Latest WW2 mag has Stalingrad on the cover & makes interesting commentage on why airlift was a failure.

"Even if the neccessary aircraft could be found,Luftwaffe personnel were at the mercy of Stalin's most formidable assets, the weather. Wind, snow and bitter cold closed available airfields one out of 3 days. Of the six airfields within the 15-mile perimeter of Der Kessel- The cauldron, containing the trapped army, only 2 were equipped with the radio beacons that would allow for a nonvisual approach and only one of these -Pitomnik- could be used at night. and had facilities for large scale maintenance and loading operations".

Very different from other Luftwaffe supply operations in other theaters.

Another point it brought up that I wonder about the feasibility of was " Ulitimately, this was all Hitlers fault. At almost any point after the encirclement he could have ordered his troops in the cauldron to attempt a breakout while they were still able. Had it succeeded, a reinforced Sixth army could have renewed its offensive in the spring, crossing the Volga at other places and bypassing Staligrad in favor of open country more favorable to its mechanized columns.

I see the Stalingrad airlift as just one more engineering failure by the Germans. A better equipped engineering force and more attuned command would have flown in materials and equipment to construct and maintain the airfields right from the start.
By way of comparison, one reason the US Bastogne airlift was more successful (and the British Arnheim lift failed) was the use of a ground-air radio beacon system coded Rebecca-Eureka. It consisted of portable air droppable transmitters and a homing system in the aircraft. It had sufficent accuracy when operating correctly to ensure drops within a few hundred feet of the target. At Arnheim most of the transmitters for this system were either put out of operation or overrun and captured.

They didn't forsee the encirclement, therefore didn't plan accordingly. & the cauldron was only a 15 mile perimeter, doubtful any army could have pre-predicted the exact locale of the cauldron & put in place ahead of time all that infrastructure.

On the other hand, they should well have pre-predicted the horrible weather, & perhaps some runway snow clearing equipment should have been sent in ahead.

The spring offensive on flat terrain surrounding Stalingrad is the more interesting strategic contemplative theme.

After reading " Stopped at Stalingrad Luftwaffe in the east 1942-43 " it seems the weather was one of the major points. A bit later on the troops in the Caucasus area got almost daily the 500 tons they were asking for and that was with good weather.

Of course must not forget the Soviet Air force doing its best to stop the cargo being received as well.

Also the distance grew fast so that the German fighters could not follow and protect the Ju 52´s or the air fields.

The fields were also under artillery fire all the time so many planes crashed either during landing or take-off.

Another point is the low cargo amount the planes could take. How many Ju 52´s or he 111´s etc you need to get 500 tons per day? And even that was a lowered figure from the 750 tons first suggested.

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Yep, not enough transport planes. & the replacement for the JU 52 never really materialized in serious numbers.

"Interesting" also is the fact that at the same time Hitler sent some 80,000 men, Tigers and 250 Ju 52´s to Tunis after "Torch". How about sending these to the Eastern front instead.

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That was the way he created a bigger Stalingrad in Tunis a few months later.

Changing subject, where were located the departure airfields for the airlift, before and after the Soviet encirclement offensive (18th Nov.'42), where the pincers closed in Kalatsch on the Don?

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The air fields were separate for Ju 52´s, he 111´s, Ju 86´s and Condors in order to make the maintenance easier for the different plane versions. However I do not have the air field data with me now but I can check them up from
" Stopped at Stalingrad " next week.

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Good point Kai. In fact one what if is based on operation torch occurring one month after it did which freed up the a/c used in Tunis for Stalingrad. How much this may have changed things is hard to know. Weather & small number of airfields hard problems to overcome.

Medical supplies/clothing and ammunition should have been a priority being Paulus was told to stay, Fuel would hog valuable cargo space.
All this takes time on limited rail lines from their origin to the Front.And there were 2 other Army Groups to supply.

The planes nor the ground crews were not prepared for the frigid weather.
The Russians bombing at night making even more work for exhausted/starving ground crews.

Maybe Hitler was hoping this airlift would work as the successful Demyansk[sp?]airlift was earlier.

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I read somewhere that Goering made a big mistake when he was asked if the LW was able to carry enough supplies.

For the He-111s, he made a calculations based on the bombload that could be carried, not taking in account the fact that, for a given weight, most supplies required much more cargo space than bombs did.

I don't know if it's serious or a tale.

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Join the C-cube now !

Goering was looking to get back in good with Hitler....after the Battle of Britian.
Even if it was spring time, there was no way to supply Paulus with his minimum.
Maybe if there was a real plan and not some hastily thrown together plan.

The 6th Army might not have froze but still needed food and ammunition.

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The use of He 111 in the Stalingrad airlift, as well as several other non-transport types, was problematic at best. Aside from the amount of load that could be carried, there are issues of loading and unloading. The 111 had no cargo doors so the size of what could be carried was limited. Loading and unloading also was much slower.
On the whole, these aircraft could only deliver a fraction of what proper transports could. But, since the Germans had no alternatives they were pressed into service.
As an added negative, by pressing these bombers into service they could not be employed as bombers in any attempt to aid ground forces trying to relieve the encirclement. So, it really amounts to a double negative.

I think the He111 was already being phased out from the bomber role, but I would have to check.

Now, back to my question, does anyone know where were the departure airlift airfields after the encirclement in 18th Nov. 42?

Also Operation Little Saturn was launched and at least the Tatsinskaya German airfield was reached on Dec.24th ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tatsinskaya_Raid ), Operation Saturn being expanded to the Don in January and February '43. Of course having to abandon the closer airfields and the others more backward being in jeopardy must have been a liability for the Luftwaffe, that's why I ask about their location on different phases.

As an aside, there used to be a Soviet saying that applies here perfectly: "The best anti-aircraft weapon is a tank on the runway"

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The major airfields from which the airlift was to be mounted were Tatsinskaya and Morozovskaya-west. About 100 miles distance....but the closest ones.
They were 6th Army's supply dumps before the encirclement.

From "OstFront".

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http://lonestar.texas.net/~snolep/organpg/index04.htm

Women fighter pilots at Stalingrad.

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Za,

here´s the actual map from The book I mentioned.

http://users.pandora.be/stalingrad/g...ap_airlift.htm

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Looking at Kai's map, there is another big problem for the Germans: Simply getting the supplies to the various airfields they are flying them in from.
At the time of this operation there was a single rail line to Stalino in that part of AGS's operating area. As you can see from the map this would mean that the supplies must then be trucked to the various airfields before loading. Since the Germans have a severe shortage of trucks already and, the roads are likely to be horrid in the middle of winter just this part of the operation must have had a major effect on efforts to fly supplies in. It would also certainly complicate aircraft servicing and fuel availability as well.

That is correct T.A.!

Also once Milch took over the operation (14 January Hitler ordered Field Marshal Erhard Milch to take over the air resupply of the Stalingrad pocket)it was his obsession to use gliders to take supplies to Stalingrad and even once he had given up the idea every third train (!) was bringing gliders to the front. This also from " Stopped at Stalingrad ".

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Thank you for the map, Kai, I know about that website but I had never noticed that map.

And I see other people are thinking in quartermaster's terms [img]smile.gif[/img]

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"Gliders"? Have never read about that before. So much for trying to get the wounded out.
Guess they could use them to keep warm and burn them? How were the Germans to keep the fields clear of 1 use gliders?

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Now I started wondering; what did the Soviets do with the German gliders as they were bound to end in their hands?

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http://www.fiddlersgreen.net/AC/airc...321/gigant.php

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Well, this is another case of incompetent generals blaming Hitler for the débâcles...

When Hitler asked if the Luftwaffe could supply the pocket, as it had done a year earlier at Demiansk, colonel general Hans Jeschonnek, chief of staff of the Luftwaffe, immediately said it could. Göring agreed.

If the C-in-C is told by his sub-ordinates, the ones who know their business, that it could be done and he gives the order... How can Historians still blame it on him?

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"War is less costly than servitude, the choice is always between Verdun and Dachau." - Jean Dutourd, French veteran of both world wars

"A mon fils: depuis que tes yeux sont fermes les miens n’ont cessé de pleurir." - Mère française, Verdun

http://www.joelhayward.org/stalingradairlift.htm

No verbatim records of Hitler's conversation with Jeschonnek have surfaced, but the basic facts are known: Hitler explained that Sixth Army would probably be totally cut off within days, that he had organized a new army group under von Manstein, and that it would launch a relief effort as soon as possible. He hoped not only to free Sixth Army within a short time, but also to regain lost territory and rebuild a strong defensive line. Apparently understanding Sixth Army's encirclement to be temporary, Jeschonnek assured Hitler that if both transport planes and bombers were used, and if adequate airfields inside and outside the pocket could be maintained, the Luftwaffe could airlift sufficient supplies to the army.

Jeschonnek's spontaneous and ill--considered assurance that the air force could sustain Sixth Army at Stalingrad pleased Hitler. He could hardly allow the army to abandon that city after he had proclaimed to the entire German nation in September that “you can be certain no one will get us away from there!”

Von Richthofen considered it sheer madness for Paulus and his staff to plan an all--around defense at Stalingrad and pin their hopes on the Luftwaffe to sustain their army. The air force simply lacked the ability to keep it supplied, he frantically warned everyone who would listen. “Sixth Army believes that it will be supplied by the air fleet in its hedgehog positions,” he complained in his diary on the 21st. “I make every effort to convince it that this cannot be accomplished, because the necessary transport resources are not available.” During “dreadfully many telephone calls . . . until late in the night,” he emphatically insisted to almost every relevant air force and army leader—including Göring in Berlin, Zeitzler in East Prussia, Jeschonnek at Berchtesgaden, and von Weichs at Army Group B headquarters—that he lacked the means to supply Paulus's army. It should immediately attempt to break out.

The firmness of Hitler's conviction that the “fortress” should stand fast and that the Luftwaffe could keep it adequately supplied had grown considerably in the two days since Jeschonnek had first mentioned it. One of the main reasons for his increased conviction was the almost unanimous support for the decision expressed by those around him. At Berchtesgaden, and during his long train journey to East Prussia on the 23d, Hitler had no contact—personal or telegraphic—with the army and air force commanders at the front. During that critical decision--making period, he did not speak to von Richthofen, Fiebig, or Pickert, whose air forces would have to carry out the massive supply operation and who were now frantically warning almost everyone else that they lacked the means to sustain Sixth Army. Nor did he communicate with von Weichs, who shared their view and advocated an immediate breakout. Hitler learned of their views from Zeitzler, who had finally “come around” and now defended their assessment. Yet, because their warnings were not delivered personally, but only passed on by the army's “overanxious” chief of staff, they carried little weight. Hitler merely accused Zeitzler of being too pessimistic and advised him to stop paying heed to “defeatist” commanders who couldn't see the forest for the trees.

Aside from Zeitzler's, the only dissenting voice Hitler heard during his last two days in Berchtesgaden and his long journey north to East Prussia belonged to Jeschonnek, who had abandoned his earlier position and now meekly suggested that Sixth Army should break out. He regretted his earlier assurances to Hitler. Almost as soon as the words were out of his mouth, he wished he could swallow them again. After having his staff check his figures and after talking with von Richthofen several times by telephone, he quickly realized that nothing close to adequate logistical support of Sixth Army by air would be possible, even with consistently favorable weather and taking no account of VVS action. He and von Richthofen were close friends, but the latter clearly dominated their relationship and, when they disagreed on matters, usually managed to win Jeschonnek over. This was clearly one such case. However, although Jeschonnek notified Hitler that he might have been too hasty when he made his earlier assessment, his retraction carried no weight. Not only did Keitel and Jodl believe Sixth Army should stay, Hitler retorted, but Jeschonnek's own superior, Reichsmarschall Göring, had now given his personal assurance that the air force could fully meet the army's supply needs.

And:

..on 11 February 1943, almost two weeks after Paulus surrendered and his surviving troops staggered into Soviet captivity. Hitler admitted to von Richthofen that Göring was not entirely to blame for the failed airlift; he had himself promised Sixth Army that it would be supplied by air, “without the Reichsmarschall's knowledge.”

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