Barbarossa is well planned & executed, much like the sickle cut was.

I use no more hindsight than you do. You pick the parts of hindsight you like and ignore that it is pure hindsight.

Gee, you already forgot about Panzers, halftracks, divisions, guns, etc, landing in Oulu, Kirkenes and Petsamo and planes deployed in these areas and about the fact that some of the force lands in Helsinki during the first days of the offensive.

Again, even a much larger force of a half million men and 1,000 tanks and 1,500 planes planes in Finland would be less threatening than millions poised in the direction of Kiev and Moscow, where they cannot attack any other country. At least the former could be used to invade Sweden, the latter can only be there to attack the USSR, yet Stalin remained in denial.

Hitler can claim that he plans to invade Sweden in July and that he has to mine much of the Baltic to do so.

 

Geee, How could anyone forget about things that you have not presented clearly and coherently (in spite of repeated requests for a clearly presented timeline, and resource accounting)

No, you seemed to be talking about hiding 10 or more motorised divisions in the populous South, as opposed to the historical non-motorised units crossing in from Norway, in a remote area that is sparsely inhabited in the extreme... But from the South of FInalnd, no one is getting Sweden, and there is only one country to threaten....

Or are you seriously suggesting trying to blaze a path with a Corps sized motorised force in the marshy swamps all the way from Petsamo to Leningrad?!? JC and his merry gold fish... Have you not been paying any attention at all to what any writer on the Arctic Wars in this region (WInter, Continuation, or Anglo-American Intervention 1919) have been saying?!? In the near roadless region between Finland and Russia, North of Lake Ladoga, moving even regimental-sized non-motorised forces is extremely hazardous to their coherence. You add in motors, become road-bound, and it gets much, much worse.

Have you seen where Sweden is on the map? Why in the sweet name of all that is holy, would someone try to conquer Sweden from Finland, when they already control Norway and Denmark? How is that statement in any way shape or form even remotely credible? I don't want to know which bodily orifice you extracted this from.


You and LJAd need to discuss the German non-need of trucks.

 

Have you seen the mountains between Norway and NW Sweden? Coastal Sweden is relatively flat compared to mountanous Norway. If You attack Norway from S Norway and Denmark only, the forces can withdraw to the north to continue fighting, If you attack from every directions they'll surrender in days. Stalin and his stooges are not going to doubt Germany's competence planning a campaign after the WM's rapid successes and the Soviet long duration fiasco in Finland.

Again I am using the OTL 600,000 trucks, but concentrating them in narrow and shorter coastal thrusts. Trucks are not a problem ATL. Some of the trucks and halftracks are landed in Hlesinki and Oulu before the invasion and some in Riga, Tallin and Leningrad atter these ports are captured, so that there is less wear and congestion on the roads and reduced fuel and oil requirement..

I already mentioned that OTL SS-Nord had to travel from the Arctic to Salla, causing a lot more delay, fatigue, fuel consumption and wear than better trained WM divisions debarking in Oulu.travelling by train close to Salla.

In order to inspire confidence, Hitler can inform Stalin on June 18 that the USSR can invade Finland a month after Germany completely subdues Sweden, as per the secret protocol. However, Germany will occupy and keep the nickel mines in Petsamo, annexing the small region to German Norway. During the Soviet invasion of Finland, Finnish soldiers and civilians entering German territory will be granted assylum. The fewer Finns, the easier it will be for the USSR to rule Finland.

BTW, on June 21, with a large force in Finland, Hitler can offer Sweden annexation in order to avoid invasion. If surrounded Sweden accepts, Germany will have a few more divisions and pilots and more resources (industry, iron ore, copper, etc,) for Barbarossa.

 

Continue your fantastic dream. Just don't call it anything remotely realistic. Your ideas are crackpot.

Forces cannot withdraw to Northern Sweden and continue fighting in any organised fashion: Basically there is no food, no supply, no population, at least not in significant numbers to to support them.

You still don't get it. You do not present an adequate timetable for anything. You continue to hand wave. You really are incorrigible.

 

Nonsense : you can't transport 600000 trucks to Finland and if you could, these trucks could not go from Finland to the SU : you know how many road space 600000 trucks do need ? Of course not .

 

Why should the Germans want to go to Leningrad ?

 

For more kool aid...

 

There are 150,000 advancing from E Prussia-N Poland, 300,000 from coastal Romania and 100,000 from Finland (they are not all there on June 22, 1941, they continue arriving during the invasion) & 50,000 from Riga, Tallin and Leningrad after the ports are captured.

 

To secure their flank, to capture the KV tank factory and others in the first week, to secure shipping in the Baltic, to gain a port to supply the advance to Moscow but better than through a long, partisan infested supply line,
OTL Leningrad was the objective of AGN, they just planned to reach it from distant E Prussia, with few trucks, tanks and planes, a lot of infantry on foot and horses and without attacking the Soviet fleet on the first day, instead of from Finland.

 

Sure, and what does the bulk of the Wehrmacht do along the rest of the front? What does the Luftwaffe do considering their trucks are included in the overall number?
btw- the overall number of motor vehicles (all types) was 600k, that includes all the tanks, halftracks, motorcycles, specialized vehicles (ie-ambulance, wrecker, radio truck, tool truck, staff car, kubelwagen, etc.)
The number of actual cargo trucks is less than half the overall number (way less actually).

Your plan still has major issues with overloading the road net, increased traffic greatly degrades the road quality and the vehicle density far outstrips the German capacity to haul sufficient fuel (not enough fuel/tank units).
The Wehrmacht is not the 21st century US Army, it could not set up huge fuel farms on FOBs capable of supporting what youre suggesting. Its a silly simpleton pipe dream.

 

There is more food in N Sweden than in many areas in the USSR or Norway where partisans, Jews, etc, lived for years in the USSR, some to continue fighting or hiding from the USSR after Germany capitulated.

 

I already explained that the bulk of the axis Infantry is defending the central border, where the bulk of the red army is. Soviet defensive doctrine was to launch massive offensives, which are extremely incompetently planned, performed and supplied, so they are disastrous (more so even than in Grodno, where the WM was on the move and exposed, yet it trounced Kusnetsov's armor counter attack. The exposed Soviets and entrenched axis are a much better option than attacking strong Soviet defensive positions. If the red army chooses to redeploy to the flanks, it will expose the center, lose many tanks en route and invaluable time.
Nothing can be more demoralizing and deadly for Soviet troops than attacking strong defensive positions over and over.
After inflicting enormous losses, if everything is favorable, the axis can counter attack the battered enemy and advance on average 80 km along the huge front to establish a new defensive line, capturing a lot of equipment and preparing for the second round. Rzhev but with much shorter, shorter axis supply lines and much stronger forces and in 1941.
Hitler set up a longer defensive line in 1942, after the axis had lost many troops, guns, etc, and when the Soviets were more experienced, producing more T-34, cannon, etc, and rapidly expanding the army and he sent the few tanks he had left to distant Caucasus and Stalingrad. Yet the line held and inflicted very heavy losses on the more experienced Soviets.
A strong defensive line with axis fresh troops (which have not even marched into the USSR for weeks or months) all the artillery and FLAK in position (instead of behind a horse or truck) and attacked by completely green and incredibly poorly led Soviets in 1941 is a certain massacre. From the morale point of few, it is very different for entrenched Soviets defending the USSR against advancing Germans to stop them from taking Moscow, etc, than to have to charge a strong line with thousands of corpses strewn for hundreds of m.
OTL, just the processing and guarding of the millions of prisoners required a lot of axis troops. ATL the Germans will take few prisoners in the center and can easily send them by train to work in Germany.

 

You clearly have no experience in field operations or logistics, correct? You sound like a high school student. What is your professional background (if any)? You have such confidence because you simply don't know what you don't know.
It's as if your playing Panzer General on playstation or something of that nature, I detect no clue whatsoever of real world problems as they exist in strategic operations.

 

It's funny that a seasoned expert like you considers supplying a huge army on the move with 625,000 horses (which themselves need supplies in order to advance a few km per day), extending supply lines hundreds of km a week over a 2,800 km front and smashing against the enemy strong points, easier than letting the bulk of the army static and with the enemy having long supply lines and poor logistics.

in 1942 Hitler had to leave a larger front static (but with much longer supply lines through partisan territory), precisely he could only supply smaller armor thrusts after losing most of his trucks, armor, etc, Alas, he could not even use Leningrad to supply the front, but had to waste resources besieging it. ATL the early capture of Odessa, Nikolaev, Maryupol, Riga, Tallin and Leningrad make a huge difference supplying the thrusts on Kharkov and Moscow.

Mr expert probably also thinks that the thousands of axis wounded who died or became permanently disabled during the rapid advance for lack of prompt, adequate medical care would have been more difficult to care for in static emergency clinics near the front and evacuation to good hospitals a little further from the front. Thousands of wounded and medical staff were killed by partisans as the long front rapidly advanced and then by the red army as the front moved back and forth.
Imagine the nightmare of having to set up medical facilities every couple of days along the 2,800 km front, wasting a lot of time taking down and setting up everything and traveling, instead of remaining stationary and working continuously.

As I said, it was all the seasoned experts, who laughed at Manstein's plan and sent him to wither in Poland.

The Germans in Kurland in 1945 and the Finns for years could repeatedly stop large Soviet offensives with a smaller army than Germany in 1941. imagine the green red army smashing against the central defensive line.

 

Nonsense : you can't use Leningrad to supply the advance on Moscow : Leningrad is 750 km away from MOscow,and there were no roads between both cities .

And Leningrad was NOT the objective of AGN in the OTL.Weisung 21 did NOT mention any territorial objective .

 

So, basically, a disorganised rabble, that spent more time hiding and trying to eke a living than actually fighting, in any real sense.

In 1941, there was not much of any partisan activities going on anywhere; why is that even an issue? Ah, yes, hindsight. Knowing that this is going to occur, we have of course no problem selling this idea to Stalin, as the motivation for why there are massive amounts of German troops pouring into Finland, through the port in Helsinki, ... Just your ordinary everyday panzer-tourism.

 

Where did I consider that? I made no such mention, so I'm left to assume that you are attacking me to take the attention from your crackpot plan that has been shredded.

You are suggesting 1941 is planned "better", but a failure of your idea leaves Germany in a very precarious state and much worse than the OTL.

Well, I "probably" dont think that actually... Why would you assume medical care was poor to begin with? By doctrine, force structure and MTOE, Wehrmacht units had a finite amount of medical assets available and in predictable levels/distances from the front. This doesn't change with distance, but level of combat effects it. Perhaps you should look at the battles that the Infantry of AGC fought in July-Sep at Yelnya before you assume the stupid Russians would just bloody themselves against static German Infantry divisions. Seems the Soviets were able to inflict quite a bit of damage as well.

There is nothing to imagine, it was called a feldlazeratt. https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feldlazarett
They were designed and trained to do exaclty as you described, it was their function.

Right, but you the unexperienced civilian have diagnosed the issues and figured out all the solutions... :adolf:

No idea what your talking about there...

Overall, the Wehrmacht killed or captured almost 3 million Soviet Soldiers and nuetralized the Red air force in 4-6 weeks. In your plan most of those forces are given time to react and also join with the millions mobilizing. In your plan the Soviets would likely have 6 million Soldiers by 1 December, its academic.

 

Not sure why but I'll give this another try. You seem to completely underestimate the importance of capturing "Ukraine" as a whole and her need for Germany's victory.
Ukraine for example fed the entire German war machine in the East and still had enough to send back home to Germany. The country was essentially "raped" Without which the Germany simply could not sustain her offensive. Capturing Ukraine was also necessary in order to secure the Romanian oils field from the Soviet Air Force. Finally, those pesky Soviet Armies which were so right for the picking in Kiev. Your scenario does not solve the above.

 

Alternately he could have edited out the "a", many of them wanted more than one excuse, indeed all of the above isn't unheard of.

 

The capture of Ukraine in 1941 in the worst possible way (with a very weak force in coastal Romania and most of the force in strongly defended N Ukraine) cost the few weeks of decent weather of the war, 500,000 men (1,500 a day in Kiev alone, tens of thousands over months in Odessa alone), 800 tanks and shocking amounts of scarce vehicles, fuel, munitions, rubber, etc, and it forced the WM to process and guard millions of prisoners and occupy a huge area, which was never properly occupied. It also forced Germany to waste invaluable resources repairing a huge dam blown up by the Soviets, which entered service when the war was already lost (long after Barbarossa and Typhon).

Here is some information to illustrate how ill prepared Germany was to advance along a 2,800 km front, often advancing over 80 km per week on average (224,000 km2):
In early 1941 Germany had only a ridiculous reserve of 1,500 t of rubber and a few hundred thousand t each of grain and oil. Stalin was dumb enough to sell Germany 18,800 t of British rubber (spoiling the blackade), 1,800,000 t of grain, 900,000 t of oil, etc, before Barbarossa. Still, Germany had hardly enough rubber, grain oil, etc, to undertake the longest and most rapidly advancing offensive front to date.
Just the 625,000 horses consuming over 14 kg of grain each per day consumed over 265,000 t of grain on the first month (plus the food consumed by the hundreds of thousands of men caring for them), a large part of German grain reserves. Moreover, a horse can only live a few weeks hauling heavy equipment continuously, so all the initial horses were dead after a month. Moreover, most of those 625,000 horses were taken from farms in the Reich, lowering farm productivity. In contrast, 400,000 horses could have supplied a static line and they could have eaten some grass, etc, and less grain and lived much longer if they were used only to supply a nearly static defensive line. The other 225,000 horses could have remained productive in farms.

The huge area (enormous RR mileage) occupied in a short time precluded timely modification of RR gauge, so that RR transport could not be used to support most of the rapid offensive.
ATL, large areas of the Ukraine are occupied slowly from the flanks or after the Soviets suffer heavy losses attacking the central defensive line, the axis advancing about 80 km in counter offensives every few weeks (with plenty of time to modify RR gauge, so that most of the supplies arrive by train (requiring much less grain, time, rubber, fuel, etc, and more coal than rellying on horses and trucks to supply most of the army).
Millions of soldiers marching often 50 km per day for very long distances consume a lot more food, boot rubber, etc, and engage less in combat, than troops manning a defensive line, who can even capture hundreds of thousands of boots from Soviet troops killed in front of their positions.

It is infinitely easier to modify only the RR along the narrow thrusts, than along a huge front. Likewise, using Leningrad, Tallin, Riga, Maryupol, Odessa, Nikolaev, etc, to transport some of the supplies deep into the USSR with minimum fuel and rubber requirements per ton of supplies and then using the few RR is infinitely more effective than using only horses and trucks exclusively for months.(including during the impossible rasputitsa).

If the Ukraine was so vital and the main target, it was a huge blunder to place the bulk of the Panzers in Belorussia and the Baltic, leaving Kleist with only 800 Panzers to smash against a much larger force, including a lot more medium and heavy tanks and AT guns. The advance in the Ukraine was extremely slow, compared to that in Belorussia and the Baltic.

If the Ukraine was so important, then the bulk of the Panzers should have been deployed in the Ukraine (including the weak coastal area), so as to capture it rapidly, instead of sending the bulk of the tanks to Smolensk and Leningrad. Barbarossa makes no sense from any point of view. Regardless of how much you defend it.