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How could US Offensive Tactics have been improved?

Discussion in 'Land Warfare in the Pacific' started by John Dudek, Jan 3, 2009.

  1. RichTO90

    RichTO90 Well-Known Member

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    It is unclear that "better quality control testing" was the issue. Rather, it was bureaucratic inertia and a reluctance by BUORD to take action when problems were identified.

    U.S. Navy Torpedoes (part two)

    Curiously enough, the same three problems - depth control, the magnetic influence exploder and the contact exploder - were experienced by the Royal Navy and the Kriegsmarine...and only the Royal Navy reacted expeditiously to correct the problems. It took the KM about a year to react IIRC, similar to the USN.
     
  2. bronk7

    bronk7 Well-Known Member

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    1.it was not Task Force 58/38 ......Task Force 58/38 had much more power/planes/etc
    2. you forgot the most important aspect-logistics it's not a board game...and they don't have unlimited troops/ships/airplanes/etc
    --a. the farther away from your bases = the more ships/supplies/etc --more oilers needed...the more vulnerable the force is
    3. the IJN still had their carriers/etc and pilots until June 1944 = the US still had to think about the IJN's reactions
    ..there are many aspects to it
    4. Task Force 58/38 and the USN had much more training and combat experience in mid -44 than late 43 = operations more efficient
    ..I have to go--time short...SYL
     
  3. Carronade

    Carronade Ace

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    I think we may be losing sight of the topic, whether the US forces which took Tarawa and Makin in Nov 1943 could have been directed to the Marshalls instead. Of course the USN and particularly the fast carrier force were stronger and more experienced in June 1944, but the key point is that in Nov 1943 they were strong enough to launch the first major amphibious operation of the Central Pacific campaign and to deal with whatever opposition the IJN could put up. Combat power is not an absolute; it is relative to the enemy. The Japanese in 1943 had only six of the nine carriers they would employ at the Marianas, and their air groups were still recovering from the massive losses they had suffered in the Solomons.

    Logistics is always a valid concern, but both the Gilberts and Marshalls operations were mounted from Hawaii; the distance and need for oilers etc. is essentially the same.
     
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  4. bronk7

    bronk7 Well-Known Member

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    ..you think the US forces in 1943 would've done just as well as we did at the Marianas Turkey Shoot? I have doubts--less planes/less experience/etc
     
  5. Takao

    Takao Ace

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    Yes, US forces would have done just as well or perhaps better.

    As has been pointed out, both sides would have had less aircraft & aircraft carriers. More so the Japanese, because of Operation RO, the November, 1943, reinforcement of Rabaul using IJN carrier air groups - IIRC, 30% losses were suffered.

    Experience is a slippery slope, as CAGs were rotated on & off carriers. For example, the carrier air group that was aboard USS Enterprise for the Gilbert's & Marshalls, was not with Enterprise at the Marianas.
     
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  6. bronk7

    bronk7 Well-Known Member

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    better with much less aircraft and experience? wrong ...and don't forget less of everything else....physically impossible..tactically and strategically
    .. strategically = they can't wander all over the Pacific--not as many oilers or fuel/fuel bases/etc
     
  7. bronk7

    bronk7 Well-Known Member

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    ...I thought you knew more about carriers/ships/etc--but I guess I'm mistaken about that...you are way off target
    ..you prove my point perfectly = most people do not think realistically....you also are thinking like it's a board game/etc--allow me to explain:
    ..carriers have more than just the air group on them!!!!! for the ship to run and fight efficiently, everyone must know their job and have experience ....without ammo handlers --no ammo...without the deck crew being efficient, planes don't get off the deck in time..
    radarmen-new technology...not easy to learn--takes experience
    etc
    ..when I said experience I meant--and I thought you would know--meant more than just the air group!!
    ..refueling takes experience ....ships maneuvering with each other takes experience ....communication between radarmen/captains, and they with the air group/deck crew/etc
    and new ships kept coming into the fleet--bootcampers ---
    ..so you have the crew on the ship that needs to learn to work together and then the ships have to learn to work as a team ...
    ..as we saw at Savo, the Allies got an a$$ whooping...poor tactics/etc ....wasn't it Burke who trained his DDs to work together and planned new tactics? ...the DDs had to train together to be efficient
    etc

    .....a ship is not run by one man or the air group ..they all depend on each other....
    ..then you have the task force interacting with ground forces and amphib forces /etc etc etc

    ..then the air group has to work with ground FOs/Marines/etc---and the only way to learn is with REAL time combat--
    ...then when they find a good working doctrine, they document it as policy

    ....especially radar and radar men..and the men that worked on the radar ...

    ..I was in guard duty for four years and then went to the FMF as a mortarman ....I learned mortars in SOI...but didn't have any REAL TIME experience ....I had to learn the ''realistic'' way of doing it--not like a board game
     
    Last edited: Jun 2, 2020
  8. Takao

    Takao Ace

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    As usual, your forgetting that the experienced men will be pulled of and sent to new construction, so the ship experience level will stay roughly the same. The experienced men are pulled off & replaced by recruits.

    Also, you neglect the captain & command staff of the carrier. A "bad" captain & staff can and will ruin an experienced crew.

    The Air Group is the tip of the spear. If they don't get the job done, it does not matter a whit how experienced a carrier crew is at all.
     
  9. Carronade

    Carronade Ace

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    Pardon the repetition:

    "Of course the USN and particularly the fast carrier force were stronger and more experienced in June 1944, but the key point is that in Nov 1943 they were strong enough to launch the first major amphibious operation of the Central Pacific campaign and to deal with whatever opposition the IJN could put up."

    This is not just my assessment, but that of Nimitz and his planners and commanders when they decided to launch the operation. Is it your contention that they were wrong? That we might have been defeated had the IJN chosen to intervene?

    People making decisions in Nov 1943 aren't basing them on how strong or capable they expect our own forces or the enemy to be in June 1944. They - and we - have to consider the balance of forces at the time.

    Now let us return to the question actually under discussion, whether the forces which carried out the Gilberts operation could have been directed to the Marshalls instead, keeping in mind that the Marshalls were our actual objective and the Gilberts just a stepping stone to be discarded as soon as they had served their purpose.
     
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  10. bronk7

    bronk7 Well-Known Member

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    ..the ''question'' put forth was would the forces do as well in 1943 if tested the same as in 1944.....obviously less experienced and less forces = very questionable they could do as well---as well in by passing/sealing off islands and changing the strategic scene significantly
    ..and the critical point = less logistics available to change the strategic picture significantly
    ..less logistics in all areas = problems in bypassing/sealing off islands to a significant degree

    in summary:
    less logistics --plus less forces --plus less experience = a lot less power = strategic value is not going to be much more

    ..less experience = less bombs on target...longer refuel times...less airworthy aircraft/etc
     
    Last edited: Jun 2, 2020
  11. bronk7

    bronk7 Well-Known Member

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    so all the new ships will have more experienced men than not?? I don't think so
     
  12. bronk7

    bronk7 Well-Known Member

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    the AG can't get off the carrier/airfield without the crew= they are worthless without the crew
    ..they won't even make it to the combat zone
     
  13. Takao

    Takao Ace

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    And yet, of 130+ aircraft carriers whose crews were not combat experienced, all managed to find their respective combat zones. And more unbelivably, managed to somehow find the enemy.
     
  14. bronk7

    bronk7 Well-Known Member

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    HyperWar: The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II: Northern Solomons
    [QUOTEAlthough recognizing that heavy and medium bombers for the Gilberts could only be provided by taking them from somewhere else][/QUOTE]
    [QUOTEFor the 27th Infantry Division, tactical planning for its particular task was complicated by a midstream change of objectives][/QUOTE]
    lots of complications/etc
    much more to it than what you think ...here are some views on strategic planning:
    HyperWar: US Army in WWII: Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls [Chapter 2]
     
  15. Takao

    Takao Ace

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    No, it will leaven out the experienced ship crewmen, so that all of the new ships joining the Fleet will not be composed of all new recruits. Further, it allows the experienced crewmen to pass on their knowledge to new sailors. Thus, rapidly bringing the new sailors up to speed.
     
  16. Takao

    Takao Ace

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    Are you arguing for a single unified thrust in the SWPA, instead of the twin thrusts historically, so as to ease logistics?
     
  17. belasar

    belasar Court Jester

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    While US forces made their share of mistakes in the Solomon's, they certainly prevailed decisively in the end and little evidence they could not succeed here.
     
  18. Carronade

    Carronade Ace

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    The question posed in #38 was whether the forces which successfully assaulted the Gilberts in November 1943 could and should have done the same in the Marshalls instead. It's one of my favorite speculations, and I would be interested in members' responses based on the situation existing in November 1943.

    It's hardly a revelation that our forces were stronger and more experienced seven months later, but that doesn't mean they were inadequate at the time. The only relevant argument would be that the forces which were adequate or more than in the Gilberts would have been inadequate in the Marshalls. There are arguments that could be made on that side, but endlessly repeating that the Fifth Fleet of June 1944 was more powerful than that of Nov 1943 isn't one of them.
     
  19. Takao

    Takao Ace

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    OK, I'm confused. The Marshalls were invaded about 2 months after the Gilberts. The Marianas were invaded 7 months after the Gilberts. Bronk & his TF58 bit make it sound like the Marianas & Carronade makes it appear to be the Marshalls.

    So which is being invaded instead of the Gilberts...The Marshalls or the Marianas?

    If the Marshalls, I doubt it would change much. The Gilberts could still maintain a moderate air & submarine threat in the US rear. The lack of US bombers & reconnaissance aircraft might prove a little problematic, but it would be a minor speed bump. Although, AFAIK, the Gilberts made for an adequate advance base.
     
  20. Carronade

    Carronade Ace

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    I was suggesting for discussion the possibility of starting the Central Pacific offensive with landings in the Marshalls, in or about November 1943, in lieu of the Gilberts.

    Attacking the Marianas at that point would be completely unrealistic, and I don't think bronk was suggesting that.
     

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