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How long to plan and execute a major maneuver?

Discussion in 'Eastern Europe October 1939 to February 1943' started by the_diego, Feb 17, 2021.

  1. the_diego

    the_diego Active Member

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    From "Panzer Leader" I recall it took Guderian more than a week to convince OKH that he should swing south a part of Panzer Group Guderian (Army Group Center) to link with von Runstedt's Army Group South, thereby encircling Budeny's force of 600,000 at Kiev. Does it really take that long to make a major change in battle strategy? How long did it take the Germans to plan and implement the Kursk salient?

    Last how long before the opponent mounts a counter-attack?
     
  2. Kai-Petri

    Kai-Petri Kenraali

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    Stahel and Kiev 1941

    The difficulties in the Ukraine were not, however, what interested OKH, who were responsible for directing Germany´s war in the east. For the army commanders as well as the senior generals at AGC, Moscow was the sole objective they were prepared to consider for the second phase of the campaign. The result was a standoff with Hitler as a strategic crisis paralysed the German commandfrom the third week of July until 23 August. In the end it was Hitler who broke the deadlock by categorically overruling any further debate, denouncing the army commanders for their supposed ineptitude and insisting that Panzer Group 2, on the southern wing of AGC, turn south and strike into the Ukraine.

    In late August Kirponos´s South-Western Front occupied a salient with its apex on Kiev. These flanks were under attack by Guderian´s Panzer Group 2 and Weichs Second Army;then under AGS came Reichenau´s Sixth Army and Kleist´s Panzer Group 1.

    As Guderian was poised to begin his drive south, Kleist´s Panzer Group was far from being able to offer any assistance. The hard battles of June and July , followed by the long drive into the bend of the Dnepr in August, had taken their toll. So too was Kleist denied the respite he desired.

    ( Must continue later on as the book is so huge for one evening to go through....)
     
  3. Kai-Petri

    Kai-Petri Kenraali

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    Continues...more problems...

    Von Rundstedt might well have known better. His Army Group confronted an operational zone some 750 kilometers in length from the L´vov salient down to the Black Sea. AGC, by contrast, faced only a 320-kilometre front and possessed almost 2,000 tanks betweeen its two panzer groups. Kleist´s Pz Group I numbered just over 600 tanks and had to contend with the Soviet South-Western Front commanded By General Kirponos. Kirponos commanded the single largest concentration of Soviet forces on the eastern front. Even the Soviet figures attribute to Kirponos a six to one advantage in tanks and a two to one superiority in aircraft.Also there was in mthe Southern front General Tyulenev´s forces, an additional 320,000 men. AGC 797,000 men faced 1,2 million Soviet troops.

    Kiev: By July 13 German reconnaissance conclusively revealed that Soviet fortifications and troop concentrations offered no chance of a surprise attack, and ultimately the city would remain in Soviet hands more than two more months.

    Yet Kiev was also significantly larger than Stalingrad, with 850,000 inhabitants.Kiev´s importance was growing since mid-July as Red Army units were being rushed to Kirpono´s front.To ensure city´s survival an outer defensive zone was being manned.

    Indeed at the end of July and early August there were numerous unsuccessful attempts by Reichenau´s XXIX Army Corps to seize Kiev.

    From the middle of July AGS was increasingly able to assert its dominance in the Ukraine. Hitler however was more and more concerned with the AGS and advocated a southern thrust by Guderian Panzer Group 2, but this was bitterly resisted by the generals of the OKH. Kleist´s motorized formations pressed their advantage, striking souh-east to effect an encirclement with the 17th Army. This was von Rundstedt´s first large-scale strategic victory, but it took until early August for the trap to be shut, and even then it ensnared only 103,000 Soviet soldiers. The encirclement of Uman eliminated the bulk of two Soviet Armies.Kirponos was still in command of a cohesive fighting force.

    Even before the end of July it was obvious AGS could not meet its objectives due to Soviet resistance.

    In a statement to the men of AGS on 15 August, von Rundstedt openly addressed what he referred to as the ´extraordinary`demands of the campaign.

    By the end of August, von Rundstedt confronted a serious dilemma that was shared, although in no way adequately appreciated, by the whole German command.

    The summer ended badly for the Germany, hopes were still fully invested in the successful outcome. I late August and Septemberr that hope was focused on the Ukraine and the battle of Kiev.

    ---------------

    As you can see the AGS fought a numerically superior force they still managed to go ahead. I think this just shows von Rundsted was not in any optimal or normal position to attack and neither was Guderian.

    However, Hitler had given an order for Guderian to turn south in mid-July, and Guderian was able to start his thrust August 2. However if I recall right he had the first combat experience late August. AGS practically fought where they were. To cut a long story short here. I will check the details later on more.
     
  4. Sheldrake

    Sheldrake Member

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    The OP asked a question about the time to plan and execute a major manouvre, but then quoted an example about the length of time it took to make a decision - which is a different question.

    As a rule of thumb, based on cold war British practice,

    A company level operation takes maybe 15 minutes to plan.
    A battalion is thinking an hour ahead
    A Brigade is thinking four to twelve hours ahead.
    A Division plans one or two days ahead. Ops fights todays battle, while the GOC and plans think about tomorrow
    A Corps two or three days to a week
    An Army a week to a month ahead
    An Army group plans a month or season ahead.
    Strategy can be a year ahead.

    Rule of thirds - one third planning
    Operations are always a function of the logistically possible
    and
    Death may be certain but comms are not.
    and
    A bad plan excuted well is better than a great plan poorly executed
    and
    No plan survives contact with the enemy

    "any time lost that could have been saved is a gift, made to the enemy, that he will use against us; any time saved is a resource of which we deprive the enemy, in his defense against us or in his attack upon us."

    I read and understood, but did not like Stahel. Historians take stances. He is anti the panzer generals and Manstein and an apologist for Hitlers decisions. However, I mistrust his judgement. I don't think Stahel understands the concepts of manouvre warfare. Blitzkrieg may not have been a doctrine but merely a description of the effects, the Panzer generals understood that their technology delivered tactical victories with a high tempo. The Germans had to "flee to the front".

    Karl -Heinz Frieser's Blitzkrieg Legend covers decision making in the 1940 campaign and gives examples of the differences between German and French reaction times for tactical moves.
     
    Last edited: Feb 22, 2021
    Kai-Petri likes this.

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