Pre-war British infantry standard for marksmanship

Nothing particularly key. I thought you might be interested in the range courses.

 

o. ok
...I did see where they didn't allow the sling to be used...yes, that's got some interesting stuff

 

I have nothing against Britishsoldiers. BEF did its best. But time was nor on their side or strategy. Simply as that.

 

Book is In a Guardsman's Boots.

 

#
I think you are being rather kind to the British.

For the last 80 years the world in general has ridiculed the French for being ill prepared to fight Hitler and accepted the British narrative about defying Hitler from our own isles. Knowing when to abandon the hopelessly compromised French and revovering the army via Dunkirk. Retaining fighter aircraft in the UK to defend the island against the inevitable onslaught. Ready to fight on the beaches and landing grounds but never surrender.

However, there are some questions that should be asked of the British, who took the lead in the international strategy to initially appease Hitler and then decide to fight over Poland.

Why did it take so long to accept that standing up to Hitler would require a substantial expeditionary force on the mainland of Europe? The French would have been content with an eight division force, including two armoured divisions fully mechanised and trained in line with the armoured doctrine that the Brtitish had developed. A large less mechanised force comparable to the 1918 50 Division BEF would have been OK. Fifteen divisions of partially trained under equipped troops with armoured divisions was a serious under-delivery.

What culpability did the British have in developing the disasterous Plan D of 1940? Britain were equal partners in going to war, How was it that the all important land strategy was purely French? Or did the British agree with it at the time? One controversy was the decision to commit the strategic reserve - the French 7th Army to the "Breda Option" on the extreme Northern flank to try to support the Dutch. This is the force that could have plugged the gap on the Meuse. It was the British who were particularly keen on supportign the Dutch becaus ethey feared German occupied Netherlands would be used to bomb Brtitain?

Why did the British not extend their the integrated air defence system to support their french allies? If the Allies had won the war in the air over France there might never have been a Battle of Britain?

 

.....isn't part of those problems because of politics and the huge and many divisions countries have in politics? they can never agree on just about anything
...in the US there is constant bickering/etc about military situations/etc.....between politicians and the military

....true, air power is a huge advantage, but the ground element is the key ....if the French had air defense, does that mean they would have been victorious?

.....also, there were different ideas and much, much disagreement on how to use the air power...here is a perfect example-- [ I was reading just last night ] in The Battle of the Atlantic by Dimbleby--section The Battle of the Air regarding bombing the Uboat bases.... starting around page 356:
1. it takes time to assess, discuss and choose plans to put into action--
2.the War Cabinet report ''Conduct of the War n 1943'' put the priority on defeating the Uboats
--Harris thought this was wrong
3. Harris was told to bomb the Uboat bases---''until object had been achieved''
--he was then to suspend the bombing of the Uboat bases to assess results
4. ''''Nine days later'', the War cabinet revised it's instructions that there should be no assessment--to ''attack, attack, attack''''' [ here we see a change in plans! = mistakes/bad judgments/etc from the humans ]
5. Harris thought it was a '''wasteful diversion'''' from the main objective of ''''obliterating cities''' [ !! ]
--he complied with '''extreme reluctance''' [ bickering/disagreement/etc = delays-problems-mistakes ]
Harris was right!! the War Cabinet was wrong

..page 359:
'''this futile interdepartmental struggle was exacerbated by the prime minister's stance'''
many differences of opinions/options = time wasted/etc

.....in a nutshell, as I've stated many times regarding yours and other questions of '''why this why that'' = humans---humans are not perfect and make mistakes.....wars are not like tabletop games as you know...when humans get involved with something, mistakes and wrong/'''partially'' wrong decisions can [ and will ] happen

caps for emphasis only/parentheses mine

 

The plan to send the troops to Belgium every time played into the German strategy.

Some say Sending the fighters from the UK to France and losing them would be the end of Battle of Britain sooner than later.

Quite a problem to deal with.

 

most wars are -yes?

 

De Gaulle believed in moving warfare. Hitting the German tankline that was moving towards the coast he would have given the Germans their first massive loss.

 

The French command structure within France “was a peculiar one” (Major-General R Barry). The Chief of Staff Armed Forces was General Gamelin. He was responsible for the defence of France on all fronts – including overseas territories. The so-called “North-East Front”, bordering Belgium and Germany was under the command of General Georges. This front, understandably, contained a great deal of the French army in the months leading up to May 10th. Gamelin had his headquarters just outside of Paris at Vincennes. Georges had his headquarters at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, about 40 miles east of Paris. In the spring of 1940, both of these highly important military centres were linked by a single staff located at Montry, about 20 miles from Vincennes and about the same distance from Georges’ headquarters. The Chief-of-Staff, General Doumenc tried to spend an equal amount of time at both centres.

The commander of the French Air Force, General Vuillemin, had his headquarters elsewhere. The air force divided France up into ‘zones of operations’ but the pilots within each could receive instructions from Vuillemin or from the Air Observation Groups which were attached to the army. There is evidence that the air force received contradictory instructions from both once the Germans had attacked.

The most senior military figure in Belgium was the king, Leopold. He was commander-in-chief of the Belgium Army. However, he took advice from his military advisor, General van Overstraeten rather than from his General Staff. Belgium put its defensive trust in the Albert Canal, running north-west from Liège to Antwerp. Liège as a city was heavily fortified; Fort Eben-Emael was considered to be the strongest fort in the whole of Europe and the city was considered to be the linchpin of the whole defence plan of Belgium. However, such planning also meant that if Liège fell, then Belgium would also fall

 

" During the battle, language problems would at times create havoc. On 21 May 1940, General Sir Edmund Ironside, British Chief of the General Staff, requested a joint British French counter-attack.The French interpreter at Blanchard 1st Army translated "on" with "as of " (á partir de). The French Corps under General Altmayer that was to lead the French attack was not yet ready for action on 21 May. The British attacked alone and were easily beaten back. On that day, General Altmayer joined the French Generals,who wept.The liaison officer of 1st Army to the BEF, Major Vautrin,recalls: " General Altmayer looked tired and depressed. He sat on my campbed and wept silently. He told me that we have to look at things how they are and that his troops were finished."

From " Field Marshal Manstein, a portrait" by Marcel Stein

 

"German army pushes forward across the River Meuse into Belgium. RAF Battle and Blenheim bombers (of the AASF based in France) suffer very heavy losses in daylight attacks trying to halt the German advance. Two airmen, F/O Garland and Sgt Thomas Gray, flying a single-engine Battle, awarded posthumous Victoria Crosses. 75% of the force are lost. Blenheims flying from bases in England to attack the advancing Germans also suffer huge losses. By the end of 14th May, 107 Sqn had not a single serviceable aircraft."

 

1.What if the Air Ministry had ordered a new generation of biplane fighters, as they had wanted to? Planes that lacked the speed, the armament and the height to take on Hitler's Luftwaffe.

If the Air Ministry had had its way, the Luftwaffe would have been met by planes like the Tiger Moth.

2. What if Churchill's friend Professor Lindeman had had his way, and that work on an infrared detection system had replaced the development of radar?

3. What if Arthur Harris - appointed to Bomber Command at the same time Dowding was appointed to Fighter Command - had got his way, and Britain had concentrated on building bombers in 1938? Hitler's bombers would have got through.

4. What if Dowding had caved in to Churchill's demand for an extra ten squadrons of fighters for France in May 1940?

Dowding refused, and gave the War Cabinet his reasons.

 

Apologies for willfully directing the discussion OT..

However, the discussion might help to explain why relatively little effort has been spent investigating the marksmanship of the pre war British Army. It really is a marginal issue.