Why The M26 pershing come late into the war

Exactly, but the "original quote" is for three...and was suposedly uttered by an anonymous sergeant, possibly 2d AD if IIRC? All this is covered pretty extensively in For Purpoe of Service Test.

 

Not completely. Nick Moran already covered production and other tech data in Can Openers.

 

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Ok. What do you think of Leslie McNair who opposed M26? The tanks were considered to protect the infantry and the At tanks were to take care of enemy tanks. Also the Sherman seems to have been consided to be a match to any enemy tanks. So in the end the infantry would fight the infantry and very probably the protective Shermans would end up fighting enemy tanks in close combat as the enemy would attack the infantry.

Sorry about the postings that went mixed but you had sent one when I was writing my reply. I Checked the time table and you had sent it two minutes before my posting.

 

In One source it is mentioned that the Sherman engine was the same used for the first Pershings which naturally was underpowered. So the tanks also competed for the same engine in ww2 production? Is this true?

 

Not much, since he didn't. He opposed sending untested weapons into combat. He was also unclear why a specialized antitank tank was necessary given the proliferation of the Tank Destroyers.

Um, the tank was originally a weapon intended to support the infantry, not to protect it. It was primarily intended as an offensive weapon. "At [sic] tanks" in the American Army were Tank Destroyers. In the British Army they were Royal Artillery Antitank, and in the German Army they were Panzerjaeger. It was primarily intended as a defensive weapon.

Why, yes, through mid 1943, when it was. The problem is its intended upgrade took too long to develop and its replacement even longer. The root cause of that was not "McNair", but simple lack of development experience.

"You will note that Rose, one of our finest Division Commanders, as well as junior officers and enlisted men serving within his Division, are all dissatisfied with the performance of the present Sherman tank. Their criticisms, of course, relate primarily to direct duel between the Sherman and the Panther or Tiger. We have always known that the Sherman, particularly with the 75 gun, was very badly handicapped in this specific set of circumstances." General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Forces, 26 March 1945

Not really. For the Germans it was usually a case of fighting American or British infantry supported by tanks, while they had to rely solely on hand held AT and towed AT weapons. The average German division could rely typically on less than a half-dozen SP AT and a few more towed AT.

No problem, it happens.

 

Yes, the preferred Medium Tank M4A3 and the T26-series both used slightly different versions of the Ford GA-series of 8-cylinder, water-cooled, gasoline engines. They did not really "compete" since the T26 production was intended to replace the M4 production. However, it is also true that engine development and production was a major bottleneck throughout the war.

 

McNair was the commander of Army Ground Forces ( AGF) so he decided about the main tank and self-propelled at "tanks" and towed At guns?

Did Devers pass McNair and talked to Marshall to get the Pershing production get started?

 

Um, no, not exactly. As in most American Army decisions it was by committee. AGF had authority over the organization and equipment of the combat arms, but only up to a point. In theory, a requirement for a new weapon system came from the end user. In this case the Armored Force. It went to the Ordnance Committee, which was comprised of members of all interested parties, for consideration. If approved, a development pilot was produced and went through engineering tests. If passed, then the Ordnance Committee authorized additional pilots produced for service testing by the end user. If passed, a Army Service Forces decided on whether or not it would be produced and X number authorized were produced. The decision on production was based upon materials priorities, availability of production facilities, and the number required by the end users to initially equip X number of units and as replacements.

McNair's policy was to back requirements requests, but also to ensure that weapons going to the end users were combat ready. In that he had major difficulties dealing with pie in the sky attitudes from some in the Ordnance Department who did the design and engineering testing of new weapons. Many there seemed to believe that a neato keen design was combat ready, just because it was neato keen. The Medium (later Heavy) Tank T26E1 is a case in point. Ordnance wanted authorization to produce and ship 250 of them to end users...before the design was completed, before a production pilot was completed, and before any engineering or service testing had been completed. McNaor thought that wasn't a very smart idea. I agree.

Anyway, here is where it also starts to get really complicated. The Armored Force typically initiated requirements, but once Armored Force units were deployed to theaters of war they were no longer "owned" by the Armored Force or by the Armored Force's superior at AGF. Instead, they were then part of the theater of war. So now you have multiple interested parties - Armored Force, AGF, ASF, and the Ordnance Department - all with slightly different viewpoints, requirements, and priorities. Is it really surprising there were complications?

Devers is an interesting character. He made decisions, but also tended to change his mind. One reason for the delay in delivery of the Medium Tank M4 with 76mm gun was because of him changing his mind. However, when he made his request for an "assault tank" for NEPTUNE he was not commander of the Armored Force, which was his role when development of the T20-series began on 25 May 1942. He was commander of ETOUSA, a theater commander, and had not been directly involved with the development of the T20-series since May 1943...he was effectively six months "out of the loop". Worse, when the War Department acted on clarifying the request after McNair stated the obvious, pointing out that 250 T26E1 did not exist, had not been tested in any way, and were unlikely to be available for NEPTUNE, Devers was NO LONGER THERE TO REPLY! He had been replaced by Eisenhower, who knew even less about the matter, but went along with Devers request anyway.

However, that did not get "Pershing production...started", because that development pilot still had not been completed...and it had not been decided yet whether future tank production resources were to go to the T26 or to the T25. Production did not start until November 1944, when the pilots were engineering and service tested (March-June 1944), the decision was finally made for the T26 over the T25 (May), the 26E1 was rejected, then redesigned as the T26E3, and finally approved for production (September).

Anyway, on 24 December 1943, McNair overruled his own AGF Requirements Section, which recommended fighting the War Department decision to place the T25/T26 in the production plan for FY 1945 and produce 250 by April 1945. His point of view was the decision was made and it was AGF's responsibility to carry it out, which they did.

 

Yes, Can Openers by Nicholas Moran. You know, the "Chieftain"? It is a modern "Hunnicutt" that covers the development of the SP Tank destroyer during World War II. He does not cover unit organization or development though. I briefly cover the organizational development of the Tank Destroyers as it related to the Armored Force, but only give total production for the various GMC.

 

Ok. Fine by me " RichTO90 ".

 

How do I order the book?

Do you have copies of "Hitler's Last Gamble?

 

https://www.amazon.com/Can-Openers-Development-Anti-Tank-Carriages/dp/1635618592

Only my own. Search Amazon.