So true. Roosevelt totally had his head up his... er, head in the sand, when it came to the USSR. I don't think Yalta mattered though, because the USSR was going to do whatever it wanted on the ground it held despite any objections from the western powers. The only difference it might have made is that without Yalta, Eisenhower might have advanced further east and the post war lines might have included a bigger slice of Germany and parts of Czechoslovakia. The rest of eastern/central Europe was already held by the Soviets and even if Roosevelt and Churchill had shown a united front, it would have made no difference at all.
I don't think you do understand: 1. Churchill was not a dictator who pushed Britain into the war 2. It was Chamberlain who declared that the state of war existed among Britiain and Germany 3. Brits would never allow any foreign force to dominate them This isn't a what if! A struggle of the British Empire against the Nazis was the unavoidable, mandatory element of the war.
I seem to recall reading that the ships sent to Sweden did indeed refuel on the way there. Furthermore they were making a one way trip at their most economical speed I suspect. From previous times when this was discussed I believe the range of the light ships (destroyers and torpedo boats) would have been the biggest problem although none of the Italian vessels were really designed with the Atlantic in mind, and why should they have been? Optimization for the Med made and makes a lot of sense for Italian naval vessels. That said however the biggest range problem wasn't how much fuel the Italian ships could carry it was how much was available. At times the Italians were reduced to pumping fuel from some of their vessels to get enough to allow others to sail. Nor was this state of affairs due to the Italian Navy.
The US was officially neutral for a year and a half after the fall of France as well. If you look at the polls most US citizens recognized that a Nazi victory was not in the US interest. The fall of France made that look more likely and thus moved support for war with Germany but not as dramatically as you seem to think. ???? That seems at odds with what happened historically. Care to support it with some facts. I see, that's why they declared war on Germany they didn't mind what they were doing... On the contrary they did agree on a joint strategy. Different proposals were made by leaders from various allies but the final actions were for the most part joint decisions. You rather disprove your own point with that. ??? You don't think the German attack on the Soviet Union was rather more important than that? Lend lease predates the US entry into the war. Oh in case you weren't aware standard English includes at least one space after punctuation in most cases. When I learned it there were two after punctuation that ended a sentence. That seems to be shrinking to one but at least one should be there for readability.
It's possible that he could have gotten a better deal for some of the East European countries. After all the Soviets lived up to their agreement to leave Austria. The problem was negotiating would have been difficult considering the quality of the Soviet espionage system.
Stalin wasnt going to negotiate, he wanted the states for a buffer and he was not going to abandon that. Thee only government we would trust were ones he dominated.
Of course he would have negotiated as historically he did negotiate. If you are suggesting the negotiations start in mid 45 then agreed you aren't likely to get a much better deal. On the other hand negotiations in 43 or even 44 might have been more productive. Certainly one wouldn't have expected a Soviet withdrawal from all of Eastern Europe but something better than the historical situation was certainly possible.
It's ironic that Britain officially went to war to protect Poland but ended up leaving that country under Soviet control, IMO getting a commitment from Stalin in 1943 about Poland was doadble, in 1945 it was too late, Stalin was not going to give up what his soldiers had shed so much blood to get, let's not forget Poland is a historical enemy of Russia and as late as 1919 had staged a half successful invasion, so an "independent Poland" was a threat. I agree tha Italian ships were not designed with atlantic warfare in mind, with the exception of the long range "oceanici" subs, but supporting an invasion from French bases is is notreally Atlantic Warfare. But IMO the Regia Marina would never leave the Med unless the following conditions were met: a) Gibraltar was neutralized (eiher by Franco putting a siege to it of by invasion) and H force has retreated to home waters (logical step as there are no decent bases for it closer to the Med). b) The Mediterranean fleet had retreated to the Red Sea and the axis can at least interdict the canal preventing a comeback (I don't believeit would allow itself to be "trapped" in the Easter Med if the axis gets in range of Alex and the canal). c) Malta was no longer a threat (IMO implicit in a and b without fleets at "the ends" of the Med to support resupply attempts and threaten an inavsion force Malta is doomed. d) Bases are available on the French north coast. None of the above is beyond an axis "full effort" to achieve but it probably can't be done before 1941, a lot depends on what happens in the Balcans as it could cause serious delays, on the other hand control of Crete makes an advance towards Alex a lot easier. Fuel availability was not a crippling issue in 1940, the Regia Marina started the war with sufficient reserves for several months of operations, it was only in 1942 when those reserves were gone an Hiler failed to allow for replenishing them (IIRC before the Germans seized control Italy did buy oil from Rumania) that surface operations had to be severely llimited because of lack of fuel.
Funny. From what I have read, it would seem that Stalin wanted Hitler and the West "duking" it out... Hitler fooled all.
The best way how Germany would have won is by only absorbing Eastern Europe diplomatically and economically. Hitler was looking for a military confrontation with the West, something that Hitler cost a lot, and couldn't afford. The biggest problem with Germany it's Central European position,something that puzzled Gen. Helmut von Moltke and the German General Staff in WWI,who to attack first. When it comes to understanding that Churchill wasn't dictator I'm clearly aware of it.I believe that the point of this forum is to exchange opinions not criticizing somebody whose second language is English,and pick out somebody's typo mistakes.
A and B would IMO be questionable by themselves. I don't see the axis having any hope of acomplishing all 4 no matter how much effort they put into it. That depends on how you define "crippling". If you only have enough fuel on hand for "several months" and not much prospect of getting more it imposes some signficant limitations on what you can do if you don't want to find yourself running on empty in a year or so when your opponent has no such limitations. Indeed but if Italy had burned fuel at several times their historical rate which they likely would have needed to do to gain control of the Med how much sooner would they have run out and what would then have happened to said sea control?
With the A-bomb a new war was not necessary, just threatening with it would/could/should have been enough. Surely Stalin did not know in autumn 1945 that the US did not have more bombs ready.
Dont forget that FDR and Truman wanted Stalin's help in eliminating the million some men still left in Manchuria.
Stalin had a pretty effective spy network in the US A-Bomb program. While the exact number of ready bombs was not likely known, that they were difficult and time consuming to assemble would be. Despite US propaganda, Stalin would know the west could not rain down a large number of bombs and that public opinion would not allow it against a former ally.
It is very likely that Stalin knew about the bomb even before Truman was informed! Here is how Marshal Zhukov describes in his memoirs the day when Truman "informed" Stalin about the bomb:
Best option once the war started for German victory would be to send a corps into Spain in June 1940 and close the Western Mediterranean. Then offer Italy two Panzer Divisions in Libya in exchange for the help of the Italian Navy. Malta should also be taken asap. The bulk of the Italian Navy and Spanish Navy and what ever shipping the Med can provide should then be moved along the French South Coast, Spanish Coast and Western French Coast under the cover of German Airpower to assist in a German invasion of Britain in late September. If this fails a Mediterranean strategy would be the one to pursue.