Why The M26 pershing come late into the war

Geography made it easier for Germany or the USSR to deploy heavy tanks than the USA. The Germans ro Soviets could move stuff by rail. Everything made in the USA had to be shipped by sea. Nicholas Moran AKA"The Chieftain" made this point with reference to the lifting points on the M4 that enabled it to be lifted by dockyard cranes.

Heavy tanks were a gimmick. They did not win wars on their own , but their existence spread despondency among enemies and made them tactically cautious. Like elephants or scythed chariots in the armies of antiquity. The US did not need gimmicks. t had air superiority and a lot of artillery which had the same morale effects.

Was the Pershing really a heavy tank? Or was it, like the Centurion and JS3 just the post war standard?

 

Thanks! Teaser Time! Here is the current Table of Contents


Introduction. 1

Acknowledgements. 4

U.S. Army World War II Procurement and Nomenclature. 6

Part One: Organization, Development, and Production from Armistice Day to VJ Day. 13

Chapter 1 Stagnation and Rebirth: The Lean Years from the End of the Great War to 1 September 1939. 14

Organization. 14

Doctrinal Development 34

Development and Production. 41

Chapter 2 State of the Art: The View Looking in, Sereno Brett and Arthur Hadsell 68

Chapter 3 Learning to Walk: 1 September 1939 to 30 June 1940. 79

Organization. 79

Doctrinal Development 85

Development and Production. 88

Chapter 4 State of the Art: The View Looking Out, the Spanish Civil War 101

Chapter 5 The Sleeping Giant Stirs: 1 July to 31 December 1940. 114

Organization. 114

Doctrinal Development 122

Development and Production. 125

Chapter 6 The Threat Perceived. 137

Chapter 7 Explosive Growth…and Growing Pains: 1 January to 7 December 1941. 145

Organization. 147

Doctrinal Development 150

Development and Production. 157

Chapter 8 First Blood in the Pacific: The Fall of the Philippines, 1941-1942. 176

Chapter 9 Giant Steps…and Stumbles: the First Year of the War, 1942. 190

Organization. 194

Doctrinal Development 204

Development and Production. 208

Chapter 10 Hard Knocks: The Battle of Happy Valley. 243

Chapter 11 Learning Curve: the Second Year of the War, 1943. 264

Organization. 264

Doctrinal Development 280

Development and Production. 284

Chapter 12 More Hard Knocks: Early Lessons Learned. 315

Chapter 13 Maturity: the Third Year of the War, 1944. 328

Organization. 328

Doctrinal Development 342

The German Challenge. 348

Development and Production. 362

Chapter 14 Europe: the Normandy Breakout 394

Chapter 15 Endgame, the Last Year of the War, 1945. 411

Organization. 411

Doctrinal Development 416

Getting the New Tanks Into Action. 420

Development and Production. 443

Chapter 16 Europe: The Winter of Discontent 454

Chapter 17 Firestorm in the Pacific. 487

Part Two: Controversies. 515

Chapter 18 Death Traps? Myths of U.S. Tank Development in World War II. 516

Chapter 19 The Great Tank Scandal? “It is said that it takes three of our Shermans to knock out a Tiger.”. 526

Chapter 20 Bigger Guns?. 539

Chapter 21 Where are the Tanks? The Real Tank Scandal 557

Chapter 22 What’s in a Name?. 580

Conclusion. 587

Appendix I: Other Ordnance Combat Vehicles. 590

U.S. Army Ordnance Self-Propelled Weapons Development and Production. 590

Armored Special Equipment 595

Remanufactured Tanks. 617

Appendix II: Lend-Lease. 619

Appendix III: Tank ‘T’ Numbers Assigned by Ordnance, 1926-1945. 631

Appendix IV: Tank Model Year, ‘Mark’, and ‘M’ Numbers Assigned by Ordnance, 1928-1945. 632

Appendix V: Principal Non-Tank ‘M’ Numbers Assigned by Ordnance, 1927-1945. 633

Appendix VI: The Cost of Ordnance. 636

Appendix VII: The Cost of War: U.S. Army Armored Personnel and Tank Losses in World War II. 640

Appendix VIII: Firing Tests. 668

Shoeburyness Test, 23 May 1944 (1st ETOUSA Test) 668

Balleroy Test, 10 July 1944 (2d ETOUSA Test) 672

1st Isigny Test, 12-30 July 1944 (3d ETOUSA Test) 673

2nd Isigny Test, 19-21 August 1944 (4th ETOUSA Test) 676

776th Tank Destroyer Battalion Test, 8 December 1944. 682

703d Tank Destroyer Battalion Test, 5-9 December 1944. 686

Bibliography. 690

Primary Sources. 690

Armored School Advanced Course Committee Reports. 690

Armor and Infantry School Student Papers. 692

The Armored School Research and Evaluation Division. 695

Other Primary Sources. 695

Secondary Sources. 707

Newspaper, Magazine, and Journal Articles. 718

Websites. 722

Videos. 724

 

List of Tables


Table 1: Organization of the Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized) 1935. 26

Table 2: Organization of the Ordnance Department, 31 July 1939. 31

Table 3: Tank Production 1921-1933. 66

Table 4: Tank Production 1934-1 September 1939. 67

Table 5: Tank Production 1 September 1939-30 June 1940. 100

Table 6: Armored Force General Staff, June 1940. 114

Table 7: Organization of the Armored Force, July 1940. 115

Table 8: The National Guard Tank Battalions. 119

Table 9: Organization of the Armored Division, 1940. 121

Table 10: Tank Production 1 July-31 December 1940. 136

Table 11: Medium Tank M3/Grant I Production. 160

Table 12: Medium Tank M3A1 Production. 161

Table 13: Medium Tank M3A2 Production. 161

Table 14: Medium Tank M3A3 Production. 161

Table 15: Medium Tank M3A4 Production. 162

Table 16: Medium Tank M3A5 Production. 162

Table 17: Medium Tank M3-Series Production. 162

Table 18: British Designations for the Medium Tank M3 Series (* = actually manufactured) 163

Table 19: Light Tank M3-Series Production. 166

Table 20: Tank Production 1 January-31 December 1941. 175

Table 21: Organization of the Armored Division, 1942. 198

Table 22: Organization of the Ordnance Department 1 February 1942. 201

Table 23: Organization of the Ordnance Department 1 September 1942. 202

Table 24: Medium Tank M4 (75mm) Production. 210

Table 25: Medium Tank M4A1 (75mm) Production. 212

Table 26: Medium Tank M4A2 (75mm) Production. 213

Table 27: Medium Tank M4A3 (75mm) Production. 214

Table 28: Medium Tank M4A4 (75mm) Production. 215

Table 29: Medium Tank M4A5 (RAM) Production. 217

Table 30: Medium Tank M4A6 (75mm) Production. 218

Table 31: British Designation for the Medium Tank M4-series. 219

Table 32: Light Tank M5-Series Production. 221

Table 33: British Designation for Light Tank M3 and M5. 222

Table 34: Tank Production 1 January-31 December 1942. 242

Table 35: Production of the T10 Shop Tractor (CDL) 268

Table 36: The Armored Group Headquarters. 271

Table 37: Unit Assignments to the Armored Divisions before the 1943 Reorganization. 272

Table 38: Organization of the Armored Division, 1943. 274

Table 39: Reorganization of the Armored Regiments, 1943. 274

Table 40: Unit Assignments to the Reorganized Armored Divisions. 276

Table 41: Tank Loading Capacity of Allied Landing Craft and Ships 1945. 299

Table 42: Light Tank T9E1 Production. 300

Table 43: Tank Production 1 January-31 December 1943. 313

Table 44: Organization of the 741st Tank Battalion for D-Day, 6 June 1944. 339

Table 45: Availability of Dozer Blades in the ETOUSA.. 341

Table 46: Allocation of 76mm and 105mm Armed Medium Tanks January- May 1944. 354

Table 47: ‘Ultimate Design’ Medium Tank M4A3 (75mm) Wet Production. 366

Table 48: ‘Ultimate Design’ Medium Tank M4-Series (76mm) Wet Production. 367

Table 49: ‘Ultimate Design’ Medium Tank M4-Series (105mm) Production. 368

Table 50: Status of ETOUSA Medium Tanks, 20 October – 20 December 1944. 368

Table 51: Medium Tank T23 Production. 370

Table 52: Light Tank M24 Production. 371

Table 53: Medium Tank T25 and T25E1 Production. 372

Table 54: Assault Tank M4A3E2 Production. 381

Table 55: Losses of the Medium (Assault) Tank M4A3E2. 385

Table 56: Heavy Tank T1-Series Production. 388

Table 57: Tank Production 1 January – 31 December 1944. 393

Table 58: Operational Tank Strength of VII Corps on the eve of Operation COBRA. 398

Table 59: Wartime Deployment and Inactivation of the Tank Battalions. 412

Table 60: Organization of the Armored Division, 1945. 416

Table 61: Status of T26E3 as of 14 April 1945. 430

Table 62: Heavy Tank T26E3 allocations and on hand, April 1945. 431

Table 63: Status of Heavy Tanks T26, 5 May 1945. 431

Table 64: Light Tanks M24 “on hand” with 12th Army Group, 3 March – 11 April 1945. 438

Table 65: Allocation of Light Tanks M24 to the 12th Army Group, 12 November 1944-213 April 1945. 438

Table 66: Light Tanks M24 with 12th Army Group Units, 28 April 1945. 439

Table 67: American 17-pdr Tank Conversions. 441

Table 68: Medium Tank M4-Series Production by Manufacturer 446

Table 69: Total OCO-D and OMP Medium Tank M4-series Production. 446

Table 70: Heavy Tank T26-Series Production. 449

Table 71: Tank Production 1 January – 31 August 1945. 453

Table 72: Tank Production 1 July 1940-31 August 1945. 453

Table 73: Change in Tank Strength, 5th Armored Division, 2200 24 November-8 December 1944. 464

Table 74: Status of HVAP as of 14 February 1945. 549

Table 75: Special Projectiles Manufactured for the 3-inch, 76mm, and 90mm guns (1,000’s). 549

Table 76: Principal Ordnance Tank Periscope Systems. 553

Table 77: Principal Ordnance Tank and GMC Telescopes. 554

Table 78: Medium Tank Deliveries to the ETOUSA, June-September 1944 (Partial) 564

Table 79: 12th Army Group Monthly Medium Tank Status. 573

Table 80: Average Daily Medium Tank Strength in 12th Army Group. 575

Table 81: First U.S. Army Tank Allocations Oct 44-Apr 45. 576

Table 82: Third U.S. Army Tank Allocations Oct 44-Apr 45. 577

Table 83: Ninth U.S. Army Tank Allocations Oct 44-Apr 45. 577

Table 84: Fifteenth U.S. Army Tank Allocations Jan-Apr 45. 577

Table 85: 12th Army Group Tank Allocations Nov 44-Jan 45. 577

Table 86: Total Tank Allocations to 12th Army Group Oct 44-Apr 45. 578

Table 87: On Hand and Redeployment of ETOUSA Tank Stocks 31 May-31 August 1945. 578

Table 88: Vehicle 5th Echelon Maintenance Awaiting Completion at ETOUSA Depots. 579

Table 89: Production of Tank Recovery Vehicles. 596

Table 90: Mechanized and Main Armament Flamethrower Production. 612

Table 91: Medium Tank M4-series Remanufactured Production. 617

Table 92: Light Tank M5, M5A1, and M3A3 Remanufactured Production. 618

Table 93: Medium Tank M3 Allocation to the British Empire as of July 1942. 620

Table 94: 21st Army Group Sherman Tank Holdings, 21 January 1945. 622

Table 95: Lend-Lease Tank Deliveries to Britain according to Hunnicutt 623

Table 96: Lend-Lease Tanks Deliveries to the UK according to Army Service Forces. 624

Table 97: Canadian Tank Situation in Northwest Europe, May and December 1944. 626

Table 98: Lend-Lease Tanks Shipped to the USSR.. 627

Table 99: Lend-Lease Tanks Shipped to the French. 629

Table 100: Lend-Lease Tank Shipments by Type and Recipient as Recorded by the War Department 629

Table 101: Estimated Value of Army Ordnance Procurement of Combat Vehicles ($-thousands) 638

Table 102: Armored Division Total Personnel Losses. 642

Table 103: U.S. Tank Casualties by Theater and Year as Calculated by ORO.. 643

Table 104: Total Work Orders by First U.S. Army Ordnance Maintenance. 644

Table 105: 12th Army Group Tank Losses by Armies. 645

Table 106: 12th Army Group Medium Tank Losses. 645

Table 107: Armored Division and Tank Battalion Tank Losses. 645

Table 108: Mechanized Cavalry Tank and Armored car Losses ETOUSA.. 647

Table 109: First U.S. Army Tank Loss by Type, 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. 647

Table 110: First U.S. Army Strength and Losses, June-July 1944. 648

Table 111: First French Army Medium Tank Losses. 649

Table 112: U.S. Army Tank Losses in North Africa and Sicily. 649

Table 113: U.S. Army Tank Losses in the Pacific. 650

Table 114: U.S. Marine Corps Losses in the Pacific. 651

Table 115: U.S. Army Tank and Armored Vehicle Losses in the European Theater of Operations. 652

Table 116: First Army Operational Tanks and Losses. 658

Table 117: Third Army Operational Tanks and Losses. 661

Table 118: Ninth Army Operational Tanks and Losses. 663

Table 119: Fifth Army Tank Losses, Italian Campaign. 666

 

The T26 was the T25, only with heavier armor and a wider track to compensate as best as possible for the greater weight. As I mentioned, it was originally called a "heavy-medium" tank, before the OCM agreed to bite the bullet and call it a heavy tank. However, it was always used as a medium tank in World War II. It replaced medium tanks on a one-for-one basis in the armored division and never was issued to the separate battalions, which is where originally it was thought heavy tanks would find a niche. It wasn't until the Korean War that the M26 and M46 were issued to separate tank battalions...but by then they had been reclassified as medium tanks, so it all came full circle. Or course, just to confuse everyone, the tank battalions they were issued were sometimes called heavy tank battalions...

 

You had me at "Table of Contents". Where's the pre-order? What's that saying.... "Shut up and take my money" ?

 

Its still in proof, and then I need to shop it about. The key problem is how to produce a 1,000-odd page book? I Know Chris managed to get Stackpole to do it with the condensed version of his Kursk book, but I don't think that will work here. I will keep you apprised.

 

As I understood it the US strategy was not tank vs tank even though I am sure the Allied knew of Tiger and Panther. So as more easy to handle and turn Sherman was chosen the main battle tank. Pershing was not slowed Down but in production Sherman was no 1 So naturally M26 Pershing was less produced than Sherman in General terms. Don't get me wrong I am pro-Pershing for Overlord but it also seems that production figures might have meant delaying the Overlord.

About the towed At guns. Defending does not bring you too close of the enemy. I read that the towed US At guns did not kill very Many German tanks during the battle of France.

 

Also about mobility. Operation Goodwood is the best example in my opinion to show that things can go wrong. Their own mine field forced the tanks go one by one and there were Traffic jams. Good way to start an offensive. Time for the Germans to prepare after the air bombing.

 

The Pershing never really 'fit' the style of war the US tried to fight in NW Europe, but the desire to keep up with the Jones's is hard to ignore. It doesn't help that power plant/drivetrain technology in WW II could not keep up with armor/gun size. A number of countries flirted with the 'breakthrough'/heavy tank, but I am not sure anyone actually got the concept to work, except for perhaps the Soviets. They did make for a effective mobile pillbox though.

 

Nobody's "strategy" was tank versus tank. Tank versus tank is pitting strength against strength, which is the exact antithesis of strategic, operational, and tactical thinking. EVERYONE planned that the primary "ant-tank" weapon would be antitank guns.

Yes, they "knew" of Tiger c, fall/winter 1942/1943 and rightly discounted it as unimportant. Panther the western allies did not "know" about until 5/6 June 1944.

"Sherman was chosen the main battle tank" from c. August 1940, about four years before "Pershing" was a glimmer in the designers eyes. "Pershing" eventually replaced "Sherman" entirely in production, so I would say it definitely "slowed" "Sherman" production. I also suspect the simple fact that "Sherman" was in wartime emergency production for three years, before a single "Pershing" was produced at the end of the war may have had something to do with the difference in numbers produced?

Considering there was zero "Pershing" production until November 1944, yes, indeed, I think it might have meant delaying Overlod.

Possibly not, but then there isn't much data to go on. OTOH, it is pretty evident based on solid data that the SP AT performed much better than towed AT.

 

Considering the ratio was counted as ca 5 Shermans to 1 Tiger or Panther I would see that as tank versus tank in the battlefield. But that is my opinion. But Sherman was chosen as the main battle tank for entering the continent anyway. The Allied High Command had to do the decision.

 

Shermans most often fought as a platoon(5 tanks) or as a company. Rarely were they employed individually. Hence the "5 Shermans" ratio.

 

There was no "5 Shermans" ratio until the wargaming community latched onto the notion sometime in the 1970s-1980s. It then got picked up in the spate of veterans memoirs, many of which were ghost written, in the 1990s and early 2000s.

The only thing that comes close to calculating and speaking of such a ratio was in a Washington Post article on 29 March 1945, "Specifically, the Panther and the Tiger tanks, according to the fighting men, are far superior to our Shermans. It is said that it takes three of our Shermans to knock out a Tiger." When the article was reprinted in Paris in the International Herald Tribune on 5 April 1945, it sparked the interest of General J.C.H. Lee, Deputy CG ETOUSA, who set his staff to analyzing the matter. The reply from the AFV&W Section, ETOUSA, is as complete an answer to the question as there has ever been, but is always ignored. You can read it in full, when For Purpose of Service Test is published.

Nor was the "Sherman" ever "chosen" as a "main battle tank', which is a post-World War II concept.

 

Are you saying that the quote did not mean 5 destroyed Shermans for One destroyed Tiger tank? Or the platoon could even be destroyed without the Tiger hurt If the five tanks were done with and there were no more to take part in the battle?

 

That, while logical, it is also quite literally an ex post facto reasoning based on a misremembering of the original source of the phrase.

 

[QUOTE="RichTO90, post: 861080, member: 30634"

Nor was the "Sherman" ever "chosen" as a "main battle tank', which is a post-World War II concept.[/QUOTE]

There was a lot of things to decide for the Allied High Command. If they did not decide between Shermans and Pershing then who did?

Also the British Bomber Command was not happy to help bombing Overlord targets as German cities were their main object.

 

I am always ready for new info but this is the first time I see the ratio changed. Then again I was stunned when the Kursk Prokhorovka tank ramming was more or less denied at least in the original quantity.

 

How does anyone "decide" for something that has essentially zero physical existence? The "Pershing" did not exist as anything other than ten pilots on 6 June 1944. Production of the Heavy Tank T26E3 did not begin until November 1944.

Try to read what I wrote before replying. There was no, zero, zilch, nada, "main battle tanks" in World War II. There were light, medium, and heavy tanks.

I'm sorry, but this thread title is "Why The M26 pershing come late into the war". Do you know what a "non sequiter" is?[/QUOTE]

 

[Q

UOTE="RichTO90, post: 860443, member: 30634"]Its still in proof, and then I need to shop it about. The key problem is how to produce a 1,000-odd page book? I Know

Are you including Tank Destroyers in your boo regarding production, numbers, and doctrine?

 

It is ex post facto, but so is the "5 Shermans". The original quote, IIRC, was from General Collins...3 or 4 Sherman tanks attacking a Tiger simultaneously...Which itself implies platoon level coordination in the attack.