Operation Barbarossa - the UK is neutral and Japan attacks Siberia

The Transiberian supplied 1.6 million Soviet troops in 1945.
Can you get that in your head?
If people keep making comments on topics you know nothing about it will just make them look ridiculous.
Japan would have over just over a million to supply and has several railways to do so.

The Soviets will as they did be drawing off hundreds of thousands of troops to the West.

Is your 5% statement based on fact or did you just make it up?
Same with the tankers being produced at 600,000 tons a month on average and with no war with the USA they wont be losing them.
This aside from the fact that a host of European countries have tankers who would supply oil.
Again if you make statements research them first or you will look ridiculous.

Mmmmm is that not a rant.
Quite a childlike one I may add.
Lets just stick to the facts and figures and leave this pathetic childish abuse aside.

You realise wiki just relays information from the actual sources themselves right hence it has all the sources at the bottom of the page wrote by actual army officers or historians.
You know like the ones I post.

 

Margaret Thatcher says it all, “Name calling demonstrates a loss of control and destroys intimacy and trust. I always cheer up immensely if an attack is particularly wounding because I think, well, if they attack one personally, it means they have not a single political argument left.”

 

You question my statistics on what could be transported via rail, Well how about this, Russia in 1941 had about 100,000+ km of track, They transported 400 billion tmk (tonnes-km). Dividing the tmk by the total rail length and you get your annual amount that was transported, Which comes in at around 4 million tones. While I can not speak for which lines where used and which were disregarded basic maths on paper, The Trans-Siberian line made up not even 10% of the total Russian network, So 10% pf 4 million and it could have transported all of 400,000 tonnes ... So your right, My 5% estimate was off, It should have been WAY lower =) Thanks for making me look deeper into it, Helped a lot.

 

Why not go look up the transiberian rail networks movement figures instead of just making figures up.

 

While the 400,000t figure for movement along the Trans-Siberian line is just a guess, Which I did state so clearly as I said I had no idea's which line where used often and which where not the 4 million tonne figure is not made up but is actual fact, In 1941 the USSR had 400 Billion tkm (or kmt [misspelt earlier when I said tmk]), With a total network of 106,100km by 1940 gives you a figure of 4 million tonnes moved (give or take). Now that could have been increased with better efficiency but to double it took them almost 15 years for the whole network. So either way you slice it, The network would not be able to supply Japan.

Here is a good question, This oil flowing by rail to Japan assumes that Russia has been defeated, If that does not occur what then? Japan has gone and thrown all her egg's into one basket with no certainty that the Russian oil fields will be captured, Thus if they dont capture them in the first 6 months and have oil flowing almost instantly Japan will literally run out of fuel. Actually that would have been an idea, Let Japan attack Russia, They run out of Gas, US attacks them and sinks there navy and wipes out there air force, Then we can all declare war on Germany and concentrate all of our forces.. You know BE, Japan going in against Russia like this is a smart move, For the Allies at least =) Good job

 

Japanese railnetworks and plans-

The Japanses rail network was actually in place in June of 1941 with double track lines reaching major depot points that had spurs off of them heading straight through the border. There are basically two main objectives and one supporting:
1) Vladivostok (Japanese navy plays a prominent role with IJA)

2) Main attack of an entire Army Group towards Lake Baikal supported by rail

3) Support attack due north of Mukden and Harbin along the rail line that leads up to the border and is closest to the Trans-Siberian line, the intent is to sever communications, transport and reinforcements from Vladivostok while it is reduced. There is no other way to get there for the Soviets and no immediate base of operations to work from to contest this attack as opposed to the Japanese position which would be supported by prepositioned depots feeding the attack.

http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.0...siberia_rr.gif

http://www.flickr.com/photos/kernbeisser/4156904688/

In regard to Soviet vs Japanese performance of field armies in 1941-

Khalkin Gol 1939 is in no way a blue print or some sort of scaleable template for a large scale strategic operation in support of the Japanese Northern Strategy. This link provides a much better picture of the events in 1939: http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/resources/csi/drea2/drea2.asp
Read it carefully and identify how long it took, how much effort and at what cost it took for the Soviet's to destroy A SINGLE Japanese Infantry division.
In 1941 the Japanese had double track rail feeder lines leading up close to the border and their quality was on par with US rail lines of the period (best in the world). If the Japanese decided to go north in 1941 instead of south you can safely bet that there would be at least force parity with the Soviets and likely plenty of local superiority at key points of Japan's choosing all while holding the initiative (something that the Soviets held at Khakhin Gol).
I love the simplistic idea....
Red Army(1941) > Imperial Japanese Army(1941)

For more perspective on Khalkhan Gol later-

"An especially bloody affray at Changkufeng/Lake Khasan in 1938 resulted in over 2,500 casualties on both sides. It also seemed to stiffen Soviet resolve because the following year, Joseph Stalin, speaking before the Eighteenth Soviet Party Congress in March 1939, warned that any acts of aggression against the inviolable Soviet frontiers would be met by twice the force of any invader"

In short..... After reading the link above its clear that the Japanese sent a force that they assumed was "large enough" to evict the invaders and restore border integrity. The Soviets sent the largest possible force that they could successfully sustain as a means to dissuade the Japanese from further border clashes. These are two clearly different initiatives and thus two entirely different effort levels. If the Japanese had decided to make a maximum effort of force projection (which they did NOT at Khalkhin Gol) into the area the Soviets would not have had anything close to the same experience. Man for man the IJA was superior to the Red Army in 1941, especially if supplies were lacking and privations were extreme.

The Japanese had difficulty because of the level of resistance as opposed to what they expected and consequently planned for. Don't draw the wrong conclusion that they could not sustain their forces or even larger ones with adequate planning. Errors in planning we're made, that doesn't qualify as an inability.

"Nomonhan was aproxiniately 200 kilometers south of the IJA base at Hailaerh, but it was about 750 kilometers from the nearest Soviet bases of operations at Borzya, USSR, and Ondorhann, Outer Mongolia, respectively. Looking at their maps, Kwantung Army planners estimated that large scale Soviet operations around Nomonhan would be impossible. They thought that the great distances from the nearest Soviet railhead insured that the Red Army could never concentrate large armor and infantry forces at Nomonhan. This meant, in turn, that the only Soviet troops around Nomonhan would be those assigned to the 7th Border Guard Brigade. The 23d Division expected to encounter only Outer Mongolian and second-rate Soviet troops. Based on assumed Soviet capabilities, a single IJA division would suffice to handle this latest border flare-up"

In regard to Japanese tanks:
From the Philipines invasion force that in this alternate history goes north into Siberia- The 14th Army had two first-line infantry divisions, the 16th and 48th, to invade and conquer Luzon, and the 65th Brigade as a garrison force. The Formosa-based 48th Division, although without combat experience, was considered one the Japanese Army's best units, was specially trained in amphibious operations, and was given the assignment of the main landing in Lingayen Gulf. The 16th Division, assigned to land at Lamon Bay, was picked as one of the best divisions still available in Japan itself and staged from the Ryukyus and Palau. The 14th Army also had the 4th and 7th Tank Regiments, five field artillery battalions, five anti-aircraft artillery battalions, four antitank companies, and a mortar battalion. An unusually strong group of combat engineer and bridging units was included in the 14th Army's support forces."

There are two tank regiments listed above and I could easily see the Japanese using 4-6 more (not all line abreast but in support of the Infantry divisions at important locations.
I don't believe the Japanese have to advance at anything like the speed of the armies in the west. They merely need a steady advance at marching/pack animal speed in order to meet their objectives. Soviet forces responding are not likely to be swift, coordinated or concentrated due to slow command structure, poor communications equipment and clumsy logistical support (not to forget vast distances involved). For the Japanese ability to support troops in difficult terrain over distance, look at the Singapore campaign and Malay pennisula.

The Japanese tanks Ha-Go and Chi-Ha and adequate by 1941 standards and fit in well enough in Japanese doctrine to make their Infantry divisions difficult for the Soviets to contend with. In a fluid tactical environment I wouldn't expect the Soviets to enjoy any advantage with their armor until they were pushed back to Lake Baikal. The Soviet tank force never performed well without a supply hoard right behind their lines in preset fashion. Without proper coordination for support Soviet armor will be heavily attritted from mechanical breakdown more than combat.

 

The Japanese tanks were not adequate by 1941 standards. Even the Soviet BT series were better then them. Some problems, You cant look at the Malaya, or Philippine operations. They were against poorly trained and ill equipped troops and in the case of the British bad morale and leadership. The Japanese had the advantage of air superiority and could in the case of Malaya land behind lines. They would not have that advantage. Im not familiar enough with Soviet air forces in the east, but the Japanese didn't have the absolute superiority they did later.
The main problem with the Japanese attack is that they don't gain anything but land, their navy would collapse with out the oil of the south and with so many troops committed to China they cannot fight a long term war with the Soviets. The loss of Vladivostok and the far east would only make the Soviets mad and would not affect their war making ability.

 

In regards to the idea of the Japanese putting tankers in the black sea, right, Germany is going to give the Japanese oil, If you think the Japanese are capable of marching all the way west, they why not simply have them invade the US.

 

If there had been any sort of meaningful co-operation or co-ordination between Germany and Japan, the Soviets would have an almost impossible task with or without British neutrality.

Firstly Japan did not act strategically, fast enough to secure its oil needs which it could have done at a price in early 1930s

Late on it tried, to build synthetic oil plants but the technology was deficient. However Manchuria as we know sits on huge quantities of coal - easier to extract than German coal and eminently suitable for production of petroleum products.
If Japan had bought a licence of IG Farben's technology before the Nazis came to power it could have easily been self-sufficient in oil. It did not because synthetic oil was expensive - four times the price of the stuff from Indonesia.
The same goes for rubber - IG Farben sold a licence to Standard Oil otherwise the US would have been seriously short of this vital commodity following the fall of Malaya.

If the Japanese had their wits about them they should have made purchase of war making technology a condition of signing the Tripartitie pact.

 

That is the wonderfulness of it, they were too self absorbed to really cooperate. Im sure the US would have ignored any licensing issues if needed.

 

Well it did.

Standard Oil did not benefit at all. Since it had exchanged a large amount of oil for the licence for Buna Rubber, the US politicians embarrassed it into granting it free to all other American potential producers.

And nothing was paid to IG Farben.

As one of those interesting but useless facts, compare this with Vickers which manufactured the No. 80 fuse under licence from Krupps in WW1 and at the Armistice then paid Krupps for all the fuses it had manufactured during the war!

Those were the days - a far cry from the wholesale looting in WW2.

 

A fair number of your posts come across as snide, condecending or insulting.
Your comments about other's ignorance are rather amusing, considering that you seem to have some facts confused in your own posts.
You also might find that people will take your points more seriously if you refrain from doing this, especially to Moderators or Trustees.

Just a bit of friendly advice

You realize that wikipedia does no such thing correct?
It doesn't "relay" information from reliable sources, it is text written by random editors, who may or may not be uninformed, biased or careless in what they write?

When the Wiki page for HMS Formidable stated that the carrier was operating Corsairs in 1941, after it's refit in the USA, can I have taken that to be fact? (Since Wiki only relays information from reliable sources?)

Why would FDR need to declare war on all 3 powers? (Or declare war at all?)
The US was far more concerned about Japanese aggression in the Pacific, where the US has some vested interests. They may decide to disrupt the Japanese war effort in China & the Soviet Far East and stay neutral to the other Axis.
Or do you propose that Japan abandons its war in China?

Perhaps the Spanish Blue division could parachute in as well?


.

 

Japanese tanks circa 1941 were adequate within the context of Japanese doctrine (Infantry support) and force structure and how Japanese forces would have been deployed in the scenario I posted previously. Soviet tank forces would have dissipated in space due to all of the logistical issues that were inherent in the Red Army in that time frame. What happened at Khalkin Gol is in no way comparable to the scenario suggested here. The Soviets would not be given months to generate a huge logistical base while the enemy remained static, unaware and undermanned. The Red Army facing the Japanese in Fall of 1941 did not have the truck assets to support mobile operations or a large force structure far forward, even if the Japanese advance was slow (relative to the Germans'). A few T34's would not have made any difference, the Red Army in 1941 in that theatre lacked the ability to support them adequately. Once the Soviets are backed up to Lake Baikal, the scenario changes however.

As far as comparing the Phillipine or Malay campaigns, you missed my point. The point is not related to combat, but that the Japanese were able to land and logistically support their corps sized forces overland in the absence of rail. The point being that they were very skilled in working with minimal logistical support and it did not degrade their combat capability as much as their enemies.

 

I disagree. It would almost certainly have had some impact in 43 and even more in 44. A bit too late to help the Germans much though.

What meaningful co-operation could there be?

How can they secure it in the early 30's? They are in a much weaker position and without any real allies. Synthetic oil at the time was a rather poor solution. It was expensive and inefficient.

Certainly looking at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synthetic_rubber it doesn't seem like this is the case.
and this one http://www.nationalww2museum.org/learn/education/for-students/ww2-history/at-a-glance/rubber.pdf makes it clear that it was a bit more complex than you imply as well.

Would this really have helped much?

 

That's far from clear. FDR seems to have agreed that Hitler and Nazi Germany was the greater threat and the Gallup polls clearly indicate a lot of concern about events in Europe. That said there is little reason for the US to declare war until it is ready for it. This would not be a good thing for the Axis.

 

I don't believe the Japanese used tanks except in small groups and yes they were great against troops that had no tanks, but they were vulnerable to even the 37mm gun. You cant compare the landings in Malaya to a land fight in Mongolia and east Siberia. Any logistical difficulty the Soviets had, the Japanese would face also. The Japanese were still fighting the 1901 war with the Russians and while they had some updating of equipment they were still stuck in the past. The Japanese army was simply unprepared for a 2nd rate Soviet army and don't forget the Soviets believed in using a sledge hammer to crack a nut. Finally please explain to me how all that wonderful plains in east Russia would help the Japanese fuel their fleet and feed their people.

 

Well I did say that synthetic oil was many times more expensive.

But is Easy - the Japanese simply buy a licence from IG Farben who were in desperate straights late 20's and early 30's due to the fact that they had virtually bet the Company that the World would require synthetic oil from coal.


Japan could have borne the high cost in view of the strategic benefit of a secure supply of oil.

(In the Apartheid Era, South Africa's Sasol produced most of the country's need for oil by the synthetic route from coal to avoid any embargos - its a perfectly valid way, provided you have the technology).

Amazing as it now seems, it was believed that the World was running out of supplies of oil at the time. Then the vast oil fields were discovered in Texas! A major reason IG Faben backed Hitler was to save the Company - Hitler could not careless about the cost, he simply wanted a secure supply of Oil. A quarter of the 4 year German Investment Plan went to IG Farben (far more than Krupps et al) for production of synthetic oil.

IG Farben also produced synthetic butadiene rubber - this was a bit soft (if my memory is correct) and lifetime of tyres was lower than natural rubber. With the loss of Malaya, the US built a very large capacity of synthetic rubber. By co-polymerising with Styrene they improved on the IG Farben product and made the rubber harder and more durable they improved tyre lifetime.

Co-ordinating and co-operating attacks might be useful - but I also allude to co-operation on technology. The UK and US agreed at an early stage to share technology secrets.

Although I admit, this would be difficult given the character of the regimes in Japan and Germany (luckily for us).

 

The polls were all done during a time when Churchill had resolutely declared Britain's determination to continue to fight Facsism, and were fighting the Axis on land, in the air and at sea. The situation would be completely different with Britain, Netherlands & the Dominions neutral.

How exactly would the US even wage war against Germany? They might as well declare war on the Mongol Horde or the Byzantine Empire. Without the British fighting Germany there is no battle in the Atlantic, no U-boats and no threat to US shipping.
Germany only has a tiny merchant marine, it's dwarfed by the much larger British, Dutch and Norweigan fleets, and even if the US declared a total embargo on Germany, there is nothing that they couldn't get elsewhere.

Obviously without Britain in the war there will be no bombing campaign.

Or do you think the US would try an amphibious landing on the German coast in 1941?

FDR might not like it but there's nothing he can do.
America's interests are in the Pacific, and supporting China, which will bring them into conflict wwith Japan sooner or later

 

Buying a license doesn't produce oil. Considerable resources had to be committed to building the plants. Did Japan have those resources? You point out just how much of the German budget went to Farben to build this capability. Then there are questions about where to build such plants. Logisitically Manchuria would be the place to do it but would the Japanese be willing to do so? And how vulnerable would the plants and transport network be?

 

The Japanese had 14 tank Regiments available in late 1941 (takes four to form a Tank Div). These Regiments were usually subordinated to Infantry Corps as were AA units, engineers, artillery, etc. to form combat groups. The cohesion of these Japanese units would be superior to anything that the Soviets had at that time. At Khalkhin Gol the Japanese 37mm AT gun had proved effective against the Soviet BT tanks and each Infantry Regiment had 4 in addition to AT capable artillery.
As far as the Japanses having logistical issues, take a look at the maps I linked previously. The Japanese have rail capacity right up to the border and would have had stockpiles there enabling their advance. So no, they don't have the same issues as the Soviets and the culmination point of the Japanese offensive would likely be on the approached to Lake Baikal.