Would the loss of both Enterprise and Hornet at Santa Cruz doom the Guadalcanal campaign?

Of course losing both our carriers would have been a huge blow, but would it have crippled our campaign at Guadalcanal?

 

that was in october, right? TAG commented that 90 days after the initial landings in august, things were pretty much hopeless for the japanese on the island. they already had a division of marines, 200 planes, a working harbor, a tank company, shore defense and AA defense guns, henderson field was being extended landwards out of the range of naval guns.

for you to reverse that, you'll probably have to isolate the island for more than a month, and then land an equal-sized force to dislodge the americans.

 

Enterprise didn't play a decisive role after Santa Cruz anyway. It was more the tin cans and the Cactus Air Force.

 

It depends on "if" the Japanese knew she was lost. Just her presence in the AO was a threat to IJN ships around Guadalcanal during daylight hours. IIRC, she reached New Caledonia on 30 October for repairs and was sent back to help defend Guadalcanal in early November with repair crews still aboard to aid in turning back renewed Japanese Naval attacks that became known as the 1st and 2d Naval Battles of Guadalcanal. Enterprises aircraft helped sink the crippled Hiei, and sank or damaged numerous other Japanese ships involved in shuttling Japanese reinforcements to the island or supporting the naval actions. No Enterprise and most of these ships and where applicable their troops and cargo would not have been lost.
Instead of Abe withdrawing (during the Oct 12-13 action) after Hiei was damaged, without the threat of carrier aircraft, he might not have decided to withdraw and if he had stayed the Kirishima, and the bulk of the bombardment force could have stayed and rendered Henderson Field inoperable while the damaged Hiei withdrew. With Henderson out of commission and no American air threat against their naval forces or aerial defense against Japanese air strikes, the Japanese could have resupplied and reinforced their troops on the island.

The Japanese 14"/45's had a range of 30,650 yards firing the HE round. That works out to about 17 and a half miles. The airfield was always in range of these guns.

Not saying Japan would have won, but an allied victory would probably have taken significantly longer and at a much higher cost.

 

^
as i understood it, they were building a new strip outside the range of the BB guns.

 

I was certain that the loss of Enterprise at Santa Cruz(alongside the sinking of Hornet as historically) would have had a negative impact at the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal for us, thank you for the confirmation Price.

 

It would have to be on another island, far away from Japanese waters.

 

I totally agree with Mac...the Japanese suffered catastrophic defeats at Bloody Ridge in Sep, and Maruyama's disaster in Oct......this strengthened the US position so much, they went on the offensive.....Cactus was an unsinkable carrier.....let's be reasonable and realistic here, ...some of the IJN carriers were heavily damaged at Santa Cruz with many plane and pilot losses....Henderson always came back operational......what about the IJN fuel supply?...if I'm not mistaken, they could not stay long around the Canal after the Santa Cruz battle.....while away, Henderson builds up
and Halsey, the fighter, had just taken command while Nimitz promised to give the Canal everything he had.

http://www.nettally.com/jrube/genjirou/genjiru2.htm here is a Japanese diary from September.....they were not doing well logistically back then.....what about B17s from Espiritu?? ....again, let's not make it sound like the Japanese would walk all over the place without interference....what could really be accomplished by the IJN? not what might happen in a computer game
and I will add, the US just had to defend, not attack ...making every aspect much simpler...

 

Sorry, but no.

Carney Field(Bomber 2) and Koli Field(Bomber 3) were constructed in the vicinity of Koli Point, some 15 miles east of Henderson Field & Lunga Point. But, they were still well within gun range of even off-shore destroyers, albeit that to bombard these airfields the enemy warships would have to travel that much deeper into Allied controlled seas.

That being said, Carney Field remained an Emergency field, until mid-1943, when it was expanded into a full-fledged bomber base. Koli Field was not completed until the beginning of June, 1943. Around this same time, a 3,000 foot * 300 foot crash strip was also completed.

 

True, but without the contribution of the "Big E" and her air groups at the naval battle of Guadalcanal, the Japanese might of had more success at bombarding Henderson field and landing supplies and reinforcements, giving the army sufficient strength to make a another major attack that might have bore fruit, not saying Enterprise' absence would guarantee a Japanese victory at Guadalcanal, but it would improve their chances.

 

Did the Japanese ever get a good idea on just how big the American force was there? From what I've read they significantly underestimated it. Given that I simply don't see them allocating enough ground troops. IJN assesement of damage inflicted on US carriers was off in many cases as well. Although usualy they overestimated the damage so they had to be wondering what carriers the US had at this point.

The first significant action I see Enterprise planes in after Santa Cruz is the sinking of the Hiei but she was in pretty bad shape even before she started getting hit by planes that day and only some of them were from the Enterprise. I don't think it's likely she makes it home. There's also the question of whether or not any of Enterprises planes could have made it to Guadalcanal if she was sunk. In any case the loss of the Kirishima seems likely and that's going to make the IJN think a bit as well. On the otherhand the transport run that night was savaged by Enterprises planes so there's a good chance more of them make it. I don't t hink it's enough to come close to turning the tide at that point though. It could even result in them trying to hang on longer and loosing even more ships and men.

 

Much of this is very debatable.

Henderson Airfield still remained the focus of Japanese naval attention, even with the USS Enterprise sunk, Henderson would still make any daylight naval runs to Guadalcanal a risky proposition. Indeed, all the early air attacks came from Henderson, and the majority of the total air attacks were by aircraft operating from Henderson.

The air attacks that resulted in sunk or damaged ships were almost always in concert with aircraft from Henderson. While several troopships were sunk by these combined forces, most of the troops carried were rescued by escorting destroyers. So, it remains an open question as to how effective the Enterprise's aircraft would have been on their own.

Abe's actions have always been open to question, especially, sending Kirishima away during the closing minutes of the battle. Nor did he bother to recall her until well into the morning of the 13th to return to assist the damaged Hiei. The bombardment of Henderson is also questionable...Even during the ferocious bombardment by Kongo & Haruna on October 13th, the runway was made operational within hours. So, Henderson would still prove a threat to the crippled Hiei.

 

I don't recall ever claiming the Japanese could "walk all over the place without interference". What I did say was, "Not saying Japan would have won, but an allied victory would probably have taken significantly longer and at a much higher cost."

I don't really think you understand how near a thing that battle was. By mid-October through early November, victory or defeat hung in the balance, it was so close that often the difference between victory or catastrophe regularly hinged upon the actions of small groups or a single man, individual ships and pilots. The Marines had been on the island almost three months, they were malnourished, tired, debilitated by malaria and other tropical diseases. The reason the heroics of John Basilone and Mitchell Paige stand out so starkly in the October 24-26 fighting was the fact that at those points a single man potentially prevented disaster. The heroics of the Army's 164th regiment, fed into fighting holes, in the dark, by Puller to bolster his very thin line. That's why Enterprise seemed such a heroic ship, the last US carrier in the Pacific. If the situation were not so critical would the Navy have risked their last carrier, a ship badly damaged during the same period, October 26. They sailed her to Noumea for repairs, (arriving on the 30th) yet turned her around and sent her back into the fight on the 11th with repair crews still aboard her!
On 12/13 November, the Navy sent Admiral's Callaghan and Scott in with two CA's, 3 CL's and 8 DD's to try and stop a Japanese force with two BB's from putting Henderson Field out of action. (If Enterprise was known to have been previously sunk on the 26th and therefore no carrier air threat existed, the Japanese "might" have undertaken this mission sooner) In a confused night naval engagement the US had all but two of it's ships sunk or badly damaged and both Admiral's were killed but, the Japanese bombardment force was turned back and Henderson saved for a day. The next day the Cactus airforce and aircraft from Enterprise sank the crippled Hiei. Then on the night of 14-15 November, the Navy sent in South Dakota and Washington to stop the next bombardment attempt. It's epic heroic stuff, the last ships, a desperate situation, victory or disaster hanging in the balance. Ships fighting, damaged and steel burning, sailors fighting with their decks awash. Washington sailing into the fight, passing by damaged and sinking destroyers sailors in the water all around them, it's crew throwing life preservers them. The navy was really prepared to fight to the last man and the last ship. If you've never read "Neptune's Inferno", I would highly recommend it. They really deserved for their story to be told.
What it came down to was who could control the waters around Guadalcanal. The side that could best reinforce and supply it's ground forces would eventually win this battle. The US would win the war but not necessarily the battle. Henderson Field and the US carriers were critical to keeping the Japanese navy away except at night, and punishing those enemy ships attempting to reinforce/resupply their forces on the island. Vandegrift received significant reinforcement early in November, (after Santa Cruz) two batteries of 155mm guns that allowed counter battery fire against Japanese long range guns, the 8th Marines, the transfer of two battalions of 2d Marines from Tulagi, aviation, engineer and aviation support elements, and just as importantly supplies. The November battles were the most critical to the success of the campaign, as the official US Army history states: "The November battle had been the most decisive engagement of the Guadalcanal campaign. It had almost "sealed off" the Japanese on the Guadalcanal battlefields from their rear bases. After November, the most important factor of the campaign was to be the long hard ground fighting on the island itself."
So, an event such as the loss of a major friendly asset, such as the Enterprise in October, "could" have effected the November battles and thus the entire campaign. (note I did not and have not said it definately would have effected the outcome)

 

The flip side of the coin being that if the battle was that close run a thing, the US Navy would have risked their battleships much sooner than they did historically, rather than relying heavily on a motley collection of cruisers and destroyers to defend the island. Yet, even after Kongo and Haruna played hell with Henderson in mid-October, the American battleships continued to be a no-show. A fuel shortage only goes so far to assuage this, while still leaving plenty of grey areas open to question.

 

Great history.
Found "The Second World War In The Far East" by HP Willmott (part of the Smithsonian History Of Warfare series- of which I possess exactly 1 book ) to be informative in a nutshell.
Has some excellent graphs, pie charts, pictures, stats, etc. ..Have my eye out for that series every time out and aboot.

Also like to read the older paperbacks, circa '45-70.
The cover art is like nose bomber art. ..a guy holding his red hot .30 cal mg barrel with a wet towel, as he sprints toward Japanese positions.
Gonna post some of those old paperback front covers. Maybe even capture the yellowing pages. Need smellovision to understand the old library smell.

 

I fully agree with all said here. No debate.

It's not the Enterprises effectiveness in the historical reality that is a question. The question, as I see it is how the known absense of a naval air threat would have altered Japan's tactical plans for neutralizing Henderson Field, which was the American's most dangerous asset for dealing with Japanese naval and aviation units.

Yes, but the overall situation was that Kongo and Haruna had to run in under darkness and run back out of range before daylight exposed them to air attack. If Henderson was the only source of aerial retaliation/response, they could have remained on station longer and finished the job. Even so they very nearly finished the job. While the airfield itself was repaired within several hours, the losses to aircraft and aviation gas was nearly crippling. A longer, more protracted bombardment might have rendered the airfield and it's ability to support sorties unusable for an extended period. If it was still inoperable or reduced to the point to make it's threat negligible, then air raids and daylight bombardments by lighter naval units would likely to have been sufficient to keep it suppressed until sufficient troops and supplies were ferried in. I would also submit that a different outcome for the Enterprise on the 26th, would very likely have changed the operational decisions and tactical employment of resources by both sides. Would Halsey have deployed his naval assets as he did, if Henderson were not operational? If not, then the Naval Battle's of Guadalcanal might not have occurred.

LWD wrote:

again from the US Army history of the campaign:

Japanese Plans
Following their defeat in the night battles of 23-26 October, the Japanese began preparing for a second major counteroffensive. Staff representatives from the Combined Fleet hurried to Guadalcanal by destroyer to help complete the plans. On 26 October General Hyakutake decided to send the 38th Division, commanded by Lt. Gen. Tadayoshi Sano, and its heavy equipment from Rabaul to Guadalcanal on transports instead of aboard the Tokyo Express..... On 14 November it left the waters near northern New Georgia, where it had been standing by since 13 November, to sail southward down the Slot. Consisting
of eleven transports and cargo ships and twelve escorting destroyers. this convoy was the largest the Japanese had yet employed in the Solomons. The ships carried about 10,000 troops of the 229th and 230th Regiments of the 38th Division, artillerymen, engineers, replacement units, a naval force of between 1,000 and 3,500 men, weapons, and 10,000 tons of supplies.

 

The fast battleships had been part of the screening force for the carriers. After Admiral's Callaghan and Scott got whacked, Halsey ordered the Enterprise out of the area and used her escorting battleships as a surface force. I would submit that Halsey felt the safety of his carrier force was crucial to countering Japanese naval moves, until he lost his surface assets. He then had to choose how best to employ what he had left.

 

excellent Poppy...I find the older books much easier, and smoother, to read...better writers back then...
Price and Washington--...the US totally defeated the Japanese at the Tenaru armed with 1903s...at Bloody Ridge....http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masao_Maruyama_%28Japanese_Army_officer%29 <>and Maruyama decisively defeated...now Army troops with a major increase in firepower in the semi auto Garands were helping and gaining experience...with del Valles outstanding and experienced arty......after all these decisive defeats, with the US getting stronger on defense, defense defense, all of a sudden the Japanese would come up with a miracle? would somehow defeat the US forces in ground battle?....how?
the US forces were entrenched with superior weapons on defense....
yes, I read that book and many, many more on the naval as well as ground actions......very concentrated, air, land, and sea action!! was there anything else like it in WW2? 2 major surface naval battles within days
so the US loses the Enterprise....this will significantly change, total turn around, the land battles?? in a short time?? the Japanese landforces were soundly defeated in late Oct...they would need time to bring in troops, supplies, etc for another go...

as stated before, what is reasonable? so the US loses Enterprise and Cactus?? we're saying the US loses total airpower?

it's not like the US would not reinforce...the President even specifically told the chiefs to reinforce the Canal

 

Old paperbacks are in fact, time machines...
Remember reading about how a large invasion force would anchor off the intended target. At night, while waiting for dawn, ships would broadcast music for all to hear.
Imagine. Waiting on board for the action that would take place hours ahead...who could possibly sleep.
Listening to the music that felt like home. ..Next to smell, music brings the most memories.

 

http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/USN-CN-SantaCruz/USN-CN-SantaCruz-11.html..this is a conclusions paragraph


from Wiki ""The most significant losses for the Japanese Navy, however, were in aircrew. The U.S. lost 81 aircraft along with 26 pilots and aircrew members in the battle.[75] The Japanese, on the other hand, lost 99 aircraft and 148 pilots and aircrew members including two dive bomber group leaders, three torpedo squadron leaders, and 18 other section or flight leaders. Forty-nine percent of the Japanese torpedo bomber aircrews involved in the battle were killed along with 39% of the dive bomber crews and 20% of the fighter pilots""
the Japanese naval air was not in great shape

'''The fuel situation for Kondo's forces was becoming critical by midnight on 26 October, and Admiral Yamamoto ordered a withdrawal to Truk unless a dawn air search to the east on 27 October revealed the presence of American warships. When none were found, Kondo directed all ships to set course for Truk'''. from http://www.pacificwar.org.au/Guadalcanal/SantaCruz/LossofHornet.html


and the support ships are to go all the way to Cactus, then use more fuel to bombard it?? did they even have enough HE shells do damage Cactus significantly, if they didn't run out of fuel?

the battle was not 'near' the Canal