At what point was the war in the east lost for nazi germany? Was it at the gates of Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk or did the Germans ever have a chance to beat the Soviet Union? Could they have won if Operation Sealion was succesful, or was the presence of the western allies irrelevant to the outcome?

I believe the war against Russia was doomed before it even began.

While enjoying success in Crete and the Balkans, the Germans wasted a crucial few weeks to invade Russia - with winter soon after. This caught the Nazis off guard as they were initially ill-equiped for the weather, and this bought impotant time for the Soviets to prepare/regroup. I think that this seriously hindered the German advance, all the way to the end.

I personally beleive that the war was lost for Germany after the Kursk failure. Stalingrad was a huge German defeat, but the fact of the matter is Germany still had the forces and resources to mount another large-scale offensive. After its failure the Wehrmacht was in disaray till the end of the war.

T34 and KV1 were very nasty surprises, only 88 antitank guns were able to kill them at a distance... If you think Stalin knew better about Operation Citadel (Kursk) than Hitler himself, and the Stalingrad Trap, one thing seems clear: German intelligence made a really poor job!

I think Germans may have take Moscow in 1941, but no one can say if that would have been a major victory.

I think a victory on Staline was only possible by raising the people of USSR against him and communists, people of Ukraine suffered so much in the 30s they would have been really eager to fight for anyone trying to free them. And then the SS came and burned the villages and kill mothers and children...

Nazis just harvested what they sowed.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Erich Hartmann:
...
While enjoying success in Crete and the Balkans, ...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
Crete a success?

I can’t see loosing 4,000 to 6,400 men of best-trained airborne and mountain troops, plus 271 of the very valuable and needed transport planes (that’s a loss rate of 54%) on seizing an island in order to gain a better defense position as a *victory*.

IIRC, there weren’t significant German air raids from Crete against Suez / Red Sea or any other place later in the war. Even the CiC Student (not Milch, as I misstated earlier) said: “I was miscalculating when I proposed the attack and this meant not only the loss of many parachutists...but in consequence, the death of the German airborne weapon itself”. By “miscalculating” that bad in Crete the German General Staff lost the possibilities for the subsequent invasions of Cyprus / Malta.

But I digress...

"I can’t see loosing 4,000 to 6,400 men of best-trained airborne and mountain troops, plus 271 of the very valuable and needed transport planes (that’s a loss rate of 54%) on seizing an island in order to gain a better defense position as a *victory*."
-AndyW

Andy, if you're going to base the difference of victory or defeat on the number of casualties, we mind as well label the D-day invasion a failure for the Allies. Rommel has been quoted as saying that high losses is sometimes is necessary for success.

I think the nazis could have won the war even up to mid 1944. Hitler never really moblised of rtotal war until that date, and the soviets were losing millions of troops every 'vicory'. Of course DDay would have to have failed, and had Rommel and others been allowed to act, it would have been.

I think the war was lost May 22, 1941, but not because of any military strategy, but because of racial politics. The average soviet knew they had it bad with Stalin, he nistreated his people terribly. When Hitler invaded, many believed the Germans were liberators, especially the westernmost soviet states; Ukrain, Estonia etc. However, as Cowboy said; "And then the SS came and burned the villages and kill mothers and

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Erich Hartmann:
"I can’t see loosing 4,000 to 6,400 men of best-trained airborne and mountain troops, plus 271 of the very valuable and needed transport planes (that’s a loss rate of 54%) on seizing an island in order to gain a better defense position as a *victory*."
-AndyW

Andy, if you're going to base the difference of victory or defeat on the number of casualties, we mind as well label the D-day invasion a failure for the Allies. Rommel has been quoted as saying that high losses is sometimes is necessary for success. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

It’s not primary the number of losses up to a level were a weapon is inoperable for another use (paratroops and air transport), but the fact that no adequate advantage has been drawn out of the seizure of Crete.

And yes, I know: Rommel was known to waste his soldiers. I don’t blame him exclusively for that: Many German Generals did so.


<FONT COLOR="#ff0000" SIZE="1" FACE="Verdana, Arial">This message has been edited by AndyW on 16 October 2000 at 07:20 AM</font>

oops, a double posting. I fix it...


<FONT COLOR="#ff0000" SIZE="1" FACE="Verdana, Arial">This message has been edited by AndyW on 16 October 2000 at 07:24 AM</font>

Yes, in the end the was absolutely NO advantage in taking Crete. However, be it a victory OR loss, valuable time/supplies were lost as the invasion of Russia had a later start, with winter fast approaching.

I think that the war in the east was lost as soon as the Russian winter forced the german advance to a halt. Once that happened the Germans were never again able to generate enough steam to push the Soviets back (once the advance was slowed the shock of invasion and loss finallt subsided and the Red army finally started to organize itself.) Although i think the German army was superior to the Russians until at least mid 43. The loss of advance from the fist days of invasion was deadly to the operation just because of the plain volume of Russian arms.
Once the Germans could no longer make significant advances a stalemate ensued until someone weakened. As the months went on and winters came and went...Russian industry (which was moved beyond the range of german bombs) way out produced germany.
Then finally when the Atlantic wall was breached in 44 that forced the eastern front to be significantly weakened. Thus making victory an impossibility.
I think hitler invaded to early. He had to neutraliz britian so as to concentrate forces in Russia. They should have been more prepared for the weather patterns. Resuppling should have been better organized. and the populace should not have been abused. (almost like the Allies taking advantage of the French) This of course pertaining to those areas not loyal to Stalin. Hitler treated ALL Russians with the same indignity pro or cons to their cause.
The germans had to either attack or be ready to attack for i'm not sure but i think i heard that the Russians were planning there own invasion in the future if germany didn't invade.

Well said Ron, except i don't believe Russians would have tried to invade Germany. Stalin was mad, but he was extremely skilled when it comes to it's personnal power. He knew very well the danger Hitler was for him, and he tried to ally with french and british against Nazis for year. When he saw none was going to declare war to Hitler just to save him, he betrayed them and Molotov signed the Germano Sovietic non-agression pact in 1939.
He knew Hitler was going to attack anyway, but that was a trick to gain some time and reinforce the Red Army against the unavoidable invasion.
The "russian invasion" was the official German propanganda pretext for Plan Barbarossa... Stalin was trying to avoid the war with Germany at all cost, actually for the first hours of the war the russian border troops didn't shoot back because they were ordered not too: Staline trying to postpone the war.
Sorge, the famous soviet spy, warned Staline about Barbarossa, but Staline decided a war against Germany was no good, no good at all, so he won't do it. And that's why he didn't believe his best agent, and he didn't believe his own troops when they claimed being bombed by Luftwaffe: that could have been a plot from his enemies to get him in war against Hitler and take his power in his back while he was not searching for them...

My opinion about the russian campaing is that Hitler was too much concern about Moscou. The first objectif of Barbarossa was Leningrad. A that time leningrad was a main industry place, with KVI factories, a very important harbour and the key to isolate Mourmansk, the main route of the american suplying line. I am sure that it was a good idea to take Leningrad, specially, because it could help, in order later to isolate moscow.

Instate of that, Hitler, change the plans, stop the batlle of Leningrad, and ordered a frontal attack of Moscow. In my opinion probably, the german army lost the East war here.

Comet

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>
Originally posted by Ron:

I think that the war in the east was lost as soon as the Russian winter forced the german advance to a halt.
<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

It was the Red Army and the losses it inflicted on the Wehrmacht which made Operation BARBAROSSA a failure, not the winter. That’s just a popular excuse of German General’s memoir literature. See below.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>
Although i think the German army was superior to the Russians until at least mid 43.
<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Until that time both Operation BARBAROSSA, TYPHOON and BLAU failed, the Wehrmacht lost some 1.5 million men as KIA / MIA and was retreating, an entire German Army was killed off at Stalingrad, and the next defeat (Kursk) led to the total collapse of the Eastern Front. In which point was the German Army superior to the Russians?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>
The loss of advance from the fist days of invasion was deadly to the operation just because of the plain volume of Russian arms.
<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

And because out of the fact that out of 3.3 million Wehrmacht soldiers at the beginning of BARBAROSSA, 753,046 or nearly a quarter had been eliminated (KIA, MIA, WIA, Army only) by the Red Army until Dec. 1, 1941. Plus material losses.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>
I think hitler invaded to early. He had to neutraliz britian so as to concentrate forces in Russia.
<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

How should he neutralize Britain at time? Building up a strategic airfleet? Re-building the navy that has already been crippled at Norway? How much time do you think he has to do this? What do you think Stalin was doing in the meantime?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>
They should have been more prepared for the weather patterns. Resuppling should have been better organized. and the populace should not have been abused. (almost like the Allies taking advantage of the French)
<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

As the “weather-myth” shows up again and again, let me re-post some facts.

Halder ordered preparation for Winter on July 8, 1941

An OKW-paper issued at end of August 1941 speaks frankly about the fact that there is the need for further operations in 1942. Hitler approved this document, which makes it highly probable that he accepted the fact that more troops had to stay in Russia over the winter than originally planned – the question is how many?

Halder’s goals to achieve BEFORE Winter were Hitler’s goals of 1942. It is obvious that it was Halder / OKH who “pushed” AGC into winter; he finally was allowed to go for *his beloved* target (Moscow) and he did it against all risks.

During the entire Autumn of 1941 the General Quartermaster, Wagner issued hundreds of memos, orders etc. Re: Winter preparation. In the beginning all went according to the initial BARBAROSSA plan of only preparing a occupation force of 56 Divisions, soon later increased to 750,000 men, ending up with the need to equip the entire Eastern Army.

Alas, Wagner was notoriously optimistic (not the best characteristic for an ‘supply guy’) but not a bit as strong-willed and energetic as f.ex. the commander of U.S. Army Service Forces, General Somervell. Facing limited transport capacity, he tended to serve the different Armies’ requests hand to mouth. These were, due to TYPHOON, ammunition, spare parts and fuel, not winter equipment.

As the frost arrived, he was – surprise, surprise - bombed with requests from the Army and Army Groups HQ’s for winter equipment. Fulfilling this requests would have needed an additional 100 trains, which was absolute fantasy. Even worse, 70% to 80% of the German locomotives broke down due to frostbite – their cooling system was outside the fuselage (contrary to the Soviet locomotives’).

Conclusion: the OKW / OKH, the Quartermasters and Hitler knew that Winter was coming and they realized pretty early that the mass of the Eastern Army needed to stay in Russia during the Winter. Halder’s and the High Commands wishful thinking in Operation TYPHOON permitted the adequate logistic preparations for Winter.

Given all this, a one-sided blaming of Hitler for this blundering comes too short for me.

Sorry for the lenght.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by COMET:
My opinion about the russian campaing is that Hitler was too much concern about Moscou. The first objectif of Barbarossa was Leningrad. A that time leningrad was a main industry place, with KVI factories, a very important harbour and the key to isolate Mourmansk, the main route of the american suplying line. I am sure that it was a good idea to take Leningrad, specially, because it could help, in order later to isolate moscow.

Instate of that, Hitler, change the plans, stop the batlle of Leningrad, and ordered a frontal attack of Moscow. In my opinion probably, the german army lost the East war here.

Comet<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You can’t blame Hitler for that.

The change is due to the permanent pressure of the German General Staff, namely Halder to go for Moscow. Hitler was always in favorite of Leningrad and the Ukraine, but the Army leadership did their own thing.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by AndyW:
I think hitler invaded to early. He had to neutraliz britian so as to concentrate forces in Russia.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

How should he neutralize Britain at time? Building up a strategic airfleet? Re-building the navy that has already been crippled at Norway? How much time do you think he has to do this? What do you think Stalin was doing in the meantime?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

As you know, we already discuss about Britain in the "what if" board. And yes, for me it was not possible to invade UK before summer 1941.
And the Luftwaffe was not what it should have been, they had no real strategic bombers, and the transports were not sufficient to supply surrendered units dying in the snow. They knew about Napoleon's "Grand Armée", supply in Russia should have been main concern. And Goering believed he could save Paulus...

The worst IMHO is the lack of good German intelligence. T34 and KV1 were big surprises, Panzers were outclassed at the time and none knew it. Stavka knew about major German offensive before they begin to move (Citadel...), OKH/OKW never saw Operation Uranus coming.

And of course Japanese could have been used to help keep Siberians away from the "west" front, the Nipo-Sovietic non agression pact was a nice gift to Molotov.

It was the Red Army and the losses it inflicted on the Wehrmacht which made Operation BARBAROSSA a failure, not the winter. That’s just a popular excuse of German General’s memoir literature. See below.

Well i wasn't using the winter as the MAIN excuse. However i think the weather saved Russia. I say this because if it was summer or fall all the time the advance would not have slowed and Germany would have been able to make it to Moscow. Also if the weather was not a problem i'm sure there wouldn't have been such a supply problem.

[/b][/quote]
Until that time both Operation BARBAROSSA, TYPHOON and BLAU failed, the Wehrmacht lost some 1.5 million men as KIA / MIA and was retreating, an entire German Army was killed off at Stalingrad, and the next defeat (Kursk) led to the total collapse of the Eastern Front. In which point was the German Army superior to the Russians?

I guess superior is a strong word. I think that the leadership and general skill of the german soldier was better until a point. The only reason i believe the Russians were pushing the germans back until 43 was the massive volume of the russian military. After that i think the moral of the german soldier was low and training lessened and that the Russian soldier whose moral was increasing and training also increasing became a better soldier than the german soldier.

[/b][/quote]
How should he neutralize Britain at time? Building up a strategic airfleet? Re-building the navy that has already been crippled at Norway? How much time do you think he has to do this? What do you think Stalin was doing in the meantime?

What i meant here really was that it NEVER was really wise to invade Russia. Only until Britian surrendered was an invasion of Russia safe. Hitler should had concentrated his military on Britian until Britian surrendered. Of course since this neer happened he should never have made a second front for himself.

[/b][/quote]
As the “weather-myth” shows up again and again,

I don't really blame Hitler for misjudging the weather. His generals should have done their homework. NOBODY knew how much the weather would effect logistics and supply. But they should have been better prepared. If they had been better prepared their invasion wouldn't have lost so much steam in that first winter.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>
Originally posted by Ron:

However i think the weather saved Russia
<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

BARBAROSSA was planned to be finished before winter. By August 1941 the Germans knew that they won’t make it until that and prepared for winter. Winter isn’t a kind of unexpected catastrophe, and even the Germans have calendars. The miscalculation in the timetable and execution of plan BARBAROSSA “saved” Russia, not the fact that there are such things like seasons in mother nature.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>
The only reason i believe the Russians were pushing the germans back until 43 was the massive volume of the russian military
<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Isn’t it always good to field as much military power as possible in a military conflict? I’m sure the Germans would have been glad if they would have had 1.5 million more men plus material on the East Front. Unfortunately for them, these 1.5 m had already been killed / captured / destroyed by the Red Army.

And wouldn’t you say that there was also pretty much strategic blundering on the German side, too?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>
What i meant here really was that it NEVER was really wise to invade Russia
<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I agree.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>
His generals should have done their homework. NOBODY knew how much the weather would effect logistics and supply. But they should have been better prepared. If they had been better prepared their invasion wouldn't have lost so much steam in that first winter.
<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Again, they knew about winter and its negative impacts, but it wasn’t a relevant factor in their plan BARBAROSSA.. As soon as they realized that they might have a timing problem (caused by the Soviet resistance, BTW), they reacted adequately. At the beginning of winter _everything_ was there. It just couldn’t be shipped because the rail transport capacities were used for TYPHOON instead.

With 20/20 hindsight, you can blame Halder for playing vabanque in starting TYPHOON in 1941, but you can’t excuse the failure of BARBAROSSA with the Russian winter.

Only German Generals do this.

I agree with Hartmann

The war was lost since the begining of Barbarossa operation.
German army lost a very important time and "energy" in the Mediterranean area.

Italians had a very important part on this lose of time, due to the invasion of Greece before the german plans (if they existed).
Germany should not attack Creta.
They should press not more.
They should attack Malta.
Anyway, Mediterranean area was the begining of the end in the german war.

bye

oh well...i don't have the best knowledge of this theater. However i am reading a book called "The Forgotten Soldier" in which he writes about his own expierences during the war in the East. Details that i noticed was the horrible supply system of the germans (greatly hampered by the weather), The large amount of training on the soldiers, and the unending supply of men by the russians.
But also...if the germans were that prepared for the winter...then why did SO many men die of the cold and of starvation?
I think they realized the weather...i just think they underestimated the effect it would have...

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Ron:
But also...if the germans were that prepared for the winter...then why did SO many men die of the cold and of starvation?
I think they realized the weather...i just think they underestimated the effect it would have...


<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

German winter equipment was designed for Central European winter conditions. Extreme harsh weather conditions were of disadvantage for Germany’s “Sunshine army”. The equipment was there, but couldn’t be shipped to the front because of rail transport limitations. The trains were busy transporting men, material, fuel for TYPHOON instead winter equipment.

Rail (and any other) infrastructure in Russia was bad. The Germans knew that, but can’t do anything about it. (How long and how many men would it have taken to built new railway lines and streets?). The limited rail and street system was a fixed factor one can’t easily change. You have to deal with it or leave it.

It’s like saying: “We would have won the Russian war if Russia would have had France’s infrastructure and size, if there wouldn’t have been Russian manpower but French’s and if there wouldn’t have been mud when it rains, frost in winter, heat in the summer etc...”