Island hopping?

The island hopping campaign, though, is so often portrayed as a province solely governed by the US Marine Corps. No doubt, they deserve a hard-won credit. It was a joint effort from the Aleutians to Burma. In terms of raw numbers the US Army had man more troops in the theaters and conducted more amphibious and airborne operations. The Army insisted on using hardened, experienced troops time and again for their amphibious assaults where the Marine Corps mostly conducted their operations with newer, fresher troops; however, all gained so much more experience after each operation. Each service had its own doctrine, tactics, and equipment and masterminded by different theater commanders to include both Buckner and Geiger. Unfortunately all branches of the US services had leaders more concerned with their own interests, prerogatives and goals. The Army of the Central Pacific Theater was different than the Army organizations in the SWPA. Problems with Army and Marine discord continued, and probably more noticeable on the Island of Saipan. So much acrimony that there will probably never be an accurate comparison drawn from the strategic goals and tactics. Having the opportunity to sift through some of MacArthur's own memoranda and planning documents it seems to me that he was really focused on the endstate and utilized the troop formations in his area quite well. He even insisted on some of the early strikes against the Japanese that fell simultaneously with Doolittle's raid against the mainland of Japan. I couldn't imagine taking on that magnitude of a fight. The Asia-Pacific region is just so immense. More study is needed and more items brought to the public forum.

 

...regarding rejecting Nauru for invasion, in Storm Over the Gilberts by Ed Hoyt page 51:
Gen. Holland Smith was ''''committed to use the army troops in the second invasion''' [ Nauru ]
'''and he had no confidence in the army troops at all'''....they ''had not been trained yet to do the job''''
..also Nauru and Tarawa were so far apart, '''Spruance did not feel capable of covering both areas''''
..so Spruance picked Makin

 

Question... How was the Navy support for MacArther's arm of the attack vs. Nimitz supporting the Marine offensives? Did one get more priority?

 

..... the big naval power was with Nimitz and the Central Pacific drive...Mac had just about ''nothing'' compared to the Marines.....

 

Nimitz had priority, since MacArthur only rarely operated outside of 5th Air Force striking range. Mac could call on carriers when needed, such as the carrier strikes on Rabaul, and the landing at Hollandia. IIRC, through 1943 and into 1944, MacArthur's largest US warship was a destroyer.

 

So MacArthur relied on the 5th Air Force and light naval support... He had to have the ships to land his Army ground troops, so that was basically it?

 

Just remember, that the US Army had more vessels than the US Navy...roughly 128,000 to 75,000. Although, the US Navy did have more ships over 1,000 tons.