On Edvard Radzinsky´s book Stalin

"In May Hitler was in the Balkans, and it was getting late for attacking Russia. If Hitler would attack Russia still in 1941 he would have to prepare for winter.Which means he would need millions of fur coats and that would mean that lamb meat price would go down in the markets and as well the lamb skin prices would go up. The Russian security service had not noticed anything like this happen..."

Maybe, maybe not. But Stalin did not know Hitler was sure the war would end long time before winter!

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Berija, Lavrentyij Pavlovics (1899-1953)









Berija and Stalin´s daughter Svetlana 1936

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The "Churchill" Heavy Tank in the USSR

http://www.battlefield.ru/library/lend/churchill.html

The heavy infantry tank Mk.IV "Churchill" is known on a phrase ostensibly told English prime-minister: "this tank carrying my name has more drawbacks than me". Yes, it had obsolete design: to increase room for the tank crew, the designers of the "Vauxhall Motors" corporation have mounted some elements of transmission under the hull so the track was bent around it, as a tanks of the World War One. The tank had a 12-cylinder petrol engine of 350 h.p. that provided it with 27 km/h speed. First models (Churchill I and Churchill II) were armed with 40 mm gun - too weak for a heavy tank. Further tanks were armed with either 76 mm gun or 57 mm gun. The tank had 152 mm frontal armor.

Tank had two major disadvantages: first, the tracks were too vulnerable from shells and shell's fragments because they were too high. And second - the track often jammed the tank's turret. However, 5400 vehicles (all models) have been built and in British Army this tank served to 1952.

Western Allies delivered to the Soviet Union 301 of both Churchill Mk.III and Mk.IV. These two models were very similar and distinguished only a minimal changes- some changes in turret design. Probably, USSR had received some flamethrower Churchills VII (one of those tank showing in Kubinka museum). Interesting fact - during the Kursk battle, the 5th Guard Tank Army had 35 Churchills. They were the only heavy tanks in this army.



Churchills in Russian Use:

Some early Marks of the Churchill were sent to Russia as part of the lend-lease agreement. These were Marks I, II and II models. However the Russians had no use for the 2 and 6 pdr guns, so they tended to replace them with their own superior 76.2mm L30 gun. Some Mark IVs and Crocodiles were also sent, some 35 Churchills being employed by the 5th Guard Tank Army at Kursk

http://staff.bus.bton.ac.uk/fesg/mei...churchill.html



Prokhorovka 1943

[ 20. February 2003, 04:20 PM: Message edited by: Kai-Petri ]

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Bulgaria

Among the Axis countries Bulgaria was the only country that did not declare war on the Soviet Union. The Bulgarians had only declared war on the western allies. In order to persuade them to join the fight against Russia, the Germans supplied them with large amounts of war material, including Arado 96s, Me 109 Es and French Dewoitine 520s. Only after the Ploesti air raids were the Bulgarians supplied with Me 109 Gs, as the Americans had to fly across Bulgaria to get to Romanian oil fields.


The Russo- Bulgarian "war" lasted four days and enabled Russia to treat Bulgaria as a defeated German satellite (!!!)

On September 5 1944 - USSR declares war on Bulgaria
September 8, the Red army invaded the territory of Bulgaria
Bulgaria asking for armistice on 9th
On September 10, the Fatherland front government declared war on Germany and its allies.

In the beginning of September three Bulgarian armies - the First, the Second and the Fourth, in total some 500 000-strong, launched an offensive against Yugoslavia in two lines of advance - Sofia-Nis and Sofia-Skopje. The Supreme command assigned them the strategic task to block the way of the German troops withdrawing from Greece. Within a month the Bulgarian army, at the price of thousands sacrificing their lives, succeeded in liberating Macedonia, southern and eastern Serbia. The German troops which had been cut off in Greece, gave themselves up to the British. First Bulgarian army 130 000-strong, continued on its march to Hungary. There, between 6 and 19 March 1945, it engaged in epic battles; it drove off the Germans attempting to launch a counter-offensive and then, went on the offensive itself By April 1945 First Bulgarian army had entered the territory of Austria. On the day of the capitulation of nazi Germany, it liberated the town of Klagenfurt. There, the soldiers of First Bulgarian Army and the British Eighth Army established contact. The Bulgarian-British encounter at this Austrian 'Elbe' was marked by a friendly football match between the two army teams which drew one all.

http://www.bulgaria.com/history/bulgaria/war2.html

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Luftwaffe and 22nd June 1941:

From Williamson Murray Luftwaffe 1933-1945

Milch recorded in his diary the destruction of 1,800 Soviet aircraft on the first day, followed by 800 on June 23, 557 on the 24th,351 on the 25th, and 300 on the 26th.

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How did Russians accepted Western-Allied tanks?! That kind of 'helf' was not such... I think they'd loved if they would have been given twenty jeeps instead of a Sherman...

And this was not because the Luftwaffe became more incompetent, but because there were not enough Russian planes to shoot down!

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

I don't know about that, the Russians put the Shermans to very good use and weren't too displeased with it as far as I'm aware.

In fact, the Sherman would seem to work better in the East than in the West, with the larger area of operations allowing more breakthroughs. Like the T-34, the Sherman is more of a classical blitzkrieg tank than the larger and more heavily armoured counterparts at the time. I would even go so far as to say that both the T-34 and Sherman were very good tanks for the war the Soviets were fighting during the latter half of the war. That is, striking where the enemy is not concentrated and advance into the rear.

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"Nervous wait for the whistle to blow
Rush of blood and over we go..."
- Iron Maiden, "Paschendale"

KANEV
September 23rd, 1943


In the aftermath of the failed Kursk offensive in July 1943, German forces throughout Russia were in retreat. The Soviet Army was determined to pursue their enemy with the utmost vigour and thereby prevent the establishment of major fortifications on the Dnepr River.
Both sides reached the river at about the same time. The Soviet 3rd Tank Army forced a bridge-head at Zarubentsy while away to the south, lead elements of the German 8th Armee were crossing the Dnepr at Kanev. The Russians decided to commit their parachute reserve. This was the 1st Airborne Corps(?) of some 10,000 men. The plan was to drop the parachutists on the west bank of the Dnepr to seal off the bulge in the river between Kanev and Khudorov. This would allow the Russians to build up strength on the west bank for a subsequent drive on Kiev, some 100 km further up the river.

The logistics involved in getting the airborne operation underway proved too much for the limited transport capacity of the VVS. 180 transports were required; 6 were available on the 23rd, the day the airlift was supposed to begin. The first parachutists did not drop until the 24th and then only in dribs and drabs. The inexperienced transport pilots dropped their cargoes all over the place and to compound the troubles, several batteries of flak guns from the 24th Panzer Korps had arrived and gone into action along the Kanev-Ulyanik road.
A full-strength panzer division, the 19th, was available to
contest the 40th Army's crossing of the Dnepr at Balyka while some infantry divisions from the 8th Armee, now safely
across the Kanev bridge, went into action in the rugged terrain north of Tschernyski to stall the advance of 3rd Tank Army.
With each passing day, the German build up made the chance of a successful Russian breakout increasingly slim. The Russians persistently tried to force the German position throughout October with no success. Finally, they withdrew, in secret, most of the mobile forces and sent them north where a successful assault broke through the German defences, resulting in the liberation of Kiev on November 7th.
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Map:

http://home.clara.net/percy/maps/kanev.gif

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The parachute landings began at dusk on the 24th September. The Soviet 5th Parachute Brigade jumped literally on top of the 19. Panzer Division as it formed up ready to move to Kanev. The Soviet parachutists and their planes came under heavy fire and those survived the landing were, by and large, killed or captured. Overall the Soviet airborne operation was badly planned and their 7000 paratroops were scattered over a large area. Without heavy weapons or communications large numbers were killed or captured and the rest melted into the woods and swamps where they joined up with partisan units.

http://home.clara.net/percy/siegfriedmenzel.htm

Eventually the Soviets decided to switch their main efforts to the Lyutezh bridgehead north of Kiev, whilst deceiving the Germans into thinking Bukrin was still the main focus of attack. In order to fool the Germans the Soviets continued to apply pressure at Bukrin and this worked superbly. When the Soviet offensive broke out of the bridgehead at Lyutezh on 3rd November 1943 the Germans were taken by surprise.

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Russian propaganda leaflets...

And other historical stuff:

http://www.museumofworldwarii.com/To...13a_Russia.htm

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Russian propaganda posters

http://www.earthstation1.com/Russian...a_Posters.html

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Heartland:

Certainly the Sherman was not very appreciated by Soviet crews... I think their own T-34 could deal with the German tanks much better than any Western-Allies' tank they sent. What the Russians really appreciated were planes, lorries and jeeps, along with food rations and hand guns, which we know were very good.

Cool posters, Kai! Very impressive!

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

Are there any detailed reports on the Russian "internment" of USAAF crews and the copying of the B-29 into the Russian bomber? Why with all the lend-lease equipment supplied to the Reds was the B-29 kept out of the arsenal? Was this their expression of allied gratitude?

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Well, the Sherman was certainly looked down on by the T-34 crews, but I'm not so sure about the people using the Sherman. In the Soviet Union there was a cerain stigma attached to using foreign equipment, and users were expected to not heap praise on it. For example, in "The Spitfire Story" there is an interview with a Guards pilot who states that their old Polikarpov I-16 fighters had many advantages to the Spitfire Vb lend-lease aircraft they later received(!). So there may be a reason for these disparaging comments during the Soviet years.

Going back to the Sherman, there are numerous advantages to it compared to the T-34, which were well received by the crews.

- Softer armour. Non-penetrating hits on the hard but brittle armour of the T-34 tended to spall off and kill/injure crew - not so on the Sherman.
- Shermans were less likely to explode when knocked out, and more refined US explosives less likely to brew up due to fire.
- Longer engine lifetime.
- Better crew compartment and layout.
- Excellent HF and VHF radio sets. HF was used for coms to higher command, while VHF was used for company/battalion.
- Intercom system.

The disadvantages mentioned by Russian sources are ususally the high profile and center of gravity. Armour, speed and armament is generally similar, with the T-34 having better cross-country mobility but the Sherman having an advantage on roads.

It is also worth pointing out that 3 out of 9 Guards Mechanized Corps were equipped with Shermans by the end of the war. These were some high-prestige units, and were given Shermans late in the war. The 3rd Guards was entirely re-equipped with Shermans in June '44, 9th Guards became an all-Sherman unit in December '44, while the 1st Guards handed in their T-34/85s in January '45 for M4A2s.

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"Nervous wait for the whistle to blow
Rush of blood and over we go..."
- Iron Maiden, "Paschendale"

http://www.transneft.ru/About/Histor...LANG=EN&ID=241

After 1941 the oil industry was adapting to the war conditions. The battle front and the home front required fuel, and it was needed to: firstly, give the maximum increase to oil extraction in the traditional oil areas, and secondly, to get the maximum and fastest oil extraction rates in the new oil fields, especially between the Volga and the Ural, but also in the East.

Oil from Sakhalin was delivered to the mainland via water transport and then by trains to refineries. Already at the start of the war it was decided to build Okha - Sofiysk oil pipeline, 325 mm diameter and 368 km long, whereas 9 km had to be laid at the bottom of the Tatar strait. Later on, in 1946, this pipeline extended to Komsomolsk-on-Amur and its total length grew to 655 km. During the oil pipeline construction a technique was used, where pipes, filled with water, were freely submerged from the ice.

The fascist troops advancing in the Caucasian direction caused enormous damage to the Soviet oil industry in the south. In 1942, oil fields in the Krasnodar Territory were entirely put out of production, oil extraction in the Grozny area reduced by half. Those were especially hard times for the Southern oil fields. Having destroyed the main line which connected Baku with the center of the country, the fascists blocked the Volga River and took hold of the Armavir - Trudovaj pipeline. During winter of 1942 - 1943, oil products from the Caucasus were delivered to the central regions of the country by a long route - through Middle Asia and Kazakhstan. The transport could not cope with moving-out oil products. A few million tons of them transported from Baku oil storages were kept in hollow mountains. Later, the stock was used to feed the front and the rear. Astrakhan - Urbakh - Saratov kerosene pipeline and Kizlyar - Astrakhan railroad which were built in 1943 played an important role. The pipeline construction under the order of the State Defense Committee, started in April 1941. The construction was carried out despite constant enemy air raids. To cover the pipe, reinforcement and equipment shortage, it was necessary to dismantle the Baku - Batumi-2 oil pipeline, part of the Grozny - Tuapse oil pipeline, and 60-km transit of Kosh - Armavir. Pipes and equipment were urgently moved to the construction site. Almost all work was done manually, including arc-welding of the pipe joints. The total length of the water passages was 11.2 km. A 655-km kerosene pipeline with eight pumping stations was built within unprecedented short periods: from April to November 1943. Construction of the railroad Kizlyar - Astrakhan and the kerosene pipeline Astrakhan - Urbach - Saratov allowed to carry out at Astrakhan tank farms new transshipping activities using other kinds of transport.

Particular place in the pipeline transport history belongs to the benzene piping on the bottom of the Ladoga Lake. This pipeline helped the Leningrad citizen to survive through the blockade. The State Defense Committee decided to start the pipeline construction in April 1942. The works were done by the Narkomstroi OSMCh-104 and the Baltic marine force EPRON. Pipes for the pipeline were taken from the stock of Izhora plant. The project was designed under time pressure, and many assemblies and components were built following drafts. The benzene pipeline, 102 mm in diameter and 29 km long, was laid on the lake bottom up to 35 m deep. It was constructed within 43 days - from the 5 May through 16 June 1942. Two pump stations were built on the eastern bank of the lake, while tanks and a loading rack were built on the western bank. The pipeline was annually supplying Leningrad with 400-600 tons of fuel. Overall, 47.4 thousand tons of the fuel was delivered - 32.7 thousand tons in 1942, and 14.7 thousand tons in 1943. The benzene pipeline operated without failures for over twenty months and was disabled after removal of the blockade.

During the war there were successfully used mountable-and-dismountable portable pipelines. They not only supplied the troops with fuel, but also helped to force crossings over water barriers. So, in the spring of 1942, upon the Oka a metal, mountable-and-dismountable, 75-mm pipeline was mounted. It supplied with fuel the troops of the 61st Bryansk Front Army. In a part of the Leningrad front, across the Volkhov River, the similar 75-mm pipeline was laid. In March of 1943, 100-mm pipeline was laid across the Don that was used as a part of the railroad bridge, because the bridge was destroyed. It transported from one bank to the other 700 tons of fuel daily. The 2.72 km long pipeline, laid in the spring of 1944 near the Lots-Kamensky railroad bridge over the Dnepr, was used in the same way. In November 1944, mountable-and-dismountable pipelines were put across the Danube, and in winter 1945 also across the Vistula. The 100-mm and 225 km long mountable-and dismountable pipeline which was laid in January 1945 can be regarded as a trunk pipeline. Its throughput was 40 m3 per hour, and it delivered the fuel from the Ploeshti region, Romania, to the transfer tank farm in Reni, the USSR. The fuel was loaded into tank cars and sent to the front. Special units were maintaining the pipeline. During the war, mountable-and-dismountable pipelines were used for various purposes. They helped to successfully carry out large-scale battle operations. The oil pipeline Zolny - Yablonevy - Syzran also was put into operation during the war.

On the whole, from 1941 to 1945 the USSR built 1,264 km of trunk oil and oil product pipelines. However, it is impossible to figure out the precise length of the trunk pipeline network at that time, because the Baku - Batumi pipeline, for example, was entirely dismantled.

The study of the pipeline transport as of 1917 to 1945 shows that the throughput of specific trunk oil pipelines was not completely used. Of course, some oil pipelines, such as the Caucasian, showed lower performance during the war time (see the table that shows actual figures of oil pipeline utilization, check the site for this). Other pipelines, such as Okha - Sofia, were in the initial operation phase. The older ones were in no better position. For example, from the very beginning of the operation only one third of the capacity of the oil pipeline Guriev - Orsk, built in 1934, was utilized, and by 1945 only 27 % of its throughput was used. This was caused by the slow development of the Emba deposit and a significant delay in developing refinery capacities in Orsk. A good example could be the history of Makhachkala - Grozny oil pipeline. Built in 1936, it was underused since the early operational days - the flow of homogeneous oil was inadequate. During the war its operation was suspended, its returning into production delayed, and by 1945 its usage was only 20 %. At the same time, the railroad line Makhachkala - Grozny was overloaded.

This was due to the facts that the overall oil fields development plan was inadequately elaborated, the rate and scale of field development was unfounded, refinery capacity, such as that of Baku - Batumi oil pipeline, was insufficient. In addition, the pipeline capacities were underestimated, especially in the war time. This resulted in slow recovery of destroyed pipelines. Poor technical equipment and unprepared provision for alternate transportation of various oils and oil products via the same pipeline also had negative impact on pipeline usage. Using trains for oil transit was considered the best.

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On 22 June, 1943, the Germans celebrated the second anniversary of their invasion of the Soviet Union. To mark this occasion a military parade was organized in Pskov. To the shock and disbelief of the Russian on-lookers, the German military parade was opened by a company of the First Guard Brigade of ROA. Among the Russian on-lookers present at the parade were also honorary guests like Zhilenkov, Kromiadi, and Boyarski. The Russian traitors were celebrating the invasion and rape of their own country!

http://members.tripod.com/~marcin_w/index-Gil.html

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The Order of Victory




The Order of Victory was established by a Decree of the Presidium of the (Former) USSR Supreme Soviet on November 8, 1943. The Order of Vicory is the highest military order and is one of the rarest Orders in the world today having been awarded only 19 times during WWII and only once since then. The Order of Victory is made of silver (19 grams) and gold (2 grams) on a platinum frame (47 grams) and encrusted with diamonds (16 carats) and rubies (25 carats). This order was given to top-ranking commanders of the Red Army for a successful operation within the framework of one or several fronts resulting in a radical change of the situation in favour of the Soviet Armed Forces. It was also awarded to a select few commanders of the Alied forces.

The order was originally proposed by Colonel N. S. Neyelov, who served in the headquarters of the Rear of the Soviet Army in July 1943. Initially to be called the Order for Faithfulness to the Homeland but in October this was changed to Victory. The badge's principle designer was Kuznetsov and went through 15 drafts until a final design was selected by Stalin on 25 October. The badge is a 72mm five-pointed ruby star on a platinum frame. The star being bordered by 16 carats of diamonds. In the centre is a blue enamel circle with portrayals of the wall of the Kremlin, the Mausoleum of Lenin and the Spasskaya tower. Above this is the inscription "USSR" in white enamel and the word "Victory" below. It is to be worn on the left side of the tunic 12 -14 cm above the belt. In 1945 it had an estimated value of £3,750.

http://www.russian-medals.net/chkord3.htm





The recipiants;


Georgi Konstantinovich Zhukov #1, 10 1944


Alexander M. Vasilievsky #2, 10 April 1944


Joseph (Iosif) Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili Stalin #3, 28 July 1944 ( Surprise...?)


Konstantin Konstaninovich Rokossovlky, 19 March 1945


Ivan Stepanovich Konev, 19 March 1945


Georgi Konstantinovich Zhukov, 2nd award 30 March 1945


Alexander M. Vasilievsky, 2nd award 19 April 1945


Rodion Yakavlevich Malinovsky, 26 April 1945


Fyodor Ivanovich Tolbukhin, 26 April 1945


Leonid A. Govorov, 31 May1945


Alexei Innokentyevich Antonov, 4 June 1945


Semyon Konstaninovich Timoshenko, 4 June 1945


Joseph (Iosif) Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili Stalin, 2nd award 26 June 1945 ( Heh-heh...)


Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov, 8 September 1945


Dwight David Eisenhower, 5 June 1945 (General of the Army)


Bernard Law Montgomery, 5 June 1945 (British Field Marshal)


Mikai Michael Hohenzollern, 6 July 1945 (King Michael I of Romania)


Michal Rolja-Zymersky, 9 August 1945 (Marshal of Poland)


Josip Broz Tito, 9 September 1945 (Marshal of Yugoslavia)


Leonid Iilich Brezhnev, 20 February 1978 (Rescinded 21 September 1989 because "it was noncorresponding to the statute of the Order".

http://www.fortunecity.com/victorian...y/Victory.html

[ 23. May 2003, 06:29 AM: Message edited by: Kai-Petri ]

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*BUMP*

If you didn´t see The Order of Victory check it above...

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WAR MEMORIALS OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR ACROSS EUROPE

http://www.vor.ru/55/Monument/Mon_eng.html

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Order concerning the purveyance of front-line Red Army servicemen with vodka in the quantity of 100g per day
N 0320 25th of August 1941


According to the State Committee of Defense Decree of the 22nd of August 1941 (¹ 562 cc), I hereby order that:
1. Since the 1st of September 1941 the front-line servicemen and commanders of the Field Forces should receive 100 g of 40-degree vodka each per day.


The Red Airforce airmen, that fulfil combat duties, and the technical personnel, that maintains the field airstrips of the Field Forces, should receive vodka just as the combat front-line troops do.


2. The Military Councils of the Fronts and Armies should take the measures to:

a. Organize the vodka distribution exclusively for the contingents that are defined by the State Committee of Defense Decree and most strictly supervise the exact observance of it.
b. Ensure the timely delivery of vodka on the frontline of the Field Force and organize a reliable guarding service of vodka in the field conditions.
c. At the expense of the purveyance administration of the units and formations, provide the selection of special personnel that should be held responsible for the correct distribution of vodka portions, accounting of the vodka expenditure and conduct the balance sheets.
d. Order the intendants of the Fronts to deliver once in every ten days to the Main Intendant Board the information concerning the remains of vodka and to compose applications for the necessary quantity of vodka every month before the 25th. As a basis for such application the exact number of front-line troops should be taken into account and be ensured by the Military Councils of the Fronts and Armies.


1. The necessary quantity of vodka for the month of September should be established by the Chief Intendant of the Red Army without submissions of applications from the Fronts and Armies.
The order should be made valid via telegraph.




Deputy of People's Commissar of Defense Lieutenant General of Intendance Service Khruljev.
State Committee of Defense Decree
N GOKO-1227 of the 11th of May 1942
Moscow, Kremlin
Concerning the purveyance of Field Force of the Red Army with vodka


1. Since the 15th of May 1942 the mass everyday distribution of vodka among the personnel of the Field Force should be abolished.


2. The existing distribution of vodka should be maintained only among the front-line troops that have exhibited successful conduct of operations against the German invaders; moreover, the portion of vodka from now on should be increased to the 200 g to each serviceman per day.
To achieve this, every month vodka should be delivered to the disposal of the Front Commands in the quantity of 20% of total strength of Front or Army depolyed on the front-line.


3. The remaining personnel of the front-line troops should receive vodka in the quantity of 100 g to each serviceman exclusively on the following revolutionary and social holidays: Great October Socialist Revolution anniversary (7th and 8th of November), the Constitution Day (5th of December), New Year Day (1st of January), Red Army Day (23rd of February), International Labor Days (1st and 2nd of May), All-union Athlete's Day (19th of July), All-union Aviation Day (16th of August) and International Youth Day (6th of September), also on the day of Unit Holiday (unit's formation date).


4. State Committee of Defense Decree N 562 cc of the 22nd of August 1941 should be abrogated.


State Committee of Defense Chairman I. Stalin
Order concerning the rules of vodka mainteinance and distribuition among Field Force troops
N 0470 of the 12th of June 1942


Despite the repeated directions and explicit demands concerning the distribution of vodka among the Field Force troops strictly and purposefully, according to the established portions, up to this time the cases of unlawful vodka distribution take place.
Thus vodka is given to staff personnel, commanders and units that do not have any rights to claim it. Some commanders of units and formations, as well as staff officers, exploiting their ranks and positions, receive vodka from the warehouses, ignoring the orders and established rules.
The control of the vodka expenditure is performed badly by the Military Councils of the Fronts and Armies; accounting of vodka quantities in the units and warehouses is in the unsatisfactory condition.


According to the State Committee of Defense Decree of the 6th of June of this year ¹ GOKO-1889c, I hereby order:
1. The distribution of vodka in the quantity of 100g to each serviceman per day should be performed only in relation to the personnel of the frontline units that conduct offensive operations.


2. The remaining personnel of the front-line troops should receive vodka in the quantity of 100 g to each serviceman exclusively on the following revolutionary and social holidays: Great October Socialist Revolution anniversary (7th and 8th of November), the Constitution Day (5th of December), New Year Day (1st of January), Red Army Day (23rd of February), International Labor Days (1st and 2nd of May), All-union Athlete's Day (19th of July), All-union Aviation Day (16th of August) and International Youth Day (6th of September), also on the day of Unit Holiday (unit's formation date).


3. The distribution of vodka among the personnel of Armies and other formations should be co-ordinated with the Chief Purveyance Officer of the Red Army according to the directions of General Staff and the applications of Military Councils of Fronts and Armies.


4. For the maintenance of vodka special warehouses should be created within Front and Army food stores. The manager of the warehouse and one storekeeper should be chosen out of the specially selected honest, reliable personnel, able to secure total security and safety of the vodka stocks.
The warehouses should be sealed up after the distribution procedures, and guards should be kept at the doors, chosen out of the reliable soldiers.


5. The Chiefs of Purveyance boards of the Fronts and Chiefs of Purveyance departments of the Armies should register all available vodka stocks as of 15th of June and transfer them for the maintenance to the Front and Army warehouses.


6. The registration of the vodka distribution should be performed by the Chief of Red Army's Main Board of Purveyance involving the Chiefs of boards and departments of the Purveyance of the Fronts and Armies according to the directions of the Chief Purveyance Officer of the Red Army concerning the terms of vodka distribution and numerical composition of units liable to it.


7. Military Councils of the Fronts and Armies should be held responsible for the correct maintenance, expenditure and accounting of vodka, vodka bottles and packing.


8. This order should be made valid via telegraph.


9. State Committee of Defense Order N 0373 of 1942 should be abolished.


Deputy of People's Commissar of Defense Lieutenant General of Intendance Service Khruljev.
Order concerning distribution of vodka among the troops of Red Army Field Force since 25th of November 1942
N 0883 13th of November 1942


1. In accordance with the State Committee of Defense Decree of the 12th of November 1942 N 2507c, starting from the 25th of November this year vodka should be delivered to the trooops as follows:


a. 100 g to each serviceman per day should be given to the units, whose troops are directly involved into combat actions and are deployed on the frontline in trenches; to the units on reconnaissance missions; also to artillery and mortar units attached to infantry and deployed on the fire positions; aircraft crews after they fulfil combat missions;


b. 50 g to each serviceman per day should be given to: regimental and divisional reserves; technical service units and formations that work on the front-line; units that fulfil important duties in special circumstances (erection and reconstruction of bridges, highways and other) and in special conditions under enemy fire; wounded personnel deployed within field sanitation service, according to the doctors' directions.


1. The remaining personnel of Red Army Field Force should be given 100 g of vodka to each serviceman per day on the occasion of revolutionary and social holidays mwentioned in the Sate Committee of Defense Decree N 1889 of the 6th of June 1942.


2. Concerning the Transcaucasus Front's troops, instead of 100 g of vodka 200 g of strong wine should be given (or 300 g of table wine); instead of 50 g of vodka 100 g of strong wine or 150 g of table wine should be given.


3. The Military Councils of the Fronts and Armies should establish monthly limits of vodka distribution to the Armies by isssuing Army orders and securing the expenditure within the limit, established for every month separately.


4. Upon the expenditure of monthly limit, the Fronts should report to the Red Army's Main Board of Purveyance in order to receive the next month's limit. In case the Fronts do not submit the reports of vodka expenditure before the 10th day of the coming month to the Chief of Red Army's Main Board of Purveyance, the Fronts that have not submitted the reports will receive no vodka portions.


5. The limits of vodka consumption should be established for each Front for the duration of 25th of November-31st of December 1942 according to the Appendix.


6. The Chief of Red Army's Main Board of Purveyance - Brigade Engineer com. Pavlov and Chief of Red Army's Military Communications-Major General com. Kovaljev-should attend to the fact that vodka portions are delivered to the troops of South-Western, Don and Stalingrad Fronts before the 16th of November, and to the remaining Fronts before the 20th of November, according to the limits.


7. The Chief of Red Army's Main Board of Purveyance should establish permanent control of the vodka expenditure in strict accordance with the current Order.


8. The military Councils of the Fronts and Armies should organize the return of used packing and bottles from vodka to the vodka factories and refineries People's Commissariat of Food Industry, attached to the Fronts.
Units that have not returned the packings should receive no vodka portions.


9. This order should be made valid via telegraph.


Deputy of People's Commissar of Defense Lieutenant General of Intendance Service Khruljev.
Appendix
To the People's Commissariat of Defense Order N 0883


Limits of vodka expenditure for the troops of Red Army's Field Force from 25th of November to 31st of December 1942
Fronts and Separate Armies Limits of vodka expenditure (in litres)
Karelian Front 364 000
7th Army 99000
Leningrad Front 533 000
Volkhov Front 407 000
North-Western Front 394 000
Kalinin Front 690 000
Western Front 980 000
Brjansk Front 414 000
Voronezh Front 381 000
South-Western Front 478 000
Don Front 544 000
Stalingrad Front 407 000
Total: 5 691 000
Transcaucasus Frtont 1 200 000 (wine)
Deputy of People's Commissar of Defense Khruljev.
Order concerning the establishment of vodka portions and distribution procedure among the technical personnel of Airforce units of the Red Amy's Field Force
N 0311 of the 13th of January 1943.
In addition to the People's Commissar of Defense Decree N 0883 of the 1942 concerning the procedure of vodka distribution among Red Army's Field Force personnel, I henceforth order that:
1. 1. In the Airforce units of Red Army's Field Force and in the Airforce units deployed within military districts, but with the People's Commissariat of Defense Orders put on the same foot as the former, 50 g of vodka should be given to each serviceman, including technical personnel, only on the days when operational sorties are flown by the aircraft they directly operate and maintain on the airfields.
2. The order of vodka distribution should be established according to the personal lists, compiled by the commanders of airforce units, approved by an air-division commander.
The order should be made valid via telegraph.
Deputy of People's Commissar of Defense Colonel General of Intendance Service Khruljev.

http://www.1jma.dk/articles/1jmaarticlesvodka.htm

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Greetings to Skorzerny!

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"Gentlemen! You can't fight in here, this is the War Room!"
(President Merkin Muffley in "Dr. Strangelove")

I loved the Order of Victory post, Kai! Incredibly impressive. I thought that the Germans were the only ones with sumptous diamond awards!

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

Kai, can you see if marshal Zhúkov is wearing both of them in this picture? I think so...

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

Yes, Friedrich,

I think they are on the left breast pocket´s place one over the other.



PS. I think it must have sounded like a tank starting its engine when Zhukov got up from a chair with all these medals on him...

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Red Army tanks

This is one calculation by Pekka Kantakoski, a Finnish expert on "Red tanks":

Between 1941-1945 Russians built 99 395 tanks of various models.

Lend Lease : 12 482 tanks

Destroyed Russian tanks during the WW2:

About 106 000, of which some 20-30% could be repaired and used again.

Some 212 000 Russian soldiers died with their tanks ( 2 per tank crew )

In the front line as WW2 ended: 20 000 tanks

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Russian general officers
1940-1945


http://houterman.htmlplanet.com/persons_russian.html

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