Importance of strategy in the Axis defeat

Hello,

Discussing in the internet, I have notice that many individuals point the Allied victory as inevitable, no matter what the Axis did. The Axis are always said to be doomed due to poor logistics, inferior industrial capability, etc.

Certainly this behaviour is not realistic, and can be proved so by the fact that the decisive victories were achived by pure strategy (there was no "hindsight" for the Commanders). While the poor logistics and industrial inferiority of the Axis with no doubt played a significant role, the good old strategy was still the determinant factor.

What are your views?

 

I'm not sure it was a "close call", but it would have been a darn sight closer if Hitler hadn't insisted on throwing away innumerable soldiers at Stalingrad, N. Africa, the Falaise pocket and Lord knows how many other places where he forbade a timely retreat. In those places he lost not only the men themselves but the experience and leadership that went with them. At the end, the Soviets were scraping the bottom of their manpower bucket and Britain was about in the same boat as well. Only the USA had large reserves of manpower left at the end.

It also might have helped the Germans if Hitler had followed Adolph Galland's advice and really beefed up the Jagdtwaffe starting in early 1942.

 

I believe the Germans did have a shot at winning the war, if they destroyed the allied army at Dunkirk that would have been a huge blow to the English and might have compelled them to surrender. Aswell as during the battle of britian the raf came very close to breaking,hitler saved them when hetold goring to attack the cities not the airfields, as for the eastern front that's very controversial I believe the germans had a chance if they took care of the british and helped the Italians in africa and the balkans first.

 

Hello Harolds,

I thought that "close call" was a slang for "close victory". English is not my first language.

And yeah, it's just what you said I'm refering to. If you see: Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, D-Day, Bragation, Midway, etc. All these battles, specially the ones fought until 1943, the result was not a foregone conclusion for neither side. Some the Axis lost because Intelligence failures, others because their incompetence; or better: the Allies won them.

Had the Axis won such battles, they would inflict heavy casualities on the Alllies. The Russians for example, it's not true they would always absorve endless casualities. They already suffered too much in 1941, and like you stated, even with their improvements and Lend-Lease they were already running low of manpower by 1945, like Britain.

What I'm against is the people who just pick things like logistical tables, and conclude the X battle would be impossible to win for one side. This totally desconsiderate the human factors, which were even more or just as important. That's my point.

 

This is a myth. The LW was never close to defeat the RAF.

Well, many German veterans like to paint something like "we could have deal with the Russians alone, the problem was their Allies!!". It's a fact that had Hitler removed the war with the West from the start, it's situation in Russia would be drastically improved. At least a stalemate would have a good chance if things went wrong. However, this ignores one simple fact: BOTH the Russians and Allies needed consideration of Germany, specially Russia, that was Germany's primary target for obtain the necessary resources to fight the West. You don't enter a war to loose, even if it's "more nice" you say to have lost for the Queen's Empire and Uncle Sam than for the "barbarian asiatic hordes" of Russia (this last justification appliable more for Hitler and the Nazi staff).

 

Jenisch,

Perhaps a better definition of "close call" is ALMOST BUT NOT QUITE. Your English is pretty good.

 

First things first, Italy could not win period.

Germany could survive the war, and possibly hold much of Western-Central Europe IF they avoided war with the Soviet Union and did not give the US any easy entrance into the war.

Japan might have achieved it goal of bleeding the US to the point that it would not wish to persecute to complete victory if it could defeat or seriously hurt the US Pacific Fleet in succesive battles without losing too many assets.

The reality though is that logistics, production and effective marshalling of technology give the allies the great advantage. You can only win against the odds so many times.

 

I disagree with the initial post :Japan never had a chance to win ,the only chance they had was to let the US bleeding and hoping that the US would give up .
About Germany,it is my deep and inalterable (although some one with a moustache also used this word )conviction that at the end of june 1940,Germany not only had few chances to win the war,but,practically had lost the war,although there were still possibilities to win some tactical Clausewitzian victories in the east,but,these never changed the strategical situation to the benefit of Germany :every victory in the east had as paradoxical result that the Germans were weaker,and the Soviets were stronger .
There was also the fact (neglected/disputed by most historians,grown up in the myth of the decisive battles)that WWII was a war of attrition (as his predecessor),and that the German strategy was determined by the fact that GENERAL TIME was fighting against Germany :every day (Barbarossa or not )Germany was becoming (relatively and absolutely)weaker .

 

I was pretty positive it wasn't a myth although the incompetence of Goring and the use of radar and among other factors influenced the out come of the battle. Also I want to put a greater emphasis on when I said the germans had a chance, the soviets were still suffering from the purge of the officer corps by stalin and among other things, hypotheticly if the Germans attacked later say 43/44 the soviets would have been better prepared prepared and organized or atleast that's my theory,.realistically speaking the germans cant best the soviets.

 

LJAD,

I agree with your basic premise that the war was basically decided by attrition. In fact, almost all modern wars (starting at the American Civil War) were decided by attrition. Perhaps the only exceptions being some of the wars that Bismark and Wilhelm I fought.

Unfortunately for Hitler, he seemed to see that less and less as the war dragged on. Initially he had several advantages, one being the resources of France and other occupied countries. The second being the most professionally capable army of the 20th century. However, as I stated in my original post, Hitler threw away so many good men that he, as many have said, was almost his own worst enemy. His focus on linear defense with no retreat was the most self-desructive strategy he could have devised. In the East, he negated his army's principal strengths: mobility, flexibility, and professional ability for a strategy that emphasized rigidity and inflexibility. The Western Allies and Stalin couldn't have imagined a more cooperative enemy. What would have happened if he could have actually understood mobile warfare and hadn't been so worried about losing strategically unimportant land? No one can say for sure, but I'll bet any of you that WWII would have been much harder to win.

 

I really like your shot into the Clausewitzian corner! And i like him anyway! The main problem of Germany is well known, the other was that there was no consequent planning for eleminating first the British and than any other. To me it would only have worked if they´ve made two steps: 1. Beaten down the British Island and occupy it to take away this later well known forepost of the USA. And the next step would have been to find a agreement with Stalin for more resources and a real no aggresion pact. But Hitler tried to beat the British and as he has seen it won´t be to easy, he started the next action and manouvred himself in a multiple front war.

 

[FONT=&amp]First, let's see the definitions of strategy.[/FONT]
[FONT=&amp]
Moltke: [/FONT]
[FONT=&amp]"the practical adaptation of the means placed at a general’s disposal to the attainment of the object in view."[/FONT]
[FONT=&amp]
Clausewitz:[/FONT]
[FONT=&amp]"the art of the employment of battles as a means to gain the object of war"[/FONT]
[FONT=&amp]
Lidel Hart: [/FONT]
[FONT=&amp]"the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy."[/FONT]
[FONT=&amp]
The problem with the Axis strategy was poor definition of the objectives and what were the ends of policy. To conquire Britain? Was that the capture of Moscow? Chase Stalin untill he retreats to Vladivostok? Or was it to have Caucasian oilfields? Perhaps it was to capture the city almost nobody knew it's name before the battle of Kursk? To guard every inch of the Atlantic coast?[/FONT]
[FONT=&amp]
Of course, Germans fought well but were faced with megalomaniac objectives.[/FONT]

 

As i´ve said: it would have been good working down the list step by step! And have you noticed that the quote from Lidell Hart is very close on von Clausewitz?

 

And yet, there is a fundamental difference: Clausewitz limits the choice of means just to the battle while Liddell Hart offers more freedom of choice with »[FONT=&amp]distributing and applying military means[/FONT]«.

It is well known that Guderian opposed Zeitzler's plan Citadel with this sentence: “My Fuhrer, why do you want to attack in the East at all this year?” This is a good example of proper distributing of military means by avoiding unnecessary battle. However, it was too late then to avoid total defeat.

BTW, how is the weather in Bavaria? I've had my first picnic in the garden this year.