the road element from the ports to the front line that ate up most of the fuel before it ever got to the troops. It's the British that are stuck with the problem of keeping troops in supply in Southern Egypt from Red Sea ports with no transport infrastructure worth mentioning.

Both sides would have big problems in getting forces to Iraq but no Greek campaign means the paras are available, A scratch force like Habba stands no chance against a FJ regiment and probablty the best the British can scrape together and supply in Iraq in early 1941 is not enough against the full strength 7th FJ supported by Iraq local forces. Both sides would be severely limited by supply considerations but the British would be operating in hostile territory and with a much smaller force pool, the Germans have plenty of potentially airmobile units, thoug the most they can supply by air is likely to be a Korps, and once they open a land route through Syria the game is over. Vichy after Mers El Kebir, and it's possible repetition when pulling the French squadron out of Alex, is unlikely to object.

So if there's something worthwhile to take the German can get it if they want it hard enough.

 

How likely would he be to even be able to take Alexandria? Certainly tanks don't hold up well under destroyer guns much less those of battleships. Then there's getting the port working again. I doubt the British would let it be captured intact. Even if Egypt does fall the British can use the Indian ocean to effectivly give them interior lines. I suspect they can put Anzac and Indian troops in Iraq well before the Germans get there.

 

Battleships don't do well under air attack either, at one point the Med Fleet will have to decide whether to move to the Red Sea or risk beng bottled up and destroyed in the Eastern Med. Without Alex they have no bases that can be protected from land attack, Haifa is a trap and Suda can only last as long as the Germans respect Greek "neutrality", which is inexistent if they allow the RN the use of that base.

IMO when the Germans can base Stukas close by the fleet will pull back. It's very difficult to render a good natural arbour completely unserviceable, Tobruk changed hands a couple of times but was still usable.

The troops available to the Britsh in early 1941 are limited, modern planes are even more scarce, from the coast to Kirkurk is a long way to go thruough hostile territory.

I'm immagining around six German motorized divisions supported by plenty of planes begginning to arrive just after the fall of France. IMO the British can't scrape together a force capable of stopping them in that timeframe while the Germans can probably keep them supplied from undamaged Bengazi, Tobruk and Derna. The British had a lot of trouble against only two divisions arriving in May 1941.

What interior lines? the British have to come round the cape, the Germans can sail from Trieste to Beyrouth. ANZAC, South African and Indian troops are a little better off but their heavy equipment still has to come from Britain that has precious little to spare at the time after the BEF lost practically all that it had.

 

Until Alexandria and other points actually fall the British battleships will still have some air cover and a base. The question is whether or not the Germans could actually take all of Egypt. In any case it would hardly be quick or easy. Once it's fallen or about to fall the fleet is likely to head either for Gibralter or the Indian Ocean. At this point the Germans have an awful lot of coast line to defend. Not just in the Med but off the Indian Ocean. That's going to tie up a lot of troops and logistics by itself.

Note that it wasn't just a problem getting supplies to Africa it was moving them around as well. Fuel was a problem but so was water and adding more troops is going to amplify that.

 

IIRC the fleet did pull back from Alexandria when the Axis reached El Alamein, sailing across the whole Mediterranean with a battered squadron is asking for a disaster, the canal is the logical way out.

If the Germans have any Indian Ocean coast to defend it means the British Empire is in big trouble, the logical barrier against an enemy that has naval superiority is the desert not the sea.

If Suez is lost all the Med coast is basically safe until 1942. Hitler would be a fool to go for Gibraltar but unless the British want to risk Vichy or Spain join the axis, and they certainly don't need to add a couple more million men to the Axis manpower pool, the first axis target from the west is Tripolitania, that is out of air range from Gibraltar and so would need a larger carrier force than they have to attack. Attacking Norway makes a lot more sense if/when they have enough troops to face the German Army.

Troops in Egypt can be supplied without too much trouble from Alex, if the axis push beyond things get more tricky, the Med coast is indefensible but land comunication lines from Siria to Iraq are poor, IIRC the existing railine goes through Turkey that is neutral.

But comunications from the coast to the oilfields is pretty bad too, so both sides would be fighting on a logistical shoestring, it would be difficult to force the British out of Bassora but the Germans don't need to get to the coast and the Japanese would love to see lots of Commonwealth troops go there instead of Malaya and Burma.