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What if Germany built 100 Type VII U-boats instead of Bismarck and Tirpitz?

Discussion in 'What If - European Theater - Western Front & Atlan' started by vonManstein39, Dec 19, 2002.

  1. Sbiper

    Sbiper Member

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    Z Plan actually called for more than 300 subs, I'm in work so don't have the exact figures infront of me.

    In all honesty the Z Plan was pure fantasy, there was no way the Reich could have either afforded the Z Plan nor actually built the majority of the ships in the plan. In the book 'The wages of Destruction' it is clearly laid out how Germany was plagued by a perenial lack of foreign exchange to pay for critical imports, the Z Plan would have consumed rescources at a completely unsustainlable rate that made no allowance for the needs of either the other services nor of the civilian economy.

    They could have built the U-Boat portion of the Z Plan, the surface fleet was just pie in the sky for the Kreigsmarine.
     
  2. Devilsadvocate

    Devilsadvocate Ace

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    Not so, according to Clay Blair in his book "Hitler's U-boat War", Vol. 1, page 46;

    "The Z-Plan also included a plenitude of U-boats -- a total of 249, comprising about 200,000 tons."

    The 300 number you mention was probably what Donitz would have liked to have had, but it was never incorporated in any official KM construction planning program and was never officially approved.

    Germany could never have operated subs off the US West Coast with, or without, Japanese help. The range of German U-boats was never sufficient to operate effectively in the Pacific and certainly not several thousand miles from the nearest friendly base. The Japanese could only operate their own subs off the US West Coast because their range was more than twice what the U-boat's best range was. In addition, the Japanese had terrible logistical problems just keeping their own subs operational, so they are unlikely to be able to spare any fuel or other items for Germany's U-boats.
     
  3. von Rundstedt

    von Rundstedt Dishonorably Discharged

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    For my two cents worth i seriously believe that had the Germans in say 1935/36 had decided that building large capital ships like battleships and aircraft carriers was a waste of time as Germany was no longer a maritime power like she was in the first world war she embarked on a programme of building commerce raiders with her armoured ships programme and so the likes of the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Bismarck, Tirpitz and Graf Zeppelin are'nt built.

    Germany in this time period builds a dozen panzer schiffs. Also Hitler knows that war will eventually come between Germany and Britain and that starving Britain out of the war almost worked in ww1 with it's unrestricted u-boat warfare. So the Kriegsmarine decides that it will build U-Boats in vast numbers and so begining in 1938 she builds the Type VII. By the time the war eventually comes Germany has a substantial U-Boat fleet of some 140 U-Boats and out of this 100+ are the Type VII.

    When war breaks out the German U-Boat fleet are already in position to strike and without warning The U-Boats begin unrestricted warfare on all ships both military and civillian from day one, the most vulnerable ships are the RN's aircraft carriers as they were at the outset used as anti-submarine patrols and they are picked off easily and this leaves British homewaters without aircraft carriers, with no effective anti-submarine devices and unable to counter the U-Boats the RN's Home Fleet has two choices operate unprotected or be bottled up in ports.

    From the outset Britain is slowly being strangled ecconomically as the convoy system is yet to be introduced and any ship approaching Britain is on their own and quickly picked off, finally the government has no choice but to issue orders to the RN Home Fleet to Breakout and suffers losses to an extent that losses outstrip production even large capital ships fall victim, Britain can not recall her overseas fleets from the Mediterannean or Pacific.

    The Germans launch an effective invasion of Norway without challenge as the Royal Navy can not be risked in a counter invasion, also during this period the BEF that had managed to be landed in France is trapped and eventually capture with the failure of Operation Dynamo as too many RN ships are lost to U-Boat attack, this provides Hitler and the Wehrmacht with a resolution that Britain is ripe for invasion, by the time the BoB is at it's height Britain is on the verge of ecconomic collapse as raw materials are not getting through and that it is this time that the Wehrmacht launches Operation Sealion.

    to be continued......

    v.R
     
  4. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    While reading this thread, a thought entered my mind. Having more subs at sea meant that there should be more sub tenders or ships available to support and resupply them at sea.
    So my question here is:
    How many subs can a German supply ship support?

    Germany had limited resources so any expansion in the U-boat arm AND the ships required to support them would take away resources sorely sought by the other branches of the German military.
     
  5. Devilsadvocate

    Devilsadvocate Ace

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    Germany's operational U-boats were mostly supported by land-based facilities like those installed in French ports such as Brest, Lorient, St. Nazaire, La Pallice, and Bordeaux. The few German surface vessels that acted as sub-tenders usually operated with the training formations in the Baltic. Most often, when U-boats required replenishment at sea, this was provided by specialized submersibles which could transfer fuel, torpedoes and a few provisions to other submarines. This was because surface replenishment ships had proved too vulnerable to Allied warship patrols early in the war.

    There was also the option of snaking into Spanish ports where the Spaniards had pretended to "intern" some German ships, including a tanker, and replenishing at night from these sources. This was done only sparingly because of the delicate political problems involved.
     
  6. Devilsadvocate

    Devilsadvocate Ace

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    Germany's operational U-boats were mostly supported by land-based facilities like those installed in French ports such as Brest, Lorient, St. Nazaire, La Pallice, and Bordeaux. The few German surface vessels that acted as sub-tenders usually operated with the training formations in the Baltic. Most often, when U-boats required replenishment at sea, this was provided by specialized submersibles which could transfer fuel, torpedoes and a few provisions to other submarines. This was because surface replenishment ships had proved too vulnerable to Allied warship patrols early in the war.

    There was also the option of snaking into Spanish ports where the Spaniards had pretended to "intern" some German ships, including a tanker, and replenishing at night from these sources. This was done only sparingly because of the delicate political problems involved.
     
  7. seeker

    seeker Member

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    Sorry double post.
     
  8. seeker

    seeker Member

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    Up until Munich in 1938/39, the bulk of all European politics was anti Stalinst not Anti Hitler. So curbing Soviet military expansion was always on the aggenda.

    I read somewere that the British prefered the Germans build Uboats instead of Capital ships. I gather the prewar belief was that ASDIC equipped destroyers could detect and defeat Uboats, while fast German capital ships could smash any convoys they find.
     
  9. Heidi

    Heidi Dishonorably Discharged

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    ah! i had thought britain built there own subs for ww2. why would the british trust the germans?and why would the germans build subs for there emeny.does not make sence.
    for some reason i don't think churchill would want to use germans subs and i don't think hitler would want to help and supply britain with subs.
    if this did happend germany supplying britain with german subs,don't you reckon britain would ask for more! like german tanks and planes?
    Wow,i never had thought this before,but if you read this accurred,then i believe you.;)
     
  10. von Rundstedt

    von Rundstedt Dishonorably Discharged

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    Part two

    Hitler had planned the invasion of Britain as early as 1938 as such they had enough landing barges to carry out a bridge-head and that the devestation of the losses of the RN ship during Operation Dynamo comes home to rest as too many destroyers and light cruisers that otherwise would act as interdiction are either sunk or heavily damaged and what ships are available are bottled up in port, but Churchill has no option but to deploy the RN to stem the invasion as best as they could.

    By now the Germans have more than 100+ plus U-Boats within the approaches of the English Channel and also the dozen or so Panzerschiff's as well as the Luftwaffe acting as aerial artillery support for the invasion fleet (by now the RAF is a spent force as no more aircraft can be built and that the last of her fuel is almost spent) and now the sight of the battleships, aircraft carriers and heavy cruisers are thrown against the invasion fleet and this proves disasterous as dozens of ships are either sunk or damaged, capital ships prove useless and vulnerable to U-Boats, finally by August 1940 Britain is forced into unconditional surrender.

    To be continued.......

    v.R
     
  11. seeker

    seeker Member

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    So all you are admitting is you don't know what I mean by....

    "British prefered the Germans build Uboats instead of Capital ships". :rolleyes:

    Try reading it again ,this is not a difficult concept :D
     
  12. Devilsadvocate

    Devilsadvocate Ace

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    But you don't present it in a particularly clear manner. And English can be oblique, especially if it's not your native language.

    What seeker meant was that, if the Germans were determined to build a formidable navy, the British would prefer that the Germans spend their limited resources building U-boats because the British felt submarines would be easier to defeat than large surface ships. He didn't mean that the British ever considered buying German-built submarines for their own use.

    I'm not sure this assertion is true, and I'd like to see some documentation of this point. The British themselves actually tried (and failed) to get submarines completely outlawed through the Washington/London Naval Treaties. But the British also knew that Germany had not a snowball's chance in Hell of building a surface navy capable of seriously challenging the RN.
     
  13. von Rundstedt

    von Rundstedt Dishonorably Discharged

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    That is the point of the whole thread as it goes back to a point that Germany knows full well the building any large surface fleet is a waste of resources. Even Adolf Hitler knows that Germany can never compete with Britain but it can in the way of building a historically larger fleet of U-Boats that can be used to strangle Britain in a ecconomic war.

    And so in this thread hitorically Germany at the outbreak of war has in her invetory over 100 Type VII U-Boats, plus all the other types in existence which would number a further 30+ and not only that but fully deployed at the outbreak of hostilities and waging unrestricted U-Boat warfare from the start effectively making British waters a huge killing field for any ship that enters the warzone.

    Using my senario that the Royal Navy's Home Fleet capital ships such as battleships, heavy cruisers and aircraft carriers are targeted and suffer higher loss rate in casualties and that the Royal Navy finds itself in a bind to where they are going to come up with the replacements to cover Home Fleet's losses, this is a Rob Peter to pay Paul senario.

    v.R
     
  14. seeker

    seeker Member

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    'When in Rome do as the Romans'.... no one else around here presents sources.

    Yes but the Germans did realise that they could never win a war of attrition with the rest of Europe, since they outnumbered the germans about 5:1 to 10:1 in most important categories. However they also recongnised that wars could be won by a string of campaigns to disarm their enemies in a sequential manner. In fact it was the only way to defeat them.

    In regards to naval war, Rear Admiral Raeder had taken the first step in developing this from the "Dead Angle" debate with Wegner. He clearly showed through the Norway invasion how even a medium size navy could make a serious contribution to European domination.

    Saw this on another site and shows the direction he was thinking.

    http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/PressReviewPDF.aspx?q=135
     
  15. lwd

    lwd Ace

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    Not true
    That's part of the answer. They also "recognized" that Britain was to be their ally in much of this. Nor did they plan on even fighting wars of attrition. Unluckily for them they didn't realize that they could be forced to.
    He also demostrated how to almost destroy it in the process.
     
  16. Devilsadvocate

    Devilsadvocate Ace

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    If you were paying attention, you would have noticed that the posters whose opinions are generally well respected do frequently reference sources and almost always once their assertions are challenged.

    If you choose to dismiss a request for your sources, I'll just disregard your statements.

    As the Germans learned to their discomfiture, that only works so long as their is a supply of much weaker adversaries. Or until your adversaries realize that your strategy is to "divide and conquer". Then they band together to destroy you.

    At the cost of what amounted to it's destruction as a viable naval force. The naval part of the German Norwegian operation bordered on farce.
     
  17. seeker

    seeker Member

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    When I read about so called 'respected people on forums', it makes my skin crawl. I long ago gave up on those so called 'experts', since I can mostly tell which book they got their info from, without asking. People only find what they are looking for in these sources, so you don't need their sources, once you figure out which way they are bent.


    Admiral Raeder estimated they'd lose 1/2 of their ships in Operation Weserübung. In actual fact they only lost about 1/4, so it more or less worked since they clearly fooled the British for long enough to pull off the invasion. The deployment of the merchant and tankers ahead was a risky maneuver that in the case of Narvik, backfired, but in the other cases it worked well enough to allow the country to be invaded. For a country with apparently no experience in oversea invasion of another country, Germany put in a credible performance.

    Out of 147 vessels sent , 28 were lost [1/5]. Out of 104 warships sent , 23 were lost [1/4].

    The British reaction was slowed since they were confused as to what was happening and were only able to respond clearly to one of the 1/2 dozen port invasions ,days later and that victory didn't even change the final out come of the port battle. I sometimes wonder if the Germans had left Narvik to the allies initially and moved up from the south instead, time would have forced the Allies to withdraw anyway. With the same end result, but no destroyer massacre.
     
  18. Devilsadvocate

    Devilsadvocate Ace

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    Well, I'm not particularly interested in your dermatological problems, nor your take on how people spin the references they quote.

    But before I accept your assertions on the pre-war British views of the German Navy, I want to hear what the authors who gave you those impressions actually had to say. Otherwise I will simply disregard your unsupported opinions.

    There is no doubt that the German invasion of Norway was ultimately successful; that was due to two things, the British High Command was terribly inept and botched the British reaction, and the Germans basically got lucky.

    But to sacrifice a quarter of your warships and a fifth of your support vessels is a very high price to pay. The consequence for Germany was that the surface vessels of the KM were subsequently unable to play any significant role in the European war. It is, in fact, comparable to the losses inflicted on the IJN at Midway.
     
  19. Friedrich

    Friedrich Expert

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    Well, I think this is actually one of the very few plausible what-ifs...

    It happens that, at the beginning of the war, there were 57 serviceable U-boats. These, along the approximately 35 new ones that were added, between september 1939 and july 1940, sunk 443 Allied ships (136 less than in 1943, when U-boat production and combat quantity peaked)... 564 in 1940 and 500 in 1941, the 'Golden Era'. And that is along the 1/3 fighting, 1/3 travelling, 1/3 resting ratio!

    It is no surprise that, by using even a fraction of the resources and infraestructure Germany could have (and had, at the peak of the 'total war' effort), she could have increased the number of available U-boats, therefore sinking more Allied vessels (even if Dönitz couldn't yet have his ideal number). And, of course, we know what a waste those white elefants, Tirpitz and Bismarck, were. Also, Great Britain was desperately short of escorts and her ship-buildying system was much slower, she couldn't afford quitting the big battleships and the 80 four-chimney destroyers she got from the US were not there yet! (not until 1941).

    With this scenario, I have no doubt the U-boat threat would have become much more dangerous, and Great Britain wasn't exactly able to cope with it... (though I'm not saying she would have surrendered).

    Now, there are some things yet to consider:

    1) Admiral Raeder and the Kriegsmarine's officer corps were amongst the most conservative sailors in thw world. They simply couldn't consider a navy without big, huge-gunned monsters... because battles and wars were won by mutually shooting fleets, not ugly and slow hunters sinking ugly, slow merchant boats... :rolleyes: That is why they never came with the idea of developing aircraft carriers, as they should have and most certainly could have (T. A. Gardner once suggested it, most convincingly).

    2) The success of the U-boats grew because their efficiency did grow too. Why? Because of the French ports Devilsadvocate just mentioned: St. Nazaire, Brest, Lorient, etc. These were available for the first year of the war, which brings us again to the decisive year of 1941, when Great Britain was at full war effort and receiving aid from across the Atlantic, not to mention developing new anti-submarine tactics and gaining expertise.

    Well, this is true, but, coming back to the naval issue, Germany was even less prepared for an across-Channel invasion and had not yet defeated France. And, if I remember well, the Gladiators didn't do too bad at Malta, did they? ;)

    Now, this may sound alright in theory... However, it was Japan's strategy and, at first, the US'. It didn't work at all.

    Kai brings another argument here... let's remember that the III Reich was everything but efficient at the time of making strategical considerations, developing and implementing solutions. In fact, Germany was the godess of resource wasting!

    Well, she did! At least until she developed the 'milky cows' submarines.

    I don't think so. Surface ships are far more expensive. I don't think Great Britain could have afforded (nor I think Germany could, though she could build ships twice as quick) another Dreadnought escalating race...

    Regards, everyone!
     
  20. Devilsadvocate

    Devilsadvocate Ace

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    Those numbers are somewhat misleading. Germany, in September, 1939, did have a total of 57 U-boats in commission, but the majority of them were NOT suitable for attacking British shipping in the Atlantic. Out of the total number of U-boats available, 30 were Type II's, IIB's, and IIC's. These were 250-ton training boats which could do a maximum of 12=13 knots and had only three torpedo tubes with a maximum of six torpedoes. They were extremely short-ranged and could only really be effective in the Baltic and parts of the North Sea. Another 18 were Type VII's, or VIIB's, larger boats of 500-tons with a range that allowed them to operate in the Eastern Atlantic, but they were still short-ranged compared to the boats of other navies and carried only 11 to 14 torpedoes. They were, however, Donitz's preferred boat because they were quick diving and could do up to 17 knots. There were 7 large Type IX's of 750 tons which had better range (8,100 nm), carried 22 torpedoes, and could do 18 knots. Donitz, however, considered them clumsey and slow to dive and was loathe to use them where ASW forces operated, especially aircraft. The last 2 boats were large, experimental types (U-25 and U-26) which Donitz felt were not battle worthy and they played little part in the war.

    So Donitz effectively had 25 sea-going, battle worthy, U-boats at the beginning of the war, which, given the one-third rule, meant that the KIM seldom had more than eight U-boats on station at any given time. Due to the need for refits and overhauls, that number was sometimes reduced to only four or five U-boats. And it was more than a year before the number of U-boats began climbimbing substantially because of the need to work up boats and train crews. The winter of 1940 was the worst since the turn of the century and the Baltic froze completely over, delaying trining and shake-downs, which did not help Donitz situation at all.

    I do not know what source you used for the number of merchant sips sunk, but again it is misleading without mentioning the size of the pool from which they were sunk. That number, 443 ships, really represnts a failure of the U-boat campaign ecause it was a very small fraction of the ships available and was in no way decisive.

    In September, 1939, the British controlled 2,999 merchant ships for 17,784,000 tons. In December, 1941, the British controlled 3,616 merchant ships for 20,693,000 tons, an increase, after twenty-eight months of the U-boat war of 617 ships or almost 3,000,000 tons. The source of my numbers for the above is Blair, "Hitler's U-boat War", Vol.1.

    I think it is questionable whether Germany had the economic or industrial resources to build an addirtional 100 U-boats and the Air Force and Army Hitler's plans required, but I'll leave that to others to address. I would assert, however, that Germany building 100 additional U-boats prior to September, 1939, would trigger a massive response from Britain and the US, probably in the form of large convoy escort construction programs. And Britain not only could build ships faster than German, she did so historically. The US, of course, was capable of outstripping Germany by a factor of twenty to one in ship construction.

    You are incorrect about the number of US four-stack destroyers sent to Britain and the time-frame in which they became operation. There were only 50 of these vessels lent to Britain and an additional seven to Canada. Of the fifty that went to Britain 10 were operational with the RN by the end of 1940. Another 8 were in operation within an additional 30 days. Five of the seven which went to Canada, Moreover, the US lent an additional ten Treasury-class large Coast Guard cutters to Britain, the size, sea-keeping ability, and power of these vessels made them the best convoy escorts of the war and they were all operational within the first five months of 1941.

    No doubt the U-boat campaign would have become more intense earlier in the war, but I doubt whether the U-boats would hav been any more successful than they were historically, simply because Britain certainly would have built more escorts in response to Germany's challenge.

    Now, there are some things yet to consider:

    The KM ha no need for aircraft carriers and couldn't have operated them successfully (unless in the Baltic) because she had no bases on the Atlantic outside the range of British land-based bombers. Furthermore, the experiences of the US, Japan, and Britain proved that it takes many years of experimentation and trial to build well-designed aircraft carriers and successfully develop operating doctrine. Germany was only able to start that process in 1935, which was about a decade too late.

    The first Germany U-boats were not based in a French port until near the end of July, 1940, so they were not avilable for almost the entire first year of the war. Britain began convoying merchant ships almost immediately, and by mid-1940 had some very proficient ASW units. In addition, Britain had deployed ASV radar in aircraft more than a year ahead of Germany.

    The U-boats did not become more efficient after about mid-1941; in fact, they started becoming less efficient at that time due to training and personnel issues. The number of ships sunk per U-boat per patrol began to fall in early 1942, and thereafter went down progressively. The number of U-boats which failed to sink any ships during a patrol began to increase at the same time and continued to do so until the end of the war. This was due to less training time, the loss of experienced officers and crews and the neccessity of crewing U-boats with men who had little or no U-boat experience. By mid 1942, for example, U-boats were being skippered by ex-pilots, surface gunnery officers, and merchant officers; this had marked effect on not only the ability of the boats to sink ships, but also tended to rduce the longevity of U-boat crews as Allied ASW doctrine improved.

    This absolutely true. Submarines did not prove effective against warships for the most part. As for the ability to "bottle up the Rpyal Navy" subs would prove useless. Hanging around the entrance to naval bases would be suicide for U-boats due to the intense naval ASW activity in these areas.

    Nope, they never did.

    U-boats were only able to operate off the EAST coast of the US by utilizing replenishment U-boats. This was a very difficult and wasteful procedure, but it was the only way the short-legged German U-boats could spend any time on patrol in US waters.

    U-boats were never able to operate off the US WEST coast because it was out of reach of even the replenishment U-boats without tapping their replenishment reserves of fuel, a process that would have rendered the whole idea pointless

    Britain already had a navy that was far more powerful than Germany's, so she would not have had to build nearly as many ships just to stay comfortably ahead of the Germans. Germany really had no hope of ever building a navy which could seriously challenge Britain, not when Germany also needed to build a large and powerful Army plus a strong Air Force. And that doesn't even take into consideration that any naval challenge to Britain had to take into consideration that Britain would be allied with the US, whose Navy was even more powerful than Britain's.
     
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