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Would the war have been shortened

Discussion in 'WWII General' started by Riter, Jul 3, 2020.

  1. Riter

    Riter Well-Known Member

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    If Montgomery wasn't commanding the 21st Army Group? Montgomery was always advocating for a single, narrow thrust straight to Berlin. The fallacy of it was proven in Market Garden. Hard to move supplies, needed material (pontoons), equipment forward on a narrow thrust. Additionally, the terrain in Northern Germany was no as favorable to tank warfare as was other parts of Germany.

    While Monty was carefully planning his Rhine River crossing, the 9th Armored captured Remagen. Then Patton crosses too. Monty was still planning.

    Monty had boasted that he would capture Caen on D-Day. That didn't happen and it took a long time before it was. Then he failed to close the Falaise Gap. Admittedly he was up against 5 panzer divisions, but he had overwhelming air superiority in his favor.

    I would have sacked Monty and asked for Alexander to lead in his place.
     
  2. belasar

    belasar Court Jester

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    I'm not sure there is any evidence Alexander would/could move faster than Montgomery. The troops comprising 21st Army Group all faced the same issue, the need to keep casualties down. Canadian soldiers had to volunteer to go overseas, Ex-pats (Polish, Belgian, Dutch) had a finite limit of reserves and even the British were starting to suffer from manpower shortages. Monty was also popular on the English home front because of North Africa and a American supreme commander removing him could cause political headaches that might slow things down even further.

    Montgomery was not as good as he thought he was, but that was true of nearly all commanders and it can't be denied that he was a effective commander at his level. He gave Eisenhower fits on occasion and I suspect he might of done a worse job in his place, (SHEAF) needed a more diplomatic minded leader and Patton gave Ike fits also and might have been a disaster in Bradley's position.

    Now if Alexander succeeded Montgomery because of natural causes (medical reasons/injury) or was recalled by Churchill for cause I'm sure he would have done as good a job, possibly a little better in some instances (Falaise/Antwerp capture) but that is far from assured.
     
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  3. RichTO90

    RichTO90 Well-Known Member

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    No.
     
  4. Riter

    Riter Well-Known Member

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  5. RichTO90

    RichTO90 Well-Known Member

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    Sorry, it was late and my time is quickly being constricted by my next book project.

    No, it would not have "shortened the war" to change one of the three principal ground forces commanders in NWE in mid-stride as the allied pursuit reached the Germany frontier. Eisenhower moving his HQ to the Continent in the same time frame caused enough problems.

    Yes, Monty consistently advocated for a "narrow thrust". No it wasn't really "straight at Berlin". No, changing an army group commander would not change the army group commander's demanding greater emphasis on his axis...it is the nature of the beast. I think it is in the notebook given all commanding generals. "Always ask for more, they may give it to you."

    No, MARKET GARDEN did not prove the fallacy of a "narrow thrust". It demonstrated the problems associated with ad hoc and poorly planned attempts to achieve an operational objective. It was a badly planned operation intended to get Second British Army a bridgehead across the Rhine. Full stop.

    The 9th AD seizure of the Remagen Bridge was a successful coup de main, which by their nature cannot really be planned for. A planned coup de main in the good old days was also known as a forlorn hope...they succeed probably less often than they fail. Moreover, its success does not say anything good or bad about the successful 21st Army Group crossing of the Rhine.

    No, Monty never "boasted he would capture Caen on D-Day, although I suspect he was pretty confident it would happen. That it did not happen was a consequence of many events outside Monty's control...no matter how much he may have believed he could control them.

    No, Monty did not "fail to close the Falaise Gap"...that is a reductio ad absurdam of an incredibly complex and misunderstood event. For one thing, there was no "Falaise Gap", the only "gaps" were between Mont Ormel and Chambois (c. 3 KM), Mont Ormel and Trun (c. 6.5 KM), Chambois and St Lambert (c. 1.5 KM), St Lambert and Trun (c.. 3 KM), and Chambois and Le Bourg St Leonard (c. 3.5 KM), which were not physically occupied by a contiguous line of troops. Before you say, "oh that is about a 17.5 KM gap!" please look at a map and note where the critical terrain was.

    BTW, you might want to clarify where and when those "5 panzer divisions" Monty was up against were... :D

    Is that enough for now? I could elaborate more, but it may be easier to explicate it completely in my next book, which will likely touch on some of these subjects.
     
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  6. Riter

    Riter Well-Known Member

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    My info came from Eisenhower's Crusade in Europe and Bradley's A General's Life and Max Hastings' Overlord.
     
    Last edited: Jul 6, 2020
  7. Carronade

    Carronade Ace

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    When were you envisioning Monty being removed? You mention the narrow-broad front debate, Market-Garden, the Rhine crossing, D-Day, and Falaise. And why Alexander? He was already commanding an army group in action and, depending on the "when", would become Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean.

    The whole Allied chain of command, all the way up to Marshall and Arnold in Washington, were looking for an opportunity to use the new airborne army, and since the airborne were based in England, it was almost inevitable that any operation would be in 21st Army Group's sector. Monty did ask one of the key questions, whether it would be possible to make a second drop on the first day, only to be told that it wouldn't. It probably wouldn't have been feasible to stage and fly two glider lifts, but planes carrying paratroops could make a quicker turnaround. Aside from the general benefit of having more troops in action earlier, this might have facilitated capturing the key bridges.
     
  8. Carronade

    Carronade Ace

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    Montgomery was actually told prior to D-Day that he could expect to have to disband two divisions and several smaller units after the army was established on the Continent; this happened from August through November 1944.

    Knowing that they would have to disband combat units suggests that they should have taken a hard look at headquarters and staffs. 21st Army Group peaked at 16 British, Canadian, and Polish divisions in Normandy and 18 in the last weeks of the war, but for most of the campaign had about 14, not too much to organize as a single army including a Canadian corps.
     
    Last edited: Jul 6, 2020
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  9. Riter

    Riter Well-Known Member

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    Not I. Just asking for perspectives of those interested in the ETO.
     
  10. RichTO90

    RichTO90 Well-Known Member

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    Well, there's your problem... :D

    Seriously, the last place you want to look for a good perspective on the senior command controversies is the the memoirs of the senior commanders, since it will always be from their point of view and so diametrically opposed. Nor can I recommend a journalistic account of the controversy for a dispassionate assessment, since it will always look for the titillating, sensationalistic bits needed to "sell the story" rather than at the mundane realities of running a highly complex, large-scale, mechanized war.
     
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  11. bronk7

    bronk7 Well-Known Member

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    maybe--maybe not ....hard to say ....
    ..not significantly, I would say
     
  12. Riter

    Riter Well-Known Member

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    Just like Monty never lost a battle?
     
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  13. RichTO90

    RichTO90 Well-Known Member

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    Would you care to respond to something I actually said?
     
  14. A-58

    A-58 Cool Dude

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    I believe that the failure to clear the Scheldt Estuary in a timely manner extended the war a bit. The major post of Antwerp was not usable unless shipping could get to the wharves and docks to unload logistical supplies, troops, vehicles, etc. The Red Ball Express and other traditional forms of supply could not keep forward units sufficiently supplied. Operation Market Garden should not have been undertaken until the Scheldt was cleared.
     
  15. Carronade

    Carronade Ace

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    Clearing the Scheldt would certainly have helped the operations of the northern Allied armies, but it might have made them consider a next move other than Market-Garden. M-G's prospects for success depended largely on the Germans being weakened and disorganized after the Normandy battles and the rapid retreat across France and the Low Countries. It and the airborne operations previously planned but not carried out were intended to exploit that situation. If the front stabilized for a few weeks on what became the M-G start line, while the Scheldt was being cleared, German defense and reserves would be more formidable than they were on Sept 17.
     
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  16. GunSlinger86

    GunSlinger86 Well-Known Member

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    Is 18 divisions considered a small Army Group? That seems kind of on the light side, however I know the Western Allied divisions contained more personnel and the Air Force and Navy of Britain used a good portion of combat manpower.
     
  17. belasar

    belasar Court Jester

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    There was no size requirement for a Army Group other than their be two or more Army sized formations 'grouped' together for a tactical/strategic purpose. For much of the war in the west two armies were pretty much the norm, though for much of the time 12th AG under Bradley contained 3 armies, and for awhile 21st AG had 3 attached (much to Bradley's consternation.

    Corps/Armies/AG were pretty flexible in their organization dependent on the mission before them and often fluctuated in size.
     
  18. Carronade

    Carronade Ace

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    It was on the cusp, large for an army, though not unheard of; small for an army group. 21st AG also included up to ten armoured and army tank brigades, usually attached to infantry divisions, and the Belgian and Dutch motorized infantry brigades. Some of the brigades were also disbanded, as were some regiments and battalions.

    Having a British army group, or a Canadian army, was largely a matter of prestige. For most of the campaign the Canadians comprised one corps with three divisions. They had to attach a British corps and the Polish armoured division to call it an army and justify the larger command being an army group. In the last weeks of the war, the Canadian forces from Italy were transferred, making a total of five divisions, still able to be managed as a single corps.

    A logical organization for the campaign in NW Europe would have been one army group landing in Normandy and another in southern France. These would include a British-Canadian and a French army respectively. Each would have one American army initially and a second as more American troops arrived in theater. Since the majority of troops would be American, so should be the commanders, which would no doubt be a sticking point for the British.

    Incidentally I also think the organization in Sicily was top-heavy, an army group and two armies for no more than twelve divisions. I expect this also reflected nationalistic concerns. Patton's 7th Army had only one actual corps under command, Bradley's II; 2nd Armored and 82nd Airborne formed an ad hoc second corps for the advance into western Sicily. 7th Army HQ was basically Patton's former I Armored Corps renamed. A logical organization there would have been one army with two American and two British corps under the most experienced general at the time, Montgomery. Monty in these speculations might have ended up in the same position as Patton historically, going from being Bradley's superior in Sicily to his subordinate in Normandy.
     
  19. RichTO90

    RichTO90 Well-Known Member

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    It wasn't for prestige, but for the other "p" word, politics. :D The Canadian Government insisted on the independence of Canadian forces under Canadian command, rather in the same way the U.S. Government did in World War I. The deployment of the 1st Canadian Division and 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade to Sicily and Italy was a concession, partly intended to get Canadian forces in action in a way more likely to be successful than their earlier commitment at Dieppe. It was also part of the CIGS machinations to split up Canadian forces in England, by eventually move one of the two corps to the Med, removing the need for a Canadian Army command...and thus getting McNaughton out of his hair, which was a tactic that eventually worked.

    The decision to deploy the rest of Canadian ! Corps to Italy to Italy put McNaughton at odds with PM King and led to his resignation in December 1943. However, by that time I Canadian Corps was established with Eighth Army in Italy, so...

    Yeah, that was never going to happen. By mid 1943 even Churchill was aware of the fact that the cross-Channel Supreme Commander would be American...in recompense the Med Supreme Commander was British.

    Again, politics as well as prestige, which always outweighs logic. :D

    BTW, Seventh U.S. Army was activated and organized using I Armored Corps as its basis, but I Armoured Corps was not renamed, it was concurrently inactivated at sea on 9 July 1943.
     
  20. Frank Natoli

    Frank Natoli Member

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    Monty had a very hard time in Normandy, but with 21st Panzer in Caen on the morning of the 6th, British and Canadian soldiers without armor were in no position to push the Germans out. All the hard fighting that followed would probably have been not much different with an American commander [read that George Patton].
    I suggest the shortening of the war that was missed was Falaise, and again I do not blame Monty.
    The villain in that moment was Bradley.
    Patton had ordered Wade Haislip and XV Corps, with four full strength divisions, 2nd French Armored under the excellent LeClerc, 5th American Armored, 79th and 90th American Infantry, to advance north through Argentan to Falaise but Bradley countermanded Patton.
    Patton meekly shifted forces to the east and theoretically an encirclement on the Seine but that didn't happen either.
    Had the Bradley / Patton roles been reversed, Patton would have pressed home the closure of the Falaise Gap.
    Haislip would have closed the gap, Collins and VII Corps would have come up from the southwest.
    It was have been a slaughter house but the war in the west would have ended there and then, August 1944.
     

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