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F4U Corsair vs F6F Hellcat

Discussion in 'Aircraft' started by KnightMove, May 17, 2012.

  1. mcoffee

    mcoffee Son-of-a-Gun(ner)

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    The higher powered F4U-4 and the F8F Bearcat would have replaced the F6F.

    Vought continued to improve the F4U airframe. Grumman took a different approach and built the F8F Bearcat with the smallest airframe they could wrap around the R2800-34W engine. The Bearcat's performance was spectacular - it was fast, had great maneuverability and an outstanding climb rate.

    A highly modified Bearcat "Rare Bear" holds the closed course speed record for piston-engined aircraft as well as some time-to-climb records.
     
  2. lwd

    lwd Ace

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    Didn't the F8F have a relatively short range? If it's the one I'm thinking of it was designed as an interceptor. There was also a two engine fighter in the works for the navy wasn't there?
     
  3. Old Schoolr

    Old Schoolr Member

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    Grumman F7F Tigercat.
     
  4. mcoffee

    mcoffee Son-of-a-Gun(ner)

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    F4U - 1,000 miles
    F8F - 1,100 miles
     
  5. lwd

    lwd Ace

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    These two web sites mention a range of 1,500 mile or so for the F4U:
    http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/hist-ac/f4u-4.pdf
    Vought F4U Corsair
    But the corresponding numbers for the F8F from:
    The Grumman F8F Bearcat
    is almost 2,000 miles.
    Thought I might have been confusing it with the F7F but it's got range comparable to the F8F in the sites I looked at such as the following:
    http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/hist-ac/f7f-3n.pdf

    Thanks for the correction.
     
  6. mcoffee

    mcoffee Son-of-a-Gun(ner)

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    One has to be careful when looking at aircraft range numbers. Note on the F8F website you posted that "range" is 1105 miles and "max range" is 1965 miles. Maximum range numbers are for a ferry condition without combat weapons loads and flown at best lift/drag airspeed. Combat range at operational loads and air speeds are always considerably less. Also note the performance data on the F4U-4 which lists combat range at 1005 miles with 1-150 gal external tank. Combat radius goes down even farther as allowances are made for warmup, rendezvous, 20 minutes of combat at full power and a 60 minute reserve (notes at end).
     
  7. lwd

    lwd Ace

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    Indeed one of the reasons I posted those links was the detailed information in them particularly as it related to combat radius and load outs (note the 150 gallon drop tank as well in some cases). Fortunatly several of those links did make it clear which ranges they were talking about. Many web sites and books for that matter just say "range" not making it clear if it is ferry range, one way range (with weapons and such), combat radius, etc.
     
  8. GunSlinger86

    GunSlinger86 Well-Known Member

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    The British were using the Corsair for carrier operations in the North Atlantic/Norway theater at the time when the U.S. Navy was having trouble using the F4U on carriers, and the Marines were mostly using them from land.
     
  9. Takao

    Takao Ace

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    AFAIK, US Corsairs were being used in combat as night fighters flying off USS Enterprise, some two months before FAA Corsairs flew their first combat mission from HMS Victorious during the beginning of April, 1944. This was, of course, before the Corsair became US carrier-qualified - which also occurred in April, 1944.
     
  10. 4th wilts

    4th wilts Member

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    Hey guys,forgive me if this has already been asked.Are there any records of either the F6F,or the F4U being captured and used against the Allies,by the Japanese forces in the pacific campaign.? Thanks,Lee.
     
  11. Dave55

    Dave55 Member

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    I think they captured a RNZAF Corsair but I'm not sure
     
  12. R Leonard

    R Leonard Member

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    Captured? A better word would be "recovered" after a hard landing. And "used" depends on your definition . . . flown, as in some attempt at evaluation, or operated, as in some sort of deception operations.

    Yes, both F6Fs and F4Us were recovered. Most all were in pretty bad shape and not flyable. At least one F6F, however, recovered on Formosa was eventually restored, at least from appearances, to perhaps a flying condition, though how much use the Japanese got from it is certainly questionable.

    Seriously, by the end of the war there were not just a few crumpled examples littering the Japanese landscape, not really more than artifacts

    My two cents in all this is that you cannot compare the F6F and the F4U in terms of operational effectiveness unless you restrict your examination to the last 8 months of the war when the F4U started to see more operational use on carriers. Anytime before that the two were fighting two different wars with the F6F primarily, but not exclusively, aboard carriers and the F4Us primarily, and almost exclusively, operating from land bases. Statistics one could gather up until the move to employ F4Us aboard carriers on a routine basis for either airplane are, yes, interesting, but pretty worthless for comparative purposes.

    The prime examples which come to mind are two, the first being the number of enemy aircraft shot down by each type . . . which type had the greater exposure and the greater opportunity for exposure? Easy, the F6F due simply to the tempo and mobility of carrier operations; they could go where the targets were. The F4Us were land based and when the aerial opposition was eliminated, there was scant opportunity to increase the score. The second is what about the proportionately large tonnage of bombs dropped by F4Us? Well, after they ran out of aerial opponents, the powers that be had to keep all those VMF squadrons busy, so they spent almost a year routinely bombing by-passed Japanese garrisons, over, and over, and over and over. Certainly racked up a lot of tonnage when compared to F6F operations of the same period, but it was before the routine use of F6Fs as fighter bombers.

    If you want a valid comparison of F4Us and F6Fs you have to look to the period when the two types were routinely operating from carriers as stablemates. Apples to apples, don't cha know.

    I've a write up on it around here somewhere, maybe I'll get lucky and find it.
     
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  13. mcoffee

    mcoffee Son-of-a-Gun(ner)

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    I've written the same, but can't find it due to an external drive failure.
     
  14. Slipdigit

    Slipdigit Good Ol' Boy Staff Member WW2|ORG Editor

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    Backups and backups of backups.
     
  15. mcoffee

    mcoffee Son-of-a-Gun(ner)

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    Many, just had to find the right thumb drive...

    [SIZE=9pt]Okay, here's a true head-to-head comparison: 1945 carrier based only - both the F6F and F4U were operating in the same task force. The result is that the F6F posted a 22.1 kill-to-loss ratio against the F4U's 16.9. The F6F was credited with 1724 enemy aircraft against the loss of 78 to same. The F4U was credited with 573 against 34 losses. The F6F engaged 2409 fighters and shot down 1214 of them – 50%. The F4U engaged 1024 fighters and shot down 419 – 41%. Operating in the same environment, the F6F exceeded the F4U in both kill-to-loss ratio and in percent of engaged fighters actually downed. (All numbers from [/SIZE][SIZE=9pt]NAVAL AVIATION COMBAT STATISTICS—WORLD WAR II)[/SIZE]
     
  16. R Leonard

    R Leonard Member

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    And to compliment the McC’s air to air data, above, the below is mostly to address the popular belief in the F4U as a better and more prolific bomb hauler when compared to F6F. Some of the data can also, perhaps, explain in passing some of the noted air-to-air disparity in terms of squadrons in action and action sorties.

    The employment of the F4U as a bombing type began in the North Solomon Islands Campaign around the end of 1943. This was more a matter of greater availability more than greater capability. It would seem to me that one has to bear in mind that the majority of F4U squadrons in those days were USMC squadrons and were land-based. In that theater, by the end of 1943, most, if not all, of the Japanese aerial opposition had been eliminated and the Marine VMFs began their employment in strikes on by-passed Japanese held areas.

    This trend continued into the central Pacific theater where, once based on various captured airfield in the Gilberts and Marshalls, the Marine VMFs provided routine CAP and, mostly to keep them employed, also conducted many, many strikes on, again, by-passed enemy islands within strike range.

    The F4U’s much deserved close air support reputation did not come until much later, mostly in Korea, not in WW2. That is not to say that F4Us were not used in close air roles in WW2, it is just that in actually came pretty late in the game, most significantly in the Philippines and at Okinawa. Most of the close air support in actual invasions came from carrier based bombers – note, bombers, not fighters. Indeed, for the majority of 1944, Marine air was largely involved in the task of supporting smaller operations in the northern Solomon Islands and the bombing the bypassed islands in the Gilberts and the Marshalls from the closest US occupied island airbases. Although through these missions the VMFs were not particularly providing large air support missions, the VMF pilots certainly used these operations as opportunities to develop techniques and develop their proficiency at bombing small targets usually while being shot at in return. Except on a very small scale in some of those operations in the northern Solomon’s, mostly in the Bougainville area, there was no real opportunity to refine the tactics of employing close air support in front of advancing Marines. It should be remembered, however, that the majority of these missions and those still later in the Philippines beginning in late 1944, were flown by VMSB and VMTB squadrons in SBDs and TBMs, not F4Us, and were part of an evolving CAS doctrine that by the end of the war was firmly established.

    On the carrier side, the story is different. For the most part bombing was left to the VB and VT types. It was not until January 1945 that the Navy began to break-up its, by then very large – up to 70 plus planes in some cases, VF squadrons and form 2 squadrons within the CV air groups, of VF fighting squadrons and the other VBF fighting-bombing squadrons. Some of the VBFs were equipped with F4Us while others were equipped with F6F. It is probably important to note that for anything the F4U could haul or deliver, the F6F had the same capability. But now, here’s the commonly carrier based F6F, which has been in action since the fall of 1943 with all these aerial victories, certainly, by far, more than the scores racked up by the USMC VMFs and the few land-based or night-fighter carrier-based USN F4U squadrons. The large number scores of the F6F are certainly not indicative of that airplane being a better fighter than the F4U any more than the large tonnage deliveries of the F4U make it a better bomber than the F6F. It was, again, a function of employment. Stationed aboard carriers, the F6F squadron went to where the Japanese were, thus, and especially, when compared to land-based F4U squadrons there was far and away more opportunity for aerial combat, thus higher scores.

    The fallacy of comparing numbers using the land-based deliveries can be readily illustrated by looking at land-based F4Us of the VMFs and land-based F4Us of the VFs. Land-based F4U VMFs dropped some 14,305 tons over course of the war (less, by the way than their VMSB SBD stable mates) whereas land-based F4U VFs dropped but a paltry 4 tons. Does this mean that the VMF F4Us were better bombers than the VF F4Us? Of course not, they were essentially identical aircraft; it simply means that that the VMFs saw more employment in a bombing role than did the VFs. In fact, the VMFs dropped one ton of ordnance for every 3.69 action sorties as opposed to the VFs one ton for every 317.25 sorties – quite a difference in mission type operating tempo. Further, one might note that land-based F6F equipped VMFs dropped 284 tons of ordnance compared to the land –based F6F VFs 227 tons. The F6F VMFs dropped 1 ton for every 5.79 action sorties and the VFs were 1 ton for every 10.88 sorties. But we, likewise, cannot say that the land-based F6Fs flown by the VMFs were better bombers than the land-based F6Fs flown by VFs simply because they delivered more ordnance at a higher rate; no, just as with the F4U, is was simply a matter of employment. The VMF F6Fs were, obviously, almost twice a likely to fly a bombing missing than the VF F6Fs. Land based fighters, be they F4Us or F6Fs flew some 56 ground support missions in 1943; by 1945 that number was up to 4,480.

    Back to carrier employment . . . the first employments of F4Us on US CVs by air group assignment were the temporary assignment of USMC VMF squadrons to USN air groups. This was a stop-gap measure designed to meet an immediate need for additional fighters. From there, and with the expansion of VBF squadrons, carrier operation of F4Us became commonplace to the point of that by the end of the war there were USN air groups where both the VF and the VBF squadrons were equipped with F4Us and had F6Fs only in division strength for night fighting and in section strength for photo reconnaissance. Carrier based fighters, be they F4Us or F6Fs flew some 257 ground support missions in 1943; by 1945 that number was up to 6,512.

    As an aside, one might note that the first VF(N) squadrons deployed to combat operated F4U-2s, the early night fighter version. Eventually, though, in the carrier world, the F6F took over the role in both regular VF day squadrons and in dedicated night, VF(N), squadrons. If one were look at the inventories of the NACTULant and NACTUPac activities, one would find that the airplane in which night fighter pilots were being trained was the F6F . . . a function of mid-late war availability . . . which translated to the F6Fs use as the go-to night fighter for carrier operations, not that it was particularly better, other than the design’s better inherent stability, than the F4U-2, just that there were, quite simply, more of them.

    Anyway, looking at bombing operations for carrier based F6Fs and F4Us, most of which occurred in the last year of the war, we can draw some comparisons which could be more enlightening on the subject. First of all we can observe the progression of F4U squadrons being assigned to carriers and their noted action sorties (an action sortie is defined by the USN as one in which contact is made with enemy forces and includes the entire basic element, be it a section or a division, even if only one aircraft in the element makes contact. Starting in January 1945, F4U squadrons assigned to carriers and their total action sorties:

    January - 2 squadrons, 131 action sorties
    February - 9 squadrons, 652 action sorties
    March -17 squadrons, 2,274 action sorties
    April - 11 squadrons, 1,916 action sorties
    May - 10 squadrons, 1,021 action sorties
    June - 8 squadrons, 520 action sorties
    July - 11 squadrons, 2,012 action sorties
    August -11 squadrons, 1,047 action sorties

    During the same period, we can observe F6F carrier based squadrons and their action sorties:

    January - 13 squadrons, 4,482 action sorties
    February - 20 squadrons, 2,465 action sorties
    March - 19 squadrons, 3,853 action sorties
    April - 20 squadrons, 5,652 action sorties
    May - 22 squadrons, 3,583 action sorties
    June - 18 squadrons, 1,425 action sorties
    July - 18 squadrons, 3,473 action sorties
    August - 18 squadrons, 1,789 action sorties

    So we can then see the ratios of F4U squadrons to F6F squadrons and their corresponding ratios of action sorties:

    January - 1 : 6.5 F4U squadrons to F6F squadrons; 1 : 34.2 F4U action sorties to F6F sorties
    February - 1 : 2.2 F4U squadrons to F6F squadrons; 1 : 3.8 F4U action sorties to F6F sorties
    March - 1 : 1.1 F4U squadrons to F6F squadrons; 1 : 1.7 F4U action sorties to F6F sorties
    April - 1 : 1.8 F4U squadrons to F6F squadrons; 1 : 2.9 F4U action sorties to F6F sorties
    May - 1 : 2.2 F4U squadrons to F6F squadrons; 1 : 3.5 F4U action sorties to F6F sorties
    June - 1 : 2.3 F4U squadrons to F6F squadrons; 1 : 2.7 F4U action sorties to F6F sorties
    July - 1 : 1.6 F4U squadrons to F6F squadrons; 1 : 1.7 F4U action sorties to F6F sorties
    August - 1 : 1.6 F4U squadrons to F6F squadrons; 1 : 1.7 F4U action sorties to F6F sorties

    So, on average, there were 1.9 F6F squadrons operating from carriers in the Fast Carrier Task Force for every F4U squadron and these F6F squadrons flew 2.75 action sorties for every F4U action sortie.

    Hold that thought . . .

    When we talk about using a fighter for bombing missions, be they CAS, flak suppression, or specific targets, what becomes of immediate concern is the aircrafts’ survivability in the face of ground fire. There is enough available data to compare these two aircraft types and, especially, in their employment from the fast carriers in the period during which they were operating together in numbers, the last eight months of the war, and we can, as well, compare that data to land-based results. The results of carrier-based operations becomes the ruler of measurement as the squadrons involved were tasked with similar targets at near the same rate, with similar levels of resistance and, most important, similar levels of pilot competency. Essentially this environment allows for an examination in relatively homogeneous circumstances.

    Carrier based fighters during this period (January thru August 1945) flew 29,958 action sorties attacking targets on the surface, either on land or at sea, the air-to-ground attack. Most of these were flown by the carriers of the Fast Carrier Task Groups, where most of the squadrons involved were Navy VF or VBF, and of these sorties, 22,230, or 74.5%, were made in the face of enemy antiaircraft return fire. Breaking these sorties down by type, the results are:

    Overall:
    Air to ground sorties: 29,958 (82.5% of all VF/VBF action sorties)
    Sortie w/AA present: 22,320 (74.5%)
    Total aircraft hit: 1,249
    Total aircraft lost: 370
    Aircraft hit per sortie w/AA present: 0.056
    Loss rate per action sortie w/AA present: 0.017
    Action sortie w/AA present per loss: 60.32
    Percent aircraft lost of those hit: 29.6%

    And for the F4U:
    Air to ground sorties: 7,993 (83.5% of all F4U sorties)
    Sortie w/AA present: 5,982 (74.8%)
    Total aircraft hit: 338
    Total aircraft lost: 137
    Aircraft hit per sortie w/AA present: 0.057
    Loss rate per action sortie w/AA present: 0.023
    Action sortie w/AA present per loss: 43.66
    Percent aircraft lost of those hit: 40.5%

    The same data for the F6F:
    Air to ground sorties: 21,965 (82.2% of all F6F sorties)
    Sortie w/AA present: 16,338 (74.4%)
    Total aircraft hit: 911
    Total aircraft lost: 233
    Aircraft hit per sortie w/AA present: 0.056
    Loss rate per action sortie w/AA present: .014
    Action sortie w/AA present per loss: 70.12
    Percent aircraft lost of those hit: 25.6%

    We can see that the F4Us and the F6Fs involved in these missions were being hit at just about the same rate per sortie with AA present, 0.057 for the F4U and 0.056 for the F6F (lower is better); or, to look at it the other way, a given F4U could be expected to be hit at least once every 17.70 sorties and a given F6F, every 17.93 sorties (higher is better). Where the rubber meets the road, though, is the rate at which one might expect a type to be lost, not just hit. F4Us were lost at a rate of 0.023 per sortie with AA present, F6Fs, on the other hand, were lost at a rate of 0.014 per sortie (remember, less is better). In terms of sorties per loss, then a given F4U might be expected to be lost to AA every 43.66 sorties as opposed to the F6F rate of 70.12 (again, higher is better).

    What is really an eye opener are the losses versus total aircraft hit by AA. Overall, as shown, one might expect about 29.6% of aircraft hit by AA to be lost, but that translates to 40.5% of F4Us hit going down versus 25.6% of F6Fs. This would seem to indicate a basic superiority in robust protection inherent in the F6F flying the same type missions – and, as we can see, quite a few more of those missions thus more opportunity for bad things to happen – than the F4U. If we go back and look at the data on squadrons in action during the time period, we can see, even at casual glance, when comparing the numbers of action sorties the data holds in terms of the ratio of F6F action sorties to F4U, with about 2.75 F6F sorties for every F4U sortie.

    I admit to leading you all to this conclusion, rather than just baldly stating it. The USN, in its analysis of the situation, draws exactly this same conclusion, probably through the same examination of the data:

    “The F6F appears to have had considerable advantage over the F4U when flown under the same conditions. Receiving about the same number of hits per sortie in comparable operations, the F6F had a far lower rate of loss per plane hit.” (See Naval Aviation Combat Statistics – World War II, OpNav-P-23V No. A129.)

    This same document also provides a summary table for combat lost rates per 100 sorties which notes that F6Fs operating from CVs & CVLs had a lost rate of 0.87 per 100 action sorties and from CVEs a rate of 0.83. The rate for F4Us operating from CVs & CVLs per 100 action sorties was 1.46 and from CVEs 0.90. (The big winner in the loss rate per 100 action sorties was the ubiquitous FM-2, operating solely from CVEs with a rate of 0.40.)

    As somewhat of a data validity check, what about ordnance delivery during these eight months? Overall, VFs and VBFs in the Fast Carrier Task Force delivered roughly 7,313 ton of bombs, 3082 were delivered by F6Fs, 1,231 by F4Us. The F6F, then, in going back to the calculated 2.75 more sorties than the F4U, delivered 2.50 times the bomb tonnage. F4Us launched 22,107 rockets at targets, F6Fs, 44,718, or 2.02 times the number launched by F4Us. And last, but not least, rounds of ammunition: F6Fs expended some 12,796,000 rounds of .50 cal. while F4Us expended 4,688,000; that’s 2.73 time more rounds from F6Fs than F4Us. These ratios, 2.50, 2.02, and 2.73 are below the 2.75 sortie ratio and would indicate that the results of the analysis hold true. Oh, and just to be honest, in terms of 20 mm rounds expended, the F6Fs expended 7,000 rounds and the F4Us expended 135,000, the only place where the F4U comes out ahead on expenditures.

    Looking into ordnance deliveries a little more for the 8 months of 1945, unfortunately, the data does not allow the separation of Fast Carrier Task Force (the CVs and CVLs) results from the CVE results. One will just have to bear in mind that the majority of F4Us on CVEs were USMC VMFs and the F6Fs on CVEs could be either USN VFs or USMC VMFs. Anyway, the USN thoughtfully has provided a breakdown of ordnance dropped by the various types in use in 1945. The results for the F6Fs and F4Us from all carriers, including the CVEs, are below.

    Format is Ordnance type || Tonnage || % for Aircraft Type || % F6F & F4U combined tonnage.

    For the F6F:
    100 - lbs GP || 33 || 0.9% || 91.7%
    250 - lbs GP @ || 97 || 2.6% || 89.0%
    500 - lbs GP || 2,402 || 65.1% || 72.9%
    1000 - lbs GP || 455 || 12.3% || 66.8%
    500 - lbs SAP || 12 || 0.3% || 100.0%
    1000 - lbs SAP || 7 || 0.2% || 100.0%
    Armor Piercing || 1 || 0.0% || 100.0%
    Napalm (Tank) || 373 || 10.1% || 75.8%
    Other Incendiary || 2 || 0.1% || 40.0%
    Fragmentation || 300 || 8.1% || 84.5%
    Depth Bombs || 7 || 0.2% || 87.5%
    TOTAL || 3,689 || 100.0% || 73.8%

    For the F4U
    100 - lbs GP || 3 || 0.2% || 8.3%
    250 - lbs GP @ || 12 || 0.9% || 11.0%
    500 - lbs GP || 893 || 68.1% || 27.1%
    1000 - lbs GP || 226 || 17.2% || 33.2%
    500 - lbs SAP || 0 || 0.0% || 0.0%
    1000 - lbs SAP || 0 || 0.0% || 0.0%
    Armor Piercing || 0 || 0.0% || 0.0%
    Napalm (Tank) || 119 || 9.1% || 24.2%
    Other Incendiary || 3 || 0.2% || 60.0%
    Fragmentation || 55 || 4.2% || 15.5%
    Depth Bombs || 1 || 0.1% || 12.5%
    TOTAL || 1,312 || 100.0% || 26.2%

    Again, and especially through this break down, we can see that F6Fs were delivering approximately 2.8 times the ordnance as the F4U. Not that the totals themselves are particularly significant, just that the tonnage trend follows the action sortie rate noted above, just about what one might expect . . . F6Fs, flying 2.75 times the number of action sorties as the F4Us, delivered overall, 2.8 times the dropped ordnance. Interestingly, and right along with the findings, standing out like a sore thumb, take a look at the 500 lbs GP . . . this was the most common bomb dropped by USN carrier aircraft in the war at 21,623 tons or 47.95% of the war effort. In this data for carrier operations in 1945, we can see that the F6Fs, with their 2.75 sortie rate dropped 2.69 times the number of 500 lbs GPs as did the F4U. All seems to be rather consistent, and when you look at the ratios of F4U to F6F squadrons in action and the ratio of action sorties flown by the types, the disparity in their air-to-air scores apparently follows the same pattern.

    R
     
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  17. lwd

    lwd Ace

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    On the otherhand does the fact that the F6F's had more time on carriers at that point suggest an experiance advantage that might unbalance the comparison? Also are night fighter kills included in this? If so how many for each plane? Were the mission profiles the same or was there a tendency for one to be used as a fighter bomber more than the other?
     
  18. AE1TW

    AE1TW New Member

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    First I'd like to say that both aircraft do have their share of Zeros and Bettys shot down during the war. However from what most do not know is the Corsair was mostly a land based aircraft. Do to a design problem pilots had a great difficulty seeing in front and low thanks to the long nose on the plane. Because of that it was a big hazard on Carrier landings. That's why the F6F Hellcat became into being in the first place. and the Navy gave most of it's stock in the F4U Corsairs to the Marines that used them based on the Islands thru out the Pacific. Now as far as the Navy's 11 to 1 kills against zeros was done in Hellcats not so much in the Corsairs cause the Marines used them and their 11 to 1 kills also improved both services used the F4F WildCat before their replacements. With the bigger engine in both planes they could out climb the zero with all their armor and weapons to boot. And as later in the War it got the better the improvements got on the planes did as well.
     
  19. AE1TW

    AE1TW New Member

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    Good question. I'd have to say the F6F's record stands on it's own as does the F4U and the later F2G I myself am glad we had them. and especially the men that flew them as well. You also have to figure in this as well what most forget. We kept getting better killing zeros and when they lost their experienced pilots they had rookies to replace them with. This also may have been why the big leap in ratios as well. There is many factors in war people tend to forget. That is the human equation.
     
  20. Dave55

    Dave55 Member

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    Welcome to the forum.

    There is a lot of info on these planes in various threads here although sometimes it is in posts that have strayed from the title of a thread.

    I suspect there will be a lot more info coming shortly.
     

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