lack of efficient recon at Pearl

Post attack

 

No, they wanted to hit the attacker within sight of the island, by intercepting them. That was the point of radar and an air warning system. In the test in November they intercepted an "enemy" spotted by radar as they approached the coast, about 20 miles offshore, so still in sight of the islands. Indeed, if they can see the islands they require little navigation skills - over water is a different matter. Bombers are one thing - they had a guy aboard designated as a "navigator" whose specific job was that, but a fighter pilot had a rather more pressing job of keeping his aircraft in the air.

Recon could locate a naval task force if it saw it. But the area to spot the Japanese - when they were launching - was 230 miles off Oahu...and they did not know what direction to look in. So what is the circumference of a circle with a radius of 230 miles? It's a 1,445 mile circle. So you have to overfly that spot or maybe within 40 miles or so of it, at dawn, to "recon" them.

More aircraft sent from the West Coast. 24/7 manning of the radar systems. Recon sent in the direction the Japanese were presumed to have come from, which was still wrong.

 

Yep, only one of them, Mori, apparently realized he was attacking Helena and broke off to join the attack on Battleship Row.

 

I've got to get this one ...I usually don't buy books, but get them at the library.....might have to buy this one......thanks.

you also could spot the attackers as they were coming in.....not necessarily the ships.....so the search pattern would be smaller
finding the Japanese ships near dawn, or slightly after, would be a miracle almost, no? even with efficient recon ?
not much time between launch and the attack considering the space to cover,etc...timing has to be on, etc....
the Japanese planned and executed well......the Americans-...??

I'll have to re-read the books and research....much thanks for replies....great information....

 

There's also the question of what you are searching for. US intel didn't think the IJN was capable of launching a carrier raid on Hawaii at that time. In large part this was due to the Japanese doing a very good job of hiding the fact that they had recently developed a capability of refueling at sea. If you aren't expecting a carrier raid what are you looking for? In 1941 the USN expected that any naval activity near Hawaii by the IJN to be in the form of submarine attacks. In that case you want to launch your recon flights on or after dawn so they have a chance of spotting even close in subs. You may also not want to go out to max range but do a more thorough search of close and mid range areas.

 

The problem is they did spot the attackers coming in, but still searched in the wrong direction. It was a smaller pattern...and still found nothing.

So how do you make a more efficient recon when the reality is you have a circle 1445 miles around you where the enemy can appear at dawn to launch? You look in the most reasonable directions you think he will approach from, which is NW, W, and SW of you - NOT NNE of you.

Actually, as Zimm has pointed out, the Japanese attack plan - in a tactical sense - was very poorly planned and executed. It was only surprise and the tactical ability of the individual Japanese pilots that made the difference and a considerable bit of luck.

If only Short hadn't decided to stand down on a Sunday, then the Army forces would have been at full alert, with air forces dispersed and ready and antiaircraft forces deployed, manned, and ready...the incoming attack waves would have been met by 84 to 139 effective fighters.
If only Kimmel hadn't decided to execute the Wake and Midway reinforcement together, then two-thirds of the battle force would have been at sea, but likely Lexington would have been in port...but the torpedo bombers probably would have been massacred.
If only the single effective 40cm bomb that hit Arizona had performed like the others...she would have survived with minor damage.

And so on.

 

even if the US forces were on alert, that doesn't mean they would be ready to significantly disrupt the attack without a recon warning.

critical point here--'banker's hours'--....as stated before by many, they are not in 'war mode'/total defense mode/total recon mode....sure, the number of recon aircraft/proficiency/interservice communication/etc was not great, but a lot more recon could've been done--as seen in the link of first post
it appears, on the surface, more recon could've been done...not as much recon because:
1. not in war time/etc mode
2. did not want to wear out crews/planes..
3. carrier threat not thought possible ?



I did not want to get into the effects/planning/good or bad of the raid unless it pertains to rcon somewhat....that's a whole other thread.....

 

The number one mistake in recon was the assumption that the northern routes were too difficult, so what patrols did go out covered the approaches from the west and SW. The next problem was the lack of communication between Block, Kimmel and Short. Block was responsible for naval patrolling, but he had a severe lack of planes and since the navy was rapidly expanding a shortage of trained men so he had a choice of patrolling or training. If Kimmel had communicated with the other two he may have understood the lack of coverage, which was compounded by Short assuming that since it was a navy job to patrol he didn't need to worry about it.

 

I'll have to look again, because the deployment schedule I recall was either one or two of the three battle divisions at sea, with carriers and the 7 December schedule left one in port and two at sea...but I'm going by memory and could be off on that. I'll look at my copies.

 

Ah, right, thanks, you have better recall of that than I did.

 

1. Yes they were in "war time/etc mode" - war warning, two of them. They took a stand-down day of rest on 7 December.
2. Yes, because they didn't have sufficient to carry out the search pattern they wanted to do, so they concentrated on doing the search pattern they could, within the limitations of conserving crews and aircraft operational, but on 7 December see 1.
3. Not thought possible because we assessed the Japanese fleet could not reach Oahu by the route they took because they lacked in route refueling capability and what capability they had couldn't be used on the harsh northern route...and they were close to correct, the Japanese refueling program was dicey at times.

 

I know, but exactly which volume is always an adventure. :ww1ace: