Good points, Martin. I had forgotten about the Carell time period. That would make sense in regards to his praise of Stalin's spies. But I still have one major problem- the speed of information still dosen't seem to work. Hitler did not decide on the date of July 5 until July 2- only three days beforehand. And yet somehow Stalin knew about this to the hour of the attack. Three days does not seem like enough time to intercept, decode, and share such info. Again, ULTRA decripts were shared through normal diplomatic channels, which often took weeks- the Bletchley park boys certainly did their work, but even they could not fight diplomatic red tape, I would think...

And one more thing- if I remember correctly, the instructions on July 2 were given to the generals IN PERSON by Hitler- if that was the case, there would have been nothing for ULTRA to intercept, correct?
That would seem not to explain how Stalin knew the exact hour the attack was to commence...
We should certainly try to get more info on this...

Erich- I've been using that site for a while now! I wonder about some of his info though- he certainly has plenty of sources listed, but then he does not cite any of his info. I'd like to know which of those sources he relys on, etc.
Great site though!

I get the idea that in many cases the stukas were used before an attack actually started on a certian position. The stukas would soften the position up (considering the lack of artillery), then the main attack would commence. Direct air support would have definetely been far more difficult- distinguishing friends from enemies and so on. But you're right- besides mentions of Rudel's tank busting stukas, the air element seems to get little notice.
I haven't read about that account, Erich... I have read something about many russian planes being wiped out on the ground by a stroke of luck early in the battle, July 5 I think. But my memory could be failing me on this one...

Friedrich, if you know about the stukas, why did you dismiss air support in your previous post???

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Pressure? We feel no pressure. We have come to cry havoc, let loose the dogs of war, and hear the lamentations of your women. Also, we will very likely kick over the cart with all those Jeter Beanie Babies. Because we're that kind of crazy.

What?! Excuse my Frainch, crazy...

I had seen that site too. Great one. Do you remember that question of Martin of the bloody Psel river and the little stupid town in the quiz? Which by the way did not let me sleep... Hehehe... I searched for the maps back there in that site. Actually, I got in touch with the host of the site and asked him about Martin's question...

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

You're right about citations, one reason why we tried to do so on our site since we had a number of vets check out our postings and correct us in a flash. Think the Panzerstaffeln of St 2 were still in the experimental stage and of course Rüdel and his boys went nutz with all the Soviet targets. I see 19 Hs 129B-2's lost during the Kursk escpade, all due to Soviet AA fire. Two Hs 129's lost to Soviet fighters. I have two huge accounts taken from the masterwerk from martin Pegg. The first was the destruction of 80 soviet tanks and the second took two days to destroy the large Russian formation of mixed panzers. I'll see if my hands can take us through the first account soon.....

E

I think we're getting there, Crazy. You're absolutely right about the 'fine tuning' of the exact attack time.

Piekalkiewicz ( again! ) deals with the battle day-by-day. As the attack drew closer, it seems the Soviets gathered intelligence from several sources in the field.
According to Marshal Vasilevsky :
'The reconnaissance service informed the General Staff during the night of 2 July that it was certain that the enemy would go on the offensive no later than the 6 July . I immediately reported this to Stalin and requested permission to inform the fronts without delay.'
Lt-General Batov, commanding 65th Army :
'Since 1st July we had been waiting for the offensive which could begin at any moment...The officers did not leave their observation posts for even an hour.'
Lt.-Gen. Moskalenko :
'..we learned that a German soldier of the 168th Infantry Division in the Kondiryev area ...had been captured by the Sixth Guards Army. According to him, the assault was to open northeast of Belgorod during the night of 5 July. The German soldiers had already received their cold rations...they had engineers with them to clear minefields and remove obstacles'.

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"Stand by to pull me out of the seat if I get hit" - Guy Gibson

Those are very nice notes, Herr Bull!!! Thanks.

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

Lots of Panthers were lost due to Transmission/ gear failures and engine faults. This was due to a lack of testing and the rush to get the vehicle into service.

The Tiger seems to have been more reliable but many were lost to mechanical faults.

T-34... think the engines in those things never broke down!!!

Also consider the differing crosscountry performance between the tanks, and dont forget the majority of german tanks would have been III & IV.

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"Watch that Fu*ker, he'll 'ave someones eye out!" King Harold at Hastings 1066.

Quite true, Red. The T-34 was very, very reliable.

And then, if we had a lot of Marks III and IV, then we also had very reliable tanks, although not to adequate for tank-to-tank combat.

Well, gentlemen. I am going out for a few days, you know, a honeymoon...

I will see you guys later and will return to post a lot on Thursday. [img]smile.gif[/img]

I want to bloody see this thread with five pages, OK!!!

Wiedersehen!

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

Erich- do you have a kursk-related site? I'm confused...
And, I got one answer to something- the northern forces did include Tiger battalions. According to Healy (Kursk 1943 from Osprey Campaign series), 1st and 2nd Companies of Heavy Panzer Battalion 505, equipped with Tiger Is, were attached to the 6th Infantry Division on the northern front. (One thing from Healy though- he refers to the companies, as above, then in the next sentence refers to the Tiger "regiments"-?) Restayn (Tigers on the Eastern Front) confirms that the 505th was at Kursk. Both also agree about at least one action- on the 5th, the two tiger companies aided in smashing the 15th russian infantry and attached tanks. Restayn claims the 505th destroyed 42 T-34s during this action. Restayn (with a typo- he states July 1 as the date) claims the 1st company lost it's commander, Hauptmann Riedesel. Healy and Carell note the overall commander for 505th being Major Sauvant.
Erich, Healy also mentions the Hs129s. Hauptmann Meyer, flying a reconaissance group of Hs129s armed with 37mm cannon came across a T-34 brigade coming out of some woods. Healy claims the Hs129s destroyed 50 T-34s.

Healy's work is pretty good- nice and concise. Occasionally lacking in fine details though. His most recent source is Piekalkiewicz, so lack of more recent scholarship could be an issue with some details- but Piek. is from 1987. But Martin, I get the idea that Piekalkiewicz is pretty good. Correct, in your approximation?

Martin, I also think we've got it on the Intel. It was neither spies in Berlin or ULTRA- just good old fashioned interrogation! Like Piek in the last item you cite, Healy claims that on the night of July 4 a patrol under Rokossovky (Northern front) captured a german sapper team clearing mines. Interrogation provided the start time of the attack the next day. Upon checking, Carell actually backs this up as well for the source of info regarding exact start time. So that means that ULTRA could have been one of the main sources. I believe Hitler have decided a couple weeks in advance that the attack would be between July 3-6, just not the exact time. Thus, with ULTRA supplying that info, probably backed up by spies, the Russian commanders simply had to remain on highest alert and hope to get lucky. Which they obviously did!

Finally, on the Panthers. RedBaron, you nailed it. I'm still looking into more detailed info (just for the hell of it ), but so far-from Carell- the final drives on the Panthers did not recieve anywhere near adequate testing, and were still being replaced as the Panthers were on the trains for Kursk. Carell also mentions the Panthers "belching flames" from their exhaust, and some actually catching fire. I think my earlier estimate of 1/3 being lost to mechanical difficulty right off may have been too high. I'm guessing now that about 10-20 broke down before the fighting started. And I forget where, but I'm pretty sure again that the exhaust problem was placement of outlet pipes in relation to gas tanks.
But the main problem the Panthers had at Kursk was deployment- the Panthers, all part of the Grossdeutchland Division, were thrown into action right into a minefield the sappers had missed. Seems at least 30 were lost there, right at the start of the battle. And we know the nature of teh fighting at Kursk- things continued much the same way. By 9th July, Healy lists GrossDeutchland as having a total of under 100 tanks available, and this includes MkIIIs and MkIVs in addition to Panthers. So according to Healy's numbers, at least 120 or so Panthers were lost in the first three days. This seems rather high, but if we factor in continuing mechanical breakdowns and action losses, this is probably close to the actual losses.

Friedrich- enjoy the weekend, Herr General!

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Pressure? We feel no pressure. We have come to cry havoc, let loose the dogs of war, and hear the lamentations of your women. Also, we will very likely kick over the cart with all those Jeter Beanie Babies. Because we're that kind of crazy.

Excellent posting and thread, Crazy.

I think Piekalkiewicz is OK...he is very throrough with his sources, and being a native German-speaker lists a comprehensive bibliography of works, archives, documents and memoirs which in many cases have never been translated. His book is easy to read, breaking the battle down into daily segments.
I find this important as ( forgive my non-academic status ) I find Kursk extremely confusing to read about !

As mentioned before, the book also contains a really fascinating collection of photographs selected from a number of German archives.

Such a shame that it was published by a small publishing house and isn't easy to find - it wasn't until the mid-90s that general interest in the Eastern Front developed in the UK. I'm all too aware that there have been some recent, scholarly works on the offensive which I have not read.

One final thought about ULTRA. There's now no doubt that British intelligence provided Stalin with extremely detailed intel about 'Barbarossa' ( even down to such detail as German units, numbers of tanks and aircraft, etc ). For whatever reason, Stalin chose to ignore or disbelieve it. By the time of Kursk, perhaps he was more able to (grudgingly) accept and act on the supplied intelligence. ( I must add that this is just me theorizing - no particular source ).

[ 10 August 2002, 05:26 AM: Message edited by: Martin Bull ]

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"Stand by to pull me out of the seat if I get hit" - Guy Gibson

Here´s some stuff on the "prokhorovka" day.
By George M. Nipe, Jr.

The climax of Operation Citadel, the Battle of Kursk, involved as many as 6,000 tanks, 4,000 aircraft and 2 million fighting men and is remembered as the greatest tank battle in history. The high-water mark of the battle was the massive armor engagement at Prochorovka (also spelled Prokhorovka), which began on July 12.

But while historians have categorized Prochorovka as a victory of improved Soviet tactics over German firepower and heavy tanks, new evidence casts the struggle at the "gully of death" in a very different light. The Germans' goal during Citadel was to pinch off a large salient in the Eastern Front that extended 70 miles toward the west. Field Marshal Günther von Kluge's Army Group Center would attack from the north flank of the bulge, with Colonel General Walther Model's Ninth Army leading the effort, General Hans Zorn's XLVI Panzer Corps on the right flank and Maj. Gen. Josef Harpe's XLI Panzer Corps on the left. General Joachim Lemelsen's XLVII Panzer Corps planned to drive toward Kursk and meet up with Field Marshal Erich von Manstein's Army Group South, Col. Gen. Hermann Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army and the Kempf Army, commanded by General Werner Kempf. Opposing the German forces were the Soviet Central Front, led by General Konstantin K. Rokossovsky, and the Voronezh Front, led by General Nikolai F. Vatutin.

The Central Front, with the right wing strengthened by Lt. Gen. Nikolai P. Pukhov's Thirteenth Army and Lt. Gen. I.V. Galinin's Seventeenth Army, was to defend the northern sector. To the south, the Voronezh Front faced the German Army Group South with three armies and two in reserve. The Sixth Guards Army, led by Lt. Gen. Mikhail N. Chistyakov, and the Seventh Guards Army, led by Lt. Gen. M. S. Shumilov, held the center and left wing. East of Kursk, Col. Gen. Ivan S. Konev's Steppe Military District (renamed Steppe Front on July 10, 1943) was to hold German breakthroughs, then mount the counteroffensive. If their plan succeeded, the Germans would encircle and destroy more than five Soviet armies. Such a victory would have forced the Soviets to delay their operations and might have allowed the Wehrmacht desperately needed breathing room on the Eastern Front. Model's Ninth Army never came close to breaking the Soviet defenses in the north, however, and soon became deadlocked in a war of attrition that it could not win.

On the southern flank, Kempf's III Panzer Corps, commanded by General Hermann Breith, also encountered tough Soviet resistance. By July 11, however, Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army was in position to capture the town of Prochorovka, secure a bridgehead over the Psel River and advance on Oboyan. The Psel was the last natural barrier between Manstein's panzers and Kursk. The Fourth Panzer Army's attack on the town was led by SS General Paul Hausser's II SS Panzer Corps, General Otto von Knobelsdorff's XLVIII Panzer Corps and General Ott's LII Army Corps. Hausser's corps was made up of three panzer divisions: the 1st Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (Adolf Hitler's bodyguard), 2nd SS Das Reich (The Empire) and 3rd SS Totenkopf (Death's Head). Although all three were technically Panzergrenadier divisions, each had more than 100 tanks when Citadel began. Knobelsdorff's corps was composed of the 167th and 332nd infantry divisions, the 3rd and 11th panzer divisions, Panzergrenadier Division Grossdeutschland and Panther Brigade Decker, and Ott's corps contained the 25th and 57th infantry divisions.

Opposing Hausser at Prochorovka was the newly arrived and reinforced Fifth Guards Tank Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Pavel A. Rotmistrov. The Fifth Guards was the Soviet strategic armored reserve in the south, the last significant uncommitted armored formation in the sector, with more than 650 tanks. The Soviet operational armored reserve, General Mikhail E. Katukov's First Tank Army, was already in action against Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army south of the Psel. Katukov's army had been unable to prevent the Germans from reaching the river, however. His VI Tank Corps, originally equipped with more than 200 tanks, had only 50 left by July 10 and 11, and the other two corps of Katukov's army also had sustained serious losses.
On July 10, the 3rd SS Division Totenkopf, commanded by SS Maj. Gen. Hermann Priess, had established a bridgehead over the Psel, west of Prochorovka. By July 11, the division's panzer group had crossed the river on pontoon bridges and reached the bridgehead. What was left of Katukov's armor regrouped to oppose the XLVIII Panzer Corps below Oboyan or counterattack the Psel bridgehead. Reinforced with the XXXIII Rifle Corps and X Tank Corps, Katukov launched continuous attacks on the Totenkopf units on the north bank of the river.

During the evening of July 11, Hausser readied his divisions for an assault on Prochorovka. Totenkopf anchored the left flank of the corps, while Leibstandarte, commanded by SS Maj. Gen. Theodore Wisch, was in the center, assembled west of the town between a rail line and the Psel. Das Reich, commanded by SS Lt. Gen. Walter Krüger, moved into its attack zone on the corps right flank, which was several kilometers south of Tetrevino and southwest of Prochorovka. While Hausser's SS divisions prepared for battle, there was feverish activity in the Soviet camp as well.
On July 11, the Fifth Guards Tank Army arrived in the Prochorovka area, having begun its march on July 7 from assembly areas nearly 200 miles to the east. The army consisted of the XVIII and XXIX Tank Corps and the V Guards Mechanized Corps. Rotmistrov's 650 tanks were reinforced by the II Tank Corps and II Guards Tank Corps, increasing its strength to about 850 tanks, 500 of which were T-34s. The Fifth Guards' primary mission was to lead the main post-Kursk counteroffensive, known as Operation Rumyantsev, and its secondary mission was as defensive insurance in the south. The commitment of Rotmistrov's army at such an early date is stark evidence of Soviet concern about the situation on the Psel.

The Fifth Guards' arrival at the Psel set the stage for the Battle of Prochorovka. Prochorovka is one of the best-known of the many battles on the Eastern Front during World War II. It has been covered in articles, books and televised historical documentaries, but these accounts vary in accuracy; some are merely incomplete, while others border on fiction. In the generally accepted version of the battle, the three SS divisions attacked Prochorovka shoulder to shoulder, jammed into the terrain between the Psel and the railroad.

A total of 500 to 700 German tanks, including dozens of Panzerkampfwagen Mark V Panther medium tanks with 75mm guns and Panzerkampfwagen Mark VI Tiger heavy tanks with deadly 88mm cannons, lumbered forward while hundreds of nimble Soviet T-34 medium tanks raced into the midst of the SS armor and threw the Germans into confusion. The Soviets closed with the panzers, negating the Tiger's 88mm guns, outmaneuvered the German armor and knocked out hundreds of German tanks.

The Soviet tank force's audacious tactics resulted in a disastrous defeat for the Germans, and the disorganized SS divisions withdrew, leaving 400 destroyed tanks behind, including between 70 and 100 Tigers and many Panthers. Those losses smashed the SS divisions fighting power, and as a result Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army had no chance to achieve even a partial victory in the south. While it makes a dramatic story, nearly all of this battle scenario is essentially myth. Careful study of the daily tank strength reports and combat records of II SS Panzer Corps; available on microfilm at the National Archives in Washington, D.C.--provides information that forces a historical reappraisal of the battle.

These records show, first of all, that Hausser's corps began with far fewer tanks than previously believed and, more important, that they suffered only moderate losses on July 12, 1943. As those reports were intended to allow the corps commander to assess the combat strength of his divisions, they can be considered reasonably accurate. Considering that information, it seems that the Germans may have been near a limited success on the southern flank of the salient. The number of SS tanks actually involved in the battle has been variously reported as high as 700 by some authorities, while others have estimated between 300 to 600. Even before the Battle of Kursk began, however, the II SS Panzer Corps never had 500 tanks, much less 700.

On July 4, the day before Operation Citadel was launched, Hausser's three divisions possessed a total of 327 tanks between them, plus a number of command tanks. By July 11, the II SS Panzer Corps had a total of 211 operational tanks: Totenkopf had 94 tanks, Leibstandarte had only 56 and Das Reich possessed just 61. Damaged tanks or tanks undergoing repairs are not listed. Only 15 Tiger tanks were still in action at Prochorovka, and there were no SS Panthers available. The battalions that were equipped with Panthers were still training in Germany in July 1943. On July 13, the day after the Battle of Prochorovka, Fourth Panzer Army reports declared that the II SS Panzer Corps had 163 operational tanks, a net loss of only 48 tanks.
Actual losses were somewhat heavier, the discrepancy due to the gain of repaired tanks returned to action. Closer study of the losses of each type of tank reveals that the corps lost about 70 tanks on July 12.

In contrast, Soviet tank losses, long assumed to be moderate, were actually catastrophic. In 1984, a history of the Fifth Guards Tank Army written by Rotmistrov himself revealed that on July 13 the army lost 400 tanks to repairable damage. He gave no figure for tanks that were destroyed or not available for salvage. Evidence suggests that there were hundreds of additional Soviet tanks lost. Several German accounts mention that Hausser had to use chalk to mark and count the huge jumble of 93 knocked-out Soviet tanks in the Leibstandarte sector alone. Other Soviet sources say the tank strength of the army on July 13 was 150 to 200, a loss of about 650 tanks. Those losses brought a caustic rebuke from Josef Stalin.

Subsequently, the depleted Fifth Guards Tank Army did not resume offensive action, and Rotmistrov ordered his remaining tanks to dig in among the infantry positions west of the town. Another misconception about the battle is the image of all three SS divisions attacking shoulder to shoulder through the narrow lane between the Psel and the rail line west of Prochorovka. Only Leibstandarte was aligned directly west of the town, and it was the only division to attack the town itself.


The II SS Panzer Corps zone of battle, contrary to the impression given in many accounts, was approximately nine miles wide, with Totenkopf on the left flank, Leibstandarte in the center and Das Reich on the right flank. Totenkopf's armor was committed primarily to the Psel bridgehead and in defensive action against Soviet attacks on the Psel bridges. In fact, only Leibstandarte actually advanced into the corridor west of Prochorovka, and then only after it had thrown back initial Soviet attacks.

Early on July 12, Leibstandarte units reported a great deal of loud motor noise, which indicated massing Soviet armor. Soon after 5 a.m., hundreds of Soviet tanks, carrying infantry, rolled out of Prochorovka and its environs in groups of 40 to 50. Waves of T-34 and T-70 tanks advanced at high speed in a charge straight at the startled Germans. When machine-gun fire, armor-piercing shells and artillery fire struck the T-34s, the Soviet infantry jumped off and sought cover. Leaving their infantry behind, the T-34s rolled on. Those Soviet tanks that survived the initial clash with SS armor continued a linear advance and were destroyed by the Germans.

When the initial Soviet attack paused, Leibstandarte pushed its armor toward the town and collided with elements of Rotmistrov's reserve armor. A Soviet attack by the 181st Tank Regiment was defeated by several SS Tigers, one of which, the 13th (heavy) Company of the 1st SS Panzer Regiment, was commanded by 2nd Lt. Michael Wittmann, the most successful tank commander of the war. Wittmann's group was advancing in flank support of the German main attack when it was engaged by the Soviet tank regiment at long range. The Soviet charge, straight at the Tigers over open ground, was suicidal. The frontal armor of the Tiger was impervious to the 76mm guns of the T-34s at any great distance. The field was soon littered with burning T-34s and T-70s. None of the Tigers were lost, but the 181st Tank Regiment was annihilated.

Late in the day, Rotmistrov committed his last reserves, elements of the V Mechanized Corps, which finally halted Leibstandarte. Das Reich began its attack from several kilometers southwest of Prochorovka and was quickly engaged by aggressive battle groups of the II Tank Corps and II Guards Tank Corps. Fierce, somewhat confused fighting broke out all along the German division's axis of advance. Battle groups of 20 to 40 Soviet tanks, supported by infantry and ground-attack planes, collided with Das Reich regimental spearheads.

The 8.s-SS Pz. Kompanie (LSSAH) on its way to battle, during the Kursk offensive.
Rotmistrov continued to throw armor against the division, and combat raged throughout the day, with heavy losses of Soviet armor. Das Reich continued to push slowly eastward, advancing into the night while suffering relatively light tank losses. Meanwhile, on the left flank, Soviet First Tank Army elements unsuccessfully tried to crush Totenkopf's bridgehead. The SS division fought off the XXXI and X Tank Corps, supported by elements of the XXXIII Rifle Corps. In spite of the Soviet attacks, Totenkopf's panzer group drove toward a road that ran from the village of Kartaschevka, southeast across the river and into Prochorovka. The fighting, characterized by massive losses of Soviet armor, continued throughout July 12 without a decisive success by either side - contrary to the accounts given in many well-known studies of the Eastern Front, which state that the fighting ended on July 12 with a decisive German defeat.

These authors describe the battlefield as littered with hundreds of destroyed German tanks and report that the Soviets overran the SS tank repair units. In fact, the fighting continued around Prochorovka for several more days. Das Reich continued to push slowly eastward in the area south of the town until July 16. That advance enabled the III Panzer Corps to link up with the SS division on July 14 and encircle several Soviet rifle divisions south of Prochorovka. Totenkopf eventually reached the Kartaschevka-Prochorovka road, and the division took several tactically important hills on the north edge of its perimeter as well. Those successes were not exploited, however, due to decisions made by Adolf Hitler.

After receiving the news of the Allied invasion of Sicily, as well as reports of impending Soviet attacks on the Mius River and at Izyum, Hitler decided to cancel Operation Citadel. Manstein argued that he should be allowed to finish off the two Soviet tank armies. He had unused reserves, consisting of three experienced panzer divisions of XXIV Panzer Corps, in position for quick commitment. That corps could have been used to attack the Fifth Guards Tank Army in its flank, to break out from the Psel bridgehead or to cross the Psel east of Prochorovka. All of the available Soviet armor in the south was committed and could not be withdrawn without causing a collapse of the Soviet defenses.

Manstein correctly realized that he had the opportunity to destroy the Soviet operational and strategic armor in the Prochorovka area. Hitler could not be persuaded to continue the attack, however. Instead, he dispersed the divisions of the II SS Panzer Corps to deal with the anticipated Soviet diversionary attacks south of the Belgorod-Kharkov sector. On the night of July 17-18, the corps withdrew from its positions around Prochorovka.

Thus, the battle for Prochorovka ended, not because of German tank losses (Hausser had over 200 operational tanks on July 17) but because Hitler lacked the will to continue the offensive. The SS panzer divisions were still full of fight; in fact, two of them continued to fight effectively in southern Russia for the rest of the summer. Leibstandarte was ordered to Italy, but Das Reich and Totenkopf remained in the East. Those two divisions and the 3rd Panzer Division, which replaced Leibstandarte, were transferred to the Sixth Army area, where they conducted a counterattack from July 31 to August 2 that eliminated a strong Soviet bridgehead at the Mius River. Without pause, the three divisions were then transferred to the Bogodukhov sector in early August 1943. Under the command of the III Panzer Corps, they were joined by another unit, the Fifth SS Panzergrenadier Division Wiking. During three weeks of constant combat, the four divisions played a major role in stopping the main Soviet post-Kursk counteroffensive, Operation Rumyantsev.
They fought Rotmistrov's Fifth Guards Tank Army, rebuilt to 503 tanks strong, and major portions of the First Tank Army, now at 542 tanks. By the end of the month, Rotmistrov had less than 100 tanks still running. Katukov had only 120 tanks still in action by the last week of August. While at no time did any of the German divisions have more than 55 tanks in operation, they repeatedly blunted the thrusts of the two Soviet tank armies, which were also reinforced by several rifle corps. Totenkopf repeatedly cut off and defeated all of the First Tank Army's thrusts toward the Kharkov-Poltava rail line.

Das Reich threw back two Soviet tank corps south of Bogodukhov and blunted Rotmistrov's last major attack west of Kharkov, and the III Panzer Corps halted Operation Rumyantsev. After Kharkov itself fell, however, the German front gradually collapsed. The Soviets regrouped, committed additional strong reserves and renewed their attack toward the strategically important Dnieper River. Army Group South was subsequently forced to abandon much of southern Ukraine in a race for the safety of the Dnieper. Despite the remarkable efforts of the German army and Waffen SS panzer divisions during July and August, the Germans were too weak to hold the Kharkov-Belgorod-Poltava sector after their summer losses. It is apparent from their operations during the late summer that the SS panzer divisions were not destroyed at Prochorovka.

This reassessment of the battle provides food for thought regarding possible German successes if Manstein's panzer reserves had been utilized as he had intended. To what extent the course of events in Russia would have been changed is, of course, unknown, but it is interesting to speculate. If Army Group South's panzer reserve had been used to encircle and destroy the Fifth Guards Tank Army and the First Tank Army, the outcome of the war in Russia might have been significantly different.

Although it was beyond the German army's capabilities to force a military end to the war by the summer of 1943, a limited victory in the south could have resulted in a delay of Soviet strategic operations for months or perhaps longer. It is doubtful, however, that this pause would have lasted long enough for the Germans to transfer enough forces to the West to defeat the June 6, 1944, D-Day invasion. But one fact is beyond any question, regardless of the number of tanks possessed by the Germans or Soviets or what might have been possible.

Due to Hausser's panzer corps failure to take Prochorovka on July 12 and the subsequent misuse of German panzer reserves, the momentum of the Fourth Panzer Army was slowed dramatically.
When Hitler abandoned Operation Citadel on July 13, the Germans' last opportunity to influence events on a strategic level in the East was lost. It is interesting that the information regarding German tank losses at Prochorovka has not been made available before now. Due to the lack of crucial primary-source information--especially the records of the II SS Panzer Corps on the Eastern Front--there had been no evidence to correct the erroneous accounts and impressions given in previous studies of the Eastern Front.

Waffen SS formations records of their Eastern Front operations were not declassified until 1978-1981. By that time, many of the major works about the Eastern Front had already been published. Later authors accepted the accounts of the battle as given in the earlier books and failed to conduct additional research. As a result, one of the best known of all Eastern Front battles has never been understood properly.

Prochorovka was believed to have been a significant German defeat but was actually a stunning reversal for the Soviets because they suffered enormous tank losses. As Manstein suggested, Prochorovka may truly have been a lost German victory, thanks to decisions made by Hitler.
It was fortunate for the Allied cause that the German dictator, a foremost proponent of the value of will, lost his own will to fight in southern Ukraine in July 1943.

Had he allowed Manstein to continue the attack on the two Soviet tank armies in the Prochorovka area, Manstein might have achieved a victory even more damaging to the Soviets than the counterattack that had recaptured Kharkov in March 1943.

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Here´s some facts I found this morning in the net. First on the panthers:

Panzerkampfwagen V Panther Ausf D(D1), along with Panzerjäger Tiger(P) Ferdinand (Sd.Kfz.184) and other new armored fighting vehicles, made their debut with Panzer Abteilungen 51 and 52 (96 tanks each) along with Panzer Regiment Stab 39 (8 tanks each) as part of Heeresgruppe Sued (Army Group South) in July 1943 during Operation Citadel in the Kursk salient. Because of technical problems (especially with the gearbox, transmission and suspension, and engine fires) that were not fully solved until later, many Panthers broke down before and during the battle.

"...they (Panthers) burnt too easily, the fuel and oil systems were insufficiently protected, and the crews were lost due to lack of training." - Heinz Guderian.


From the original 250 Panthers, only 43 were in service by August 10, 1943.

The new tanks had turned out a very disappointing show with most of the Mk V Panthers breaking down on the first day due to problems with the complex electrical cooling systems (from a total of 200 only forty were in running order at the end of the first day). The Elefant tanks although a formidable machine with their 88mm gun had also proved a disappointment with Russian infantry simply attacking the 73 ton monsters with satchel charges and Molotov cocktails when they were separated from the infantry with relative ease due to the absence of a hull machine gun as a secondary defence.


There were Tigers in the northern sector:

Schwere Panzer Abteilung 505 - sPzAbt 505

The 505th was the last independent battalion created with the old organization of 20 Tigers and 25 PzKpfw III. Formed in February 1943, the 505th received several Tigers and the rest in March with 25 Pzkpfw IIIs. The unit was loaded on rail cars on 29/30 April 1943 and sent to Heeres Gruppe Mitte on the Eastern Front, where it was ordered to upgrade to the new organization, and received 11 Tigers that were shipped from the ordnance depot between 8 and 10 June 1943. It took part in OPERATION CITADEL as part of Feldmarschall Model's 9th Armee. At the start of the Kursk offensive on 5 July 1943, the unit had 31 Tigers and was joined on 9 July 1943 by 3.Kompanie which was formed in April and received Tigers in June. The 505th lost only four Tigers during the Kursk offensive but lost a further six by the end of July 1943.

To check all the Tiger tank losses visit this site!

http://members.tripod.com/~Sturmvogel/tigerlosses.html

On the subject of knowing the precise time of attack this might help us:

On the night of the 3rd July German Army sappers cleared and taped paths through some of the minefields, an extremely dangerous business as the ground was full of metal and the readings on detectors went into a frenzy. This meant that the mines had to be prodded with a bayonet and lifted out and made safe by hand. Testimony to the expertise of the Großdeutschland engineers was the fact that ten men of the 2nd Engineer Company on the night of the 3rd July lifted and made safe a total of 2,700 mines which worked out at a rate of a mine a minute by each man! On the same night the Red Army captured a sapper of the 6th Infantry Division-Private Fermello after a skirmish, who informed the Soviets of the start time of the offensive which was to be at 3am on 5th July. In the Belgorod sector a Slovene sapper deserted and told the Soviets of the date and start time of the offensive confirming what they already knew.

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Also a little something on T 34´s.

Arguably the Soviet Unions T-34 had the greatest design for a tank ever developed. It balanced the qualities of armor protection, mobility and firepower. The T-34 was very reliable, simple to build, and produced in large quantities of 35.000 vehicles. The T-34 was based on the concept of Christies "fast tank" of the 1930s. T-34s designwork started in 1934, to replace the old T-28. Meanwhile the production of the BT-tank had begun, the chief engineer of the Kirov Works in Leningrad - Mikhail Koszkin -, tried to fit a T-28 with a Christie-type suspension. The test resulted in the T-29. This was only faster than the T-28, but it did not offer better fireaccuracy, and the type was abandoned. A design team at Komintern Factory in Kharkov, led by an engineer called Tsiganov, gave the birth of the T-34. They thought that it was better to produce a heavier version of the BT, that trying to put is characteristics on other design like the T-28. The latest BT-tank at the time was the BT-7M. One of those was given a sloped armor hull instead of the original slab-sided structure. This resulted in a BT-IS (Ispitatelinig), which showed very promising, and in 1936 a special design team led by Koszkin and A.Morozov (designer) was up at Kharkov. Morozov had designed the T-46-5, a fast medium tank, which was not taken up. In 1937 blueprints of the A-20 (later T-30) was made, which was an improved BT-IS.This still had the wheel/track-option and BTs 45mm gun, but it had the T-34s shape and design. Koszkin was given the task to develop the T-30 further on. He then developed the T-32, which didn«t use the wheel/track-option, but was now fitted with a short 76mm gun (76L/30.5). The T-32 had proved very good in trials and a small production was ordered. But after battle experience in the Spanish Civil War, showed that it needed more armour protection. The improvements led to the T-33 and T-34. The T-33 used the wheel/track system, meanwhile the T-34 didn«t. After many trials, the T-34 were accepted by the War Council, and mass-production was ordered. The T-34 was known for its excellentely shaped hull and turret and the 76m gun of a relative long barrel-length and its high muzzle-velocity made it to a feared devil. The T-34s use of a diesel-engine reduced the risk for fire when hit, and gave the T-34 larger operation range. The Christie-suspension permitted high speed in rough terrain, meanwhile its wide tracks made it able to cross mud and snow easier and faster.The first T-34/76A was delivered to the Red Army in June 1940. When Operation Barbarossa was launched on June 22nd 1941, the production of the T-34 had not reached far enough to employ sufficient numbers to the Red Army. Approxiamately 2.800 T-34/76 was manufactured in 1941. At this time at least half of the total tank strength (21.000) was deployed in a infantry-support role, and BTs and T-26s comprised 75 percent of all tanks. Due to the speed of production (A T-34 could be built in just 40 hours), some of its components producers were not fast enough to keep the time-schedule. A shortage of the new V-12 diesel engines led to that some of the early T-34s had the older M-17 gasoline-engine (same as the BT and T-28 tanks used). A hastaly laid demand for more transmissions produced some serious problems; some early T-34s were very unreliable, and spare parts to repair the transmission were added to the side hull. New tank plants were built at Kharkov, Kirov. Stalingrad, Mariupol, Voroshilovgrad, Chita, Novo-Sibirsk, Chelyabinsk and Nizhni-Tagil. Later, another two plants were built at Gorki and Saratov. Apart from the incredible losses of tanks in the 1941 campaigns (USSR lost 6.000 tanks only at the two battles at Minsk and Smolensk), the russians lost all their western industrial regions with its raw materials. The training of the crews was almost not anything, when drivers and mechanics sometimes only had 1* - 2 hours of training before they was sent to operational units. When Germany more and more penetrated into Russia, it became necessary to move or evacuate all factorys all the way to the Urals and Siberia. After the evacuation, the T-34 was built by Ural Tank Building Establishment (Uralmashzavod), which was a combination of the Komintern Factory from Kharkov and the Nizhni-Tagil Tank Plant. Uralmashzavod did now produce the T-34 under the command of J.E.Maksarov, with A.Morozov as the Chiefengineer. In July 1942 the factory recieved the first blueprints of the T-34, and the first production model from Uralmashzavod was called "Comrade Stalin". The T-34 came as a sad surprise to the Germans when they encountered them in quantity in July 1941. (Even if the T-34 engaged the Germans for the first time on June 22nd at Gorki). When the Germans engaged them they noticed that all their tanks had suddenly become obsolete and undergunned, for they were not a match to the T-34 either in speed, hitting power or protection. This immediately led to the Germans speeding up the developement of the heavy Tiger tank and the designwork of a tank with a similar design as the T-34, later to be known as the PzKpfw. V Panther, which owed its appearance and features directly to the T-34.

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Not too mention you could fit a steam boiler in them and run them on coal and wood... now thats versatility!!!

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"Watch that Fu*ker, he'll 'ave someones eye out!" King Harold at Hastings 1066.

Hi there!

The "panzerkeil" formation has been questioned if it works or not. I just read that there was a formation called "panzerglocke" the "tank bell", in which the heavy tanks where in the middle and medium tanks surrounded the heavy tanks and protected them. But mostly the texts refer to "panzerkeil". (Of course there were loads of variations, but let´s not get to that at all. If someone´s into that he could tell us more!) Maybe these two were used together depending on the situation and shape of the ground. Anyway if the german and russian losses were the amount we are getting in the latest statistics, the germans got the right formation anyway!

From geocities.com I noted equal losses to what previously mentioned. On 11th july 2nd panzer corps had 213 tanks, 67 assault guns, 39 marder tank destroyers. On 12th july 49 were lost. Likewise I believe that this is after the exclusion of repaired tanks.
the russians had 842 tanks(?) to begin with including T34, T70, Churchill IV, SU 122, SU 76. The russian lossess 313 tanks.The ratio thus being 6.4 to 1.

According to this I start to think that the biggest panzer battle of all time never happened...which is a shame. We´ve been tricked big time.

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