Good Evening and Welcome once again..... Submarine operations from a Soviet perspective make for an exercise in frustration. Numbers counted for little, and the Soviets found their operational conditions were bad. But, so were British operations difficult in the Mediterranean, and their acknowleged expertise and training made their contribution worthwhile..... The Soviets can make no such claim..... Why?......Read this. Read it and weep.......... :arrow:RED BANNER FLEET: Soviet Operations in World War Two................By Carl O. Shuster.....expansions in blue and white by B5N2Kate The Soviet Navy entered WW2 with the largest submarine force in the World, numbering over 168 boats. Over 2/3 of that force was stationed in European waters, and most of the vessels were less than ten years old. Moreover, they consisted of modern designs heavily influenced by German assistance dating back to the early 1920s, and the salvage of a British submarine sunk in 1919. Nonetheless, Soviet submarines suffered from high noise levels and poor crew training. Their dictator's ambitious fleet construction program had called for 341 submarines to be built between 1934 and 1943. By the time of the German invasion, the USSR had 215 subs in service and another 100 undergoing sea trials or in various stages of construction. That was an impressive industrial performance by any standard, but it was also one that had strained the fledgling Soviet ship-building industry to it's limits. Construction was spread among eight shipyards and centered around five classes - ranging from small coastal units to large Kreyser (Cruiser) or K-Class boats. Manning the submarines also became a problem when over 2/3 of the senior officers were purged. Theoretically, every submarine commander was a graduate of a Soviet naval academy and had served four or five years in various positions on several submarines. But the purges and the rapid growth of the sub force made maintaining that standard impossible. Shortcuts were therefore taken. Officers were drafted out of the merchant marine, given a quick course on submarines, and spent one tour as an executive officer. Those who "qualified" were given command. This new process virtually guaranteed a limited experience level, and the Soviet command attempted to compensate for it by assigning a staff "rider" to go out with the new commanders (COs) on their first cruises and periodically thereafter. They also established restrictive rules on diving and the conduct of attacks, probably in the hope of preventing the CO from attempting more than his crew could handle. .....There is, in fact, another dimension to this that Mr. Shuster does not mention. Stalin's distrust of Naval officers was well known, and they were some of the most closely scrutinized in the entire Soviet military forces. This was a political holdover from the revolt in 1905 of the Czarist Battleship "Potemkin". Naval officers were seen to have the most independance of mind, a product of their training and conditioning for life at sea. During the purge, the Navy was the only service to lose every one of it's top office holders (8 from 8 Admirals). The role of the Imperial German fleet in the 1918 mutinies was remembered as well; the regime's utter distrust of Naval officers severely handicapped the selection of their replacements. A lesson the Soviets had not learned was that you simply cannot "mass-produce" this kind of trained man. Staff "riders" had more political overtones than most would like to admit, but had to take a backseat to the Captain's role as tactical co-ordinator of the submarine as a weapons system, making their job all the more sinister in conception. A submarine does not lend itself to having more than one person in charge. The Russian language has two words for education; OBRAZOVNIE, meaning "instruction", and VOSPITANIE. The first refers to the conveyance of knowledge, but the second refers to "upbringing". The entire Soviet regime was dedicated to VOSPITANIE, in the sense that all institutions of the state, from trade unions to the armed services, had as one of their principle missions to instill in the citizens the "spirit of Communism". And of course, Naval officers were in the best position to defect to the west, and submarine officers in particular, due to the secrecy surrounding all aspects of the "silent service". These staff "riders" were in the position to conform to "vospitanie", as much as they were to assist with "obrazovanie". Stalin, too, had shown very little interest in Naval affairs, and probably made the avoidable error of assuming that numbers of submarines could make up for deficiencies in experience and technological inferiority. This is demonstrated as late as December 1944, in his discussions with CinC Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov pertaining to Baltic Fleet operations. Stalin was still under the impression that sheer numbers could compensate for other deficiencies, dismissing Kuznetsov's learned protests concerning difficulties in operational conduct by saying, "I have given you a submarine fleet second to none. Now use it to it's full potential." Combat gave the Soviets an intensive training crucible which eventually provided them a cadre of experienced COs by late 1944. Until that time, however, their submarine losses were far out of proportion to the results achieved. About a third (55 units) of the submarine fleet was stationed in the Baltic on 1 September 1939. Despite having the pick of the best submarines and crews, the Baltic Fleet Submarine Force failed to execute it's very first wartime mission: the covert sinking of the Soviet tanker 'Metallist' to provide a propaganda justification for Moscow's attack on Poland. The Submarine SHCH-303 missed :mrgreen: , and the tanker had to be sunk instead by a Soviet torpedo boat! It was an inauspicious beginning, and the Reds' submarines failed to improve at all by the start of the "Winter War" with Finland later that same year. During the war, Soviet submarines, usually operating in pairs, gave their positions away by frequent communications and managed to sink only one Finnish merchant ship, two neutrals, and a few small coastal craft. ....This was not assisted at all by inefficient torpedoes that exploded prematurely or not at all, or simply running wild. Cold waters are more saline and cause problems with correct 'run' of depth, torpedo performance characteristics, and with submarine buoyancy itself. Hydrophone listening devices were crude in comparison with British and German systems, and their engines were quite noisy, always the biggest concern of submarines even today. This state of affairs was made worse by the constant drain of technicians for service in the Red Army. The Soviets themselves recognized their faults, but the continued expansion of the fleet precluded their doing much about it. In addition to new construction, they had aquired four subs from the Baltic countries when they were occupied by the Red Army in 1940. Another problem was the overriding priority given to new construction. This meant repairs and routine maintenence on those boats already in service suffered. The German invasion caught the Baltic Fleet with 69 operational submarines, 34 undergoing sea trials or fitting out, and another 22 under construction. Of all those boats only 37 were actually combat ready, and 10 of them were on patrol. Submarine losses to the Germans' attacks were immediate and heavy. At least 12 boats were sunk by 29 June, one week after the invasion began. Other units had to be scuttled when German ground forces approached their bases. By September, the Baltic fleet was blockaded within it's bases and incomplete units had to be evacuated to the Northern and Black Sea Fleets via the Russian river and canal system. The Germans used the time to lay multiple minefields in the gulf of finland to contain what was left of the Soviet submarine threat. The two other western Soviet fleets initially fared better. Their bases were out of German bomber range and there was time to evacuate most non-operational units before Axis ground forces approached. The black Sea and Northern Fleets had 47 and 15 operational submarines, respectively. on June 22nd 1941. Niether fleet made contact with Axis forces until mid-July, and the resulting actions were inconclusive. Soviet losses in the Black Sea were confined to 4 units abandoned in the newly built Nikolayev shipyard east of Odessa. The Northern Fleet suffered no casualties at all, but also failed to inflict any on the invaders, even after receiving 6 new units from the Baltic by early autumn. Despite the reinforcements, neither of those fleets gained any important successes in 1941. The leadership in Moscow knew Germany's naval vulnerbilities. The Germans had extensive sea lines of communications passing through all three soviet fleet areas. In the Arctic, the poor road network forced them to transfer supplies by sea. The Germans also received 75% of their iron ore from Sweden, and all of that came by sea, by way of the Baltic, eight months of the year, and by way of Narvik (Norway) during the cold winter months. Army Group South's received a large portion of it's supplies via coastal convoys emanating from the Danube River. The Arctic offered the most open ocean, and therefore seemingly provided the best opportunities for the Reds to prey on German shipping. But the harsh climate limited the northern Fleet's operations. Units often operated under conditions of restricted visability, and stormy weather many times precluded any sorties at all. Also, the Soviets had only primative facilities to support their forces in the far north. Moreover, the entire North Cape area is peppered with narrow and deep fijords which the Germans effectively sealed with mines. Thus, the Germans' coastal convoys moved from protected fijord to protected fijord, which both complicated the Soviet targeting problem and limited the areas from which they could attack. ...Soviet problems in the North Cape were in no way assisted by insufficient air-recon, a product not only of the primitive facilities, but also a shortage of aircraft slated for this role, drawn away to the south by the desperate battles in the Ukraine. Soviet photo-recon was also un-sophisticated, with the few air-missions devoted to this task relying on eye-contact, a factor not assisted by the weather, or the complete lack of suitable aircraft types for this purpose (flying boats were needed, with the long range to stay in contact, and the multiple crew to provide many pairs of eyes for this tedious work). Still, the Soviets attempted to maintain a continuous presence off the main German port of Petsamo, and throughout the North Cape area. They even provided a base at Polyarny for 5 Royal Navy submarines. ..This co-operation demonstrates just how ineffective Soviet sorties were, and how desperate they became to achieve positive results against the multitude of targets on offer. Other forms of Allied co-operation were consistantly shunned, Lend-Lease being a notable exception. The Soviets were notoriously touchy about foreign military presence within their borders. Real offensive opportunities, though, remained scarce until 1944. Even then, the Soviets inflicted only light losses on the Germans, sinking only a few merchant ships and damaging nothing larger than a sub chaser. The Baltic Fleet also had problems. Though Germany annually recieved almost 8 million tons of iron-ore via Baltic shipping lanes, the Soviets' only access to these routes, after August 1941, was through the narrow gulf of Finland - and the Axis controlled both of it's shores. By October, the Axis navies had the eastern half of the Gulf sealed with nearly 2,000 mines. A second, more extensive anti-submarine net barrier was laid at the western mouth of the Gulf between March and May of 1942. Finnish and German submarines, aircraft, fast patrol boats and ASW units patrolled the area. ...Problems here were made worse by the nature of the minefields themselves. Consisting principly of contact mines, efforts to explode these fields by magnetic-field-detonation from the air (as practiced by the British to beat the magnetic-mine) were therefore quite pointless. Further, the Soviet surface navy played little or no role in attempting to sweep these lanes clear, a product not only of a lack of air-superiority, but a general lack of craft for the purpose. The Navy's sortie rate for it's surface ships of all types was dismal to say the least....they simply did not dare to venture out. Soviet Baltic Fleet submarines therefore had to sail a 200 nautical mile gauntlet before even reaching Germany's sea lanes, and the Baltic submarine campaign was marked by extensive small unit actions as the Soviets tried to break through in groups. The barriers remained a severe impediment to submarine operations until Finland left the war in September 1944, and the entire network was dismantled. As a result, the Baltic Fleet enjoyed most of it's submarine successes in the final half-year of the war. The Black Sea Fleet faced a different set of problems. It had few targets in the first six months of the war. Once Sevastopol fell, the Axis sea lines extended out to the eastern end of the Crimea. At the same time, however, that city's fall also forced the Black Sea Fleet to stage it's ships out of the small cities of Poti and Taupse in the eastern Black Sea. Logistical facilities were limited ther, but at least there were no choke points between the bases and their target areas. Still, the Black Sea Fleet submarines had a difficult time attacking Axis shipping. Most of it consisted of small freighters and barges, which operated in the shallow waters close to the shore. The 50-fathom curve extended out some 35 nautical miles from the western Black Sea coast, and the Axis navies laid nearly 8,000 mines in that shallow zone. They also concentrated their convoys into large formations protected by heavy escort groups. The relatively short transit distances between ports further limited the convoy's exposure to sub attack and enabled the Germans to restrict movement to the daylight hours when they could employ support aircraft. Finally, the Germans relied on shallow draft vessels which were generally not suitable targets for torpedo attack, while the size of the escorts and Luftwaffe air supremacy precluded surface attacks, except at night. The German Air Force was a powerful deterrent to submarine attacks, and remained so until the Soviets finally gained air superiority in June 1944. But just as in the Baltic, the Soviets actually lost more submarines to mines than any other single cause. ....The Black Sea Fleet was probably hamstrung by the other operations of the Soviet Surface Navy being given priority for scarce resources in this region. The surface navy seemed ready and willing to mount several large scale troop landing operations and evacuations (Sevastopol and the Taman peninsula are but two examples), even with the admittedly large presence of minefields. Lack of reinforcements hamstrung operations here, and poor repair facilities and little or no air cover combined to make Black Sea operations timid and sparse. Again, lack of purpose built or converted minesweepers played it's role here, and the limited exposure time of German surface operations meant that intelligence gathered on German shipping movements was stale and unuseable by the time it was acted upon In sum, the Soviet submarine force conducted it's campaigns in environments of severe logistical, personnel and operational difficulties. It faced those difficulties with great determination and often proved innovative in finding solutions to it's problems. Despite having all but two of their shipyards overrun by German forces, the Soviets went on to produce 57 new submarines during the war, as well as repairing damage to more than 30 others. Submarine production was centered around 5 basic types: the K, L, SHCH, S, and M classes, (see table below). Refinements were added to the new units and improvements made on boats entering the yards for repairs. Interestingly, the M class was built in Gorky, southeast of Moscow, then transported in sections along the inland river-canal system, to either Leningrad or Severodvinsk (near Archangel) for final assembly. Units destined for the Black Sea were dispatched, again on the river-canal system, to the Sea of Azov. Two experimental submarines were launched during the war, but only one was actually completed, the M-401. It used a closed cycle diesel for propulsion, and was tested sucessfully in the Caspian Sea, but never saw operational service. A submerged stabilization system, to enable a sub to "hover" at a given depth, was also tested during the war and used operationally in 1944. Other improvements noted on Soviet submarines during the war included quieter engines, better hydrophones and sonar. Despite testing a primative "snorkel" device before the war, the Soviets did not pursue dvelopment of it, and waited instead until after 1945 to install a copy of the German "Schnorkel" on their own units. The Soviets also used their submarines to land agents and raiding parties, conduct intelligence collection, and for minelaying. Though the Soviet submarine force achieved only limited results during the war (Table below), their crews pressed home their attacks in the face of heavy losses and often overwhelming odds. They got better as the war progressed and tried incresingly complex tactics involving cooperation with surface units, fast patrol boats, and even aircraft. They also increasingly conducted their attacks "accoustically", relying on sonar and hydrophones, instead of the periscope, to target their torpedoes. Though these new tactics were generally ineffective, they did cut losses and did cause the Germans much concern in the final days of the war. Despite it's problems, losses and lack of recognized success, the Soviet submarine force drew German naval resources away from other theaters and other tasks, provided intelligence support to Red Army commanders, and facilitated that army's campaign against the German rear in the far north and along the Baltic coast. In those respects, the Soviet submarine campaign was successful. As a final note, the Soviets' Pacific Fleet submarines saw no action during the war. The Pacific Fleet had only been re-established in 1935, but it had the largest submarine contingent by 1939. Five of it's units transferred to the Northern Fleet in 1942-43 and returned after the war. By the time Moscow declared war on Japan in August 1945, there was virtually no Japanese shipping left to attack. Nonetheless, at least two Soviet submarines were lost in the Pacific. One, the L-16, was mistakenly sunk by the Japanese submarine I-25, as it cruised off the U.S. west coast en'route to the Northern Fleet via the Panama Canal. The other was lost in either Japanese or American minefields near Hokkaido. SOVIET SUBMARINE ORDER OF BATTLE BY FLEET: :arrow: ...............................................1 SEP 1939...................22 JUNE 1941 BALTIC FLEET: A Class...........................................0...................................0 B Class...........................................5...................................1 D Class...........................................3...................................1 K Class.......................................1 (+10)..........................4 (+5) L Class.......................................3 (+3)............................3 (+3) M Class....................................16 (+7)..........................21 (+23) P Class...........................................3...................................3 S Class.......................................6 (+6)..........................11 (+5) SHCH Class..............................17 (+11).........................20 (+13) Foreign Built...................................1...................................5** Sub Tenders....................................4...................................4 Submarine Salvage Ships..................1...................................1 Total Subs................................55 (+37).........................69 (+49) Total Support Ships..........................5...................................5 BLACK SEA FLEET: A Class...........................................5...................................5 D Class..........................................3...................................3 L Class........................................1 (+3)..........................3 (+3) M Class.......................................6 (+13)...........................14 S Class........................................0 (+5)..........................4 (+2) SHCH Class..................................8 (+6)........................15 (+3) Sub Tenders...................................2...................................2 Total Subs..................................23 (+27)......................44 (+8) Total Support Ships.........................2...................................2 NORTHERN FLEET: D Class..........................................1...................................1 K Class..........................................2...................................2 M Class.........................................6................................6 (+3) SHCH Class...................................5...................................6 Sub Tenders..................................1...................................1 Total Subs...................................14...............................15 (+3) Total Support Ships........................1...................................1 PACIFIC FLEET: L Class......................................6 (+7)..............................13 M Class.......................................37..................................37 S Class......................................0 (+6)...........................2 (+4) SHCH Class..............................33 (+3).........................35 (+3) Sub Tenders.................................2....................................3 Total Subs................................76 (+16).......................87 (+7) Total Support Ships...................... 2....................................3 TOTAL SOVIET SUBMARINES.........168.................................215 Notes: Numbers in parentheses indicate number of submarines under construction, fitting out, or in sea trials within a fleet area. Construction totals in the table don't match those in the text because many M Class units were built in the Gorky and Sverdlorsk shipyards and thus were not located in any fleet area. Shipyards in the Northern Fleet area were newly completed in late 1940, and could only be used for final assembly. ** = Foreign submarines included one British and four Baltic country's boats. The British sub L-55 was sunk by a Soviet destroyer in 1919, then recovered by the Reds in 1928, refurbished and recomissioned in 1931. The Soviets also seized two submarines from Estonia and Latvia when they occupied those countries in August 1940. RED BANNER FLEET SUCCESSES: olice: YEAR..............BALTIC...........NORTH.........BLACK SEA......PACIFIC 1939................0-0.................NA..................NA..................0* 1940..............1/703...............0....................0....................NA 1941..............2/4,067.........5/7,199.........5/15,845............NA 1942............19/40,146......10/19,020...... 9/11,526............NA 1943............... **...........14/26,169.....15/30,168...............NA 1944............12/20,969.......7/15,819.......5/6,858..............NA 1945......***15/67,504..........NA...................NA............4/unknown TOTALS........48/132,686.....36/68,207.....34/64,847......4/unknown Total Axis Losses: 122 ships comprising 265,740 Gross Registered Tons. NOTES: #/# = Number of ships / Gross Registered Tons * = Although Japan and the Soviet Union fought along the Chinese Mongolian border in September 1939, there were no naval actions. ** = Operations were suspended as a result of heavy losses due to the effectiveness of Finno-German ASW minefield/barriers in Gulf of Finland. *** = The loss of a single German Liner "Wilhelm Gustlav" on 30/01/45 represented 25,484 GRT of this total. Ten ships ("Wilhelm Gustlav", and 4 ships of no recorded tonnage, probably because they were fishing smacks for a wartime total of 52,144 Grt) were credited to the top scorer of the Red Banner Fleet , Captain Third Class ALEXANDER MARISENKO (Sub S-13), who had been operating since the German invasion in June, 1941. RED BANNER FLEET LOSSES: :tinysmile_angry2_t: YEAR.............BALTIC..............NORTHERN..........BLACK.........PACIFIC 1939..................0..........................1....................0..................0 1940..................1..........................1....................0..................0 1941................29..........................0..................12..................0 1942................16........................10..................11..................1 1943.................5.........................10...................4..................0 1944.................1..........................6....................4..................0 1945.................1..........................0....................0..................1 TOTALS............53.........................28..................31.................2 BASELINE NUMBER + CONSTRUCTION: Units aquired from foreign sources.............................................4 New construction, (1 Sept.'39 - 22 June '41)..............................39 New construction after 22 June, 1941........................................57 Foreign Aquisitions (1944)........................................................4 Total Additions(1 Sept.'39 - 9 Aug,'45)....................................100 Units in commission 1 Sept.'39...............................................168 Total Subs commissioned during war.......................................272 DELETIONS: Decommissionings (1 Sept,'39 - 22 June,'41)..............................4 Total war losses....................................................................114 Units in commission 9th August, 1945.....................................154 % Combat force lost in combat/accidents..............................41% Note: Of the nations participating in WW2, only Germany suffered a higher loss rate in it's submarine force.....:tinysmile_cry_t4: SUBMARINE DATA BY CLASS SOVIET BUILT CLASSES: A CLASS: ...................................A1-5 Commissioned 1921-28. Speed..................................12kts surfaced/8 kts submerged. Displacement.............356 tons surfaced/453 tons submerged. Armament...........4x4.5cm torpedo tubes,4 torpedos, 1x45mm gun, 1xMG. Range.............1,500nm surfaced 7 kts/80nm submerged 3kts. Crew..........22 Refurbished and recommissioned after the Russian Civil War. Stationed in Baltic Fleet. 3 lost during war. Survivors discarded 1945. B CLASS:...................B2, B4-6, B7, B8 Commissioned 1915-16. Speed................................11.4kts surfaced/9kts submerged. Displacement.............664 tons surfaced/753 tons submerged. Armament......4x53.3cm tubes, 6 torpedoes, 2x76mm guns, 1x45mm gun Range..............3,700nm surfaced 7kts/60nm submerged 3kts. Crew............25 Boats in this class discarded in 1940. THE B-1 MYSTERY: B-1 is not listed, and boats were meant to have been "discarded" in 1940. BUT, B-1 turns up in the Arctic, where on 27 July 1944 it was sunk in error by RAF aircraft with the loss of all hands. This could mean one of two things. Either, Russian records concerning submarines are incomplete or unreliable, OR, the B-1 was on a "clandestine" mission, and was not where it was supposed to be, hence the reason it was sunk by RAF aircraft. The Russians did not waste war material as valuable as submarines, so it is suggested that the B-class were used for covert operations. D CLASS:...................................D1-5 Commissioned 1930-31. Speed................................15kts surfaced/8.4kts submerged. Displacement..........920 tons surfaced/1,318 tons submerged. Armament.....8x53.3cm (6 tubes forward, 4 aft), 10 torpedoes, 1x102mm gun, 1 or 2 45mm gun(s), 2 mine tubes (8 mines). Range............7,000nm surfaced 9kts/105nm submerged 4kts. Crew..........60 Served in all three western fleets. D1 sunk in training accident (flooded by human error), 1940. D2 damaged by German bombs 11 August, '41, but was the only unit to survive the war. K CLASS:.............K1-3, K21-24, K51-56, commissioned 1940-42. Speed................................22.5kts surfaced/10kts submerged. Displacement.........1,480 tons surfaced/2,095 tons submerged. Armament......8x53.3cm tubes (4 forward/4 aft), 22 torpedoes, 2x100mmguns, 2x45mm guns, 2 mine tubes, 20 mines. Range............15,000nm surfaced 9kts/160nm submerged 3kts. Crew...........65 Served with Baltic and Northern Fleets. 5 units lost in action. L "Leninet" CLASS:..................L1-24 Commissioned 1933-42. Speed...................14kts surfaced/9kts submerged. Displacement.........L1 only1,040 tons surfaced/1,335 tons submerged....All others 1,200 tons surfaced/ 1,550 tons submerged. Armament...........6x53.3cm tubes (4 forward/2 aft), 12 torpedoes, 1x100mm gun, 1x45mm gun, 2 mine tubes, 14 mines. Range.........7,400nm 8kts surfaced,/154nm 3kts submerged. Crew..........54 L7-19 built and served in Pacific Fleet. L15 transferred to Northern Fleet via Panama Canal in 1942. Other 12 unit's construction divided equally between Baltic and Black Sea Fleets. Six units sunk in the war. L-16 sunk in error by Japanese sub I-25 off West coast, USA, 13 Oct, 1942. M CLASS:...M1-13, 15, 16, 18-28, 33-36, 46, 51-63, 71-83, 89, 90, 94-99, 101-108, 112-122 commissioned 1933-47. Speed..........................................14kts surfaced/8kts submerged. Displacement.....161 tons surfaced/202 tons submerged (1st & 2nd series, then 206 surfaced/258 submerged. Armament..............4x53.3cm tubes(2 forward/2 aft), 4 torpedoes, 1x45mm gun. Range........................................1,600nm 8kts/55nm 2kts (1st & 2nd series), then 3,440nm 9kts/107nm 3kts. Crew.......18 Assigned evenly between the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets. 35 units lost during the war. Survivors served into the mid 1950s. .........................................CONTINUED BELOW...............................
..........................................................RED BANNER FLEET CONTINUED................................................................ P "Pike" CLASS:.........P1-4 Commissioned 1936-37. Speed............18.8kts surfaced/7.7kts submerged. Displacement.........955 tons surfaced/1,671 tons submerged. Armament.............6x53.3cm tubes (4 forward/2 aft), 10 torpedoes, 2x100mm guns, 1x45mm gun. Range...........5,750nm 10.7kts surfaced/105nm 4kts submerged. Crew............54 All assigned to Baltic Fleet and used primarily as supply boats. All lost in war, but P2 & P3 were recovered post-war and served into the mid-1950s. P.402a lost (38 crew killed),21 Sept, 1944 when accidently bombed by Russian aircraft in the Barents Sea. S "Stalinet" CLASS:........S1-16, 19, 31-38, 51-58, 101-104 Commissioned 1936-45. Speed....................................19.5kts surfaced/ 9kts submerged. Displacement......................840 tons surfaced/1,070 submerged. Armament........6x53.3cm tubes (4 forward/2 aft), 12 torpedoes, 1x100mm and 1x45mm guns. Range..............9,800nm 10 kts surfaced/148nm 3kts submerged. Crew..............50 Served with all Fleets. 15 were lost during the war, S-2 sunk by accident (no known cause), 3 Jan, 1940. Survivors served to late 1950s. SHCH CLASS:.............SHCH 101-141, 201-216, 301-311, 317-320, 322-324, 401-411 Commissioned in 1935-44. Speed..................................11-14kts surfaced/8kts submerged. Displacement.................577 tons surfaced/702 tons submerged. Armament........6x53.3cm tubes, (4 forward/2 aft), 10 torpedoes, 1 or 2 45mm guns. Range................3,250nm 8kts surfaced/110nm 2kts submerged. Crew.........35 Assigned evenly amonst all Fleets. survivors served until mid-1950s. One Sh-Ch class boat sunk 24 July, 1939 off Murmansk in a collision, going down with all hands. It is listed as No. 424, but probably could be Sc-Ch 324, as this is the only serial number that comes close to fitting the bill. Soviet submarine records are unreliable. ** Non Russian speakers please note. Russian has a letter in it's alphabet pronounced "Sh-ch". To say it correctly, say the two word English phrase "fresh cheese", drop the "fre" from "fresh", and the "eese" from "cheese", and say again whats left over..."Sh-ch" FOREIGN BUILT SUBMARINES IN SOVIET SERVICE: :tinysmile_classes_t L-55:............................................................Commissioned 1931. Speed.......................................13,5kts surfaced/8kts submerged. Displacement........................954 tons surfaced/1,139 submerged. Armament.......6x53.3cm tubes (4 forward/2 aft), 12 torpedoes, 2x76mm guns. Range..................6,000nm 7 kts surfaced/100nm 3kts submerged. Crew.......36(? British submarine sunk by Soviets in 1919, recovered 1928, repaired and recommissioned. Served with Baltic fleet until decommissioned in late 1940. KALEV & LEMBIT:...........................................Commissioned 1941. Speed...................................13.5kts surfaced/8.5kts submerged. Displacement..................600 tons surfaced/820 tons submerged. Armament.........4x53.3cm tubes (all forward), 1x40mm gun, 20 mines. Range.................2,000nm 10kts surfaced/40nm 3kts submerged. Crew..........35(?) Built in Britain in 1935-36, taken over by Soviets 1940. Kalev was scuttled in Tallin in August '41. Lembit survived the war and was scrapped in the late 1940s. RONIS & SPIDOLA:.........................................Commissioned 1941. Speed......................................14kts surface/9.25kts submerged. Displacement...................390 tons surfaced/514 tons submerged. Armament..........6x45.7cm tubes (2 forward, 4 external, 2x2 trainable tubes), 1x76mm gun, 3 MGs. Range..................1,600nm 14kts surfaced/85nm 9kts submerged. Crew.........24(?) Built in France and delivered to Latvian Navy in 1926. Taken over by Soviets in 1940 and scuttled in 1941 to prevent capture by the Germans. Units were never employed in action. V-1:.............................................................Commissioned 1944. Speed.....................13.75kts surfaced/no figure given submerged. Displacement...................768 tons surfaced/990 tons submerged. Armament...........6x53.3cm tubes, 12 torpedoes, 1x3inch (76mm) gun. Range...................6,000nm 10kts surfaced/48nm 3kts submerged. Crew.......39 Ex-Royal Navy submarine, "Sunfish", originally commissioned 1935. Transferred to Soviet Navy in August 1944 as compensation for surrendered Italian tonnage turned over to Anglo-Americans. Served with Northern Fleet and returned to Royal Navy 1947. V2-4:..........................................................Commissioned 1944. Speed.......................................11.5kts surface/9kts submerged. Displacement..................630 tons surfaced/730 tons submerged. Armament..........4x53.3cm tubes (all forward), 8 torpedoes, 1x 3 inch (76mm) gun, 3x.303mm MGs. Range...................4,050nm 10kts surfaced/72nm 3kts submerged. Crew.............33 Ex-royal Navy "U" class submarines (ex-"Unbroken" V2, ex-"Unison" V3, ex-"Ursula" V4). Transferred to Soviet Navy in August 1944 as compensation for surrendered Italian tonnage turned over to Anglo-Americans. Units were returned to Royal Navy 1948. So there you have it. Once again, as always, comments, good bad or indifferent are most welcome, and if anyone has an appropriate picture they'd like to post, feel free! Meanwhile, ponder over the unfortunate fate of so many soviet submariners for so meager a return. See ya next time, and thanks for dropping in! MORO! (Cheers!)O0 B5N2Kate