Reasons for loss of Philippines, May 1942

What are some of the main reasons, the US lost control of our forward bases in the Philippeans. Seems to me, under the cicumstances, we would have guarded those bases very carefully. We were planning for a war with Japan, and the Phillipines were going to be a very valuable base, in such a war.

 

General Douglas MacArthur. 'nuff said.

 

You're entirely correct. All you say is true but you're being rational and thinking clearly. You don't have your ego getting in the way like "Dugout" Doug.

 

Pre-war reasons
Yes, we were planning for a war with Japan, "War Plan Orange."
War Plan Orange
However, given the circumstances, distance and time, the US knew that holding the Philippines in the event of war with Japan was a near impossibility, and thus, the Philippines were expected to fall to Japan and be recaptured at a later date.

Another "nail in the coffin" was the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. To get Japan to agree to the 5-5-3 capital ship limitation, the US, Great Britain, and Japan agreed, in Article XIX, that they would not fortify most of their territories in the Pacific. For better or worse, the US could not fortify the Philippines until the Treaty expired.

Another "nail" would be the Great Depression era. With government spending greatly restricted, the US could not have fortified the Philippines had they been allowed to. The US military would fall to its lowest point in many years. The US was only beginning to build its military back up when war began in Europe in 1939.

For more on the Philippine situation, you can read more at these sites
The Fall of the Philippines-Contents
http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/fulltext/they_fought_with_what_they_had.pdf

 

I'll second that.
He's the reason they weren't prepared for the war.
He's the reason our Air Force in the PI was destroyed on the ground.

 

I admit that General Brereton does seem to be a sort of "Typhoid Mary" when it comes to operations under his command; some of them were planned before he came on the scene (Ploesti, Market-Garden), and the operation in the Philippines was too muddled to really lay the blame anywhere but "Big Mac". But even then, the whole thing is rather muddled to say the least. Not letting MacArthur off the hook here (I'm not a fan), but the problem as it evolved was a bit confused and confusing.

Sutherland overrode General Brereton on decisions concerning the use of the USAAF in the Philippines repeatedly. Brereton's own personality was another problem. MacArthur liked and trusted him even in the face of his (Brereton’s) inability to cope with the domineering Sutherland who was MacArthur’s Chief of Staff.

While there are two sides to any historical event depending on who is writing it, the consensus of opinion seems to be that the blame for the loss of the B-17's falls on MacArthur, not Brereton, since even though Brereton was in command of the USAAF (Far East Air Force), he was under the direct control of "Big Mac", as well as Sutherland (de facto), since he could do nothing without upper command approval.

Most sources infer that MacArthur went into a sort of funk with the news of Pearl Harbor and was emotionally paralyzed so he did nothing for quite some time. General Brereton as the head of the Far East Air Corps tried several times to get MacArthur to authorize the removal of the B-17's (through Sutherland, who may not have forwarded the requests to Mac) south to a new air base. Supposedly, MacArthur's delays in approving that requested transfer caused the B-17's still at Clark to be destroyed by the Japanese attack.

Apparently, there was no initial effort to use the B-17's to bomb Formosa as the war plans called for, but they had been sent out on initial scouting flights (without bombs!) around the islands. Then there were no "new" maps of Formosa in the Philippines in Dec. of 1941, their newest maps dated from the Spanish American War, and hadn't been updated since the Japanese had started building airfields on that island. The Navy had over-flown and taken pictures, but they didn't share them with the Army! The Army didn't want to over-fly the island before Dec. for fear the Japanese would interpret this as an "act of war".

Bad weather delayed the Japanese air attack forces from Formosa, but when they did strike, they wiped out half of the B-17 force and a large number of fighter aircraft that were also caught on the ground.

See:

Douglas MacArthur

That Spartacus site makes the common mistake of forgetting that the Philippines are on the other side of the International Date Line, and so even though they were attacked on Dec. 8th, it was really just later in the same time period. Fog delayed the Japanese from taking off from Formosa for a few hours, not a whole day.

and:

HyperWar: The Army Air Forces in WWII: Vol. I--Plans & Early Operations [Chapter 6]

At that site be sure to scroll down to pages 206-212, and notice that the planes were back from a scouting mission when they were attacked. It goes into some detail of the different statements by MacArthur, Sutherland and Brereton. They had used up their fuel, returned to the base for refueling and were eating lunch while the planes were being serviced. Timing is everything.

 

Actually, Brereton had resisted moving the B-17's South to Del Monte as the field was primative and not really ready to operate the B-17's. Also, the 12 B-17's that arrived at Pearl Harbor during the attack were bound for the Philippines, and Brereton intended to place them at Del Monte. He didn't feel there was room at Del Monte for both the new arrivals and the 19th BG currently at Clark.

After news of the Pearl Harbor attack reached the Philippines, Brereton attempted to get authorization from MacArthur for an attack at daybreak on the Japanese airbase on Formosa. He was denied access to MacArthur by Sutherland. While awaiting an audience with Mac, Brereton sent the B-17's out on a defensive reconnaisance mission. They had landed for refueling when the Japanese attack arrived.

 

The US was in the same trap as most other allied forces in 1941 - World war 1 weapons and tactics were thought to be good enough for world war 2. Also many in the US military dismissed the Japanese as a serious enemy, and thought they'd never be stupid enough to try to take on the USA, since everybody including a lot of Japanese knew they would lose. So the US did take precautions and built up US and Filipino forces, but not enough.

Macarthur's occasionally poor judgment and huge ego also played a major factor. The US military had a long-standing plan in the event of an attack on the Phillipines. US and Filipino forces were to withdraw to the rugged interior of the main islands, and fight the attacker there. This terrain was highly defensable and well suited to the forces and weapons available, and might have delayed the Japanese forces for months - in time for American forces to reinforce the islands. When the Japanese attacked, Macarthur discarded this strategy in favor of fast, mobile attacks and a hit-and-run strategy, tactics which his forces lacked the training and logistics to do.

If Macarthur had held the Phillipines, the Pacific war might have gone very differently. The US would have had a very rough time trying to supply and reinforce friendly forces, because Japan held every piece of land around the Phillipines for thousands of miles. Maybe the only way they could have been supplied was by submarine, which wouldn't have been enough. So that may have been why the US simply gave up the Phillipines in 1942 - these islands were probably indefensible at that time.

 

I have read where MacArthur really had a big ego which clashed causing friction. I am only relating how I heard it from where I am. In reading a couple paperbacks from the 50's I recall MacArthur evacuating early and taking with him his whole entourage . Writers, photographers, servants, etc when there were a lot of injured men in the tunnel who could have been evacuated. That left a real bad taste in my mouth....Now maybe it wasn't like that. I dunno. Who writes history?

 

I've always thought that the Japanese had a lot to do with it.

 

Haha. Yes the Japanese did play a large part...OP, who made that quote regarding Vietnam?

 

Are you heard the story of Corregidor Island "The Rock " in the Philippines.?

 

I've gradually gained the insight that, yes, MacArthur was, indeed, a part of the problem initially. But it turns out it was much more complex than mere military oversight.
He was trying to avoid a war between the Philippines and Japan. He sought to find ways to have the Philippines remain neutral, and even considered the idea that U.S. forces would be withdrawn from the Philippines in order to help this happen.
He continued to be fascinated by this idea, even more so because one of his top advisors, Willoughby, was an admirer of Franco of Spain. A favorite scheme, seemed to be the idea of somehow using Spain as an intermediary with Japan. The upper classes in Manila were all interested in an arrangement with Japan. This atmosphere helped to influence MacArthur's thinking as a statesman, as much as a general. He saw himself, after all, somewhat correctly, as a head of state, not "just" a general in the Philippines in 1941.
Several supply-related decisions very early in the campaign were probably influenced by that thinking.
However, I do think it's overblown to believe that, had Clark Field , Iba, or others been better advised of the pending Japanese raid, that, in the long term, US air would have overcome the Japanese. It would have delayed, but not prevented, the Japanese victory.
The idea of an air raid against Formosa--just think about that one. What chance would it have had of succeeding, against that island then bristling with Japanese aircraft? B-17s were tough, but they'd have been swarmed by Zeroes--and probably numerous other models.
Also, I confess I'm still trying to figure Sutherland out. He screwed several things up, it would appear. Why, is my question. But, even if he hadn't, what chance, really, did we have at that point in time? Given no other "what if's", the above, just don't get the job done for turning it around.
MacArthur clearly had a big ego on some level, but it's hard to say that he wasn't realistic about the Philippines' chances against Japan, early on. And, like a lot of other wealthy Americans, he wasn't enthusiastic about FDR--or, what he may have perceived, very early, though not later, as FDR's (and not his) War.
And, make no mistake: he probably really would have gone down with his ship, at least, up to a point. After all, his wife and baby were with him. He'd have gotten them out, but probably wasn't a coward. He'd stand and watch the Japanese planes fly over Corregidor, counting them, and would have to be pulled out of danger as their bombs fell. (Manchester refers to this in American Caesar.)
We were going to be ready for the Japanese, possibly, some time up in 1942--and the Japanese knew it. They tried to hit before we could get ready.
It's really that simple, although all these convoluted events and ideas floating around Manila in 1941, didn't help any.

 

B-17's over Formosa swarmed by Zero's? Just how many Zero's did the IJN have at the time?

 

That's the big problem, MacArthur was there in the 30s as a military advisor to the President of the Philippines, and to build and train their armed forces for the coming war with Japan. His job was not to play global politics, but to get the Philippine Army into some representation of an army instead of the rabble it was. Mac was recalled to the colors in 1941 and was supposed to oversee the gearing up of the USAFFE, but he dropped the ball there too. Upon the commencement of hostilities with Japan, he was supposed to initiate WPO, which called for US forces to fall back to Bataan and dig in. Instead Mac sent weak forces to oppose Japanese troops who had landed at Lingayen and were moving south. Mac then second guessed himself and decided to follow the pre-war gameplan and head to Bataan. Tons and tons of much needed supplies that should have been sent ahead of the Army to Bataan was left behind in Manila. Instead of having trenches and defensive strong points developed across the Bataan peninsula before the war started, and having plans to evacuate all civilians from the area, he did nothing. One thing he did was this:

On January 1, 1942 MacArthur was offered and accepted a payment of $500,000 ($7.5 million in current value) from President Quezon of the Philippines as payment for his pre-war service. MacArthur's staff members also received payments: $75,000 for Sutherland, $45,000 for Richard Marshall, and $20,000 for Huff. Eisenhower, after being appointed Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, was also offered money by Quezon, but declined. These payments were known only to a few in Manila and Washington, including President Roosevelt and Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, until they were made public by historian Carol Petillo in 1979. The revelation tarnished MacArthur's reputation.

It gives a lot of motivation to his famous catch-phrase "I will return" doesn't it.

source: wiki

Of course the debacle at Pearl Harbor sealed the Philippines doom, but USAFFE forces there could have done a better job and tied more Japanese forces down longer if Mac had done his job properly.

No, I really don't care for MacArthur. Don't get me started on him.

 

No US general could have saved the Phillipines, but they could preformed far better if Mac had followed the original war plan and had not tried to win an improbable victory.

 

The performance of the US sub force was terrible. While they alone could not have stopped the Japanese, if used properly with torpedo's that worked .... they could have slowed them down a bit.

 

US sub doctrine and training were flawed, but their biggest problems were too many S-boats and really crappy torps.

 

I always thought the S boats had fairly reliable torpedoes? Or am I thinking of the Flush deck DD's as the ones having reliable torpedoes?